Chinese Company Signs MOU with Sudan for Port Development

 The Sudan Tribune published on 7 July 2026 an article titled "Sudan Signs Infrastructure Deal with China Harbour to Upgrade Ports."

The Sudan Sea Ports Construction signed a memorandum of understanding with China Harbour Engineering Company to develop port infrastructure at Port Sudan.  The agreement includes plans to build new seaports.

Comment:  Although the Sudan Armed Forces (SAF) controls that part of Sudan along the Red Sea where these improvements are to be made, the government in Khartoum is engaged in a bitter war with the paramilitary Rapid Support Forces (RSF) in the interior of the country and has included RSF drone attacks on Port Sudan.  This is a curious time for a Chinese company to commit to major infrastructure work along the Red Sea coast with one side of the conflict.

Sudan Armed Forces Government Returns to Khartoum

 The BBC posted on 11 January 2026 an article titled "Sudan's Government Returns to Capital after Nearly 3 Years of War" by Wedaeli Chibelushi.  

The Sudan Armed Forces government officially returned to Khartoum following nearly 3 years of war with the paramilitary Rapid Support Forces (RSF) and having relocated operations to Port Sudan.  Basic services are barely functioning after years of fighting in the city.  The conflict with the RSF continues in other parts of Sudan.

Sudan's Rapid Support Forces and the Future

 The International Crisis Group posted on 24 July 2025 a 32-minute podcast titled "What Does Sudan's RSF Want?" with Alan Boswell and Sarra Majdoub, Sudan analyst.

Khartoum became a liability for the paramilitary Rapid Support Forces (RSF) where it lacked local support.  Supply chains and recruiting became difficult and the RSF decided to pull out of the capital.  Fighting between the Sudan Armed Forces (SAF) and RSF has shifted to Kordofan and northern Darfur where the RSF is still a threat but does not have full control.  The RSF is fighting to stay politically relevant.

The RSF is comprised of many different ethnic groups, which creates the possibility for internal divisions.  It recently aligned with the Sudan People's Liberation Movement-North and may be preparing to establish a separate government in Western Sudan.  This could lead to a permanent state or only serve as a way to bargain with the SAF.

The RSF conducted drone strikes on the SAF in Port Sudan and elsewhere because it lost Khartoum and wants to send the message that it can reach the SAF anywhere.  The RSF's supply chain in Darfur is challenging but it receives requirements through Chad, southern Libya, and by air bridge to Nyala.  The RSF connection with the UAE is well known but Abu Dhabi is probably not in a position to dictate the RSF's future.  The RSF wants to be treated as an equal partner in Sudan.   

Sudan's Rapid Support Forces Control Strategic Border Area

 The International Crisis Group posted on 20 June 2025 an article titled "Capture of Tri-border Area Marks Another Twist in Sudan's Civil War" by Shewit Woldemichael.

Sudan's paramilitary Rapid Support Forces (RSF) have seized control of the strategic Sudan-Libya-Egypt border triangle, which marks a significant victory for the RSF following setbacks elsewhere in Sudan.  This could mark the start of an offensive by the RSF into regions that have so far seen limited fighting, forcing the Sudan Armed Forces to redirect resources.  

Sudan: Sudan Armed Forces Makes Gains in Spite of Drone Attacks

 AEI Critical Threats published on 22 May 2025 an analysis titled "SAF Advances across Sudan Despite RSF Drone Strikes" by Kathryn Tyson.

The Sudan Armed Forces have made incremental progress against the paramilitary Rapid Support Forces (RSF) in spite of successful RSF drone strikes on Port Sudan.

Sudan Conflict Increasingly Becomes a Drone War

 Aljazeera published on 13 May 2025 an article titled "Drones, Gold, and Threats: Sudan's War Raises Regional Tensions" by Mat Nashed.

As Sudan's civil war enters its third year, drones are playing a larger role in the conflict.  The Sudan Armed Forces relies on the relatively affordable Turkish-made Bayraktar TB2 drones.  The paramilitary Rapid Support Forces uses Chinese-made drones purchased and supplied by the UAE.    

Sudan's Rapid Support Forces Extend Drone Attacks

 The East African published on 8 May 2025 an article titled "Drone Attacks Spread to Sudan's 'Safe Havens' as War Escalates" by Mawahib Abdallatif.  

The paramilitary Rapid Support Forces has launched drone attacks on parts of Sudan under Sudan Armed Forces control where they have not occurred in the past two years.  These attacks are adding to the humanitarian crisis in the country.  

Drone Attacks on Port Sudan Continue

 Aljazeera published on 7 May 2025 an article titled "Port Sudan Explosions: Lifeline for Aid Comes under Attack for Fourth Day."

