The Club of Mozambique published on 22 September 2026 an article titled "Mozambique Wants to Revise Agreement with China to Strengthen Fight Against Timber Smuggling."
China imports 90 percent of Mozambique's exported timber. Restrictions on the export of raw logs continue to be ignored by timber smugglers. Mozambique wants to strengthen its agreement with China to reduce smuggling and encourage Chinese companies to process raw logs in Mozambique.
Semafor published on 17 July 2026 an article titled "Africa's Mineral Export Bans Are Only the Opening Bid" by Yinka Adegoke.
China controls about 72 percent of global critical minerals processing capacity, giving it more leverage than the countries that produce the ore.
This has propelled a wave of resource nationalism in Africa as governments try to move up the value chain. The DRC, Zimbabwe, Mozambique, and Gabon are tightening controls on the export of raw minerals in order to force more value addition at home.
Thierry Pairault published on 30 June 2026 an article titled "The African Sesame Industry and the Chinese Tariff Exemption."
China obtains from Africa more than 80 percent of its imported sesame seeds. Six countries account for 95 percent of African sesame exports to China: Niger, Sudan, Tanzania, Togo, Mozambique, and Ethiopia.
China's recent zero tariff policy for African countries will primarily benefit Chinese importers-processors rather than African producers. The tariff advantage is captured at the point of entry into China by companies whose shareholders are Chinese, Singaporean, and Taiwanese.
South Africa's Institute for Global Dialogue published on 16 March 2026 a commentary titled "Beyond Material: Russia's Appeal to Southern African States" by Philani Mthembu.
Although Russia is not a major economic partner in Africa, Moscow's increased focus on the continent has given southern Africa states greater autonomy and options on the global stage as they pursue their own national interests.
The Respondents posted on 20 May 2026 an article titled "CCM, China's CPC Deepen Ties with Southern African Liberation Parties."
Tanzania's ruling Chama Cha Mapinduzi hosted a meeting with the head of the International Department of the Communist Party of China and senior leaders from the ruling political parties in Mozambique, Angola, Namibia, South Africa, and Zimbabwe. The parties launched the Research Centre for Xi Jinping Thought on Socialism with Chinese Characteristics for a New Era.
Bloomberg published on 5 May 2026 an article titled "Mozambique Weighs Swapping Dollar Debt for Yuan in China Talks" by Tavares Cebola.
Mozambique is considering converting the $1.4 billion it owes China into yuan loans as part of a debt restructuring with its biggest bilateral creditor.
The South China Morning Post published on 25 April 2026 an article titled "China and Mozambique to Map Critical Minerals in Insurgency-Hit Cabo Delgado" by Jevans Nyabiage.
During a state visit to China, Mozambique's President Daniel Chapo signed a wide-ranging joint communique dealing with cooperation on critical minerals, natural gas, and rare earths. China also agreed to provide more support, not spelled out, for combatting an insurgency in Mozambique's Cabo Delgado region.
E-International Relations posted on 1 April 2026 my short paper titled "The Communist Party of China Reaches Out to Africa."
This is a post-COVID-19 update of efforts by the International Department of the Communist Party of China (ID-CPC) to strengthen ties with political parties in Africa. COVID-19 significantly interrupted the ID-CPC's interaction with African political parties. The ID-CPC has now returned to a high degree of engagement with them.
The South African Institute of International Affairs published in February 2026 a study titled "Back to the Shadows: Russia's African Security Engagements Since Prigozhin" by Ivan U. Klyszcz, Centre for Defence and Security in Tallinn, Estonia.
Russia continues to deploy military personnel and conduct information operations to shape regional politics in Africa. Since 2023, Moscow has taken tighter control, with Kremlin-linked figures, state agencies, and federal funding driving these efforts. Russian activities reflect the Kremlin's top foreign policy priorities but are constrained by competing demands, especially the war in Ukraine.
The Washington Post published on 28 March 2026 an editorial titled "Yet Another Step Toward State Capitalism."
The US International Development Finance Corporation has taken a 20 percent stake in a graphite mine in Mozambique to counter China's control of the world's supply of graphite. This is a tactic the Trump administration has used in other deals to control critical minerals. The editorial asks if this is the best use of taxpayer funding when they will be left holding the bag if the company fails.
Gallup just released its "World Happiness Report 2026" that assesses 147 countries from 2023 through 2025. The 2026 edition highlights the role social media plays in social connection, trust, and shared experiences worldwide.
The happiest African countries based on the social media focus were Mauritius (73), Libya (81), Algeria (83), Mozambique (93), and Gabon (96). The least happy African countries were DRC (140), Botswana (143), Zimbabwe (144), Malawi (145), and Sierra Leone (146).
Comment: There are surprises, at least for me, at both ends of the scale. The focus on social media probably accounts for them
The Institute of Development Studies published in March 2026 a major study titled "Smart City Surveillance in Africa: Mapping Chinese AI Surveillance Across 11 Countries" edited by Wairagala Wakabi and Tony Roberts.
The report provides a comprehensive account of smart city surveillance in Algeria, Egypt, Kenya, Mauritius, Mozambique, Nigeria, Rwanda, Senegal, Uganda, Zambia, and Zimbabwe. China is by far the largest supplier of AI surveillance technologies to African governments, including to all 11 covered in this study.
