Chinese and Taiwanese Fleets Behind African Shark Fin Trade

 The Environmental Justice Foundation published on 16 July 2026 a report titled "Cut and Run: Exposing Senegal as a Gateway for the Global Shark Fin Trade."

This report examines the nature and extent of shark finning on board foreign vessels that call at Dakar, Senegal.  Shark finning is the practice of cutting off a shark's fins before throwing the body overboard.  The fins are then sold for human consumption.

The Environmental Justice Foundation conducted 124 interviews with Indonesian and Filipino fishers who worked on board Chinese and Taiwanese tuna longliners operating in the region.  The Chinese and Taiwanese fleets are repeatedly linked to shark finning in the region.  

China Aims to Take Lead on Artificial Intelligence in Global South

 CNBC published on 17 July 2026 an article titled "Xi Pitches China as AI Partner to Developing World, Warns Against Risks and Security Overreach" by Lim Hui Jie.

China is reaching out to various blocs of nations in the Global South to build partnerships concerning AI.  The blocs include ASEAN, African Union, League of Arab States, and the BRICS.

Aljazeera published on 17 July 2026 an article titled "China's Xi Jinping Launches New AI Alliance: What Is It?"

Beijing is casting itself as a leader of the global AI order, challenging the position of the United States.  China announced last week a coalition of 29 nations called the World Artificial Intelligence Cooperation Organization (WAICO) with a headquarters in Shanghai.  Founding members include South Africa and Senegal.

In the meantime, Washington is retreating from global cyber and AI norms-setting processes and withdrawing its financial backing for cyber diplomacy more broadly.

Chinese Artificial Intelligence Surveillance in 11 African Countries

 The Institute of Development Studies published in March 2026 a major study titled "Smart City Surveillance in Africa: Mapping Chinese AI Surveillance Across 11 Countries" edited by Wairagala Wakabi and Tony Roberts.

The report provides a comprehensive account of smart city surveillance in Algeria, Egypt, Kenya, Mauritius, Mozambique, Nigeria, Rwanda, Senegal, Uganda, Zambia, and Zimbabwe.  China is by far the largest supplier of AI surveillance technologies to African governments, including to all 11 covered in this study.  

The rapid expansion of smart city surveillance is having a chilling effect on ordinary citizens and journalists.  The scale and invasive nature of mass surveillance is often not legal, necessary, or proportionate.  There is little evidence that the expansion of digital surveillance reduces overall crime.

US, China, and Russia Are Largest Major Arms Suppliers for Africa

 The Stockholm International Peace Research Institute published in March 2026 its "Trends in International Arms Transfers, 2025" by Mathew George, Katarina Djokic, Zain Hussain, Pieter D. Wezeman, and Siemon T. Wezeman.  

During the period 2021-2025, the largest supplier of major weapons to all of Africa was the United States (19 percent), followed by China (17 percent), and Russia (15 percent).  Nearly all of the American weapons went to Morocco and Egypt.  These percentages do not include small arms and light weapons, which would drive up percentages for China and Russia.

The largest supplier of major weapons to sub-Saharan Africa during this period was China (22 percent), Russia (12 percent), and Turkiye (11 percent).  The three countries receiving the most major weapons were Nigeria (16 percent), Senegal (9 percent), and Mali (8 percent). 

Chinese and Turkish Fishing Vessels Plunder Catch off Guinea-Bissau

 The Guardian published on 9 March 2026 an investigative report titled "How the 'Galapagos of West Africa' Is Plundered by Floating Fish Factories" by Davide Mancini.

Floating Chinese-owned factory ships longer than a football field illegally process sardinella for fishmeal in the waters off Guinea-Bissau.  The Chinese fishmeal factories are supported by Turkish purse seiners that illegally supply them with fish.  

The offshore fish processing operation has both negative food security implications for the people of Guinea-Bissau and for artisanal fisherman in the country.  Fish are the source of a third of animal protein consumed and the informal fishing industry employs 225,000 people from a population of 2.2 million.  

