The Clash Report posted on 23 March 2026 an article titled "UAE Tries to Rewire Supply Routes to Sudan's RSF via Ethiopia & Central African Republic."
The United Arab Emirates is restructuring its logistical network to sustain supply lines to Sudan's paramilitary Rapid Support Forces, shifting routes through Ethiopia and the Central African Republic as existing corridors in Chad and Libya face pressure.
Semafor published on 13 March 2026 an article titled "Zimbabwe's Lithium Upgrade Still Runs Through China" by Ray Mwayera.
Zimbabwe produced almost 10 percent of global mined lithium last year and provided about 15 percent of processed lithium in China. Harare banned exports of raw lithium ore in 2022 and plans to prohibit exports of lithium concentrates by 2027, forcing companies to invest in local processing. The companies building the lithium infrastructure in Zimbabwe are overwhelmingly Chinese. This raises the question whether Zimbabwe is building an independent refining sector or simply deepening its role inside China's battery ecosystem.
Discovery Alert posted on 1 March 2026 an analysis titled "China Becomes World's Leading Chrome Processor Overtaking South Africa" by Muflih Hidayat.
Ferrochrome production, which is essential for stainless steel, requires consistent, energy-intensive processing. Although South Africa is the source of much of the world's chrome ore, China's coal-based power generation is more reliable and cheaper than South Africa's electricity. Consequently, processing of the ore has shifted from South Africa to China.
Defence Web published on 30 January 2026 an article titled "Ethiopia Acquires Yak-130 Trainer, Orion-E UAVs from Russia" by Guy Martin.
The Ethiopian Air Force has acquired the Orion-E unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) and the Yak-130 jet trainer and ground attack aircraft from Russia.
The Robert Lansing Institute published on 30 January 2026 an article titled "Russia's Arms Exports to Ethiopia and the Erosion of U.S. Leverage in the Horn of Africa."
The article notes that the transfer of Russian drones undermines US efforts to promote standards for responsible use and control over the equipment.
Business Insider Africa posted on 26 January 2026 an article titled "US-China Mineral Race Heats Up as Africa's Top Mining Nations Head to Washington" by Solomon Ekanem.
US officials are accelerating direct engagement in the mining sector of African governments and promoting investment-led partnerships with American companies.
China Africa News published on 25 December 2025 an article titled "Congo's Tightrope: Navigating U.S.-China Rivalry for Mineral Wealth."
For decades, China has been the dominant force in Congolese mining benefiting from state-backed capital. The United States has stepped up its engagement in the DRC mineral sector but faces significant Chinese structural advantages including entrenched refining capacity, long-term investment relationships, and an extensive operational presence.
The Africa Center for Strategic Studies published on 9 December 2025 a paper titled "China's Critical Minerals Strategy in Africa" by Paul Nantulya.
China controls over half of global critical minerals production and an estimated 87 percent of its processing and refining capacity. It also produces nearly 70 percent of rare earth minerals.
China's strategy for dominance in critical minerals includes a tolerance for high-risk projects, generous government support to Chinese companies, diversified access to minerals, financial support of African infrastructure linked to mineral extraction, financing the development of African mineral projects, and strategic stockpiling of critical minerals in China.
Mining.com posted on 3 November 2025 an article titled "China's Massive African Mine Threatens to Upend Iron Ore Market" by Thomas Biesheuval and William Cloves.
Simandou mine in Guinea is the world's largest untapped iron ore deposit with estimated reserves of 3 billion tons. Its iron content is among the world's highest, and its development could impact the global market. Chinese firms own most of the project. China will be in a strong position to influence iron ore prices once production advances further.
The International Crisis Group posted on 24 July 2025 a 32-minute podcast titled "What Does Sudan's RSF Want?" with Alan Boswell and Sarra Majdoub, Sudan analyst.
Khartoum became a liability for the paramilitary Rapid Support Forces (RSF) where it lacked local support. Supply chains and recruiting became difficult and the RSF decided to pull out of the capital. Fighting between the Sudan Armed Forces (SAF) and RSF has shifted to Kordofan and northern Darfur where the RSF is still a threat but does not have full control. The RSF is fighting to stay politically relevant.
The RSF is comprised of many different ethnic groups, which creates the possibility for internal divisions. It recently aligned with the Sudan People's Liberation Movement-North and may be preparing to establish a separate government in Western Sudan. This could lead to a permanent state or only serve as a way to bargain with the SAF.
The RSF conducted drone strikes on the SAF in Port Sudan and elsewhere because it lost Khartoum and wants to send the message that it can reach the SAF anywhere. The RSF's supply chain in Darfur is challenging but it receives requirements through Chad, southern Libya, and by air bridge to Nyala. The RSF connection with the UAE is well known but Abu Dhabi is probably not in a position to dictate the RSF's future. The RSF wants to be treated as an equal partner in Sudan.
Nigeria's The Guardian published on 24 May 2025 an article titled "U.S.-China Trade Tension Poses No Risk in Africa" by Oliwe Anthony.
