The Economist published on 20 August 2026 an article titled "Somaliland Wants to Help Secure the Red Sea."
Somaliland's president says his country can help secure the Red Sea by offering military bases to global powers along its coastline. Somaliland is prepared to offer both the United States and Israel bases at the port of Berbera.
Horn Review published on 12 August 2026 a commentary titled "South Sudan and China's Evolving Overseas Security Strategy" by Abraham Abebe.
In July, China committed to deepening military cooperation with South Sudan by continuing its support for the UN peacekeeping mission as the backbone of its contribution. Beyond this, China's support seems to be limited to expanding its military dialogue with South Sudan and increasing military exchanges.
The China Daily Brief posted on 12 August 2026 an article titled "Chinese Navy Dispatches 49th Escort Task Force to Gulf of Aden."
The Chinese People's Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) dispatched on 12 August its 49th escort task force from a naval port in Sanya, Hainan Province, to the Gulf of Aden and waters of Somalia. It consists of the guided-missile destroyer Kunming, the guided-missile frigate Yueyang, and the supply ship Luomahu. The fleet is equipped with two shipborne helicopters and dozens of special operations personnel.
The Somali Media Network posted on 8 August 2026 a 42-minute podcast with me hosted by Ismail Gorse on the Horn of Africa.
This is a wide-ranging discussion of current issues in the Horn of Africa and US policy with a special focus on Somalia and Somaliland.
The Doha, Qatar-based Middle East Council on Global Affairs published in February 2026 an open access E-book titled "The Red Sea: Divided by Water, United by Opportunities" edited by Dalia Ghanem, Mehari Taddele Maru, Luigi Narbone, and Carlo Palleschi.
This book provides a comprehensive analysis that breaks down the silos between Middle Eastern countries (MECs) and the Horn of Africa (HOA). It argues that it is impossible to understand the region's trajectory by looking at one side of the Red Sea in isolation and examines interactions between the MECs and the HOA. It seeks to align visions and identify concrete steps toward realizing the vision of a region that, though divided by waters, is united by opportunities.
The Conversation published on 16 July 2026 a discussion summary titled "Africa's Greater Horn Region Is Facing a Looming Polycrisis Fueled by Conflict, Prices, Climate and Disease" by Daniel Maxwell, Alex de Waal, Luka Kuol, Merry Fitzpatrick, and Peter Hailey.
The impacts of a strengthening El Nino and effects of the war in Iran combined with existing prolonged crisis and conflict in the Horn of Africa are leading potentially to a major, multicountry polycrisis.
AEIs Critical Threats posted on 23 July 2026 an analysis titled "Houthi Blockade in the Red Sea" by Michael DeAngelo, Liam Karr, and Alexsandar Wiebler.
The Iranian-backed Houthi blockade of the south end of the Red Sea has already disrupted shipping in the Red Sea, causing increased costs and transit delays. The Houthi blockade will further increase fuel shortages, negatively impact African countries that rely on Saudi fuel shipments, and strain the global economy.
The Foreign Policy Research Institute published on 16 July 2026 an article titled "Beyond the Supply Chain: South Africa's China Dilemma" by Raghvendra Kumar.
The question facing South Africa is whether China's evolving supply chain diplomacy is designed to support Pretoria's fair and equitable participation or to reinforce Beijing's own geoeconomic priorities. South Africa is China's largest trading partner in Africa, but it runs a large trade deficit with Beijing.
The author concludes that South Africa's relationship with China will be successful only if Pretoria retains control over its critical infrastructure, strategic industries, and foreign policy choices.
The South China Morning Post published on 4 July 2026 an article titled "China's Influence on African Ports Extends to Software, Automation and AI: Study" by Jevans Nyabiage.
The article discusses those aspects of African port construction and operations where China has gained influence in the past twenty years or more. They include related infrastructure projects and all kinds of software and information technology.
The International Crisis Group posted on 29 June 2026 a 41-minute podcast titled "The Scramble for the Red Sea Is Not Cooling Down" by Alan Boswell with Federico Donelli, University of Trieste and author of a new book on the topic.
The scramble for control in the Red Sea region began during the Cold War and increased in intensity in the 21st century. There are now many new actors in the Red Sea. Middle powers have become as significant as major powers.
Russia has been seeking, so far without success, a military base in the region for years. China established a military base in Djibouti to protect its interests in the region and to extend global power. The Gulf states, especially Saudi Arabia, have become much more engaged in the Red Sea.
The US/Israeli war against Iran has underscored the importance of the Red Sea for international shipping. The European Union is the one grouping that should be more engaged in the region than it is.