Artificial Intelligence for Africa's Defense Forces

 The Africa Center for Strategic Studies published in February 2026 a major study titled "Artificial Intelligence for Africa's Defense Forces: A Toolkit for Defense Sector AI Strategy and Adoption."

This toolkit is a resource for African defense professionals to develop and adopt artificial intelligence policies, strategies, guidance, systems, and tools.  It defines and illustrates some of the most relevant use cases, discusses how to guide the development of AI systems, processes, and personnel, suggests how to adapt AI to Africa's security environment, and outlines good practices that can be used to inform the development of defense sector AI strategy.

AI is no longer a futuristic prospect for Africa's defense forces, but an increasingly embedded tactical reality shaping military operations from the Sahel to the Cape.  Like past inventions such as steam power, electricity, and the internet, AI is fast becoming an essential technology that will underpin the future of warfare.  

US Travel Restrictions Take Aim at Africa Mostly for Visa Overstays

 The White House posted on 16 December 2025 a fact sheet titled "President Donald J. Trump Further Restricts and Limits the Entry of Foreign Nationals to Protect the Security of the United States."

The United States added 15 countries to the list impacted by partial or full travel restrictions.  There are now 34 countries subject to some kind of restriction; 26 are in Africa.  The stated purpose of this policy is "to protect the Nation from national security and public safety threats."  

The proclamation continues full restrictions and entry limitations of nationals from 12 "high-risk" countries.  This includes the following African countries: Chad, Republic of Congo, Equatorial Guinea, Eritrea, Libya, Somalia, and Sudan.  

It adds full restrictions and entry limitations on 5 additional countries, including Burkina Faso, Mali, Niger, and South Sudan.

It imposes full restrictions on 2 countries that were previously subject to partial restrictions, including Sierra Leone.

It continues partial restrictions on nationals of 4 original "high risk" countries, including Burundi and Togo.

It adds partial restrictions and entry limitations on 15 new countries.  They include Angola, Benin, Cote d'Ivoire, Gabon, The Gambia, Malawi, Mauritania, Nigeria, Senegal, Tanzania, Zambia, and Zimbabwe.

The Associated Press published on 16 December 2025 an article titled "Trump Expands Travel Ban and Restrictions to Include an Additional 20 Countries" by Rebecca Santana.

This article includes a map that clearly demonstrates the impact of this policy on African countries.

The New York Times published on 16 December 2025 an article titled "Trump Expands Travel Ban and Restrictions to 20 More Countries" by Tyler Pager and Hamed Aleaziz. 

The article reports that homeland security secretary Kristi Noem recommended to President Trump that he institute "a full travel ban on every damn country that's been flooding our nation with killers, leeches, and entitlement junkies."

Comment: Most of the African countries on the list are there because of "high visa-overstay rates and refusal to repatriate removable nationals" from the United States.  Visa overstay means that an individual received a visa at a US embassy overseas to be in the United States for a limited period of time, for example 3 months to visit relatives or one year to study.  They stayed longer than the allotted period, which is a violation of US law.  But it has little or nothing to do with US national security. 

The fact sheet contains some African countries that do have unusually high visa overstay rates.  But others are not especially high.  Mauritania's B-1/B-2 visa overstay rate is 9 percent.  Nigeria has a B-1/B-2 overstay rate of 6 percent and F, M, and J visa overstay rate of 12 percent.  Senegal's B-1/B-2 overstay rate is 4 percent and F, M, and J overstay rate of 13 percent.  

The US policy seems more focused on cracking down on immigration and keeping certain foreigners out of the country than US national security.  As for Kristi Noem's comment on countries in the travel ban, has America fallen to this low level?   

Illegal Chinese Fishing off Gambia

 Voxeurop posted on 10 November 2025 an article titled "The Gambia's Stolen Catch: How Chinese Trawlers Feed Europe's Seafood Market" by Davide Mancini.

