China's Red Sea Strategy

 Foreign Policy published on 14 February 2024 a commentary titled "What the Red Sea Crisis Reveals About China's Middle East Strategy" by Jon B. Alterman, Center for Strategic and International Studies.  

There has been no sign of Chinese mediation and little sign of Chinese diplomacy on the conflict in Gaza and the Houthi attacks on Red Sea shipping.  China is finding it difficult to conduct diplomacy in the Red Sea region and is demonstrating an aversion to doing hard things that serve common benefit.  Instead, Chinese officials are hunkering down and looking for marginal ways to advance their own interests at the expense of partners.

Does Red Sea Crisis Benefit China's Global Strategy?

 The Stimson Center published on 12 February 2024 an analysis titled "China Sees an Opportunity in Red Sea Crisis with the Houthis" by Emil Avdaliani, European University in Tbilisi, Georgia.

The author argues that China sees some benefit in the Red Sea shipping crisis because it raises Beijing's profile as an external power and serves to distract Washington from the Indo-Pacific region.  China believes events like this will contribute to a gradual decline of the American-led global order.  

China's Passive Approach to Red Sea Attacks

 National Public Radio posted on 8 February 2024 a transcript titled "China Depends Heavily on the Red Sea.  Why Isn't It Doing More to Stop Rebel Attacks?"

This discussion with a group of experts concluded that China's non-interference policy is deterring it from engaging more actively in efforts to stop Iran-backed Houthi attacks on international shipping in the Red Sea.  It also raises questions about China's willingness or ability to become a world power.  

India Ramps Up Naval Activity in Response to China

 The Associated Press published on 1 February 2024 an article titled "India Begins to Flex Its Naval Power as Competition with China Grows" by Aljaz Hussain.  

India is sending a message that the Indian Ocean is its backyard and signaling China that it plans to assume wider naval responsibility in the region, including the Red Sea and Gulf of Aden.  

Why China Pursues Low Key Approach to Houthi Red Sea Attacks

 The South China Morning Post published on 28 January 2024 an article titled "Great Power Lite? Why China Is Reluctant to Wade into the Red Sea Crisis and Join US-led Attacks on Houthis" by Dewey Sim.  

China has called for an end to the Iran-backed Houthi attacks on shipping in the Red Sea but is unwilling to join Western efforts to end the attacks with the use of force.  China maintains 3 PLA Navy ships in the region that could engage militarily if authorized by Beijing.

While there are some practical reasons for refusing to engage militarily, observers point out that China's caution reflects a lack of leadership and capacity in a situation where its commercial ships have not yet been attacked by the Houthis.  China has no desire to ensure freedom of navigation and is content to "free ride" on Western military responses.  China's low-key response raises questions, however, about its ability or willingness to achieve its stated goal of becoming a global power.  

Russia and China to Lead Multipolar World?

 Global Research published on 3 December 2022 a commentary titled "Russia, China and the 'Multipolar World.'  The Kremlin's Evolving Relations with Africa" by Kester Kenn Klomegah.  

The author suggests that Russia sees itself collaborating with China to lead a multipolar world.  Africa is an important part of that world.  But Russia has important gaps in its relations with African countries and does not approach the leverage that China has in Africa. The author provides some useful observations on the Russia-Africa relationship.