China's Zero Tariff Policy Seeks to Change African Trade Patterns

 Asia Times published on 27 July 2026 an article titled "China's Zero-tariff Play Aims to Lock in African Loyalty" by Bob Savic.

China's zero-tariff access for 63 countries--53 of them in Africa--is a deliberate geostrategic lever in Beijing's long-term competition with the United States and Europe for influence in the Global South.  It is designed to offer unfettered, predictable, and large-scale access for African exports in contrast to protectionist markets in the United States and Europe.

The zero-tariff policy also positions Africa's growing population as a significant long-term market for Chinese goods and services and helps China to shape the rules of global commerce.

Comment:  While this may be China's goal, it must still deal with the fact that Beijing exports far more to Africa than it imports from Africa, and the initial evidence suggests that the zero-tariff policy is not having a significant impact on this situation.

The Sino-Moroccan Rapprochement

 The Torino World Affairs Institute published in 2026 a study titled "The Sino-Moroccan Rapprochement: An Analysis of Geoeconomic Convergence, Diplomatic Calibration and Media Narratives in a Changing Maghreb" by Bianca Pasquier and Imane Ezzehouany, edited by Amanda Chen and Leonardo Bruni.  

The study concludes that by deepening its engagement with China, Morocco is reengineering its agency and room for maneuver while maintaining its traditional ties with the United States and Europe.  China's economic presence in the Kingdom, albeit still limited compared to European and Gulf partners in overall investment terms, has rapidly expanded in industrial sectors critical for the green transition and the restructuring of global value chains.  

The African Cocoa Industry and the Chinese Tariff Exemption

 Thierry Pairault posted on 13 June 2026 an analysis titled "The African Cocoa Industry and the Chinese Tariff Exemption."

He concludes that an African entrepreneur manufacturing chocolate for export to Europe would face a 30 percent customs duty, whereas the Chinese market is now tariff free.  For exporters capable of meeting Chinese customs standards, there is a real comparative advantage.  However, the tariff exemption does not create the productive and logistical capacities necessary to exploit this advantage.  The risk is therefore a consolidation of primary commodity specialization rather than its attenuation.

The true obstacle is structural, not tariff related.  The fundamental difference between African and Asian supply chains is not access to raw materials, but where value is created through processing.  

China Forces Europe to Reconsider Industrialization in Africa

 Semafor published on 25 May 2026 an article titled "How China Forced Europe to Reconsider Africa's Industrialization" by W. Gyude Moore.

Chinese dominance in a number of industrial sectors is forcing Europe to worry that it may face deindustrialization and to rethink the need to support industrialization in Africa.

Russia's Appeal to Southern African States

 South Africa's Institute for Global Dialogue published on 16 March 2026 a commentary titled "Beyond Material: Russia's Appeal to Southern African States" by Philani Mthembu.

Although Russia is not a major economic partner in Africa, Moscow's increased focus on the continent has given southern Africa states greater autonomy and options on the global stage as they pursue their own national interests.  

Africa's Critical Minerals and Great Power Competition

 Rare Earth Exchanges published on 17 May 2026 an article titled "Africa Has Become the New Geopolitical Battleground for Critical Minerals."

The article summarizes a study that examines trade flows, foreign direct investment, military relationships, diplomatic agreements, mining policy, and strategic industrial initiatives shaping Africa's critical minerals economy.  It evaluates how China, Russia, the United States, and Europe are accessing and responding to Africa's critical mineral wealth.

The entire study "In the Crosshairs: Twenty-first-century Rivalry for Africa's Critical Minerals" by Ron Matthews and Vlado Vivoda was published online on 11 May 2026 by the European Journal of International Security.  

China Projected to Dominate Africa's Solar Panel Imports

 The Wire, a digital news magazine, posted on 5 April 2026 an article titled "China's Solar Industry Follows the Sun to Africa" by Noah Berman.  

Based on the current trend of Chinese solar panel sales to Africa, China will become the critical supplier of energy infrastructure to Africa by the end of the decade.  There is concern, however, that this may result in dependency on China with Africa becoming a dumping ground for Chinese solar products.

