An Analysis of the Houthi Red Sea Blockade

 Chatham House published on 24 July 2026 an analysis titled "The Houthi Red Sea Blockade: Will Collective Maritime Security Be Defended or Break Down?" by Nitya Labh and Farea Al-Muslimi.

The rebel Houthis are part of Iran's "Axis of Resistance" but retain significant autonomy.  The Houthi blockade of Saudi ships in the Red Sea acts as a deterrent against regional adversaries and reinforces their legitimacy in Yemen.

The Houthi objective is not to sink large numbers of ships, but to create enough uncertainty for commercial shipping that insurers raise premiums, companies reroute vessels, and governments absorb mounting economic costs.

Saudi Arabia Creates Red Sea Task Force

 AEIs Critical Threats Africa File posted on 6 August 2026 an article titled "Red Sea" by Michael DeAngelo and Liam Karr.

Saudi Arabia announced on 30 July the formation of a Multinational Maritime Defense Alliance to protect shipping in the Red Sea and adjacent waterways following the Bab el-Mandeb Strait blockade of Saudi ships by the Houthi rebels in Yemen.  So far, 14 nations have joined the task force.  

Background of Houthis' Red Sea Blockade

 Pakistan's South Asian Chronicle published on 1 August 2026 an article titled "Houthi Red Sea Crisis."

This is a nice summary of the background of the Houthi blockade of the Red Sea and relations with Saudi Arabia.  

Houthis Claim to Attack Another Saudi Oil Tanker

 The New York Times published on 28 July 2026 an article titled "Houthis Claim Strike on Another Saudi Oil Tanker" by Pranav Baskar and Shipin Hakim.  

Iranian-backed Houthi rebels in Yemen said they targeted on 28 July a Saudi oil tanker, the NCC Ghazal, in the Red Sea with missiles.  Saudi authorities did not confirm the attack.

Impact of Houthi Blockade in Red Sea

 AEIs Critical Threats posted on 23 July 2026 an analysis titled "Houthi Blockade in the Red Sea" by Michael DeAngelo, Liam Karr, and Alexsandar Wiebler.

The Iranian-backed Houthi blockade of the south end of the Red Sea has already disrupted shipping in the Red Sea, causing increased costs and transit delays.  The Houthi blockade will further increase fuel shortages, negatively impact African countries that rely on Saudi fuel shipments, and strain the global economy.  

Oil Tankers Avoiding South End of Red Sea Following Houthi Threats

 The Indian Express published on 22 July 2026 an article titled "India-bound Oil Tanker Takes U-turn in Red Sea after Houthi Threat."

Two oil tankers headed south for India and one for China toward the Bab el-Mandeb choke point from the Saudi oil terminal of Yanbu in the Red Sea turned around and headed north through the Suez Canal following threats from the Iran-backed Houthis in Yemen.

The tankers must now transit the Mediterranean Sea, sail around Africa, and pass the Cape of Good Hope before reaching India or China, adding significantly to shipping costs.  These are the first Saudi oil laden tankers to respond to the Houthi threat. 

Another oil tanker scheduled to load Saudi crude at Yanbu by entering the Red Sea through the Bab el-Mandeb choke point turned back off the coast of Oman.     

Houthi Threat to the Red Sea

 The Council on Foreign Relations published on 20 July 2026 a background piece titled "Another Hormuz? What to Know About the Houthi Threat to the Red Sea" by Diana Roy.

The Yemen-based and Iranian-backed Houthis' decision to impose a naval blockade on Saudi Arabia opens a new front in the U.S.-Iran war and threatens to choke off the Red Sea's 20-mile-wide Bab el-Mandeb Strait, with potentially major consequences for the global economy.

Iran War Moves to Houthis and Red Sea

 Al-Monitor published on 20 July 2026 an article titled "As Houthis Declare Red Sea Blockade on Saudi Arabia, Oil Markets Brace for Impact" by Jack Dutton.  

