The Economist posted on 3 September 2026 an article titled "Ethiopia's Undeclared Drone War."
Beginning in late August, the federal government of Ethiopia launched an air war using drones and aircraft against the Tigray People's Liberation Front in Tigray Region. Neither side seems interested in peace talks, although a ground war appears unlikely.
The Washington Post posted on 5 September 2026 an article titled "Trove of Documents Reveals Alleged Chemical Weapons Stockpile in Sudan" by Greg Miller and Elizabeth Dwoskin.
The Sudan Armed Forces has built a secret stockpile of chemical weapons that senior military officials sought to conceal after chlorine bombs were used against the Rapid Support Forces. Sudan developed the weapons by diverting shipments of chlorine meant to provide safe drinking water, hiding warhead production sites on military bases, testing bombs in remote desert locations, and drawing up lists of targets where toxic gas could penetrate enemy defenses.
The UN Human Rights Council published on 1 September 2026 a report of the independent international fact-finding mission for Sudan titled "Fuelling Sudan's Conflict: Weapons, Fighters, and External Support Networks."
This is the most detailed UN report so far detailing external support for the paramilitary Rapid Support Forces (RSF) and the Sudan Armed Forces (SAF). It discusses Columbian mercenaries supporting the RSF, including the launching of drones, and the assistance of individuals and entities in the UAE. It also identifies support received by the RSF from individuals or entities in Libya, Chad, Ethiopia, South Sudan, and Puntland in Somalia. It identifies less external support for the SAF but notes the use of drones manufactured in Turkey.
It concludes that external support is sustaining military operations and expanding the capabilities of both the RSF and SAF, with grave consequences for civilians. Increasingly sophisticated drone capabilities enabled both sides to strike far beyond immediate front lines. The report called for the Security Council to extend the arms embargo now imposed on Darfur throughout Sudan.
AEIs Critical Threats Africa File posted on 3 September 2026 an article titled "The Sudanese War Threatens to Regionalize" by Michael DeAngelo.
The Sudan Armed Forces (SAF) conducted its first drone strikes on the paramilitary Rapid Support Forces (RSF) in Chad, striking a 200-vehicle convoy 50 miles west of the Sudanese border, raising tensions with its neighbor. The drones reportedly destroyed dozens of vehicles. The SAF then attacked the remnants of the RSF convoy.
In the meantime, the RSF stepped up its attacks on SAF forces in Blue Nile State that borders Ethiopia.
Business Insider Africa published on 26 August 2026 an article titled "Russia and China Push Back as Trump Administration Seeks Arms Embargo Across Sudan" by Ayodeji Adegboyega.
The Trump administration is seeking to expand a two-decade-old UN arms embargo on Darfur to all of Sudan and to explicitly cover drones. China, Russia, and the Sudan Armed Forces faction all oppose the initiative.
African Arguments published on 18 August 2026 a commentary titled "Sudan: Burhan's Dialogue Is Not a Path to Stability" by Ezzat Khairi, Sudanese political analyst.
While not making an argument for the rival paramilitary Rapid Support Forces, the author argues that any credible transition in Sudan must start with the departure from sovereign political authority of General Abdel Fattah al-Burhan. He has broken too many promises. Sudan's stability begins where al-Burhan's rule ends.
The Middle East Eye published on 19 August 2026 an article titled "UAE-backed Chinese Company Acquires Stake in Ethiopian Gold Mine Near Sudan War Zone" by Zecharias Zelalem and Oscar Rickett.
Last week, Canadian mining company Allied Gold sold a 9.2 percent stake to China's Zijin Gold International. This gives Zijin partial ownership of mines in Mali, Cote d'Ivoire, and near Kurmuk in Ethiopia. The Kurmuk mine is in Ethiopia's Benishangul-Gumuz region, which hosts at least one base used by Sudan's paramilitary Rapid Support Forces (RSF). The UAE supports the RSF and is the main buyer of gold coming from both Sudan and Ethiopia.
The UAE's sovereign wealth fund has a major share in the parent company of Zijin Gold International and in Canada's Allied Gold. The Ethiopian gold mine puts Chinese, Canadian, and UAE interests close to the civil war between the RSF and the Sudan Armed Forces in Sudan's Blue Nile State and raises further questions about the UAE's role in the conflict.
AEIs Critical Threats Africa File posted on 20 August 2026 an article titled "Sudan" by Michael DeAngelo and Liam Karr.
The paramilitary Rapid Support Forces (RSF) captured two district capitals in Blue Nile State on the Ethiopian border. The SPLM-N supported the RSF in one of the operations. The RSF likely launched its operations from Ethiopian territory. The RSF's advance in Blue Nile State distracts the Sudan Armed Forces from consolidating recent gains in central Sudan.
The Economist published on 6 August 2026 an article titled "The Ruin of Sudan."
Based on a visit to Khartoum and Omdurman, the article shows the devastation caused by more than three years of war between the Sudan Armed Forces (SAF) and the paramilitary Rapid Support Forces. The SAF is now in control of the capital region.
