The American Security Project published on 23 September 2026 an article titled "Two Shores, One Chokepoint: The Houthi-al-Shabaab Nexus" by Joshua Perez.
The alliance between the Iran-backed Houthis in Yemen and al-Shabaab in Somalia demonstrates that the Bab el Mandeb chokepoint at the south end of the Red Sea has two gatekeepers.
The Club of Mozambique published on 22 September 2026 an article titled "Mozambique Wants to Revise Agreement with China to Strengthen Fight Against Timber Smuggling."
China imports 90 percent of Mozambique's exported timber. Restrictions on the export of raw logs continue to be ignored by timber smugglers. Mozambique wants to strengthen its agreement with China to reduce smuggling and encourage Chinese companies to process raw logs in Mozambique.
The Africa Center for Strategic Studies published on 6 August 2026 an analysis titled "Countering Terrorism Financing in East Africa" by Daisy Muibu and Nicole Mazurova.
Al-Shabaab in Somalia has established a sophisticated revenue-generation capacity that includes criminal activities, illicit trade, smuggling, and money laundering. Al-Shahaab obtains annual revenue of up to $200 million annually. The Islamic State in Somalia generates between $100,000 and $360,000 monthly through extortion and illicit taxation.
Defeating these terrorist organizations will require degrading their revenue generation capacities through strengthened national and regional coordination.
Al-Estiklal, a Turkish daily based in Istanbul, published on 24 August 2026 an article titled "Houthi Expansion in the Horn of Africa: From Arms Smuggling to a Cross-Border Network of Influence."
Yemen's Iran-backed Houthi outreach to the Horn of Africa is an attempt to build a human, logistical, and intelligence network that can be utilized on both sides of the Red Sea. It involves collaboration with al-Shabaab in Somalia and sympathetic individuals in Ethiopia and Eritrea.
It is part of Iran's broader strategy in the Red Sea and Gulf of Aden. The Houthis monitor the movements of countries allied with Saudi Arabia and the United States and secure supply lines to ensure the continued flow of weapons and supplies.
The Hollings Center for International Dialogue published in July 2026 a brief titled "Securing Strategic Waters Across the MENA Region: The Red Sea."
The current threat in the Red Sea is not confined to the closure of the geographical Bab el-Mandeb choke point. It is shaped by persistent uncertainty caused by the security crises in the wider region.
The threat cannot be addressed through conventional naval tools alone, nor reduced to a piracy or law enforcement problem. The brief recommends incremental cooperation, capacity building, and risk mitigation measures.
The Africa Center for Strategic Studies published on 21 July 2026 an analysis titled "Ghana's Illegal Gold Mining Crisis: A National Security Threat with Regional Implications" by Edem Srem.
Ghana is experiencing an environmental crisis due to illegal, small-scale, and unregulated gold mining known locally as galamsey. According to one account, an estimated 50,000 illegal Chinese miners are now operating in Ghana, supported by broader networks of financiers, equipment suppliers, transporters, intermediaries, and informal refiners. Chinese operators and equipment have accelerated the mechanization of mining, which has led to an increase in environmental damage.
Comment: The estimate of 50,000 Chinese miners in the country seems too high, but galamsey has been a long-standing irritant in Ghana-China relations.
AEI's Critical Threats Africa File posted on 18 June 2026 an article titled "RSF Mobilizes Around SAF's Sudan Stronghold" by Michael DeAngelo.
The paramilitary Rapid Support Forces appear to be preparing for an offensive on El Obeid, the Sudan Armed Force's headquarters in central Sudan.
Thierry Pairault posted on 13 June 2026 an analysis titled "The African Cocoa Industry and the Chinese Tariff Exemption."
He concludes that an African entrepreneur manufacturing chocolate for export to Europe would face a 30 percent customs duty, whereas the Chinese market is now tariff free. For exporters capable of meeting Chinese customs standards, there is a real comparative advantage. However, the tariff exemption does not create the productive and logistical capacities necessary to exploit this advantage. The risk is therefore a consolidation of primary commodity specialization rather than its attenuation.
The true obstacle is structural, not tariff related. The fundamental difference between African and Asian supply chains is not access to raw materials, but where value is created through processing.
Global Witness published on 10 June 2026 a major report titled "Who Buys Rwanda's Smuggled Coltan? The Global Journey of Conflict Coltan from DRC to the World's Electronics."
Most of the conflict coltan mined in the Democratic Republic of Congo and smuggled through Rwanda is processed by companies in China. A few companies in Kazakhstan and Thailand are also involved. The refined tantalum often unwittingly ends up in the products of major Western companies.
AEI's Critical Threats published on 3 April 2026 an analysis titled "Houthi Escalation Calculus Following Cautious Entry into the Iran War" by Liam Karr and Brian Carter.
The Iran-backed Houthis threatened to join Iran's campaign with attacks across the region designed to coerce the United States and Israel to make concessions in negotiations with Iran and to deter further military escalation against Iran. But the Houthis are unlikely to follow through on these threats unless the US and its allies cross certain Houthi or Iranian red lines, such as the Gulf states entering the war or ground operations against Iran, to avoid retaliation from the US and its allies that would jeopardize the groups domestic position.
