China-Africa Trade Increases, but So Do African Trade Deficits

 The Institute for Security Studies published on 2 April 2026 a paper titled "FOCAC Recycled: Preferential Access, Same Old Problem" by Marvellous Ngundu.  

Since 2000, Africa-China trade has expanded dramatically from less than $10 billion to over $348 billion in 2025.  Yet beneath this growth lies a persistent structural imbalance.  Africa's trade deficit with China has widened from negligible levels in the early 2000s to over $100 billion in 2025.

Beginning on 1 May 2026 China is implementing a zero-tariff policy for all but one African country in an effort to rectify this imbalance.  But the change risks entrenching existing trade patterns in which value addition occurs elsewhere.  As a result, higher trade volumes may not translate into more inclusive or structurally transformative outcomes for African economies.

The core issue is not tariffs, but industrialization.  Africa's trade position will only shift when it exports more manufactured and semi-processed goods.  China's duty-free initiative presents both an opportunity and a test.  It expands market access but highlights the limitations without the capability.

Russian Trade and Investment Lags in Africa

 The Intel Drop posted on 31 March 2026 an article titled "Russia-Africa Summit: Russia's New Chapter on Africa Trade and Economic Collaboration" by Kester Kenn Klomegah.

If Russia intends to be a major player in Africa, it must open Russia to imports from Africa and increase significantly Russian foreign direct investment in the continent.  Otherwise, it will increasingly fall behind the economic engagement efforts of China, the United States, and India.  

China's Zero Tariffs for Africa Provide Positive Publicity at Little Cost (in French)

 Thierry Pairault posted on 28 March 2026 a working paper titled "Tarif zero: un petit geste qui ne coute presque rien."

This is the first of two analyses Thierry Pairault has posted on the impact of Beijing's decision to allow imports from 53 African countries to enter China duty free beginning 1 May.  He explains this is an inexpensive gesture that will not have much practical impact. The second working paper was reposted on 30 March below.

China's trade surplus with Africa continues to grow.  China exports value-added goods to Africa while Africa exports mostly raw materials and some agricultural products to China.  A small number of African countries account for most of the continent's exports to China.  

China's zero tariff treatment of African imports may benefit some agricultural products such as coffee and tobacco, but it will not change significantly existing China-Africa trade patterns.  

African Country Military Strength Ranking

 Global Firepower has released its "2026 Military Strength Ranking" that evaluates 145 countries based on 60 factors in the categories of manpower, military equipment, finances, logistics, natural resources, and geography.  The ranking included 38 of the 54 countries in Africa.

The ten highest ranked African countries were Egypt (19), Algeria (27). Nigeria (33), South Africa (40), Ethiopia (47), Morocco (56), Angola (59), DRC (64), Sudan (66), and Tunisia (79).

African Export Controls on Raw Minerals May Disrupt Chinese Supply Chains

 China-Africa News published on 17 March 2026 an article titled "Growing Debate Over African Resource Policies and Their Impact on China" by Cremilda Macuacua.  

A growing number of African countries are putting restrictions on the export of raw minerals.  As the largest importer of many of Africa's minerals, these export controls could disrupt current Chinese supply chains.  

Nigeria Is Turning into a US-China Battleground

 Foreign Policy published on 20 November 2025 a commentary titled "Nigeria Is Turing into a U.S.-China Battleground" by Patrick Egwu, a Nigerian-born freelance journalist based in Toronto.

After President Donald Trump threatened military action against Nigeria over the alleged persecution of Christians by Islamic insurgents, China has stepped in to oppose Trump's actions--deepening the contest between Washington and Beijing for the allegiance of Africa's most populous country.

Impact of China's Economic Slowdown on Africa

 The Atlantic Council published in November 2025 a study titled "China's Economic Slowdown and Spillovers to Africa" by Matthew Mingey, Jeremy Smith, and Laura Gormley.  

This report investigates how different projections of China's economic growth and structure over the next five years will affect trade and financial engagement with the African continent and what outcomes will mean for decision-makers.

The best long-term outcome for Africa is likely one in which China accepts the cost of reform to implement slower, but more stable growth.  While countries could previously envision the net benefits of close trading relationships with China in 2030, trade now presents both opportunity and threat: opportunity in the form of cheap imports but complication in the form of persistent trade imbalances and overcapacity in manufacturing.  Under any growth scenario, finance from China's banks and investors will continue to decline as China's domestic financial system evolves.  

