The American Security Project posted on 22 May 2026 a commentary titled "What the Mali Offensive Reveals about Russia's Partnerships in Africa" by Thomas Ullman.
Questions about Russia's role in Mali increased when its Africa Corps retreated last month from a key city to the north of the capital. A French journalist suggested that Russian forces considered defending the capital of Bamako to be their sole obligation, regardless of what happened elsewhere.
The China-Africa Security Radar published on 31 May 2026 a commentary titled "The Limits of Beijing's Embrace" by Paa Kwesi Wolseley Prah.
African countries expecting China to come to their aid when experiencing security challenges should consider China's reaction to the seizure of President Maduro of Venezuela and the attack on Iran by the United States and Israel. Venezuela has a "strategic partnership" and Iran a "comprehensive strategic partnership" with China. What purpose did they serve?
The Interpreter, produced by Australia's Lowy Institute, published on 22 May 2026 a commentary titled "China's Influence in Africa Is No Longer Just Economic" by Isel Van Zyl.
The author argues that the cancellation of overflight permission by Seychelles, Mauritius, and Madagascar for Taiwan's president to visit Eswatini, the only country in Africa that recognizes Taiwan, highlights that China's influence in Africa is no longer confined to the economic sector.
China's growing leverage in Africa is now expressed through diplomatic pressure, political signaling, and the ability to shape what governments, organizations, and even international conferences can and cannot do.
Comment: Beijing has exercised political influence in Africa for decades. One only need compare African country voting patterns in the UN General Assembly or consider the publicly stated policy of most countries on China's core domestic issues such as Taiwan, Hong Kong, Tibet, Xinjiang, human rights, and island building in the South China Sea.
Skift, a digital media company and travel website, posted on 1 May 2026 an article titled "China Quietly Cancels a Digital Rights Summit in Africa" by Miguel Neves.
Evidence is mounting that Beijing was behind Zambia's decision to cancel at the last minute RightsCon 2026 involving an estimated 2,000 international participants from over 150 countries. RightsCon bills itself as the "world's leading summit on human rights in the digital age."
Beijing's concern was apparently attendance by civil society representatives from Taiwan. The conference was scheduled to be held at the Mulungushi International Conference Center in Lusaka. China granted Zambia $30 million in 2022 to expand the facility, giving it considerable leverage to influence the cancellation of the summit by the government of Zambia.
South Africa's The Mail & Guardian published on 11 March 2026 an article titled "China Announces Major Push to Strengthen Its Partnership with Africa Amid US Trade Tension" by Brian Sokutu.
Amid strained ties between Africa and the Trump administration, China has announced a new economic package that includes full zero-tariff access for 100 percent of African imports, effective from 1 May. It has also declared 2026 as "China-Africa Year of People-to-People Exchanges" with some 600 events planned.
Comment: China is cleverly taking advantage of the downturn in US-Africa relations and especially the decision by the Trump administration to increase tariffs on goods imported from most African countries. Beijing announced the zero-tariff policy at the beginning of 2026 and the people-to-people exchanges early last year. These are not particularly new initiatives.
It should also be noted that China has had a trade surplus with Africa for the past 15 years and the size of that surplus has been growing steadily. A number of African countries have expressed concern over the size of their trade deficit with China. China's tariffs have not been the primary obstacle to importing more from Africa. Africa has to have what China wants and historically, with the exception of raw materials such as critical minerals, that has limited its exports to China.
Nevertheless, China is able to make an invidious comparison with the current state of US-Africa relations, and at minimal cost.
The South China Morning Post published on 27 February 2026 an article titled "Why Beijing's US$4.5 Billion Niger-Benin Oil Pipeline Is Being Attacked by Rebels" by Jevans Nyabiage.
A rebel group has been attacking the oil pipeline from Niger's oilfields to an Atlantic port in Benin in an effort to restore a former elected president to power in Niger. China financed, built, and continues to have a management role in the pipeline, which provides a significant amount of revenue for Niger's military junta. Although the attacks are not aimed at China, the situation poses a dilemma for Beijing and its non-interference policy.
The London School of Economics and Political Science blog posted on 11 June 2025 a commentary titled "Military Takeovers in West Africa Are Reshaping Diplomatic Ties" by Paa Kwesi Wolseley Prah and Christian Kaunert, both at Dublin City University.
Military coups in Mali, Burkina Faso, and Niger have upended democratic governance, enabling China to deepen economic and strategic engagement as Western influence wanes. At the same time, there is growing concern over China's policies on debt and labor relations.
The Associated Press published on 9 April 2025 an article titled "Beijing Ups Diplomatic Pressure on Africa as the US Pulls Back" by Dake Kang.
The government of China pressured Malawi and Gambia to withdraw from the Inter-Parliamentary Alliance on China (IPAC), a group of lawmakers from 38 countries concerned about how democracies approach Beijing. IPAC has coordinated sanctions on China over rights abuses in Xinjiang and Hong Kong and rallied support for Taiwan. These actions by China raise questions about its claims that it does not interfere in the internal affairs of African countries.
Comment: This policy by Beijing is consistent with its long-standing willingness to push back when African governments take exception to any of China's core domestic issues such as Taiwan, Hong Kong, Tibet, Xinjiang, island building in the South China Sea, and human rights policies.