Chinese Cobalt Mine in DRC Causes Health Problems

 The Environmental Investigation Agency and PremiCongo published in March 2026 a report titled "Toxic Transition: How the World's Largest Cobalt Producer Has Allegedly Poisoned Communities for Years."

A Chinese company, CMOC Group Ltd., controls two of the world's largest copper-cobalt mines in the Democratic Republic of Congo.  Thousands of people live within a few kilometers of the operations and its massive processing plant.  Local communities and civil society groups have sounded the alarm about severe health issues.  Since 2023, doctors and nurses near the mines have treated a growing list of patients.

Russia Shifts Diplomats from Europe to Africa

 Africa Business Insider published on 11 February 2026 an article titled "Following Massive Diplomatic Expulsions from Europe, Russia Redirects Its Envoys to Africa" by Chinedu Okafor.

Russia's TASS news service estimates that more than 500 Russian diplomats have been asked to leave European countries since the beginning of the war with Ukraine.  Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov said that Russia has shifted 120 to 150 diplomats from Europe and reassigned most of them to embassies in Africa, especially in Burkina Faso, Niger, and Mali.  

An Analysis of Russia-Africa Ties and Role of US

 Riddle published on 18 December 2025 an analysis titled "Russia-Africa Ties Catch Global Tailwinds in 2025" by Ivan U. Klyszcz, research fellow at the International Centre for Defence and Security, a think tank in the Nordic and Baltic space.  

Russia and Egypt are cohosting this week the 2nd Russia-Africa ministerial conference, which is setting the agenda for the 2026 Russia-Africa summit.  The focus is on expanding trade with Africa, which is currently smaller than Ukraine's trade with the continent.  Russian investment barely registers, and Moscow has fallen from the number one arms supplier to number two.

On the other hand, Russia's covert and security ties with Africa remain robust.  Moscow now has 22 "Russia House" branches in Africa, opened two new embassies in 2025, and has plans for five more.  The author adds that "with the US abandoning its leadership role, Moscow--working in tandem with Beijing--gains more space to offer governments worldwide an alternative to the US-led, post-Cold War order."  In addition, President Trump "has expressed open contempt (if not hatred) toward the continent."

Podcast with Germany's Special Envoy to the Horn of Africa

 The International Crisis Group posted on 8 December 2025 a 38-minute podcast titled "Global Disorder, Horn of Africa Turmoil.  Can Europe Keep Up?" with Alan Boswell and Heiko Nitzschke, Germany's special envoy for the Horn of Africa based in Nairobi.  

Maritime security in the Red Sea and Gulf of Aden looms large in the policies of Germany and Europe.  The Horn of Africa is increasingly being impacted by multilateralism.  Europe is only one among many engaged players in the Horn.  African countries in the region ultimately will determine the role that Europe plays.  Europe's strength is the reliability of its interest and engagement.  Its priority for the conflict in Sudan is to achieve a ceasefire and ameliorate the humanitarian crisis.

US foreign aid cuts sent shockwaves through European and Horn of Africa capitals.  European countries are trying to fill some of the gaps left by the United States, but they too are turning increasingly to private investment.  US policy in the region has also become more unpredictable.  A new order is emerging in the Horn, especially with greater involvement of the Gulf States and Türkiye.  Finally, Nitzschke expressed concern there is now a serious risk of renewed conflict between Ethiopia and Eritrea. 

China Mobile Activates 2Africa Submarine Cable

 TechAfrica News posted on 7 November 2025 an article titled "China Mobile Activates 2Africa East Submarine Cable to Strengthen Africa's Digital Backbone" by Kay-Lyne Wolfenden.

China Mobile has activated the 2Africa East Segment of its submarine cable system, marking a major milestone in enhancing Africa's digital infrastructure.  The 2Africa project connects 33 countries across Africa, Europe, and Asia.  

Western Withdrawal and the Rise of Others in Africa

 The Robert Lansing Institute (RLI) posted on 24 October 2025 remarks titled "Vacuum of Influence: Western Withdrawal and the Rise of New Powers in Africa."