US Looks Beyond China and to Africa for Rare Earths

 Fox News posted on 26 October 2025 an article titled "Trump Administration Works to Break China's Rare Earth Stranglehold on Africa" by Paul Tilsley.

Tanzania, Angola, Malawi, and South Africa expect to open rare earth mines by 2029.  The United States now imports 70 percent of its rare earth elements from China but hopes to secure new sources in Africa.  

If you can't access the article in the above link, try doing so here.

An Analysis of Russia's Africa Corps

 The Robert Lansing Institute, an American nonprofit public policy research group, published on 30 September 2025 a detailed report titled "Russia's Africa Corps: Wagner's Successor in Africa (2022-2025)." 

This in-depth account concludes that the Africa Corps has effectively taken over the Wagner Group's Africa program since late 2023.  The Africa Corps maintains a presence in the CAR, Mali, Libya, Sudan, Niger, and Burkina Faso.  It has a small engagement in Equatorial Guinea and prospective deals in Togo, Benin, and Cameroon.  

The shift from the Wagner Group to the Africa Corps marked an effort to align African operations with Russia's state strategy.  The goals of securing allies, resources, and strategic positioning remain, but the execution is now more systematic and overtly tied to the Kremlin.  The Africa Corps is the beginning of a more ambitious Russian expeditionary posture.  

Africa's Critical Minerals and Russia, China, and the US

The Africa Policy Research Institute published on 29 September 2025 an analysis titled "From Minerals to Influence: Resource-for-Security Deals Reshaping Power Dynamics in Africa" by Amandine Gnanguenon and Marius Kretzschmar.   

Critical raw materials, especially minerals, have become Africa's major attraction for Russia, China, and the United States.  Each country has a different approach for linking critical minerals to its security interests.  

China's Role in Africa's Energy Development

 The China-Global South Project published in July 2025 a major report titled "Powering Africa: China's Expanding Role in the Continent's Energy Future" by Frangton Chiyemura.

From 2020 to 2024, Chinese financing delivered over 32 gigawatts of power generation capacity to 30 African countries.  At the same time, several projects face delays or dormancy due to technical, financial, or political challenges.  

Russia Losing Influence in Africa

 The Wall Street Journal published on 29 September 2025 an article titled "Russia's Ambitious Plans in Africa Are Unraveling" by Benoit Faucon and Nicholas Bariyo.

Russian influence is receding in Sudan, Mali, Niger, and Burkina Faso following the collapse of the mercenary Wagner Group and its replacement with the Africa Corps under Moscow's Ministry of Defense.  

Russia Tries to Improve Security in Africa's Sahel Region

 Al-Estiklal published on 29 August 2025 an article titled "Sahel States and Russia Establish Strategic Partnership: Messages and Objectives."

In mid-August, Russia invited the defense ministers of Mali, Burkina Faso, and Niger to Moscow to discuss strengthening security ties.  Russia reportedly is prepared to provide comprehensive support to these countries as they battle terrorist threats and armed groups.  The meeting also signaled the transfer of security support from Russia's Wagner Group to its Africa Corps replacement. 

China's Malign Influence in Africa and US Counter Strategy

 The Senate Foreign Relations Committee held a hearing on 4 June 2025 titled "China's Malign Influence in Africa."  The senior Africa Bureau official in the State Department, Troy Fitrell, provided the testimony.

Responding to the title of the hearing, Fitrell denounced Beijing's assertive, government-backed strategies to capture African market share.  He said China's strategy for economic dominance in Africa relies on a centralized, state-directed, and nationally resourced approach to dominating global markets and strategic supply chains.

Fitrell devoted most of his prepared testimony to the Trump administration's strategy for Africa, which will focus on investment-led and trade-driven growth.  It will prioritize robust commercial engagement, recognizing and treating African nations as equal partners in trade and investment.  He then identified six targeted actions:

1.  Making commercial diplomacy a core priority across US embassies;

2.  Promoting private-sector-identified market reforms with African governments;

3.  Implementing high-quality infrastructure projects;

4.  Sending commercial diplomacy missions with private sector representatives;

5.  Connecting export-ready US companies with African opportunities; and

6.  Reforming US trade and financing tools to better compete with China's swift and risk-tolerant financing model.  

Fitrell rightly concludes that "the strategy's success relies on U.S. companies expanding into new markets and African partners enabling environments for transparent and lasting commerce."