Yemen's Iran-backed Houthi rebels said on 20 July that it was imposing a naval blockade on Saudi Arabia, as the regional war widens to threaten another key route for global oil supplies following disruption in the Strait of Hormuz.  Because of the problems in the Strait of Hormuz, Saudi Arabia has redirected much of its crude exports by pipeline through its Red Sea terminal at Yanbu.  

Ships sailing north of Yanbu for Europe through the Suez Canal will not be impacted by this Houthi action.  Those headed south for Asia through the Bab el-Mandeb choke point will be impacted and the Saudis may put at risk a large percentage of current crude exports.  If the Houthis successfully prevent the Saudis from passing through Bab el-Mandeb, global supplies could fall by as much as 7 percent.  

Will the Houthis Shut Down the Red Sea/Suez Canal Waterway?

 Reuters published on 14 July 2026 an article titled "After Hormuz, Iran Turns to Red Sea Gateway as New Pressure Point" by Samia Nakhoul.

Depending on US and Saudi actions related to the Strait of Hormuz, Iran may ask its Houthi allies in Yemen to shut down the Bab el-Mandeb choke point, which controls international shipping through the Red Sea and Suez Canal.

The Scramble for the Red Sea

 The International Crisis Group posted on 29 June 2026 a 41-minute podcast titled "The Scramble for the Red Sea Is Not Cooling Down" by Alan Boswell with Federico Donelli, University of Trieste and author of a new book on the topic.

The scramble for control in the Red Sea region began during the Cold War and increased in intensity in the 21st century.  There are now many new actors in the Red Sea.  Middle powers have become as significant as major powers.  

Russia has been seeking, so far without success, a military base in the region for years.  China established a military base in Djibouti to protect its interests in the region and to extend global power.  The Gulf states, especially Saudi Arabia, have become much more engaged in the Red Sea.

The US/Israeli war against Iran has underscored the importance of the Red Sea for international shipping.  The European Union is the one grouping that should be more engaged in the region than it is.  

The Ethiopian-Egyptian Cold War

 Fronts, an independent online news source owned by a privately held Czech company, posted on 15 June 2026 a commentary titled "The Egypt-Ethiopia Cold War Is Key to the Horn's Growing Conflicts" by Liam Karr.

The author suggests a "cold war" between Ethiopia and Egypt is a battle for regional dominance, touches nearly every conflict in the Horn of Africa, and is fueling tensions in an already unstable region.  Control over Nile waters and landlocked Ethiopia's desire to obtain access to the sea loom large in this cold war.

China Supports Egyptian Military Modernization and Seeks Influence

 Modern Diplomacy published on 6 May 2026 a commentary titled "Egyptian Military Bases: A Strategic Linchpin for China's Interests in the Eastern Med and Red Sea" by Nadia Helmy, Beni Suef University.

China seeks to leverage the development of Egyptian military bases as centers for Chinese military technology, especially UAVs and advanced air defense systems.  By supporting Egyptian military modernization, China also weakens Cairo's military dependence on the United States.  

Will US Blockade of Hormuz Stir Houthi Response in Red Sea?

 The Independent published on 14 April 2026 an article titled "What Is the 'Gate of Tears'? Key Shipping Route that Could Be Attacked by Houthis and Disrupt Global Economy" by Bryony Gooch and Harry Cockburn.

The authors speculate on the possibility of Yemen's Iran-backed Houthis attacking international shipping in the Red Sea following a US blockade of the Strait of Hormuz between Iran and Oman.

New China-Libya Shipping Route via Suez Canal

 The Libyan Express published on 4 April 2026 an article titled "New Maritime Corridor Links China to Libya via Suez."

China is opening a new shipping route from its port of Qingdao on the Yellow Sea through the Red Sea and Suez Canal to connect with the ports of Benghazi and Misrata in Libya. The route strengthens trade between Asia and the Mediterranean and offers an alternative to traffic through the Strait of Hormuz.   