The paramilitary Rapid Support Forces (RSF) has launched drone attacks for the past 4 days on Port Sudan, the temporary capital for the Sudan Armed Forces (SAF).  Most aid for Sudan goes through Port Sudan on the Red Sea.  The SAF has accused the United Arab Emirates of arming the RSF.  

Sudan Authorizes Russian Naval Base in Red Sea

 The BBC posted on 13 February an article titled "'No Obstacles' to Russian Red Sea Base -- Sudan" by Basillioh Rukanga.

Sudan's foreign minister said on 12 February his country had reached a deal with Russia for the establishment of a naval base at Port Sudan on the Red Sea.  The 25-year agreement allows Russia to establish a naval logistics hub with warships including nuclear-powered vessels and up to 300 personnel.  All that remains is ratification of the deal.

Sudan Armed Forces Advance in Khartoum; Russia May Be Closer to Base in Port Sudan

 The American Enterprise Institute's Critical Threats Africa File published on 13 February an article titled "SAF Announces Government Plan and Russian Naval Base."

The Sudan Armed Forces (SAF) has recaptured nearly all of the capital city of Khartoum from the paramilitary Rapid Support Forces (RSF).  SAF leader Abdel Fattah al-Burhan is preparing to form a technocratic government after it completes a takeover of the capital.  The RSF still controls much of western Sudan.  

The door may finally be open to Russia to establish a long-discussed naval base at Port Sudan, the SAF's current capital, following US sanctions on the SAF and its leader.

Is Russian Naval Base in Port Sudan Still a Possibility?

 Radio Dabanga, an exiled Sudanese media house, posted on 27 December 2024 an article titled "Sudan-Russia Naval Base Talks Still Ongoing, Diplomats Say."

Earlier this month, The Moscow Times reported that Sudan had officially declined Russia's request to establish a naval base on the Red Sea coast in Port Sudan, an issue that has been under discussion for more than 5 years.

The Russian embassy in Sudan and the Sudanese ambassador to Russia subsequently denied the claim, saying that the proposal remains under review as part of a broader effort to strengthen Sudanese-Russian ties.    

Ethiopia's Leader Meets Sudan's Leader in Port Sudan

The Sudan Tribune published on 9 July 2024 an article titled "Ethiopia's PM Ahmed Visits Sudan, Discusses Peace with Burhan."

Ethiopian Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed was the first foreign head of government to meet with Sudan Armed Forces leader Abdel Fattah al-Burhan in Sudan.  Abiy briefly visited Port Sudan on 9 July where the two leaders discussed the war in Sudan and Ethiopia-Sudan relations.

Political Faction Leader Analyzes Current Mess in Sudan

 Dabanga, an independent Sudanese broadcaster/publisher now operating outside the country, posted on 9 June 2024 an analysis titled "Russian Red Sea Base and RSF 'Government' in Darfur Will Prolong War and Condemn Sudan" by Yassir Arman, founder and secretary-general of the SPLM-N Democratic Revolutionary Movement and member of the Coordination of the Civil Democratic Forces (Tagadom).  

Yasir Arman argues that the Sudan Armed Forces (SAF) and paramilitary Rapid Support Forces (RSF) cannot achieve a military solution to Sudan's divisions.  Both sides are preparing to dismember or partition their homeland for their own advantage.  They do not care if they destroy the country's entire population and infrastructure in the process.  The RSF has hinted that if it takes control of El Fasher, the capital and largest city in North Darfur, it might form its own government independent of the SAF government based in Port Sudan, causing Sudan to follow the example of divided Libya.  

Arman urges Sudan to link the civilian-political peace process with the military track in Jeddah to reach a long-term humanitarian ceasefire, with regional and international monitoring on the ground.  The goal should be rebuilding the state, establishing a single professional army, and completing the December Revolution.  

Russia Strengthens Eritrea Ties with High Level Naval Visits

 The Eritrean Ministry of Information published on 4 April 2024 a press release titled "Russian Delegation Visits Northern and Southern Red Sea Regions."

The deputy commander of the Russian navy led a delegation to Eritrea in early April when it toured a variety of port and airport facilities.  

Military Africa published on 3 April 2024 an article titled "Russian Navy's Udaloy Class Frigate Visits Eritrea to Strengthen Ties" by Kazim Abdul.

Coinciding with the Russian deputy naval commander's visit, the Udaloy class frigate, Marshal Shaposhnikov, and guided missile cruiser, Varyag, made a five-day visit to Massawa marking the 30th anniversary of diplomatic relations between Eritrea and Russia.  

Critical Threats published on 4 April 2024 an article titled "The Kremlin's Red Sea Ambitions in Eritrea" by Liam Karr. 

The article provides additional detail on the Russia-Eritrea relationship.