RLI asked me to respond to several questions dealing with Russia's effort to increase its influence in Africa and why the West is losing influence on the continent.  This piece is my response to the questions.

Turkiye as a Strategic Partner in Africa

 United World International posted on 21 September 2025 a commentary titled "Turkiye as a Strategic Partner in Africa" by Halim Gencoglu.

The author argues that as Turkiye expands its influence in Africa it could play a more important role in promoting political stability.  It offers an alternative to growing Chinese and Russian influence and could partner with Western countries.  

Houthi Red Sea Attacks and Trump Administration Response

 Reuters published on 25 March 2025 an article titled "What Are the US and Europe Doing to Counter Houthi Strikes in the Red Sea?"

The article looks at the steps taken by Europe and the Biden administration to counter Houthi attacks in the Red Sea since they began more than a year ago.  It updates the situation following the most recent strikes against the Houthis by the Trump administration.  

Shipuniverse.com published on 26 March 2025 an article titled "Red Sea Tensions Disrupt Global Shipping as Houthi Attacks Intensify."

The article explains the impact of Houthi attacks on international shipping and the way forward following the US air strikes against the Houthis in Yemen.

The Future of World Order in the Trump Administration

 Project Syndicate published on 4 March 2025 a commentary titled "The Future of World Order" by Joseph S. Nye, Jr.

The author concluded that if the international order is eroding, America's domestic politics are as much of a cause as China's rise.  The question is whether we are entering a totally new period of American decline, or whether the second Trump administration's attacks on the American Century's institutions and alliances will prove to be another cyclical dip.  We may not know until 2029.

Global Diplomacy Index: China Pulls Ahead of US

 Australia's Lowy Institute has released its "2024 Global Diplomacy Index."

China pulled ahead of the United States in global diplomatic missions in 2019 and maintained a small lead through 2023.  Russia's war in Ukraine has resulted in a significant reduction in Moscow's diplomatic representation.  Türkiye and India have significantly expanded their representation in recent years.  There has been a recent focus on the establishment of diplomatic missions in Pacific Islands countries.  

Trump Administration Considers Merging US Africa Command into European Command

 Micro Soft Network (MSN) published on 25 February 2025 an article titled "President Trump's Plan to Dismantle U.S. Africa Command Under Review" by Victor Oluwole.  

The Trump administration is considering an executive action to dismantle the U.S. Africa Command (AFRICOM) and transfer its responsibilities to the U.S. European Command (EUCOM).  This was the organizational structure prior to 2007, although the primary goal now seems to be a desire to eliminate the command in order to downsize engagement in Africa.   

Impact on Shipping of Houthi Red Sea Attacks

 The Italian Institute for International Political Studies published on 24 November 2024 a paper titled "Blue Economy and the Mediterranean: How the Red Sea Crisis is Shaping the Region's Maritime Future (and What Is Next)" by Mario Mattioli.

Houthi attacks on Red Sea shipping reduced transit through the Suez Canal by about 50 percent in 2023 and 70 percent in the first half of 2024.  Transit around Africa's Cape of Good Hope adds 3,000 to 3,500 nautical miles to voyages connecting Europe and Asia, increasing travel time by about 10 days.  This results in higher costs for fuel, wages, insurance, and freight borne by shipping companies.

Can Africa and Europe Counter Markets Flooded with Chinese Products?

 The European Council on Foreign Relations published on 4 October 2024 an article titled "Value-added and Value Lost: The Macroeconomic Limits of China's Africa Strategy" by Theodore Murphy.

China's manufacturing overcapacity relies on exports to the rest of the world, including Africa, flooding international markets with both low end and high-end Chinese-made goods.  As African economies try to increase their low value manufactured products, they must compete with low-cost Chinese products.  European economies face a similar problem from China's high-end manufacturing.  

The author suggests European and African economic policy makers should counter Chinese overcapacity jointly while creating new areas for Africa-Europe economic cooperation.