The Royal United Services Institute for Defence and Security Studies posted on 17 April 2026 an eight-minute video analysis titled "The Sudanese Civil War, Three Years On" by Michael Jones.
After three years of conflict the Sudan civil war has reached a political and military dynamic stalemate. Diplomatic efforts to reach a ceasefire have achieved little progress. The war is sustained by foreign powers, especially the Arab Gulf states. The conflict threatens to become a regional war.
The International Crisis Group published on 17 April 2026 a statement titled "Latest Sudan Conference Shows Diplomacy Is Backsliding" by Comfort Ero and Alan Boswell.
Officials who gathered in Berlin on 15 April pledged 1.5 billion Euros for humanitarian aid to Sudan but failed to agree on a joint communique. Blame for the inability to agree on a common approach to achieve a cease fire resulted because of differences in the US-led Quad, which includes Saudi Arabia, the UAE, and Egypt.
Negotiations foundered over Saudi Arabia's insistence on language stressing the need to preserve "state institutions", which would include Sudan's army, and the UAE's opposition to it. The intra-Quad discord highlights the challenges facing US-led efforts to secure a truce, which are backsliding amid deteriorating relations between Saudi Arabia and the UAE.
The International Crisis Group published on 13 April 2026 an analysis titled "Divided Sudan, Elusive Peace."
Negotiations aimed at a cease fire in Sudan appear stalled amid a row between Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates and the distraction of the war in Iran. The Sudan civil war risks becoming a regional conflict. This is the occasion, however, for the Quad (US, Egypt, Saudi Arabia, and the UAE) to step up efforts to revive the peace process.
The International Crisis Group posted on 7 April 2026 a 42-minute podcast titled "After Three Years of War in Sudan, What Hope for a Ceasefire" hosted by Richard Atwood with Shewit Woldemichael and Alan Boswell.
The Iran war has not yet had a significant impact on the situation in Sudan beyond driving up prices of everything and causing fuel shortages. If the Iran war continues, it could have a huge negative impact on the food situation in Sudan.
The paramilitary Rapid Support Forces (RSF) control most of Darfur and West Kordofan while the Sudan Armed Forces (SAF) control most of the northeastern and eastern parts of the country. Sudan is effectively partitioned between the RSF and the SAF. The major battle fronts today are along the Chad border, South Sudan border, and Ethiopian border.
The RSF political program has been a failure. Noone has recognized the RSF government. The SAF has improved its position and is the dominant actor in the country today. While SAF fortunes have improved most Sudanese probably do not want the military to remain in power indefinitely.
The RSF continues to receive strong support from the UAE while the SAF has a degree of support from Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Turkey, and Eritrea. The most worrying new dynamic is the deterioration of relations between the SAF and Ethiopia. Differences over Nile water usage and Egyptian and Eritrean support for the SAF contribute to Ethiopia's concerns.
Massad Boulos, President Trump's special envoy for Africa, continues to seek a ceasefire as part of the Quad (US, Egypt, UAE, and Saudi Arabia). The effort is currently lacking high level pressure. RSF and SAF positions on a ceasefire remain far apart. Both sides believe they hold a strong military position. Only major outside pressure on them will likely change the situation.
There is considerable concern among the outside actors about the role of Islamist forces in the SAF, which complicates a resolution. In the meantime, the Sudan conflict continues to destabilize the Red Sea region.
AEI's Critical Threats Africa File posted on 19 March 2026 an article titled "Sudan" by Michael DeAngelo and Elliot Nazar.
The paramilitary Rapid Support Forces has consolidated control in western Sudan while the Sudan Armed Forces made gains in southeastern Sudan. External actors continue to fuel the conflict.
The International Crisis Group posted on 19 March 2026 a 36-minute podcast titled "What Is Really Going on in the Horn?" with Alan Boswell and Moses Chrispus Okello, Institute of Security Studies.
The drivers of conflict and instability in the Horn of Africa are no longer confined to the Horn, which is being absorbed into the geopolitical arena of the Red Sea and Gulf States. External actors are contributing to fragmentation in the Horn that is rooted in domestic politics.
Landlocked Ethiopia is key to stability in the region because it borders all other countries in the Horn, is the most populous, and is now trying to obtain access to the Red Sea.
Chatham House published on 13 February 2026 a commentary titled "The AU Summit Is an Opportunity for Decisive Action to End the War in Sudan" by Hubert Kinkoh.
The author argued that the 14-15 February African Union Summit was an opportunity for decisive leadership on Sudan. The AU has been increasingly peripheral to competing diplomatic tracks. The AU must assert its primacy and enforce diplomatic coherence.
Foreign Affairs published on 8 January 2026 an article titled "The War that Outgrew Sudan: Middle East Countries Are Turning a Local War into a Regional Crisis" by Alex de Waal.
Last summer, it looked like the Trump administration might make a serious effort to end the conflict in Sudan. That effort has stalled and the civil war in Sudan is becoming a wider regional conflict that increasingly includes Middle Eastern countries.