The Gambia has a tiny exclusive economic zone, but it is a hotspot for illegal fishing because of the nutrient-rich waters.  Chinese-controlled trawlers are the principal offenders.  

Exodus of Chinese Ambassadors from West Africa

 The South China Morning Post published on 22 June 2025 an article titled "Routine or Rising Tensions? Chinese Ambassadors in Exodus from West African Nations" by Jevans Nyabiage.

Chinese ambassadors in Senegal, Guinea, Burkina Faso, Mali, and Niger returned to Beijing at about the same time.  It raises the question whether their return was coincidental or is intended to send some kind of subtle message to the region.  

China's Norinco Stepping Up Arms Sales in Africa

 The South China Morning Post published on 16 May 2025 an article titled "Chinese Defence Firm Strikes Arms Deal with Nigeria, Deepening Ties with West Africa" by Jevans Nyabiage.  

A Chinese company, most likely Norinco, recently signed a deal with Nigeria for producing ammunition domestically.  Norinco has been expanding its arms sales across Africa, taking advantage of Russia's preoccupation with Ukraine and a Western pull back from Africa.  

USAID Projects Shutting Down in Africa and Across Globe

 The Associated Press published on 1 March 2025 an article titled "USAID Cuts Are Already Hitting Countries Around the World.  Here Are 20 Projects that Have Closed" by Sam Mednick, Wilson McMakin, and Monika Pronczuk.  

USAID terminated some 10,000 contracts on 26 February with non-governmental organizations around the world.  This article lists 20 projects--half of them in Africa--that have closed already.  

Can China Replace the West in the Sahel of Africa?

 The Conversation published on 10 February 2025 a commentary titled "Power Vacuum in West Africa's Sahel: 3 Ways China Could Fill the Gap as West Exits" by Abdul-Gafar Tobi Oshodi, Lagos State University.

As France and the United States pull back or are forced out of Mali, Burkina Faso, Niger, Chad, Senegal, and Cote d'Ivoire, Beijing could take advantage by expanding investment in critical minerals, resolving the internal crisis in ECOWAS, and increasing arms sales in the region.  

Arms Transfers to Sub-Saharan Africa

 The Italian Institute for International Political Studies published on 30 September 2024 a paper titled "The Complex Trends and Patterns in Arms Transfers to Sub-Saharan Africa" by Pieter Wezeman, Stockholm International Peace Research Institute.

The 6 largest arms importers in Sub-Saharan Africa from 2019-23 were Nigeria, Angola, Senegal, Mali, Uganda, and Ethiopia.  The major arms suppliers during this period were China (19 percent), Russia (17 percent), and France (11 percent).  Imports of arms by countries in Sub-Saharan Africa have been declining in recent years.

Geopolitical Competition Is Reshaping Africa's Sahel Region

 World Politics Review published on 30 April 2024 a commentary titled "Geopolitical Competition Is Reshaping West Africa" by Afolabi Adekaiyaoja, Nigerian researcher.

As France and the United States lose influence and pull troops from Africa's Sahel region, several of these countries are pivoting increasingly to Russia and its Africa Corps for security assistance.

Comment:  The biggest security threat in the region remains that from ISIS and al-Qaeda-affiliated groups.  So far, Russia's security commitments to the region are too small to have any significant impact on countering jihadi organizations.  While Russia is gaining influence in the Sahel, it may soon find that it is not able to stem jihadi activity, leaving these governments in a more difficult position than previously.  

African Perception of Chinese Leadership Edges Ahead of US

 Gallup published on 26 April 2024 an article titled "U.S. Loses Soft Power Edge in Africa" by Benedict Vigers.

Gallup just published the results for 2023 of approval ratings in 36 of Africa's 54 countries on leadership in the United States, China, Russia, and Germany.  In 2023, China nudged ahead of the United States by two points compared with 2022.  Both the United States and China remained well ahead of Russia, which did restore its position following a drop in the aftermath of its attack on Ukraine.  

