France 24 posted on 30 August 2026 an article titled "Niger Junta Puts Down Mutiny with Help from Russia's Africa Corps."
Niger authorities thwarted a mutiny by young soldiers on 28-29 August with the help of Russia's Africa Corps. Moscow's ambassador to Niger said the military government requested help, and the mutineers were "neutralised particularly thanks to the intervention of Africa Corps."
HumAngle, an African media platform with funding from the MacArthur Foundation and committed to identifying security and humanitarian crises in Africa, published on 21 August 2026 an article titled "The Human Price of Turkish AI-Powered Drone Rush Across Africa" by Ibrahim Adeyemi.
Ethiopia was one of the first countries in Africa to deploy Turkey's Baykar manufactured TB2 drones in combat. Military misfires of the drones in Amhara Region of Ethiopia and in the Sahel region of Africa have taken a toll on the civilian population. Inadequate training in use of the drones probably accounts for most of the mistakes.
The Foreign Policy Research Institute published on 29 July 2026 an article titled "How France's Fall Signals China's Rise in the Sahel" by Raghvendra Kumar.
China has seized on the decline of French and Western influence in Africa's Sahel to embed itself into the region's political, economic, and security structures. The article pays particular attention to China's role in Burkina Faso.
African Arguments posted on 13 August 2026 a commentary titled "The Beijing of It All: Africa's Development Terms Are No Longer Written in Washington or Brussels" by Wanjiku Wanjohi.
Political conditionality associated with Western aid is giving way to a new framework established by China. China describes its interaction as a partnership based on non-interference and rapid delivery of development projects. As a result, Africa now has meaningful alternatives and greater negotiating power.
Comment: While Chinese loans and assistance do not come with the baggage of political conditionality, they do have economic conditionality. For example, Chinese loans and projects must be implemented by Chinese companies, usually state-owned ones.
France 24 posted on 9 July 2026 an article titled "Mali Rebels Attack Convoy of Russian Reinforcements Headed to Besieged Military Camp."
Tuareg separatists and their jihadi allies attacked on 9 July a convoy of Russian paramilitaries from the Africa Corps and Malian soldiers as they were moving to Anefis in northern Mali. The report provides no details on casualties.
The Associated Press posted on 10 July 2026 an article titled "Mali's Military Says It's Broken a Rebel Blockade Around a Strategic Northern Base."
After heavy fighting, the convoy reached Anefis between the rebel-controlled town of Kidal and Gao to the south, which is under the control of the military government.
Reuters published on 9 July 2026 an article titled "Russia and Sahel States Deepen Military Ties as Insurgent Attacks Persist."
Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov met with his counterparts from Mali, Burkina Faso, and Niger to discuss growing military cooperation with the three Sahel countries. Russia confirmed its intention to strengthen the armed forces of the three countries.
Warfronts posted on 6 July 2026 a 14-minute video titled "This Country Trusted Russia--Then It All Fell Apart" with Simon Whistler.
This is a highly critical account of Russia's Wagner Group and Africa Corps engagement with the Mali military in an effort to prop up the military government.
Thierry Pairault published on 30 June 2026 an article titled "The African Sesame Industry and the Chinese Tariff Exemption."
China obtains from Africa more than 80 percent of its imported sesame seeds. Six countries account for 95 percent of African sesame exports to China: Niger, Sudan, Tanzania, Togo, Mozambique, and Ethiopia.
China's recent zero tariff policy for African countries will primarily benefit Chinese importers-processors rather than African producers. The tariff advantage is captured at the point of entry into China by companies whose shareholders are Chinese, Singaporean, and Taiwanese.
Euro News posted on 18 June 2026 an article titled "Moscow Uses 'Russian Houses' in Africa to Lure Recruits into War in Ukraine, Investigation Shows" by Sasha Vakulina and Aleksandar Brezar.
Moscow is operating or opening "Russian Houses" in at least 22 African countries as part of its strategy to consolidate its influence on the continent. The centers screen Soviet and Russian films, often on patriotic themes, and distribute ideologically vetted literature. They also teach the Russian language and coach young people on how to move to Russia as students or workers.
Ukraine's military intelligence has done an investigation that identifies Russian Houses as key hubs for recruiting Africans to go to Russia where they eventually end up on the front lines of the war against Ukraine. Ukraine's Ministry of Foreign Affairs reports that at least 2,965 citizens from 36 African countries have taken part in combat on Russia's side.
Foreign Affairs published on 26 June 2026 an article titled "Who Is Winning Africa's Drone Wars?" by Nate Allen and Rida Lyammouri.
Conflicts in Mali, Somalia, Libya, Ethiopia, Sudan, Burkina Faso and Niger have experienced or continue to experience the use of armed drones. Increasingly, insurgent groups are making as effective use of drones as national armies. China, Turkey, and Iran provide most of the drones, but at least 11 African countries now produce them.
The Soufan Center, a New York-based nonprofit organization, published on 12 May 2026 a commentary titled "The Limits of Russia's Africa Corps: Mali and the JNIM-FLA Offensive."