Global Times published on 27 June 2026 an article titled "Chinese Navy's Destroyer Tangshan Arrives in Seychelles for a Friendly Visit" by Wang Zixuan.
The PLA Navy's guided-missile destroyer Tangshan arrived at Port Victoria in Seychelles on 26 June for a 5-day port call. The Tangshan was part of the 48th naval task force in the Gulf of Aden that arrived in October 2025.
The Africa Center for Strategic Studies published on 10 June 2026 a study titled "Beyond Ports: China Embeds Itself in Africa's Maritime Networks" by Paul Nantulya.
China has established new shipping corridors that connect African port clusters in West, North, and Southern Africa to Chinese port hubs in Qingdao, Tianjin, and Yantai. These routes add to the dozens of direct lines between African and Chinese ports, reflecting growing integration into China-centered maritime networks.
The International Crisis Group posted on 4 June 2026 a 26-minute podcast titled "Tiny Djibouti and Its Prime Real Estate" with Alan Boswell and Samson Abebe Bezabeh, University of Hong Kong.
They discuss Djibouti's role as a "garrison state," how it benefits from hosting foreign military bases, and why its strategic position may be changing as Ethiopia seeks alternative sea access.
Foreign Policy posted on 18 May 2026 an article titled "The Gulf's African Aftershocks" by Liam Karr.
The war against Iran is deepening preexisting regional proxy conflicts in the Horn of Africa and making mediation in Sudan of ongoing conflict more difficult. It has also resulted in a reduction of Gulf State investment in the region and beyond.
Reporters without Borders just published its 2026 "World Press Freedom Index." It ranks 180 countries. The United States dropped seven places to 64 compared to 57 in 2025.
Ten African countries had better scores than the United States. The top five African press freedom countries were Seychelles (35), Ghana (39), Cape Verde (40), Mauritius (42) and Gabon (43). But African countries were also well represented at the bottom of the list. The five worst performers were Eritrea (180), Egypt (169), Djibouti (167), Sudan (161), and Ethiopia (148). Curiously, all five are in northeast Africa.
The Conversation published on 15 April 2026 a commentary titled "China's Military Support for Somalia Is on the Rise--What Taiwan and Somaliland Have to Do with It" by Brendon J. Cannon, Khalifa University.
Beijing has promised equipment, training, and closer security cooperation with Mogadishu. The author argues that China is increasingly involved in Somalia because breakaway Somaliland has established close ties with Taiwan.
The Independent published on 14 April 2026 an article titled "What Is the 'Gate of Tears'? Key Shipping Route that Could Be Attacked by Houthis and Disrupt Global Economy" by Bryony Gooch and Harry Cockburn.
The authors speculate on the possibility of Yemen's Iran-backed Houthis attacking international shipping in the Red Sea following a US blockade of the Strait of Hormuz between Iran and Oman.
AEI's Critical Threats published on 3 April 2026 an analysis titled "Houthi Escalation Calculus Following Cautious Entry into the Iran War" by Liam Karr and Brian Carter.
The Iran-backed Houthis threatened to join Iran's campaign with attacks across the region designed to coerce the United States and Israel to make concessions in negotiations with Iran and to deter further military escalation against Iran. But the Houthis are unlikely to follow through on these threats unless the US and its allies cross certain Houthi or Iranian red lines, such as the Gulf states entering the war or ground operations against Iran, to avoid retaliation from the US and its allies that would jeopardize the groups domestic position.
The Houthis have conducted several attacks targeting southern Israel since March 27, marking the group's first involvement in the war. Attacks on Israel minimize the risk of entanglement with the Gulf states or the United States. They draw retaliatory Israeli strikes on Yemen that only temporarily damage Houthi infrastructure while further rallying popular support for the group.
AEI's Critical Threats Africa File posted on 2 April 2026 an article titled "Red Sea" by Liam Karr.
While the Iran-backed Houthis in Yemen have attacked Israel on several occasions since 27 March, they have not resumed attacks on international shipping in the Red Sea, indicating a restrained approach that attempts to avoid major regional escalation.
The International Crisis Group posted on 19 March 2026 a 36-minute podcast titled "What Is Really Going on in the Horn?" with Alan Boswell and Moses Chrispus Okello, Institute of Security Studies.
The drivers of conflict and instability in the Horn of Africa are no longer confined to the Horn, which is being absorbed into the geopolitical arena of the Red Sea and Gulf States. External actors are contributing to fragmentation in the Horn that is rooted in domestic politics.
Landlocked Ethiopia is key to stability in the region because it borders all other countries in the Horn, is the most populous, and is now trying to obtain access to the Red Sea.