Yemen's Iran-backed Houthis Resume Attacks on Israel; Is Red Sea Next?

 The Times of Israel published on 28 March 2026 an article titled "Houthi Missile Attack on Israel Stokes Fears of Renewed Strikes on Red Sea Shipping."

Iranian-backed Houthi rebels in Yemen launched missile and drone attacks on Israel on 28 March, marking the first Houthi response since the United States and Israel began bombing Iran.  The strikes raise the specter of renewed Houthi attacks to disrupt international shipping in the Red Sea.  About 12 percent of world trade passes through the Suez Canal and Red Sea.

Will Iranian-backed Houthis in Yemen Resume Attacks on Israel and Red Sea Shipping?

 The Hause of Saud, a Saudi Royal Family news and information platform, posted on 6 March 2026 an analysis titled "The Houthi Trigger--Why Yemen's Decision Could Be More Dangerous Than the Iran War Itself" by Abdul Mohammed.

In an excellent and timely analysis, the author explains that the Iranian-backed Houthis in Yemen are debating whether to join the Iran war.  If they resume attacks on Red Sea international shipping alongside the Hormuz closure, 28 percent of global oil trade faces simultaneous disruption.  

The Houthis are engaged in the single most important strategic decision facing any non-state actor in the current conflict. Their choice to enter or abstain from the Iran war will determine whether the world faces an unprecedented dual-chokepoint crisis, whether Saudi Arabia's $500 billion NEOM megaproject becomes a frontline target, and whether the global economy tips from disruption into recession.  

The Houthis must decide whether to join Iran in opposing Operation Epic Fury or abandon Iran.  There are apparently sharp disagreements among Houthi factions over how to respond.  

China's Port Network Clusters Near Chokepoints

 The Conversation published on 4 March 2026 an analysis titled "Far from Random, China's Global Port Network Is Clustering Near the World's Riskiest Trade Routes" by Dylan Spencer, Georgia Southern University, Gohar Petrossian, John Jay School of Criminal Justice, and Stephen Pires, Florida International University.

Chinese companies now own or operate terminals at more than 90 ports worldwide.  This program is not random; the investments cluster near maritime chokepoints and piracy-prone shipping corridors such as the Suez Canal/Red Sea, Strait of Hormuz, and Strait of Malacca.  Proximity to critical trade bottlenecks strongly predicts Chinese port investment.  

China Provides Dual-Use Technology for Houthis

 Stimson published on 12 August 2025 an analysis titled "China Sends Houthis Dual-Use Technology to Boost Influence and Undercut the US" by Mohammad Salami, International Institute for Global Strategic Analysis.

China is providing the Houthis with dual-use technologies such as satellite imagery and drone components, complicating US maritime security efforts in the Red Sea.  In return, China has secured safe passage for its vessels.

China's policy is to discredit US policies, emphasize neutrality, and appeal to Arab and Global South audiences.  

Houthi Red Sea Attacks Cause Insurance Rate Hikes

 The Insurance Business Magazine published on 1 August 2025 an article titled "Escalating Houthi Attacks in Red Sea Trigger New Global Supply Chain and Insurance Challenges" by Gia Snape.

The renewed Houthi attacks on international shipping in the Red Sea by Iran-backed Houthis in Yemen have the potential to raise energy costs and disrupt supply chains.  Many shipping companies are once again diverting cargo around the Cape of Good Hope.  Insurers have increased their marine risk premiums.  

China Increases Influence in Egypt

 The Organization for World Peace published on 25 June 2025 an analysis titled "China and Egypt: A Strategic Embrace at the Crossroads of Power and Infrastructure" by Anson Zhang.

This is an updated account of the China-Egypt relationship with an emphasis on the increasing influence of China in Egypt.  At the same time, Egypt has concerns over its large, persistent trade deficit with China and its ability to repay $8 billion in loans to Chinese banks.