Foreign Influence in Africa: Focus on Russia

 Intellinews published on 2 November 2026 an article titled "Russia's Influence in Africa Grows by a Third in a Decade but Stays a Quarter of China's" by Ben Aris.  

The Pardee Institute at the University of Denver maintains a "Bilateral Influence Capacity index." which measures influence on the basis of trade ties, diplomatic connections, security links, and patterns of dependence.

In 2024, China led with an influence capacity score in Africa of 11.4 percent, followed by France at 6.8 percent, the United States at 6.6 percent, UAE at 4.8 percent, Russia at 2.8 percent, and Turkey at 1.5 percent.  Russia rose from 2.2 percent in 2015 and 1 percent in 1995.

Ethiopian-American Pleads Guilty to Passing Classified Information

 The BBC posted on 4 November 2026 an article titled "US Contractor Gave Ethiopia Secrets to Help Kill Tigray Fighters" by Wycliffe Muia.  

An Ethiopian-born American citizen has pleaded guilty to passing highly classified intelligence to Ethiopia to help target and kill Tigrayan fighters during the 2020-2022 Tigray war.  He faces up to 20 years in prison under a plea agreement.  He worked as an IT administrator contractor at the State Department, Justice Department, and the National Reconnaissance Office, the agency responsible for US intelligence satellites.

The Upsurge in Military Drone Strikes in Africa

 The Africa Center for Security Studies published on 28 October 2026 a major study titled "Lessons from Africa's Drone Wars" by Nate Allen.

Africa experienced an upsurge in drone strikes during the period 2022-2026.  Most of the strikes took place in Mali, Sudan, Ethiopia, DRC, and Somalia.  The major providers of long endurance drones to Africa are Turkey, China, and Israel.  The largest recipients of long endurance drones are Algeria, Nigeria, Ethiopia, Morocco, Egypt, and Libya.

Ugandan Peacekeeping Troops Begin Departure from Somalia

 Deutsch Welle published on 2 November 2026 an article titled "Uganda Begins Withdrawing Troops from Somalia after Two Decades" by Natalie Muller.

Uganda was the first country to send troops to Somalia as part of an African Union peacekeeping force set up in 2007 to support the Somali government's campaign against al-Shabab Islamist militants.  Uganda has now begun to pull its 6,500 forces out of Somalia.

Chinese Companies End Kenyan Rare Earth Competition with Western Companies

 Business Insider Africa published on 2 November 2026 an article titled "Two Chinese Mining Firms Pull Out of Kenya's Rare Earth and Niobium Extraction Race as Three American Companies Stand Their Ground among Five Remaining Bidders" by Olamilekan Okebiorun.

Two major Chinese companies have exited the bidding process for Kenya's Mrima Hill critical minerals deposit.  They did not give a reason for their decision.  Three of the five remaining contenders are US-linked, with the others being an Australian consortium and a Kenyan-British joint venture.  

Sudan: Status of Fighting, External Support, and Peace Process

 The International Crisis Group (ICG) posted on 30 October 2026 a 43-minute podcast titled "The UAE in Sudan" with Richard Atwood, Alan Boswell, and Shewit Woldemichael.

The ICG staff discussed shifting front lines, how external supply of military equipment is helping the paramilitary Rapid Support Forces (RSF) sustain its campaign, and the growing risk of regional spillover.  They examine how the UAE's support for the RSF and Saudi Arabia, Egypt, and Turkiye's backing for the Sudan Armed Forces have left both sides with little incentive to compromise, complicating efforts to end the war.  They also assess why US-led ceasefire efforts have stalled and what a negotiated settlement might require.  

A Visit to Eritrea

 The International Crisis Group posted on 30 October 2026 a 38-minute podcast titled "The View from Eritrea" with Alan Boswell and Giulia Paravicini, Reuters senior correspondent.

Giulia Paravicini offers her impressions of life in Eritrea following a recent 10-day visit to Asmara.  She noted the limited access by Eritreans to the internet and how little the city has changed over the years.

Eritrean officials made clear that they are not an existential threat to Ethiopia and have no interest in toppling the Abiy Ahmed government.  They said no channels of communication are open with the Ethiopian government.  

Eritrea believes Ethiopia is threatening Eritrean sovereignty by seeking access to the sea and implying that could include militarily taking the port of Assab. Eritrean officials denied training and arming Tigray People's Liberation Front (TPLF) forces but acknowledged they are in contact with them.

Paravicini concluded that it appears Eritrea did help organize the anti-government coalition groups in Ethiopia.  At the beginning of the most recent conflict in Tigray Region, Eritrean forces apparently entered Ethiopia in support of the TPLF but subsequently retreated to Eritrea.  Asmara denied that its forces entered Ethiopia.  Global diplomacy was probably instrumental in preventing another war between Ethiopia and Eritrea and any effort by Ethiopia to seize Assab.