Disruption of South Sudan's Oil Threatens Regime

 Aljazeera published on 26 March 2024 an article titled "South Sudan on the Brink after Oil Exports Derailed by Sudan's Civil War" by Mat Nashed.

All oil produced in South Sudan passes through war torn Sudan where it is exported from the Red Sea at Port Sudan. The oil pipeline was damaged last month in an area controlled by Sudan's paramilitary Rapid Support Forces.  It has not been possible to repair the pipeline because of ongoing fighting, raising fears that South Sudan's economy could collapse.

The pipeline accounts for as much as three-quarters of South Sudan's oil revenue, which, in turn, accounts for 90 percent of the country's revenue.  Most of the oil revenue supports the ruling leadership in Juba, which faces elections in December.  

The Forgotten War: BBC Coverage Inside Sudan

 BBC TV ran a 6-minute clip on 19 March 2024 titled "Millions Face Starvation in Sudan as Warring Factions Block Aid Delivery."

This coverage is one of the few occasions when a Western media organization has reported recently from inside Sudan, including Khartoum and Omdurman.  The clip makes the point that media coverage of the situation in Ukraine, Gaza, and now Haiti has drowned out the horrific situation in Sudan.  

Russian Sudan Quest for Red Sea Base in Doubt

 The Jamestown Foundation's Eurasia Daily Monitor published on 14 November 2023 an analysis titled "Russia in the Red Sea: Converging Wars Obstruct Russian Plans for Naval Port in Sudan (Part Three)" by Andrew McGregor.  

Russia was well advanced in obtaining Sudanese approval to establish a naval base on Sudan's Red Sea coast before the outbreak of conflict in April 2023 between the Sudan Armed Forces (SAF) and the paramilitary Rapid Support Forces (RSF).  Moscow had good relations with both the SAF and the RSF before the beginning of conflict.  But Russia's mercenary Wagner Group has been one of the primary backers of the RSF, which has caused deep concern within the SAF and caused it to put on hold any approval for a Russian base.  

Comment:  An RSF military victory in Sudan might revive the prospects for a Russian military base, but the SAF controls the Red Sea coast for now.  In any event, Sudan would almost certainly remain unstable, and Russia could spend a lot of money creating a base and then find itself in possession of a white elephant.  

Update on Situation in Sudan

 The US Institute of Peace published on 19 October 2023 a paper titled "After Six Months of Civil War, What's the State of Play in Sudan?" by Alex Rondos.

The author provides an update on the conflict in Sudan and the involvement of outside countries in the conflict.  The one constant is a worsening humanitarian crisis. 

Sudan-Iran Rapprochement Complicates Horn of Africa Geostrategy

 Modern Diplomacy published on 19 September 2023 a commentary titled "Iran and Sudan's Rapprochement in 2023: New Changes in the Regional Geopolitics of the Middle East" by Aishwarya Sanjukta Roy Proma, research associate at the Bangladesh-based BRAC Institute of Governance and Development.  

Written before Sudan and Iran recently reestablished diplomatic relations after a seven year break, this commentary takes on added importance and adds a new dimension to the regional geopolitics of the region.  Sudan, although currently embroiled in war between the Sudan Armed Forces (SAF) and the paramilitary Rapid Support Forces, can provide Iran with access to the Red Sea at Port Sudan.  The Suez Canal and Red Sea are vital to Iran's oil exports and maritime trade.  

Depending on how Iran's relationship develops with the SAF, which is also supported by Egypt, Tehran could complicate an already complicated geopolitical situation in the Horn of Africa.  Saudi Arabia and the UAE are deeply involved in Sudan.  A rapprochement between Iran and Sudan might also undermine an already fraught US relationship with Sudan.   

Sudan's Conflict Expands to Port Sudan

 The Middle East Eye published on 19 September 2023 an article titled "Port Sudan: Army and Beja Fighters Face Off in Burhan Stronghold" by Mohammed Amin.

Aljazeera published on 21 September 2023 an article titled "Analysis: Port Sudan Fighting Reflects Tribal-army Tensions" by Mat Nashed.  

Eastern Sudan has supported the Sudan Armed Forces (SAF) and Abdel Fattah al-Burhan since the outbreak of conflict with the paramilitary Rapid Support Forces (RSF).  The region has generally avoided the conflict facing the rest of Sudan.  In fact, Port Sudan has become the de facto capital for the SAF and the center for sending relief supplies to the rest of the country.  

An incident between the SAF and a local ethnic leader's militia this week in Port Sudan has raised questions about stability in eastern Sudan and the alliance between local ethnic groups, especially the Beja, and the SAF.  This does not mean the Beja and other ethnic groups are switching support to the RSF, but it does pose a challenge for the SAF if handled badly.