Coordinated attacks by al-Qaeda's Sahelian affiliate, Jama'at Nusrat al-Islam wal-Musliman (JNIM), and the Tuareg-dominated separatists, the Azawad Liberation Front (FLA), have highlighted the limited capabilities of the Malian junta and its Russian mercenaries, the Africa Corps, to fend off the insurgency.
Russia's engagement in Mali also raises the question whether it has the resources to counter a genuine insurgency or if it is only in the country to ensure the survival of the military junta.
Defense News published on 30 April 2026 an article titled "Investigation: Russia Shadow Airlines Use Algeria as Base for Secretive Missions" by Linus Holler.
A fleet of Russian military-affiliated cargo aircraft is using Algeria as a hub to project Russia's power deeper into Africa and as far as Latin America. In return, Algeria is receiving Russia's latest fighter aircraft.
Reuters published on 29 April 2026 an article titled "Mali Turmoil Threatens Russian Push for Influence and Mineral Wealth in Africa" by Andrew Osborn and Anna Peverieri.
A series of reversals suffered by Mali's Moscow-backed military government has dented Russia's image and threatens its strategic and economic interests in Africa. Mali's military junta's future is now in jeopardy and Russia's military presence in Mali is also on the line.
The Sentry published in April 2026 a study titled "Doubling Down: Russia's Military Network in West Africa."
Russia's Wagner Group withdrew from Mali in June 2025, largely handing over operations to the Kremlin-controlled Africa Corps, which has about the same number of troops as Wagner and many of them are former Wagner fighters. Some core leadership also remains the same.
The Africa Corps has been moving a large quantity of weapons into Mali, which suggests that Russia is doubling down on Mali, despite the concurrent withdrawal and multiple failures of the Wagner Group.
AEIs Critical Threats Africa File published on 21 April 2026 an article titled "US Competes with Russia and Others as It Engages African Autocrats" by Liam Karr, Yale Ford, and Zoe Sommer.
The Trump administration has put the United States in more direct competition with Russia in Africa, especially in states that have come under military control. The US is primarily pursuing security-related interests and exploring opportunities for cooperation on critical minerals.
AEI's Critical Threats Africa File posted on 16 April 2026 an analysis titled "Turkey Expands Influence in Africa" by Liam Karr and Michael DeAngelo.
Turkey recently advanced economic and security ties with Somalia and Niger. Both countries now serve as Ankara's anchors for further advancing its strategic interests in Africa. In the case of Somalia, Turkey has assumed responsibility for managing and protecting its exclusive economic zone (EEZ) while it helps rebuild the defunct Somali navy in exchange for 30 percent of EEZ revenues.
The Institute for Economics and Peace posted on 30 March 2026 its "Global Terrorism Index 2026."
Of the ten countries most impacted by terrorism globally in 2025, six were in Africa: Burkina Faso (2), Niger (3), Nigeria (4), Mali (5), Somalia (7) and Democratic Republic of Congo (8). Nevertheless, deaths in sub-Saharan Africa fell in ten countries while rising in just four. Deaths in the Sahel region, however, accounted for more than half of all terrorism-related deaths globally.
Terrorism remains highly concentrated. Just under 70 percent of deaths from terrorism occurred in only five countries: Pakistan, Burkina Faso, Nigeria, Niger, and the DRC. Nigeria recorded the largest increase in 2025, with fatalities rising by 46 percent to 750. Islamic State West Africa Province and Boko Haram were responsible for 80 percent of all terrorism deaths in Nigeria.
The DRC also reported a significant increase in terrorism, reaching its worst ever position on the index. Deaths in the DRC rose by nearly 28 percent to 467, driven by attacks carried out by the IS-affiliated Allied Democratic Forces, which targeted civilians, churches, hospitals, and funerals.
Somalia's al-Shabaab, while experiencing a decline in terrorist deaths for the third consecutive year, launched its Shabelle Offensive in early 2025.
The South African Institute of International Affairs published in February 2026 a study titled "Back to the Shadows: Russia's African Security Engagements Since Prigozhin" by Ivan U. Klyszcz, Centre for Defence and Security in Tallinn, Estonia.
Russia continues to deploy military personnel and conduct information operations to shape regional politics in Africa. Since 2023, Moscow has taken tighter control, with Kremlin-linked figures, state agencies, and federal funding driving these efforts. Russian activities reflect the Kremlin's top foreign policy priorities but are constrained by competing demands, especially the war in Ukraine.
Foreign Affairs published on 25 March 2026 an article titled "Why Russia Is Losing the Sahel" by Frederic Wehrey and Andrew S. Weiss, both at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace.
As Russia confronts shortcomings in its own capacity and the complexities of an environment it never fully understood, its expansion into the Sahel is on the verge of stalling, if not unraveling entirely. Moscow's initiatives should serve as a cautionary tale for other African states contemplating whether to accept Russian security assistance. This is also an opportunity for the United States to return.
WinBuzzer posted on 12 March 2026 an article titled "Microsoft Trains Millions in Africa to Counter DeepSeek" by Markus Kasanmascheff.
US Microsoft is racing to train millions of Africans on its artificial intelligence (AI) tools before Chinese rivals led by DeepSeek lock in the continent's fastest growing user base. DeepSeek has already captured 11 to 14 percent of the AI market in Ethiopia, Zimbabwe, Uganda, and Niger.
