African Market Share of Chinese Oil Imports Dropping Like a Rock

 Mint published on 8 November 2022 an article titled "Asia May Witness Sharp Drop in Crude Inflow from Africa by End of 2022: S&P Global" by Swati Luthra.

China's crude imports from Africa fell 22.6 percent from the January-September 2021 period compared to the corresponding nine months in 2022.  Thus, Africa's market share in the nine month period fell to 10.7 percent of total imports from 13.2 percent a year earlier.

Fifteen years ago, Africa had 33 percent of China's market share. China has been reducing that percentage in recent years and most dramatically so as it purchases more attractively priced crude from Russia, Iran, and Venezuela.  Angola is the only African country that still holds a significant Chinese market share and it dropped substantially in the recent nine month period.  

China's Overseas Development Finance on Decline

 The Boston University Global Development Policy Center posted on 2 December 2020 an analysis titled "Tracking China's Overseas Development Finance" by Rebecca Ray and Blake Alexander Simmons.

The China Overseas Development Finance Database tracks lending commitments by China's two major policy banks, the China Development Bank and the China Export-Import Bank from 2008 to 2019.  During this period, China's overseas development finance totaled $462 billion.  China's development finance grew significantly from 2011 to 2016 and then fell precipitously.

Just 10 countries made up 60 percent of the total borrowing between 2008 and 2019 with the largest borrower--Venezuela--making up more than 10 percent of the total.  African countries accounted for $104.5 billion of the $462 billion or about 23 percent of the global amount.  Angola was by far the largest African borrower followed by Kenya and Ethiopia.  

The Diplomat published on 12 December 2020 an analysis titled "China's Policy Banks Are Lending Differently, Not Less" by Tristan Kenderdine, Future Risk, and Niva Yau, OSCE Academy in Bishkek. 

This account questions the methodology of the Boston University Global Policy Center analysis, although it uses examples from Central Asia.   

Study on Resource-Backed Loans in Africa and Latin America

The Natural Resource Governance Institute (NRGI) published in February 2020 an important study titled "Resource-Backed Loans: Pitfalls and Potential" by David Mihalyi, Aisha Adam, and Jyhjong Hwang. NRGI is based in New York and has offices in a number of countries, including Ghana and Tanzania. It is committed to assisting countries to get a good deal for their natural resources and ensure that the resulting revenues are managed for the benefit of their citizens.

The study looked at 52 resource-backed loans (RBLs) in Sub-Saharan Africa and Latin America. Thirty of the loans were in Sub-Saharan Africa and 22 in Latin America. Chinese policy banks and state-owned enterprises accounted for 42 of the 52 loans. Most were backed by oil. Eleven countries in Sub-Saharan Africa had RBLs: Angola, Chad, DRC, Ghana, Guinea, Niger, Republic of Congo, Sao Tome and Principe, South Sudan, Sudan, and Zimbabwe. Three countries in Latin America received RBLs. Angola was the largest RBL borrower in Sub-Saharan Africa and Venezuela the largest borrower in Latin America. Two-thirds of the RBLs went to countries with a poor or failing score on NRGI's Resource Governance Index.

The study concludes that RBLs are opaque and pose a major finance risk. Of the 14 RBL recipient countries, 10 experienced serious debt problems after the commodity price crash of 2014, with RBLs often an important contributor. There is now an important momentum to change how RBLs are undertaken by learning from past mistakes and finding more sustainable ways forward. This report provides guidelines for more responsible use of RBLs going forward.

The South China Morning Post published on 8 March 2020 a good journalistic account of the report titled "How Chinese Loans Can Become 'Perilous Pitfalls for Africa" by Jevans Nyabiage.

China and Debt Trap Diplomacy

Area Development and Policy published in December 2019 an article titled "A Critical Look at Chinese 'Debt-trap Diplomacy': The Rise of a Meme" by Deborah Brautigam.

The article looks at the claim that China deliberately seeks to entrap countries in a web of debt to secure some kind of strategic advantage. The author largely debunks this claim.

China and Debt Trap Diplomacy: Less Heat and More Light Required

Kenya's Daily Nation published on 18 August 2018 a commentary titled "Debt Weapon of Choice for China to Penetrate Developing Countries" by Eric Wamanji.

The author concluded that when states default on loans, this affords China the liberty to seize assets and even territory in lieu of the repayments.

Kenya's Business Daily published on 13 February 2018 an article titled "China Takes Up Lion's Share Debt Spend" by Constant Munda.

This article provides more detailed information on Kenya's external debt servicing, noting that China recently received about 48 percent of the total amount that Kenya paid back on loans to all lenders.

Approaching the debt-trap argument from a different perspective, Asia Global Online posted on 16 August 2018 an analysis titled "China, Venezuela, and the Illusion of Debt-Trap Diplomacy" by Matt Ferchen, Carnegie-Tsinghua Center for Global Policy.

The author points out that Venezuela is the single largest recipient of Chinese official finance and Venezuela may be the most extreme case of a Chinese debt relationship gone wrong for both debtor and creditor alike. He argues that claims about China's debt-trap diplomacy assume that China's own economic and geostrategic interests are maximized when its lending partners are in distress. Such assumptions need to be more carefully examined. What China is experiencing, he suggested, is in some ways similar to periods in the 1930s and 1970s when American companies, and subsequently the U.S. government, found themselves in unsustainable debt relationships that eventually harmed both parties.

While China's loans to Africa are contributing to debt distress in countries such as Djibouti and Kenya, it is important not to overstate the role of China or to suggest that Chinese loans are causing problems across the continent. The IMF keeps monthly tabs on debt-distressed countries globally. In many cases, China is not a major source of lending to those countries. Even as in the case of Venezuela where China is the major lender, it is not at all clear that this will end well for China. The warning flags are flying, but this is the occasion for more facts and less emotion.

China Reassesses Loans to Africa after Venezuela Debacle

Bloomberg published on 29 June 2016 an article titled "Venezuela Mess Prods China to Reassess Africa Lending Spree" by Ting Shi. The threat that Venezuela may default on China's loans is putting pressure on Beijing to reassess how it provides money to commodity-dependent nations in Sub-Saharan Africa where China loaned more than $86 billion between 2000 and 2014.

The China Africa Project run by Eric Olander and Cobus van Staden did a half hour podcast on this subject with Matt Ferchen of the Carnegie-Tsinghua Center in Beijing. Ferchen is an expert on Chinese loans to Venezuela.

China's Nationals and Assets Face Risk in Angola and Venezuela

The German Marshall Fund of the United States published a report in March 2016 titled "China's Risk Map in the South Atlantic" by Jonas Parello-Plesner. 

The report evaluates China's growing problem of protecting its nationals and assets in the South Atlantic region.  It looks particularly at the situation in Angola and Venezuela. 

10 Wars to Watch in 2015

Foreign Policy published on 2 January 2015 an article titled "10 Wars to Watch in 2015" by Jean-Marie Guehenno.  The discussion includes:

--Syria, Iraq, and the Islamic State.
--Ukraine.
--South Sudan.
--Nigeria.
--Somalia.
--DRC.
--Afghanistan.
--Yemen.
--Libya and the Sahel.
--Venezuela.