The BBC posted on 26 March 2025 an article titled "DR Congo Conflict Tests China's Diplomatic Balancing Act" by Jack Lau.
Chinese companies are significantly engaged in the mineral-rich eastern DRC where a Rwanda-supported M23 rebel group is militarily opposing DRC security forces. China has for years maintained good relations with both countries and remained neutral in the dispute. Until recently, China cited unnamed "foreign forces" as supporting the M23 rebels. Now it is naming Rwanda as the source of that support and publicly hoping that the government will end the relationship. China provides weapons to both countries.
War on the Rocks published on 25 October 2024 a commentary titled "Will China Intervene Directly to Protect Its Investments in Africa?" by Jonathan Ping, Bond University Australia, and Joel Odota, researcher on China-Africa.
China's increased focus on security raises questions about its longstanding policy of non-interference in African states' internal affairs. In areas of localized instability that threaten Chinese interests, China may have to resort to direct military involvement. The authors suggest China is pursuing an "increasingly neocolonial approach" that "may ultimately undermine its non-interference policy."
The Cradle Posted on 28 February 2024 a commentary titled "China's Unexpected Gains from the Red Sea Crisis" by Giorgio Cafiero, CEO of Gulf State Analytics in Washington.
The author argues that by rejecting engagement with the US-led Operation Prosperity Guardian in the Red Sea has bolstered China's regional image as a defender of the Palestinian cause. China has capitalized on growing anger directed at the US and UK in the Islamic world and the Global South. China's political gains appear to trump any associated financial loses.
National Public Radio posted on 23 February 2024 an article titled "China Is Mostly Quiet on Houthi Attacks in the Red Sea" by Jackie Northam.
China continues to follow a hands-off approach to Houthi attacks on Red Sea shipping even though they are significantly driving up the costs of trade for Beijing.
National Public Radio posted on 8 February 2024 a transcript titled "China Depends Heavily on the Red Sea. Why Isn't It Doing More to Stop Rebel Attacks?"
This discussion with a group of experts concluded that China's non-interference policy is deterring it from engaging more actively in efforts to stop Iran-backed Houthi attacks on international shipping in the Red Sea. It also raises questions about China's willingness or ability to become a world power.
Chatham House published on 7 February 2024 an analysis titled "Yes, China Pressured Iran on Red Sea Attacks--But Only to Protect Its Own Ships" by Ahmed Aboudouh.
China's pressure on Iran to rein in Houthi attacks on Red Sea shipping was focused exclusively on extracting guarantees to protect China's direct interests. There is no evidence to suggest Beijing was interested in putting its credibility on the line to push for a full de-escalation in the Red Sea. The Houthis subsequently granted Chinese and Russian ships immunity from attack.
The Stimson Center published on 26 January 2024 a study titled "China's Conflict Resolution and Mediation Approach in Mali" by Lina Benabdallah, Wake Forest University.
The study examines the drivers of China's cautious approach to conflict resolution and mediation in the Sahel region with a case study of Mali. The author argues that China seeks to avoid diplomatic entanglements with Western powers while protecting its economic and security interests.
The InterRegional for Strategic Analysis, a consulting firm based in Abu Dhabi, UAE, published on 25 September 2023 an analysis titled "Strategic Adaptation: China's Approach to the Aftermath of Military Coups in Africa" by Mahmoud Zakaria.
The author concluded that China has adopted a strategy of adjustment and adaptation in dealing with transitional regimes established after military coups in Africa. This is linked to China's efforts to preserve its objectives and interests, especially in the economic sphere. It also seeks to fill voids left by Western forces, especially France, and hopes to outpace the United States as it tries to contain transitional military regimes in these African countries.
The South African Institute for Security Studies published on 25 September 2023 a commentary titled "Can China Be a More Attractive Security Partner for Africa?" by Jana de Kluiver.
China's concept of non-interference is compelling to those African countries disillusioned with Western partners paternalistic approach to security. But China's cooperation comes with challenges concerning human rights and good governance.
Türkiye's Anadolu Agency news service published on 5 September 2023 an article titled "China to Mediate in Niger Crisis" by James Tasamba.
China's ambassador to Niger announced that the Chinese government intends to play the role of mediator to find a political solution to the crisis in Niger. China has invested in Niger's oil sector and is building an oil pipeline from southern Niger to the port of Seme in Benin.
The South China Morning Post published on 29 August 2023 an article titled "China Welcomes Dozens of African States to Security Conference as It Seeks Greater Role in Continent" by Jack Lau.
The Third China-Africa Peace and Security Forum is underway in Beijing with security personnel from about 50 African countries. China continues to eschew kinetic military activity in Africa and instead believes that security can be achieved through support for UN peacekeeping, training of African militaries, and economic development.
China General Television Network published on 17 September 2022 an article titled "Ethiopian Ambassador Praises China's 'Initiative of Peaceful Development in the Horn of Africa'" by Shen Shiwei.
Ethiopia's ambassador to China, Teshome Toga Chanaka, commented that China's contribution to peace in the Horn of Africa and Ethiopia in particular is based on encouraging regional development and not imposing China's views.
Comment: It has become increasingly apparent that China and its new Special Envoy for the Horn of Africa is not interested in mediating conflicts in the Horn of Africa. Rather it will rely on its long-standing policy of supporting regional development to end conflicts.
