The Limits of Russia's Africa Corps

 The Soufan Center, a New York-based nonprofit organization, published on 12 May 2026 a commentary titled "The Limits of Russia's Africa Corps: Mali and the JNIM-FLA Offensive."

Coordinated attacks by al-Qaeda's Sahelian affiliate, Jama'at Nusrat al-Islam wal-Musliman (JNIM), and the Tuareg-dominated separatists, the Azawad Liberation Front (FLA), have highlighted the limited capabilities of the Malian junta and its Russian mercenaries, the Africa Corps, to fend off the insurgency.

Russia's engagement in Mali also raises the question whether it has the resources to counter a genuine insurgency or if it is only in the country to ensure the survival of the military junta.  

China Supports Egyptian Military Modernization and Seeks Influence

 Modern Diplomacy published on 6 May 2026 a commentary titled "Egyptian Military Bases: A Strategic Linchpin for China's Interests in the Eastern Med and Red Sea" by Nadia Helmy, Beni Suef University.

China seeks to leverage the development of Egyptian military bases as centers for Chinese military technology, especially UAVs and advanced air defense systems.  By supporting Egyptian military modernization, China also weakens Cairo's military dependence on the United States.  

Algeria Serves as Hub for Russian Military Flights

 Defense News published on 30 April 2026 an article titled "Investigation: Russia Shadow Airlines Use Algeria as Base for Secretive Missions" by Linus Holler.

A fleet of Russian military-affiliated cargo aircraft is using Algeria as a hub to project Russia's power deeper into Africa and as far as Latin America.  In return, Algeria is receiving Russia's latest fighter aircraft.  

Sudan: UAE Establishes New Routes to Supply Rapid Support Forces

 The Clash Report posted on 23 March 2026 an article titled "UAE Tries to Rewire Supply Routes to Sudan's RSF via Ethiopia & Central African Republic."

The United Arab Emirates is restructuring its logistical network to sustain supply lines to Sudan's paramilitary Rapid Support Forces, shifting routes through Ethiopia and the Central African Republic as existing corridors in Chad and Libya face pressure.  

US, China, and Russia Are Largest Major Arms Suppliers for Africa

 The Stockholm International Peace Research Institute published in March 2026 its "Trends in International Arms Transfers, 2025" by Mathew George, Katarina Djokic, Zain Hussain, Pieter D. Wezeman, and Siemon T. Wezeman.  

During the period 2021-2025, the largest supplier of major weapons to all of Africa was the United States (19 percent), followed by China (17 percent), and Russia (15 percent).  Nearly all of the American weapons went to Morocco and Egypt.  These percentages do not include small arms and light weapons, which would drive up percentages for China and Russia.

The largest supplier of major weapons to sub-Saharan Africa during this period was China (22 percent), Russia (12 percent), and Turkiye (11 percent).  The three countries receiving the most major weapons were Nigeria (16 percent), Senegal (9 percent), and Mali (8 percent). 

What Is Restraining Iran-backed Houthis from Entering Conflict?

 Aljazeera published on 7 March 2026 an article titled "Why Yemen's Houthis Are Staying Out of Israel-US Fight with Iran--for Now."

Since the beginning of Operation Epic Fury, Yemen's Iran-backed Houthis have limited their support for Tehran to rhetoric and a mass protest denouncing the US-Israeli strikes.  The Houthis seem to fear Israel intelligence and the possibility of leadership decapitation.  At the same time, the Houthi leader, Abdel-Malik al-Houthi, said his group's engagement in the war could occur at any moment depending on developments.  

China Gains Military Equipment Market Access in Africa

 The South China Morning Post published on 15 February 2026 an article titled "How a 'Military Vacuum' in West and Central Africa Opened New Markets for China" by Jevans Nyabiage.  

As France retreats from parts of Africa and Russia is preoccupied with its war against Ukraine, Chinese companies have stepped up their arms transfers and military training.  China's equipment is affordable and comes without conditions.  

Possible Chinese Supported Military Equipment Manufacturing in Egypt

 Modern Diplomacy published on 7 February 2026 a commentary titled "Egypt Seeks Chinese Defense Tech, Manufacturing Base in Cairo" by Nadia Helmy, Beni Suef University Egypt.

The author suggests that Egypt is seeking Chinese technology and assistance to manufacture locally advanced radar and missile systems and unmanned aerial vehicles.  Egypt sees itself as becoming a regional manufacturing hub for advanced military weapons.     

Sudan: Pakistan and China Rebuild Air Force

 Military Africa posted on 1 February 2026 an article titled "Pakistan Finalizes 1.5 Billion Dollar Arms Agreement with Sudan" by Darek Liam.  

The Sudan Armed Forces is in the final stage of closing a $1.5 billion deal with Pakistan that could restore air supremacy as it battles the paramilitary Rapid Support Forces.  The package reportedly includes 10 Karakoram-8 (K-8) light attack aircraft and more than 200 Shahpar series of tactical UAVs.  

China and Pakistan jointly developed the K-8.  The deal may also include the JF-Thunder multirole fighter developed with China and produced in Pakistan.  This would represent a major upgrade for the SAF air wing.  

Ethiopia Receives Russian Light Attack Aircraft and UAVs

Defence Web published on 30 January 2026 an article titled "Ethiopia Acquires Yak-130 Trainer, Orion-E UAVs from Russia" by Guy Martin.  

The Ethiopian Air Force has acquired the Orion-E unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) and the Yak-130 jet trainer and ground attack aircraft from Russia.  

 The Robert Lansing Institute published on 30 January 2026 an article titled "Russia's Arms Exports to Ethiopia and the Erosion of U.S. Leverage in the Horn of Africa."

The article notes that the transfer of Russian drones undermines US efforts to promote standards for responsible use and control over the equipment.