Comment:  As someone who has been following African affairs since the early 1960s, including 37 years in the State Department and most of it in the Africa Bureau, there is nothing new about this strategy except perhaps the emphasis being put on it by the Trump administration.  But other administrations, especially the Reagan administration, also gave commercial diplomacy a high priority.  All of them were disappointed with the results in Africa.  In the final analysis, the strategy is highly dependent on the willingness of the American private sector to engage in Africa.  Private sector enthusiasm will be determined not only by the priority given to it by the Trump administration, but the tangible incentives offered by the US government.  This is where China has a big advantage.

Is the US government prepared to provide sufficient on the ground staffing at all embassies in Africa?  Will it increase resources for the US Export-Import Bank, US International Development Finance Corporation, and Millennium Challege Corporation?  Will high level Trump administration officials lead trade and investment missions to Africa?  If the response to all of these questions is affirmative, the strategy might make a difference.

But it does not help when the announcement of the Africa commercial strategy is immediately followed by a full or partial ban on travel to the United States by 10 African countries.  Even if they are not among the most important trade and investment prospects, it sends the wrong message to all of Africa that America is not really open for business.    

Sudan Is Unraveling and May Divide Again

 Foreign Affairs published on 29 April 2025 an analysis titled "Sudan Is Unraveling: Why War Is Likely to Once Again Tear the Country Apart" by Mai Hassan and Ahmed Kodouda.  

Sudan divided into two countries in 2011 when South Sudan became independent.  The country's second de facto partition is already beginning along east/west lines.  But any split is unlikely to bring durable peace.

Because the conflict is driven by a struggle over regional power and resources, rather than any larger political vision for the country, it remains likely that alliances will keep shifting, local militias will keep defecting, and breakaway groups will keep forming.  

Turkey-Africa Relations

 The Foreign Policy Research Institute published on 10 March 2025 an analysis titled "Turkey's Return to Africa" by Raphael Parens and Marcel Plichta.  

Turkey sees Africa as a core part of its global political and economic engagement and a source of support in international organizations.  Africa also provides critical raw materials and minerals for Turkish companies and markets for contractors, including Turkey's version of Russia's Wagner Group known as SADAT.  

A Former Republican USAID Administrator: Don't Gut the Organization

 Foreign Affairs published on 7 February 2025 an article titled "Don't Gut USAID" by Andrew Natsios, administrator of USAID during the George W. Bush administration.  

The author argues the Trump administration stop work order for USAID has paralyzed US aid programs around the world, bankrupting fragile local aid groups and small businesses and putting lives at risk.  Simply slashing vital programs is a huge mistake, but a far-reaching review and restructuring of US foreign aid is overdue.  If USAID disappears, the Trump administration will cede the field to China and Russia.  

China Increases Duty Free Access for Africa's Least Developed Countries

 Nanyang Technological University in Singapore published on 28 January 2025 an article titled "China Grants Full Duty-free Access to 33 African Countries."

Thirty-three least developed countries in Africa can now export 100 percent of their products duty free to China, which has gradually expanded over the years the range of products eligible for zero-tariff treatment.  In the most recent decision, China added 140 products that qualify.

In the past, however, these tariff exemptions have not significantly increased African exports to China as most of them are primary products such as minerals and oil.  China exports mostly manufactured goods to Africa.  As a result, Africa has a large trade deficit with China.  Factors other than tariffs impact Africa's ability to export to China.  African countries must develop greater processing and manufacturing capacity to export value added goods.   

Russia Expands Influence Across Africa

 CNN posted on 18 January 2025 a commentary titled "Across Africa, Russia Is Growing in Influence.  What Might Moscow Want?" by Nimi Princewill.  

Moscow is seeking to expand its influence beyond the Sahel region of Africa, sometimes offering to serve essentially as a Praetorian Guard for authoritarian African leaders.  It also seeks to control African natural resources for economic gain.  

Russia's Africa Corps Encounters Limits

 The CTC Sentinel published in December 2024 an analysis titled "Africa Corps: Has Russia Hit a Ceiling in Africa?" by Christopher Faulkner, Marcel Plichta, and Raphael Parens.  

Russia's Africa Corps deployment in Africa's Sahel region has done little to curb jihadi violence.  It is not even clear that Moscow has a Sahel strategy. Russia's recent setback in Syria will make success in the Sahel even more questionable.  The Africa Corps is encountering significant challenges.  In Niger and Burkina Faso, the Africa Corps looks more like a Praetorian Guard to keep military regime leaders in power.