Eritrean officials had no interest in discussing relations with the Gulf States or the ongoing conflict in neighboring Sudan.  They did underscore close ties with Egypt and Cairo's support for Eritrea.  They also said they are ready to improve ties with any country, including the United States.

Solomonic Decision by Angola and Tanzania Skirts Great Power Competition

 West Africa Weekly published on 30 October 2026 an article titled "Tanzania and Angola Agree to Link Atlantic and Indian Ocean Rail Corridors."

Tanzania and Angola have agreed to link Angola's Benguela railway that connects to the Atlantic Ocean with the Tanzania-Zambia Railway (TAZARA) that connects to the Indian Ocean.  China originally built and continues to support TAZARA while the United States and European Union support the Lobito Corridor project in Angola, the DRC, and Zambia.

This decision by Angola and Tanzania effectively links the competing Western and Chinese railway projects into a single network that does not force the African countries to choose between the West and China.

China Leads Drone Transfers to Africa

 Military Africa posted in 2026 a major report titled "Drone Procurement in Africa."

The report covers drone (both armed and unarmed) procurement in Africa from 2010 until 2026.  The African countries procuring the most drones of all types and uses during this period were Egypt, Morocco, Nigeria, Ethiopia, Algeria, and Libya LNA.  Those procuring the most armed drones were Morocco (102), Egypt (92), Algeria (86), Nigeria (71), Libya LNA (40), and Ethiopia (36).  

China was the largest supplier with 587 drones shipped to 20 African countries, most of them sent after 2020 to Egypt, Libya LNA, Nigeria, Ethiopia, and Algeria.

Israel was the second largest source with 325 drones to 12 African countries, most of them to Morocco, Ethiopia, Uganda, Zambia, and Libya GNA.

Turkey was third largest supplier with 291 drones to 11 African countries, including both sides of conflict in Libya and Ethiopia.

The United States supplied 247 drones to Africa during this period but significantly reduced deliveries after 2020.  

Iran provided 37 drones almost exclusively to conflict zones in Sudan, Libya LNA, South Sudan, and Ethiopia.  Russia supplied 27 drones to Mali, Libya LNA, and Ethiopia.

Fixing Sanctions on Sudan

 African Arguments published on 20 October 2026 an article titled "Why Sanctions Are Not Stifling Sudan's War Economy and What We Can Do About It" by Suliman Baldo.

While sanctions on Sudan have had some impact, more often the belligerent parties in the country have found ways to maneuver around them.

The author identifies five measures to fix sanctions.  Pay more attention to subsidiaries and joint ventures established to work around sanctions. Target the entire support ecosystems around the primary bad actors.  Expand the embargo on Darfur to all of Sudan.  Engage countries such as Kenya, Egypt, and the UAE to ensure the logistic hubs facilitating evasion are eliminated.  Unwind overcompliance by banks in areas that are not targeted by sanctions to facilitate access by those in need of assistance.

Africa Advances Its Interests in a Competitive World

 The Carnegie Endowment for International Peace published on 22 October 2026 an analysis titled "Africa in Demand: How the Continent Is Advancing Its Interests in a Competitive World" by Fonteh Akum.

Africa is in high demand as interest-driven external powers seek partnerships that enhance their diplomatic, economic, and technological edge.  At the same time, African actors are increasingly hedging and diversifying partnerships according to their own security, infrastructure, and energy agendas.  These dynamics demonstrate that external actors and African stakeholders can form partnerships that advance both their interests--diplomacy is not mutually exclusive or zero sum.

Geopolitical dynamics--marked by both rising middle powers and ongoing great power competition between the United States and China--are shaping both external counterparts' approaches toward Africa and African states' engagement with the world.  The continent's mineral endowments are an object of increasing great and middle power attraction, and so are its security markets for defense cooperation.

Chinese and Djiboutian Foreign Ministers Pledge to Expand Cooperation

 The Ground Narrative, an independent digital media platform, posted on 22 October 2026 an article titled "When Ports Meet Power: What China's Deal Means for Djiboutian People."

Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi met Djibouti's Foreign Minister Abdoulkader Houssein Omar in Beijing where they pledged to expand cooperation on trade, infrastructure, and security.  China established a military base in Djibouti in 2017.  The article underscores Djibouti's significant debt owed to China.

Update on Conflict in Ethiopia

 AEIs Critical Threats Africa File published on 20 October 2026 an update titled "Ethiopia War Security Review."

This update covers the fighting in Ethiopia from 16-20 October.  Ethiopian National Defense Forces (ENDF) continue their battle with Tigray rebels in Tigray Region.  Ethiopian rebel forces in Oromia and Benishangul-Gumuz Regions carried out their first significant attacks since the recent outbreak of fighting in Tigray Region.  The United States and Russia have separately proposed mediation.  

Red Sea Shipping and Regional Conflict

 For profit SeaVantage published a guide titled "Red Sea Ports: Full List, Trade Data & 2006 Disruption Guide."

The Red Sea is a strategic artery for global trade, but shipping is being interrupted by the Houthis in Yemen following the US-Israel attack on Iran and closure of the Strait of Hormuz.