AEIs Critical Threats Africa File posted on 6 August 2026 an article titled "Tigray on the Precipice" by Michael DeAngelo and Liam Karr.
The Tigray People's Liberation Front and the Ethiopian National Defense Forces engaged in western Tigray on 1 August, each accusing the other of initiating the conflict. The battle ended quickly but tension remains high in the region.
The UK government published on 16 July 2026 a press release titled "UK Sanctions Illicit Gold Networks Fueling Sudan's War Amid Crisis around El Obeid."
The UK government announced sanctions targeting the conflict gold trade in Sudan, procurement networks, and financial facilitators that are fueling the civil war in Sudan. The sanctions focus primarily on the paramilitary Rapid Support Forces and UAE-based companies, but they include the Sudan Armed Forces and one Hong Kong-based company.
Modern Diplomacy published on 5 August 2026 a commentary titled "Cairo's Shadow War in Sudan: Drones, Borders and a Fading Army Ally" by Carla Davies.
The paramilitary Rapid Support Forces (RSF) has been engaged in conflict with the Sudan Armed Forces for more than three years. Drones launched from inside Egypt have targeted the RSF inside Sudan for at least six months. Egypt's strong support for the Sudan Armed Forces is linked in part to a coordinated Egypt-Sudan effort to counter Ethiopia's position on Nile water issues.
Radio France Internationale posted on 3 August 2026 an article titled "Hundreds Flee Ethiopia to War-torn Sudan Following New Fighting in Tigray."
Hundreds of Ethiopians fled to Sudan following the outbreak of conflict on 1 August between federal government troops and the Tigray People's Liberation Front (TPLF) in western Tigray region. They joined thousands of Ethiopian refugees inside Sudan from the 2020-2022 war between the Ethiopian army and the TPLF.
The Associated Press published on 30 July 2026 an article titled "Child Soldiers Recount Horrors of Sudan's War and Presence of Colombian Mercenaries" by Sam Mednick, Isabel Debre, and Astrid Suarez.
Sudan's paramilitary Rapid Support Forces (RSF) have conscripted child soldiers, some of whom have been trained by Colombian mercenaries. The UAE allegedly recruited the Colombians to fight alongside the RSF.
African Arguments posted on 21 July 2026 a commentary titled "Sudan's Peace Process Is Negotiating a War That No Longer Exists" by Ezzat Khairi, a Sudan political analyst.
Diplomatic assumptions for ending the war in Sudan remain where they were in April 2023. Peace initiatives approach Sudan as a two-sided conflict between a national army and a paramilitary rebellion. That model no longer fits the war. The Sudan Armed Forces (SAF) and paramilitary Rapid Support Forces (RSF) now contain armed movements, tribal formations, ideological brigades, local defense groups, and commanders with their own constituencies and expectations of the postwar order. The leaders of the SAF and RSF do not fully control the coalitions supporting them.
World Politics Review published on 13 July 2026 an article titled "Sudan Could Be Headed for De Facto Partition" by Mohamed Wad Al-Sak.
If the paramilitary Rapid Support Forces take control of El Obeid in central Sudan from the Sudan Armed Forces (SAF), it could result in a de facto partition of the country. El Obed is the SAF's last command center in central Sudan and the linchpin of its western supply corridor.
The International Crisis Group published on 17 July 2026 a commentary titled "As the Horn of Africa Nears Boiling Point, Time for Urgent Diplomacy" by Alan Boswell.
Given the uncertainty about Washington's level of commitment to bring peace to the Horn of Africa, additional Gulf States, the European Union, the United Nations, Norway, and the United Kingdom should step up their engagement.
Foreign Affairs published on 26 June 2026 an article titled "Who Is Winning Africa's Drone Wars?" by Nate Allen and Rida Lyammouri.
Inexpensive drones are fast becoming the weapon of choice in African conflicts. They are being deployed by both governments and insurgent groups. China is now Africa's largest supplier of drones, accounting for a quarter of those procured.
Foreign drones have turned African conflicts such as the civil war in Sudan into destabilizing proxy wars. At least eleven African countries now produce drones including Kenya, Nigeria, South Africa, and Morocco.
The UN Human Rights Council published on 8 July 2026 a 26-page report titled "Information Supplementing the Report 'Sudan: Hallmarks of Genocide in El Fasher'."
This report provides detailed references not included in the initial 19 February 2026 report and additional information that the UN Human Rights Council gathered following continued investigations since the publication of the original report.
It also helps develop the legal basis for the conclusions that were drawn in the original report, that the mass killings and related atrocities committed by the paramilitary Rapid Support Forces in and around El Fasher were indicators of a genocidal path.
Foreign Policy posted on 15 July 2026 an article titled "Sudan Faces New Sanctions as Evidence of Atrocities Mounts" by Nosmot Gbadamosi.
The EU and the US have expanded sanctions on individuals and companies that have aided the paramilitary Rapid Support Forces (RSF) and/or the Sudan Armed Forces (SAF). In the meantime, global efforts to end the war have largely stalled.
Comment: Numerous sanctions in recent years on the RSF and the SAF have had no impact on bringing this civil war to an end.
