This is part 2 of the Tigray Press interview with me on 9 March 2026 hosted by Bisrat Kebede. Part 1 is posted below on 10 March.
This 44-minute segment focuses on the current situation in the Horn of Africa and the engagement in Africa of the United States, China, and Russia.
The Guardian published on 9 March 2026 an investigative report titled "How the 'Galapagos of West Africa' Is Plundered by Floating Fish Factories" by Davide Mancini.
Floating Chinese-owned factory ships longer than a football field illegally process sardinella for fishmeal in the waters off Guinea-Bissau. The Chinese fishmeal factories are supported by Turkish purse seiners that illegally supply them with fish.
The offshore fish processing operation has both negative food security implications for the people of Guinea-Bissau and for artisanal fisherman in the country. Fish are the source of a third of animal protein consumed and the informal fishing industry employs 225,000 people from a population of 2.2 million.
World Politics Review published on 10 March 2026 an analysis titled "War and Disorder Are Mobilizing the Middle East's Middle Powers" by Dalia Ghanem and Ahmed Morsy, both with the Middle East Council on Global Affairs in Doha.
A new loosely aligned "statist Quad" of traditional middle powers--Algeria, Egypt, Saudi Arabia, and Turkey--is trying to reassert itself and actively coordinate on the region's most volatile crises. The four countries are fundamentally statist powers that view governing systems in which centralized authority, often with the military as its backbone, as the sole guarantor of social order.
Acting sometimes in concert, sometimes on their own, they are seeking to intervene in a regional order whose current chaos poses an existential threat to their national interests. They have focused so far on the crises in Iran, Yemen, Sudan, Somaliland, Libya, and the Sahel region of Africa.
Modern Diplomacy published on 27 February 2026 a commentary titled "Africa's Rise: The 21st Century Story that Leaves Russia Behind" by Kester Kenn Klomegah, an independent researcher.
Russia has focused on a limited part of Africa. About 80 percent of its trade is with North African countries and South Africa. It has sent the Africa Corps to Niger, Mali, and Burkina Faso. But it has largely ignored the rest of the continent.
The University of Nottingham Taiwan Research Hub's Taiwan Insight published on 23 February 2026 a commentary titled "Taiwan's Diplomatic Bridge: Taiwan-Somaliland-Israel vs China in the Horn of Africa" by Faisal Abdirashid Adam.
Taiwan, which established a liaison office in Somaliland in 2020, has embraced Israel's diplomatic recognition of Somaliland, framing it as a major step forward for the emerging "democratic triangle" of Taiwan, Israel, and Somaliland, which now positions itself as a powerful new alliance for trilateral cooperation in technology, agriculture, and Red Sea security.
The American Enterprise Institute's Critical Threats published in March 2026 a major report titled "Fault Lines in the Horn of Africa: The Gulf States, Turkey and Israel Battle for Red Sea Influence" by Liam Karr and Michael DeAngelo.
This is an extensive study on the current situation in the Horn of Africa with special reference to the roles of Turkey, Israel, Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, and Qatar. It includes detailed recommendations for US policy.
Africa Press posted on 20 February 2026 an article titled "China Returns to Libya with New Economic Partnership" by Tamara Pro.
Closed since 2014 for security reasons, China reopened its embassy in Tripoli late last year and recently appointed an ambassador. Subsequently, China signed a number of economic agreements with the Government of National Unity (GNU). China will likely begin to increase its purchase of Libyan oil and may expand the port of Tobruk in eastern Libya.
China will continue to maintain balanced relations between the GNU in western Libya and the Government of National Stability that controls eastern Libya.
AEI's Critical Threats Africa File posted on 19 February 2026 an article titled "Sudan" by Michael DeAngelo and Elliot Nazar.
The Quad (United States, UAE, Egypt, and Saudi Arabia) peace proposal is stalled due in large part to the fact that the UAE supports the paramilitary Rapid Support Forces (RSF) and Egypt and Saudi Arabia support the Sudan Armed Forces (SAF). Neither the RSF nor the SAF has fully committed to the Quad ceasefire proposal. Ethiopia's support for a new RSF military campaign in Sudan's neighboring Blue Nile state is further complicating any peace settlement.
The South China Morning Post published on 15 February 2026 an article titled "How a 'Military Vacuum' in West and Central Africa Opened New Markets for China" by Jevans Nyabiage.
As France retreats from parts of Africa and Russia is preoccupied with its war against Ukraine, Chinese companies have stepped up their arms transfers and military training. China's equipment is affordable and comes without conditions.
Foreign Affairs published on 11 February 2026 an article titled "How the War in Sudan Could End" by Volker Perthes, German Institute for International and Security Affairs.
The author argues that both the Sudan Armed Forces and the paramilitary Rapid Support Forces may have reached the point where they believe it will be difficult to make more territorial gains at an acceptable cost. Consequently, coordinated international pressure on both belligerents could result in a ceasefire, a first step towards peace.
China-Africa Security Radar posted on 1 February 2026 a commentary titled "China and Somalia Signal Deeper Security Ties--but Agency Still Maters."
Ever since breakaway Somaliland exchanged liaison offices with Taiwan, China has been an outspoken supporter of Somalia's territorial integrity and taken increasing steps to expand its security relationship with Mogadishu.
