Reuters published on 9 July 2026 an article titled "Russia and Sahel States Deepen Military Ties as Insurgent Attacks Persist."
Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov met with his counterparts from Mali, Burkina Faso, and Niger to discuss growing military cooperation with the three Sahel countries. Russia confirmed its intention to strengthen the armed forces of the three countries.
The Sentry published in April 2026 a study titled "Doubling Down: Russia's Military Network in West Africa."
Russia's Wagner Group withdrew from Mali in June 2025, largely handing over operations to the Kremlin-controlled Africa Corps, which has about the same number of troops as Wagner and many of them are former Wagner fighters. Some core leadership also remains the same.
The Africa Corps has been moving a large quantity of weapons into Mali, which suggests that Russia is doubling down on Mali, despite the concurrent withdrawal and multiple failures of the Wagner Group.
Defence Blog posted on 1 December 2025 an article titled "Egypt and China Launch Joint Production of New Armed Drone" by Daisuke Sato.
Egypt's Arab Organization for Industrialization and China's Norinco signed a memorandum of understanding to jointly produce armed drones based on the ASN-209 platform. The drones will use Chinese components and be assembled in Egypt.
The South China Morning Post published on 30 August 2025 an article titled "A New Model for Peace? China Takes Its Global Security Initiative to Africa" by Jevans Nyabiage.
Africa is a key testing area for China's Global Security Initiative (GSI), which is evolving from an ambiguous concept to concrete training and military and police assistance programs. The GSI also encourages China's security model, which has the potential to entrench a politicized military.
Defence Blog posted on 4 August 2025 an article titled "UAE Sends Chinese Air Defense Systems to Sudan's RSF" by Dylan Malyasov.
The UAE is reportedly supplying Sudan's Rapid Support Forces with Chinese-made short range air defense systems via Chad to counter attacks by fixed-wing aircraft, helicopters, cruise missiles, and UAVs.
The China-Africa Security Radar posted on 27 July 2025 an article titled "China's Rebuttal of AFRICOM: Finding the Middle Ground."
A recent article in the Communist Party of China's Global Times responded to AFRICOM's commander, General Michael Langley's 10 June testimony before the House Armed Services Committee that framed China as a growing strategic competitor in Africa. The Global Times article dismissed US claims of China's military expansion in Africa.
Kenya's The Eastleigh Voice published on 4 March 2025 an article titled "Tshisekedi Courts US: DRC Offers Minerals in Exchange for Military Backing in War against M23 Rebels."
An American lobbyist for the Felix Tshisekedi government in Kinshasa sent a letter on 21 February to US Secretary of State Marco Rubio proposing privileged access by US companies to DRC critical minerals while giving Kinshasa military support to secure its territory against M23 rebels supported by Rwanda. The US would train and equip the Congolese Armed Forces. If the deal were to go forward, it would reverse the DRC's reliance on mineral exploitation by Chinese and European companies.
The Pew Research Center published on 6 February 2025 a fact sheet titled "What the Data Says about U.S. Foreign Aid" by Drew DeSilver.
As the Trump administration dismantles USAID, this fact sheet summarizes how and where U.S. foreign aid has been used.
CNN posted on 18 January 2025 a commentary titled "Across Africa, Russia Is Growing in Influence. What Might Moscow Want?" by Nimi Princewill.
Moscow is seeking to expand its influence beyond the Sahel region of Africa, sometimes offering to serve essentially as a Praetorian Guard for authoritarian African leaders. It also seeks to control African natural resources for economic gain.
The South China Morning Post published on 29 December 2024 an article titled "In Africa's Gulf of Guinea, China Is Proving It Is Master of the Sea" by Jevans Nyabiage.
China is paying increasing attention to security in the Gulf of Guinea where its shipping interests have been subject to attack and littoral African countries have requested assistance in preventing attacks on international shipping. This is also in China's long-term interest to extend its military influence in the region.
Radio Dabanga, an exiled Sudanese media house, posted on 27 December 2024 an article titled "Sudan-Russia Naval Base Talks Still Ongoing, Diplomats Say."
Earlier this month, The Moscow Times reported that Sudan had officially declined Russia's request to establish a naval base on the Red Sea coast in Port Sudan, an issue that has been under discussion for more than 5 years.
The Russian embassy in Sudan and the Sudanese ambassador to Russia subsequently denied the claim, saying that the proposal remains under review as part of a broader effort to strengthen Sudanese-Russian ties.