The Houthis have conducted several attacks targeting southern Israel since March 27, marking the group's first involvement in the war. Attacks on Israel minimize the risk of entanglement with the Gulf states or the United States. They draw retaliatory Israeli strikes on Yemen that only temporarily damage Houthi infrastructure while further rallying popular support for the group.
AEI's Critical Threats Africa File posted on 2 April 2026 an article titled "Red Sea" by Liam Karr.
While the Iran-backed Houthis in Yemen have attacked Israel on several occasions since 27 March, they have not resumed attacks on international shipping in the Red Sea, indicating a restrained approach that attempts to avoid major regional escalation.
The People's Map of Global China published on 25 November 2025 a paper titled "Madagascar" by Xuefei Shi, a development researcher based in Bergen, Norway.
This is a nice summary of the relationship between Madagascar and China. It covers historical ties as well as the current relationship.
The Sentry published in November 2025 a report titled "Inside Job: Libya's Fuel Smuggling Escalation."
Fuel smuggling in Libya has escalated into a national crisis costing the country about $6.7 billion annually. The smuggling enables Moscow's military activities in sub-Saharan Africa and the Rapid Support Forces genocidal war in Sudan's Darfur region.
The International Crisis Group posted on 20 June 2025 an article titled "Capture of Tri-border Area Marks Another Twist in Sudan's Civil War" by Shewit Woldemichael.
Sudan's paramilitary Rapid Support Forces (RSF) have seized control of the strategic Sudan-Libya-Egypt border triangle, which marks a significant victory for the RSF following setbacks elsewhere in Sudan. This could mark the start of an offensive by the RSF into regions that have so far seen limited fighting, forcing the Sudan Armed Forces to redirect resources.
CNN published on 6 April 2025 an article titled "Far from Being Cowed by US Airstrikes, Yemen's Houthis May Be Relishing Them" by Nadeen Ebrahim and Tim Lister.
As the United States continues airstrikes on Houthi rebels in Yemen, the Houthis become more defiant. The senior Houthi military and political leadership remains intact according to analysts and so are at least some of its missile launching sites. The total cost of the US airstrikes is nearing $1 billion in just under three weeks. While Houthi capacity is being degraded, they have an extraordinarily high tolerance for pain and the only way to defeat the Houthis may be a ground invasion.
Comment: The Saudis and the Emiratis failed to subdue the Houthis in a lengthy war on the ground. Regional experts tend to agree that only an extensive and messy ground operation can subdue the Houthis. There is little chance the US is willing to undertake such an operation and there is no guarantee it would succeed if it tried. It may be time to reassess US policy in the Red Sea region.
Agence France Presse published on 27 March 2025 an article titled "Sudan's Booming Wartime Gold Trade Flows Through the UAE."
Sudan's gold mining has become the lifeblood of the civil war, with nearly all of the trade channeled through the United Arab Emirates, enriching both the Sudan Armed Forces and the paramilitary Rapid Support Forces. The UAE denies its involvement in the gold trade.
Foreign Policy published on 19 March 2025 an analysis titled "Is This Game Over for the Houthis?" by Burcu Ozcelik and Baraa Shiban, both at the Royal United Services Institute.
The shift in US policy under the Trump administration from targeted air strikes to a more aggressive campaign marks a significant escalation in the attacks on the Houthis in Yemen. The Houthis see themselves as playing the role that Hezbollah once played.
Most observers agree that a ground operation by US forces is unlikely, which means there is a clear limitation to how much the US can achieve through airstrikes alone. The Houthis are counting on the US losing interest over the course of a protracted air campaign.
The Royal United Services Institute for Defence and Security Studies published on 6 February 2025 a study titled "Wagner's Business Model in Syria and Africa: Profit and Patronage" by Olivia Allison, Nick Connon, Antonio Giustozzi, and James Pascall.
The paper examines whether the Wagner Group was profitable under its founder Yevgeny Prigozhin, what its business model meant for Russia and Russia's geopolitical rivals in the recent past, and what the model could mean for the future. It draws primarily on three case studies: Syria, the Central African Republic, and Mali.
It concludes that Wagner Group ventures in Africa and the Middle East did not contribute significantly to Russia's coffers, but that does not appear to have been the purpose. Rather, they were intended to sustain Russia's foreign policy initiatives.
Prigozhin's death raised serious questions about the sustainability of the Wagner business model. With Prigozhin gone and given the lack of appetite for his neocolonial approach among governments that might make use of Wagner's style of operations, a more feasible approach for achieving substantial profits in the future would be a focus on smuggling.
Foreign Policy published on 6 January 2025 an article titled "The Houthis Are Undeterred" by Beth Sanner and Jennifer Kavanagh.
The US is burning through billions of dollars' worth of production of scarce munitions to combat the continuing Houthi attacks on Red Sea shipping using cheap drones and missiles. Washington may be spending as much as $570 million per month on a mission that has had limited success.
The Geneva-based The Responsible Security Association published on 4 December 2024 a commentary titled "Casting a Shadow: The UAE in Africa" by Raphael Parens, Foreign Policy Research Institute.
The UAE is heavily involved in civil wars in Libya and Sudan. Illicit gold flows through Abu Dhabi fund armed groups, mercenaries, and juntas in West Africa. The UAE may even be considering establishing its own "foreign legions," drawing from the examples of the Russian Wagner Group and the French Foreign Legion to build the country's brand of aggressive foreign involvement.