The commercially motivated guide identifies the key ports in the Red Sea, discusses the significance of the current conflict, and explains why supply chains are struggling.

Iran War Puts New Focus on Eritrea

 Reuters published on 5 October 2026 a photo essay titled "As Iran War Smolders, Shunned Eritrea Looks to Come in from the Cold" by Monicah Mwangi and Giulia Paravicini.  

Eritrea has acquired new geopolitical significance following the war in Iran and owing to its 1,000 kilometers of coastline along the Red Sea shipping route between the Mediterranean Sea and the Indian Ocean.  With the closure of the Strait of Hormuz, the Red Sea has become an important alternative route for Gulf energy shipments.  Outside powers are paying more attention to Eritrea.

At the same time, mandatory National Service continues to cause numerous departures from Eritrea and requests for asylum and refugee status in other countries.

Podcast on Ethiopia-Eritrea Conflict

 The International Crisis Group posted on 13 October 2026 a 39-minute podcast titled "Ethiopia and Eritrea, On the Cusp of War" with Alan Boswell and Michael Woldemariam, University of Maryland.

The Ethiopian National Defense Force (ENDF) is gaining control over larger parts of Tigray Region while the Tigray People's Liberation Front (TPLF) has faced reversals and appears to be moving towards asymmetric warfare.  The TPLF is more divided today that it was during the 2020-2022 Tigray war.

There are credible reports that the Eritrean Defense Forces (EDF) have joined the TPLF in Tigray Region and it will now be difficult to convince the ENDF to stop pursuing both the TPLF and the EDF anywhere inside Ethiopia   It is less clear how extensive is the EDF incursion into Ethiopia.  Should this result in an all-out war between Ethiopia and Eritrea, geography and military capacity favor Ethiopia.  In the event of war, external support for both sides is problematic.  Eritrea might get some assistance from Egypt.

It is important for external powers to encourage both sides to deescalate the situation.  Eventually there needs to be dialogue between Ethiopia and Eritrea.  The existence of external actors with separate agendas makes dialogue and a peaceful resolution of the dispute more difficult.  

Backgrounder on the Houthi Threat to the Red Sea

 The Council on Foreign Relations published on 8 October 2026 a background piece titled "Another Hormuz? What to Know About the Houthi Threat to the Red Sea" by Diana Roy.

Each year, approximately 12 to 15 percent of global maritime trade worth more than $1 trillion, including 30 percent of global container traffic transits the Red Sea.  This is an excellent summary of the threat posed by the Iran-backed and Yemen-based Houthis to international shipping through the Red Sea.

Are Ethiopia and Eritrea Close to All-Out War?

 The International Crisis Group posted on 9 October 2026 a 39-minute podcast titled "How Close Are Ethiopia and Eritrea to All-out War?" with Richard Atwood and Alan Boswell.

Eritrean Defense Forces are aligned with the Tigray People's Liberation Front forces against the Ethiopian National Defense Force (ENDF) and an opposition Tigrayan contingent.  The war in Tigray Region is nearing the Ethiopia-Eritrea border as ENDF troops advance and raises the possibility of extending into Eritrea.

Landlocked Ethiopia remains committed to obtaining permanent access to the Red Sea, although Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed says he will seek maritime access through negotiation and not force. Does the war in Tigray change the equation? 

Analysis of Somaliland President's Visit to US

 The Emirates Policy Center published on 9 October 2026 an analysis titled "Visit of Somaliland's President to Washington: Testing Potential Shifts in US Policy and the Trajectory of Bilateral Ties."

Somaliland President Abdirahman Mohamed Abdullahi visited the US in September in hopes of advancing the country's goal of diplomatic recognition.  A meeting with President Trump was not promised and it did not happen.

The analysis concludes that Washington is likely to adopt a policy of calculated openness toward Somaliland while stopping short of formal recognition.  Bilateral relations could gradually evolve into a strategic partnership, with the path toward recognition potentially accelerating should sufficient security, political, and regional drivers converge.

China-US Competition for DRC Copper and Cobalt

 Discovery Alert published on 8 October 2026 an analysis titled "Why China's Grip on DRC Copper Is Deepening, Not Loosening" by Muflih Hidayat.  

China's share of imported copper from the DRC, the world's second largest copper producing nation after Chile, climbed to 45 percent in the first seven months of 2026.  Chinese companies have spent years building vertical integration across the DRC's mining and refining sectors, controlling an estimated 70-80 percent of industrial-scale copper-cobalt production.  

The DRC this year banned exports of copper and cobalt concentrate, forcing more domestic value-added processing.  New smelter capacity in the DRC is largely backed by Chinese capital.  This has the effect of strengthening Beijing's position, making it difficult for American and European companies to compete.

Nevertheless, US imports of DRC copper surged in 2026, although it remains to be seen if the surge is durable and whether the Lobito Corridor project can change the nature of US-China competition in the DRC.