The European Council on Foreign Relations published on 9 October 2024 a commentary titled "The Sweating Bear: Why Russia's Influence in Africa Is Under Threat" by Will Brown.
Russia's military operations in Africa are not succeeding, and Moscow is not setting itself up as a long-term partner for African governments. Moscow is losing credibility as a reliable partner for African governments. Everywhere Russia has sent troops, the security situation is dramatically worse than when international forces were present.
The BBC published on 10 October 2024 an article titled "Eritrea, Egypt and Somalia Cement 'Axis against Ethiopia'" by Teklemariam Bekit.
The Presidents of Eritrea, Egypt, and Somalia met in Asmara on 10 October. Eritrea issued a statement at the conclusion of the summit calling for "respect for the sovereignty, independence and territorial integrity of the countries of the region." The article interpreted the purpose of the summit as an alliance aimed at Ethiopia.
Aljazeera published on 10 October 2024 an article titled "Somalia, Eritrea and Egypt Pledge to Bolster Security Ties."
The article gave a less confrontational interpretation to the summit but noted that Egypt has pledged to send troops to Somalia for the new African Union peacekeeping mission.
The UAE-based Future for Advanced Research & Studies published on 16 September 2024 an analysis titled "Analyzing the Challenges in Turkey's Rising Influence in the Horn of Africa" by Iman Al-Shaarawy.
In efforts to increase its influence in the Horn of Africa, Turkey has signed defense cooperation agreements, acted as a mediator in regional disputes, and invested in the energy and oil sectors. However, its engagement raises important questions about the extent and limitations of Turkey's role, its underlying motives, and Ankara's capacity to fulfill these commitments in the face of numerous regional and international challenges.
Africa Business Insider published on 7 September 2024 an article titled "US Proposes Strategic Deal to Block Chinese Military Expansion in Africa" by Adekunle Agbetiloye.
The United States will train Gabon's special forces and offer a $5 million package that includes radars to assist the country in monitoring illegal fishing, pay for collaboration with the West Virginia National Guard, and support conservation efforts in national parks. There is speculation Washington offered the package to preempt China's goal of establishing a military training facility in Gabon.
The Diplomat published on 20 February 2024 a commentary titled "China Continues Its Search for a Maritime Military Presence in West Africa" by Lea Thome.
This earlier commentary reviews China's rumored efforts to establish a military presence on Africa's Atlantic coast.
The New Left Review published on 25 July 2024 a commentary titled "Evil Empires?" by Elizabeth Schmidt.
The author looks at the plusses and minuses of China's engagement in Africa since the end of the Cold War.
American Diplomacy posted in May 2024 a commentary titled "A New Face, But an Old Tactic: History Offers Clues on Stopping Russia's African Advance" by Herman J. Cohen, former U.S. Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs.
Russia offers military support to unstable regimes across Africa, helping them retain power in exchange for diplomatic allegiance and natural resources. This is essentially a continuation of Soviet-era Africa policy.
While authoritarian leaders such as the head of the Central African Republic secure their positions with Wagner Group support, little benefit is shared with the general population. In the meantime, US policymakers need to stay focused on a strategy of fostering economic development.
The CTC Sentinel published in April 2024 an article titled "The Somali National Army Versus Al-Shabaab: A Net Assessment" by Paul D. Williams, George Washington University.
This article addresses whether the departure of the AU Transition Mission in Somalia (ATMIS) would leave the Somali National Army (SNA) or al-Shabaab stronger militarily. The author conducted a net assessment across seven factors: size, material resources, external support, force employment, cohesion, psychological operations, and morale. He concluded the SNA would retain an advantage in terms of size, material resources, and external support but performs poorly on non-material dimensions and would remain dependent upon external finance and security assistance. Overall, al-Shabaab would be slightly militarily stronger.
The Warsaw-based Centre for Eastern Studies posted on 22 April 2024 a commentary titled "The Kremlin's March Through the Sahel: Russian Forces in Niger" by Milosz Bartosiewicz.
The 100-strong recently arrived Russian military contingent in Niger will effectively serve as a tool to expand the Kremlin's influence in the Sahel region of Africa. Its small size suggests that it will mainly serve to keep the ruling Niger military regime in power.
PIME Asia News published on 11 March 2024 an article titled "The Strategic Alliance between Russia and Eritrea" by Vladimir Rozanskij.
This article describes the increasingly important relationship between Russia and Eritrea in recent years.