The African Export-Import Bank concluded that recent US-China trade differences "would have little to no direct impact on Africa" for a variety of reasons. Among the reasons is the fact that Africa's trade exposure to the United States is only 5 percent and to China 12 percent.
The Carnegie Endowment for International Peace published on 19 March 2025 an analysis titled "Can the DRC Leverage U.S.-China Competition for Critical Minerals for Peace?" by Christian-Geraud Neema.
Congolese President Felix Tshisekedi's strategy is designed to help the Trump administration secure access to critical minerals and curtail China's expansion within the mineral supply chain. As the Rwanda-baked M23 rebel group advances from the mineral rich eastern DRC towards Kinshasa, Tshisekedi's top priority may be regime survival. The advance of the M23 forces has complicated control over minerals in the eastern Congo and US-China competition for access to them.
Kenya's The Eastleigh Voice published on 4 March 2025 an article titled "Tshisekedi Courts US: DRC Offers Minerals in Exchange for Military Backing in War against M23 Rebels."
An American lobbyist for the Felix Tshisekedi government in Kinshasa sent a letter on 21 February to US Secretary of State Marco Rubio proposing privileged access by US companies to DRC critical minerals while giving Kinshasa military support to secure its territory against M23 rebels supported by Rwanda. The US would train and equip the Congolese Armed Forces. If the deal were to go forward, it would reverse the DRC's reliance on mineral exploitation by Chinese and European companies.
The Atlantic Council published on 26 November 2024 a commentary titled "The US Won't Gain a Lead in the Competition for Africa's Critical Minerals Without Innovation" by Chris Moorman.
In order to compete successfully with China for Africa's critical minerals, it needs to form partnerships with African countries that are economically feasible, environmentally sustainable, and ethical. The only way to do that is by driving innovation along the critical minerals supply chain, specifically in processing and refining.
The Washington Post published on 22 June 2024 an article titled "Yemen's Houthis Undeterred by U.S. Campaign to Halt Red Sea Attacks" by Susannah George, Dan Lamothe, and Abigail Hauslohner.
There have been about 100 Houthi drone and missile attacks on shipping in the Red Sea and Gulf of Aden since the United States and United Kingdom began targeting Houthi launching sites in Yemen. By the end of March, ship traffic through the Suez Canal and Red Sea had dropped by half because of the attacks.
Aljazeera published on 12 June 2024 an article titled "As China Scrambles for Zimbabwe's Lithium, Small Miners Are Left Behind" by Farai Matiashe.
Small scale Zimbabwe lithium miners have been harmed by the sharp drop in the price of the mineral and local laws that require it be sold to local companies for processing before export. Chinese companies control the processing of lithium in Zimbabwe. This situation has driven many of the artisanal Zimbabwe miners out of business.
Maersk posted on 12 June 2024 an update titled "Navigating Challenges in the Red Sea and Beyond."
About 30 percent of global container traffic previously travelled through the Suez Canal and Red Sea. Because of Houthi attacks on international shipping, Maersk, one of the largest users of this route, is now sailing around the Cape of Good Hope and avoiding the Suez Canal and Red Sea. This has increased fuel costs by about 40 percent, caused delays and congestion in key ports such as Singapore and Shanghai, and has reduced industry wide shipping capacity by 15-20 percent.
Foreign Policy published on 23 May 2024 a commentary titled "Kenya and the U.S. Need Each Other More Than Ever" by Caroline Gray.
The author suggests that the visit to the United States by Kenyan President William Ruto is focused on increasing American investment in Kenya, renewing the Africa Growth and Opportunity Act, and moving forward with the Strategic Trade and Investment Partnership. President Ruto also explained concerning his countries ties with China and the United States that "we want to be friends to all and an enemy to none."
The Royal United Services Institute for Defense and Security Studies published on 14 March 2024 an analysis titled "China in Sub-Saharan Africa: Sanction-Proof Supply Lines and Dual-Use Ports" by Benedict Hamlyn.
Beijing's strategy in Africa is to court foreign policy influence in order to sanction-proof supply chains and develop dual-use ports for both commercial and military purposes. The author concludes that as the US-China relationship moves into stormier waters, China will continue to expand its naval reach and supply chain resilience, particularly as its declining economic surplus will see it concentrate financing on geostrategically important locations off the Atlantic coast and in the Indian Ocean.
African Arguments published on 23 January 2024 a commentary titled "Zimbabwe Looks to China to Secure Place in EV Battery Supply Chain" by Andrew Mambondiyani, journalist based in Zimbabwe.
Chinese companies have invested over $1.4 billion to access Zimbabwe's lithium reserves, the largest in Africa. If it is not careful, Zimbabwe will squander this wealth because of regulatory gaps, human rights abuses, illegal trade, and corruption. Zimbabwe has made it easy for China to exploit mining in the country. It needs to process locally more of the lithium rather than export raw ore.