The UN Political and Peacebuilding Office posted on 22 December 2025 remarks titled "ASG Khiari Warns Indiscriminate Drone Strikes and Arms Flows Are Driving Sudan's War."
UN Assistant Secretary General for the Middle East, Asia and the Pacific, Khaled Khiari, condemned the use of drones and foreign supply of increasingly sophisticated and deadly weapons to the belligerents in Sudan's civil war. Calls to end these flows have gone unheeded and there has been no accountability.
The International Crisis Group posted on 23 December 2025 a one-hour podcast titled "Reflecting on Sudan's Collapse and Elusive Peace Process" by Comfort Ero and Alex de Waal with Yasmine Farouk.
Sudanese polarization and alienation of society in Sudan now makes peace unusually hard. Sudan has effectively collapsed as a recognizable state. There can only be a solution at the international level, making it more difficult to resolve. Sudan is now an international civil war. The personal involvement of President Trump in resolving the Sudan conflict increasingly appears not to be useful.
Aljazeera published on 4 December 2025 an article titled "Rubio Says Trump to Get Involved in Sudan Peace Efforts as Civil War Rages."
Secretary of State Marco Rubio said on 3 December that President Trump has been personally overseeing efforts to bring an end to the war in Sudan. He added that Trump is "the only leader in the world capable of resolving the Sudan crisis."
Foreign Affairs published on 7 April 2025 a commentary titled "America Needs a Real Indian Ocean Strategy" by Arzan Tarapore, Stanford University.
Chinese submarine activity will soon surpass India's ability to counter it in the Indian Ocean and India is ill equipped to offset China's growing naval presence. India's contributions to regional security are significant, but they will be dwarfed by what it will take to counter China's increasing naval capacity.
The author calls on the United States to craft a comprehensive strategy for the Indian Ocean because within a decade an expanding Chinese naval presence will be able to imperil global shipping lanes, extract more resources from countries in the region, and project force far beyond its current ability. The focus of this US strategy should be building collective military power.
The Associated Press published on 1 February 2024 an article titled "India Begins to Flex Its Naval Power as Competition with China Grows" by Aljaz Hussain.
India is sending a message that the Indian Ocean is its backyard and signaling China that it plans to assume wider naval responsibility in the region, including the Red Sea and Gulf of Aden.
The Foreign Policy Research Institute published on 6 November 2023 an analysis titled "Australia and India's New Military Bases: Responses to China's Naval Presence in the Indian Ocean" by Felix K. Chang.
The article outlines steps India and Australia are taking to counter a growing Chinese naval presence in the Indian Ocean.
The US Army posted on 22 September 2023 an article titled "Building the Quad: A Diamond of National Security" by Sarah Hauck.
The same article appeared on 28 September in the Fort Leavenworth Lamp.
The article summarizes a panel presentation on 14 September at the Lewis and Clark Center, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas. The panel discussed great power competition in the Indo-Pacific region with a particular focus on the role of the Quad (Japan, Australia, India, and US) for enhancing security and competition with China.
The Atlantic Council published on 16 August 2023 a paper titled "Indian Ocean Partnerships Are Key to Countering China's Maritime Ambitions" by Delharty Manson and Nicholas Nunez.
The paper compares China's growing engagement in the Indian Ocean with the presence of US forces and suggests the best way for Washington to counter China's expansion is to build stronger ties with countries in the region.
Foreign Policy published on 27 July 2023 a commentary titled "Beijing Is Going Places--and Building Naval Bases" by Alexander Wooley and Sheng Zhang.
Based on new AidData information, the authors offer the following short list for likely future PLA Navy bases outside China: Hambantota, Sri Lanka; Bata, Equatorial Guinea; Gwadar, Pakistan; Kribi, Cameroon; Ream, Cambodia; Luganville, Vanuatu; Nacala, Mozambique; and Nouakchott, Mauritania.
The Stimson Center's South Asian Voices published on 31 May 2023 an analysis titled "India's Evolving Maritime Strategy" by Allah Nawaz.
India has moved from a policy of "using" Indian Ocean waters to "securing" them. China's rise and increased interference in India's perceived sphere of influence pushed New Delhi to modify its strategy in the Indian Ocean. In response to China's "string of pearls" theory, India is pursuing a "necklace of diamonds" approach.
The International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS) published on 2 June 2023 a paper titled "The State of Defence Cooperation in the Indian Ocean Region" by Antoine Levesques and Viraj Solanki.
Looking to the early June IISS Shangri-La Dialogue, the authors noted the increased tempo of defense cooperation initiatives in the Indian Ocean region as relations between Bejing and New Delhi became more conflictual beginning in May 2020 in the aftermath of border clashes that led to a zero-sum mentality. India thus turned to the US-aligned Quad to bolster its regional strategy while China took a series of tangible steps in the Indian Ocean region to improve its security presence.