Defence Web published on 30 January 2026 an article titled "Ethiopia Acquires Yak-130 Trainer, Orion-E UAVs from Russia" by Guy Martin.
The Ethiopian Air Force has acquired the Orion-E unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) and the Yak-130 jet trainer and ground attack aircraft from Russia.
The Robert Lansing Institute published on 30 January 2026 an article titled "Russia's Arms Exports to Ethiopia and the Erosion of U.S. Leverage in the Horn of Africa."
The article notes that the transfer of Russian drones undermines US efforts to promote standards for responsible use and control over the equipment.
Foreign Policy published on 27 January 2026 an article titled "Red Sea Rivalries Risk Unraveling the Horn of Africa" by Cameron Hudson and Liam Karr.
The civil war in Sudan between the Sudan Armed Forces and the paramilitary Rapid Support Forces is increasingly becoming a proxy war for regional players Ethiopia, Eritrea, Egypt, UAE, Turkey, Libya, and Saudi Arabia, among others. The authors argue it is time for the Trump administration to designate a Senate-confirmed presidential special envoy for the Horn of Africa and Red Sea.
The Foreign Policy Research Institute published on 6 January 2026 an analysis titled "The Africa Blind Spot: The US National Security Strategy and the Risks of Retreat" by Christopher Faulkner and Raphael Parens.
The Trump Administration's National Security Strategy document represents a significant shift in how the United States will approach Africa in the near term. It reflects a preference for transactionalism, driven by the president's pursuit of the Nobel Peace Prize.
The limited discussion devoted to Africa (about a half a page) does not inherently reflect a lack of interest in the continent. Instead, it demonstrates that the administration's interest in Africa will be constrained, selective, and dependent on what Africa can offer in an increasingly competitive world. This effectively constitutes strategic disengagement.
The authors conclude that navigating between selective engagement and strategic retreat will not likely reduce the pressures that will draw the United States to the continent. Instead, it risks deferring engagement, ensuring that future interventions, when they become unavoidable, are costlier and less effective.
The Royal United Services Institute for Defence and Security Studies published on 6 January 2026 an analysis titled "From Syria to Somaliland: Turkey-Israel Competition Reshapes Region" by Burcu Ozcelik.
Turkey has a strong relationship with Somalia, increasing interests in the region, and opposes Israel's recent recognition of breakaway Somaliland. This development adds to tension between Turkey and Israel in the Horn of Africa. Turkish and Israeli interests also diverge sharply in Syria, Gaza, Cyprus, and Greece.
Foreign Affairs published on 8 January 2026 an article titled "The War that Outgrew Sudan: Middle East Countries Are Turning a Local War into a Regional Crisis" by Alex de Waal.
Last summer, it looked like the Trump administration might make a serious effort to end the conflict in Sudan. That effort has stalled and the civil war in Sudan is becoming a wider regional conflict that increasingly includes Middle Eastern countries.
Military Africa published on 5 January 2026 an article titled "Pakistan to Supply 16 JF-17s and 12 Super Mushshak Aircraft to Libyan Faction."
Pakistan signed a $4 billion deal with Khalifa Haftar's Libyan National Army (LNA) to supply advanced military hardware, including 16 JF-17 Thunder aircraft produced jointly by the Pakistan Aeronautical Complex and China's Chengdu Aircraft Industry Group. The LNA controls the east and south of Libya, including critical oilfields. The LNA is a rival force to the United Nations-recognized Government of National Unity in Tripoli. The introduction of 16 JF-17s could radically alter the security landscape of North Africa.
The deal represents a sophisticated maneuver by Beijing to expand its influence in North Africa while avoiding direct violation of an arms embargo. By routing these sales through Pakistan, China can sidestep regulatory and political scrutiny that accompanies sales into sanctioned territory. Although the JF-17 incorporates Chinese radars, engines, and missiles, it is technically a Pakistani product. The LNA also has received Chinese drones and WRJ-Q02 anti-drone guns.
The New Arab published on 1 January 2026 an article titled "Is Somaliland Becoming Israel's Foothold in the Red Sea?"
Israel's recognition of Somaliland gives it unparalleled access to the Red Sea and Gulf of Aden, which the article argues is the primary reason that Israel took this action. It helps Israel monitor commercial shipping, the Houthis in Yemen, and Iran's activities in the region.
Abren, a group of Ethiopian Americans, posted on 27 December 2025 an analysis titled "Israel's Recognition of Somaliland: A Game-Changer in Horn of Africa Geopolitics."
Israel's diplomatic recognition of Somaliland is a monumental shift in the geopolitical landscape of the Horn of Africa. The analysis looks at the positions of Turkey, Russia, China, US, and Ethiopia with the latter playing a pivotal role in this evolving situation.
The New York Times published on 26 December 2025 an article titled "Israel Becomes the First Nation to Recognize Somaliland" by Abdi Latif Dahir and Richard Perez-Pena.
Israel became the first country to formally recognize Somaliland. The government of Somalia called the recognition an "unlawful step" by Israel, adding that Somaliland is an integral part of Somalia. The African Union took the same position. Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu said Israel plans to offer extensive cooperation with Somaliland in agriculture, health, technology, and the economy.