Will Russian Mercenaries Protect Madagascar's Interim President?

 El Pais published on 24 January 2026 an article titled "Russian Africa Corps Mercenaries Incorporate Madagascar into Their Expansion Across the Continent" by Jose Naranjo.

A 40-member Russian delegation led by the head of the Africa Corps militia met in late December with Madagascar's interim president and offered personal protection to the Malagasy leader as the Africa Corps has done in the Central African Republic, Mali, Burkina Faso, Niger, Libya, and Equatorial Guinea.  

Do Chinese Arms in Venezuela Hold Lessons for Chinese Arms Transfers to Africa?

 China-Africa Security Radar posted on 19 January 2026 an article titled "Chinese Weapons in Venezuela: Are There Any Lessons for Africa?"

Venezuela relies heavily on Chinese weapons.  According to some accounts, the weapons performed poorly vis-a-vis American weapons used in the abduction of President Nicolas Madura.  This raises questions about Chinese arms transfers to Africa and whether they are a good match against American weapons, or if more training is required in their use. 

Saudi-UAE Rivalry Playing Out in Sudan

 AEI's Critical Threats Africa File published on 16 January 2026 an article titled "Sudan" by Michael DeAngelo.

Increasing Saudi-UAE rivalry in Yemen may also be playing out in Sudan where the UAE has backed militarily the paramilitary Rapid Support Forces and Saudi Arabia may now finance Pakistani weapons for the Sudan Armed Forces (SAF).  The SAF deal with Pakistan gives Khartoum another reason to continue to slow roll a Russian naval base on Sudan's Red Sea coast as it has less need for similar military assistance promised by Moscow.

Drones and Foreign Arms Transfers Fuel Sudan's War

 The UN Political and Peacebuilding Office posted on 22 December 2025 remarks titled "ASG Khiari Warns Indiscriminate Drone Strikes and Arms Flows Are Driving Sudan's War."

UN Assistant Secretary General for the Middle East, Asia and the Pacific, Khaled Khiari, condemned the use of drones and foreign supply of increasingly sophisticated and deadly weapons to the belligerents in Sudan's civil war.  Calls to end these flows have gone unheeded and there has been no accountability.  

Horn Developments Concerning Saudi Arabia, UAE, Sudan, Ethiopia, and Eritrea

 AEI's Critical Threats Africa File posted on 18 December 2025 an article titled "Gulf States" by Michael DeAngelo and Liam Karr.

Saudi Arabia recently hosted a series of meetings aimed at getting the Sudan peace process back on track and reducing tension between Ethiopia and Eritrea.  The article also discusses the movement of weapons into the region and alleged Ethiopian support for the paramilitary Rapid Support Forces in Sudan.  

Implications of China's Weapons Transfer to Burkina Faso

 China-Africa Security Radar posted on 14 December 2025 a commentary titled "China's Weapons for Burkina Faso" by Paa Kwesi Wolseley Prah.

The author argued that China's large military equipment transfer to Burkina Faso last August raises the question as to what kind of order is Beijing constructing in the Sahel and at what cost to the region's long-term stability.  China is exploiting the withdrawal of Western security partners from the Sahel and becoming the security provider of first resort.  This is a transactional relationship: you need weapons, we sell weapons, and what you do with them is your business.  

But the transaction creates a dependency on China, including providing ammunition and spare parts.  In this transactional relationship, China gains influence, market access, diplomatic alignment, and a testing ground for its military equipment.  Beijing offers states in the Sahel not liberation from Western paternalism but membership in a different form of asymmetric relationship.

Sudan Renews Naval Base Talks with Russia

 The Wall Street Journal published on 1 December 2025 an article titled "Sudan Offers Russia Its First Naval Base in Africa" by Benoit Faucond and Nicholas Bariyo.

Sudan's military government has revived discussions with Moscow for a naval base on the Red Sea.  Sudan is offering Russia a 25-year lease to station up to 300 troops and 4 warships--including nuclear powered ones--at Port Sudan or another Red Sea location.  In exchange, Sudan would receive advanced Russian anti-aircraft systems and other weaponry at preferential prices to support its war against the Rapid Support Forces.

Comment:  This naval base has been under discussion for years but always seems to encounter problems before a final deal is reached.  It is not clear if agreement has actually been reached on this occasion.

US Identifies Rapid Support Forces as Villain in Sudan

 The Middle East Eye published on 13 November 2025 an article titled "Marco Rubio: US Knows Who Is Arming Sudan's RSF and It Must End" by Oscar Rickett.

US Secretary of State Marco Rubio said the time has come to cut off arms to Sudan's paramilitary Rapid Support Forces (RSF).  The US knows who is supplying the RSF and is prepared to put pressure on them to end the supply.

Sudan Is in Free Fall

The New York Times published on 6 November 2025 a commentary titled "Sudan Is in Free Fall" by Eric A. Friedman, Suad Abdel Aziz, and John Prendergast. 

The most catastrophic phase of the conflict in Sudan is occurring in El Fasher, the capital of North Darfur recently captured by the paramilitary Rapid Support Forces (RSF).  The most immediate step required to dial back the violence is for the UAE to stop supplying arms and support to the RSF.  

Stopping the Genocide in Sudan

 Foreign Policy posted on 5 November 2025 an article titled "How to Stop the Genocide in Sudan" by Mutasim Ali and Yonah Diamond, both with the Raoul Wallenberg Centre for Human Rights.

The authors attribute the genocide in Sudan's Darfur region to the paramilitary Rapid Support Forces (RSF) with the backing of the UAE.  They argue the International Criminal Court should consider issuing arrest warrants for leaders suspected of complicity in the genocide and other atrocities and begin sanctioning the UAE.