The rapid expansion of smart city surveillance is having a chilling effect on ordinary citizens and journalists. The scale and invasive nature of mass surveillance is often not legal, necessary, or proportionate. There is little evidence that the expansion of digital surveillance reduces overall crime.
The Carnegie Endowment for International Peace published on 26 February 2026 a study titled "Russia in Africa: Examining Moscow's Influence and Its Limits" edited by Nate Reynolds, Frances Z. Brown, Frederic Wehrey, and Andrew S. Weiss.
The study explores Russia's role, its appeal, and its limitations across Africa since the 2010s, drawing on contributions from a range of scholars. It also looks at the agency and interests of African governments and citizens.
Opportunism continues to define Russia's approach to Africa, as Moscow hones a set of tools designed to take advantage of instability and state fragility. African actors can--and do--instrumentalize Russian engagement on the continent and advance their own agency in the relationship. Geopolitical competition in Africa is widening and intensifying as middle powers emerge as important external partners, in addition to traditional powers. The West must evolve its approach accordingly.
These essays point to a complicated and mixed record for Russia in Africa that defies simple characterizations. Russia's influence in Africa has undoubtedly grown, but there are outstanding questions about whether it can translate its gains into stable, lasting relationships; whether its tools and symbolic gestures will gain further traction; and whether it can outcompete a crowded field of external powers that can deliver more than Russia, should they choose to.
The African Center for Strategic Studies published on 30 January 2026 a paper titled "China's Military Footprint in Africa Deepens with People's Liberation Army-led BRICS Naval Drills" by Paul Nantulya.
The January 2026 BRICS Plus naval exercise in South African waters led by China's People's Liberation Army underscored Beijing's use of military power in Africa to advance Chinese geostrategic objectives. China views BRICS Plus as part of an alternative global security and geopolitical architecture intended to counterbalance Western and US-led initiatives.
Beijing has invested heavily in securing African participation in Chinese-led global initiatives to enhance its legitimacy, build regional voting blocs, and strengthen China's leverage amid global rivalries. It accomplishes this through military exercises, naval port calls, creating security architecture, arms sales, and military training.
Mizzima, a non-profit foundation that supports social change and development in Myanmar, published on 28 January 2026 a commentary titled "Weaponising the Trawl: China's Maritime Militia, Distant-Water Fishing, and the Strategic Contest in the Indian Ocean."
Chinese fishing fleets maintain a massive presence in the Indian Ocean region. What appears on the surface as fishing is, in practice, a grey-zone strategy, blending economic exploitation, intelligence gathering, and coercive presence to reshape the maritime realities without triggering open conflict.
In addition, see Sweekriti Pathak's "Fishing and Force: China's Dark Fleets and Maritime Militias" dated 29 January 2026 published by India's Observer Research Foundation.
The Wellbeing Research Centre at the University of Oxford published the World Happiness Report 2025. The focus of this year's report is the impact of caring and sharing on people's happiness. It includes factors such as giving money to charity, volunteering, and helping strangers. It tries to measure the degree of benevolence in each of the 147 countries that it evaluates.
The five highest ranked African countries are Mauritius (78), Libya (79), Algeria (84), South Africa (95), and Mozambique (96). Seven of the ten lowest ranked countries are in Africa: Lesotho (138), Comoros (139), DRC (141), Botswana (142), Zimbabwe (143), Malawi (144), and Sierra Leone (146).
The China Global South Project published on 14 November 2025 an article titled "China Moves from Infrastructure to Legal Influence in Africa" by Christian Geraud Neema Byamungu.
Representatives from Ethiopia, Algeria, DRC, Egypt, Kenya, Morocco, Mozambique, Nigeria, South Africa, Uganda, Zambia, and Zimbabwe met in China to align legal and institutional practices related to cross-border crimes and commercial disputes. The driver of this action is China's growing physical presence in Africa.
The Africa Policy Research Institute published on 29 September 2025 an analysis titled "From Minerals to Influence: Resource-for-Security Deals Reshaping Power Dynamics in Africa" by Amandine Gnanguenon and Marius Kretzschmar.
Critical raw materials, especially minerals, have become Africa's major attraction for Russia, China, and the United States. Each country has a different approach for linking critical minerals to its security interests.
Foreign Policy published on 9 September 2025 an article titled "China's Appetite for Rosewood Is Causing Chaos in Africa" by Caroline Costello and Joshua Eisenman.
China imported an estimated $2 billion of rosewood from Africa between 2017 and 2022. Much of the logging for this rare timber is illegal. Extreme drought and flooding linked to the loss of rosewood trees have had devastating agricultural impacts.
The Africa Defense Forum (ADF) magazine, published by the US Africa Command, posted on 15 July 2025 an article titled "Indian Ocean Nations Grapple with Illegal Chinese Fishing Trawlers."
China has the largest distant water fishing fleet in the world. According to the World Wildlife Fund, Kenya, Madagascar, Mozambique, and South Africa lost up to $142 million annually between 2015 and 2021 as a result of illegal fishing of shrimp, tuna, at least fifty-six species of sharks and rays and a variety of reef fish. The Chinese fleet is the worst illegal fishing offender.