The view of U.S. leadership improved significantly in Ghana, Mauritania, Cote d'Ivoire, and Tunisia but declined sharply in Kenya, Gambia, and Uganda.  China's position was much stronger in Ghana, Cote d'Ivoire, Senegal, and Guinea, but fell sharply in Gambia and Uganda.  The approval rating for the United States, China, and Russia is down significantly from where it was in 2011.

China Should Pay Attention to Africa's Year of Elections

 The Ghana-based Africa-China Centre for Policy & Advisory published in April 2024 a commentary titled "The Year of African Elections & Why China Should Not Lose Sight" by Hagan Sibiri.

In 2024, 25 African countries are scheduled for presidential, general, or local elections; 19 are presidential or general.  The author warns that Chinese policymakers should not overlook growing dynamics in African domestic politics and the potential ramifications of African elections on future interaction with China.

Any perception held by Chinese policymakers that Africa constitutes a relatively cohesive coalition in its partnership with China should be reevaluated as it risks overlooking the growing concerns toward Chinese partnerships in numerous African countries.  Given the rising manifestation of anti-Chinese sentiment across Africa, the outcomes of African elections should interest Chinese policymakers in terms of how they may shape China's relations with the continent moving forward.  

China, Europe, and Climate Collaboration in Africa

 Megatrends Afrika published in February 2024 a study titled "Climate Collaboration in Multipolar Times: The European Union and China as Energy Transition Partners to African Countries" by Cobus van Staden.  

The study concludes that China is increasingly promoting its own environmental, social, and governance norms while trying to reshape the global regulatory environment to be friendlier towards Chinese companies.  China's strongest tool in Africa remains less about any direct challenge to European influence, and more about its legacy as an alternative set of options that fractures Euro-American hegemony in African development.  A more fundamental challenge for the EU is how willing it is to adapt its African engagement to growing global multipolarity.  

Heavily Indebted Poor Countries with Loans from China

 Visual Capitalist published on 11 December 2023 a graphic titled "Developing Countries Receiving the Most Loans from China" by Marcus Lu, Bruno Venditti, and Bhabna Banerjee.

Fourteen of the fifteen Most Highly Indebted Countries (HIPC) with the largest amount of loans from China are in Africa. In order of most loans from China, the countries are Ghana, Guinea, Ethiopia, Tanzania, DRC, Republic of Congo, Mozambique, Sudan, Zambia, Bolivia, Chad, Senegal, Niger, Mali, and Cameroon.

Comment:  This list of countries is receiving pushback in some quarters, citing the fact that Angola, which has more Chinese loans than any other African country, is absent from the list and the loan figure for Ghana appears to be excessively high.  While the amount of money China has loaned to Ghana does look to be much too high, Angola is excluded because it is NOT a highly indebted poor country.  It is oil rich and, so far, has been able to repay its loans.  

Putting Best Face for Africa on 3rd Belt and Road Forum

 The Diplomat published on 3 November 2023 a commentary titled "What Did the 3rd Belt and Road Forum Mean for Africa?" by Trevor Lwere, research consultant at Beijing-based Development Reimagined.

The author concluded that the 3rd Belt and Road Forum held in Beijing last month had three important outcomes for Africa.  First, loan money will keep flowing but will become more targeted and green.  Second, small and medium sized enterprises will be prioritized.  Third, China agreed to fund several new infrastructure projects in Africa.

Comment:  The author is putting the best possible face on China's new "smaller but smarter" approach to lending in Africa.  The fact is that Chinese loans to Africa dropped from a peak of $28 billion in 2016 to about $1 billion in each of the last two years.  

China is Africa's Preferred Partner for Digital Infrastructure

 The Centre for International Governance Innovation published in October 2023 a study titled "Navigating Africa's Digital Partnerships in a Context of Global Rivalry" by Folashade Soule.  

The study highlights how African governments are choosing their digital partners.  Africa's choice of China as its preferred partner for digital infrastructure has more to do with China offering a suitable mix of financial and technological value and the lack of viable Western alternatives, than geopolitics.