Business Insider Africa published on 26 August 2026 an article titled "Russia and China Push Back as Trump Administration Seeks Arms Embargo Across Sudan" by Ayodeji Adegboyega.
The Trump administration is seeking to expand a two-decade-old UN arms embargo on Darfur to all of Sudan and to explicitly cover drones. China, Russia, and the Sudan Armed Forces faction all oppose the initiative.
African Arguments published on 18 August 2026 a commentary titled "Sudan: Burhan's Dialogue Is Not a Path to Stability" by Ezzat Khairi, Sudanese political analyst.
While not making an argument for the rival paramilitary Rapid Support Forces, the author argues that any credible transition in Sudan must start with the departure from sovereign political authority of General Abdel Fattah al-Burhan. He has broken too many promises. Sudan's stability begins where al-Burhan's rule ends.
The Economist published on 6 August 2026 an article titled "The Ruin of Sudan."
Based on a visit to Khartoum and Omdurman, the article shows the devastation caused by more than three years of war between the Sudan Armed Forces (SAF) and the paramilitary Rapid Support Forces. The SAF is now in control of the capital region.
African Arguments posted on 21 July 2026 a commentary titled "Sudan's Peace Process Is Negotiating a War That No Longer Exists" by Ezzat Khairi, a Sudan political analyst.
Diplomatic assumptions for ending the war in Sudan remain where they were in April 2023. Peace initiatives approach Sudan as a two-sided conflict between a national army and a paramilitary rebellion. That model no longer fits the war. The Sudan Armed Forces (SAF) and paramilitary Rapid Support Forces (RSF) now contain armed movements, tribal formations, ideological brigades, local defense groups, and commanders with their own constituencies and expectations of the postwar order. The leaders of the SAF and RSF do not fully control the coalitions supporting them.
The UN Human Rights Council published on 8 July 2026 a 26-page report titled "Information Supplementing the Report 'Sudan: Hallmarks of Genocide in El Fasher'."
This report provides detailed references not included in the initial 19 February 2026 report and additional information that the UN Human Rights Council gathered following continued investigations since the publication of the original report.
It also helps develop the legal basis for the conclusions that were drawn in the original report, that the mass killings and related atrocities committed by the paramilitary Rapid Support Forces in and around El Fasher were indicators of a genocidal path.
Foreign Policy posted on 15 July 2026 an article titled "Sudan Faces New Sanctions as Evidence of Atrocities Mounts" by Nosmot Gbadamosi.
The EU and the US have expanded sanctions on individuals and companies that have aided the paramilitary Rapid Support Forces (RSF) and/or the Sudan Armed Forces (SAF). In the meantime, global efforts to end the war have largely stalled.
Comment: Numerous sanctions in recent years on the RSF and the SAF have had no impact on bringing this civil war to an end.
The New York Times published on 13 July 2026 an editorial titled "The World Must Wake Up to the Horror in Sudan."
Repeating the concerns of so many others, the editorial argues that the world needs to do more to halt the killing and mass displacement in Sudan.
Amnesty International published on 1 July 2026 a report titled "City Under Seige, Children Under Fire: Rapid Support Forces' Crimes Against Humanity in North Darfur."
This is a 202-page report on the paramilitary Rapid Support Forces (RSF) atrocities in North Darfur based on 247 interviews, including 208 with survivors of the RSF seizure of El Fasher, capital of North Darfur.
The Sentry published in April 2026 an alert titled "$24M Property Safe Haven in Dubai Linked to the RSF."
A network of family members, sanctioned individuals, and entities linked to the leadership of Sudan's paramilitary Rapid Support Forces (RSF) owns a $24 million real estate portfolio in Dubai consisting of over 20 properties. These properties, while legal, shed further light on the RSF's relationship with the UAE.
Prospect published on 1 April 2026 an article titled "Sudan's War in the Mountains" by Sophie Neiman.
The paramilitary Rapid Support Forces (RSF) is using the Nuba Mountains as a thoroughfare to take territory controlled by the Sudan Armed Forces (SAF) in the eastern part of Sudan. The Nuba Mountains have become a new frontline in the civil war. The RSF is aligned with the SPLM-N against the SAF.
Foreign Affairs published on 8 April 2026 an article titled "Don't Partition Sudan Again: Splitting It Didn't Work in the Past and Won't Work Now" by Francis M. Deng and Ahmed Kodouda.
Both the Sudan Armed Forces (SAF) and paramilitary Rapid Support Forces (RSF) insist they are fighting to preserve a unified Sudan, but the longer the current geographical division persists, the harder it will be to put the country together again.
The 2011 independence of South Sudan offers a cautionary tale. Any effort to formalize the split between the SAF and RSF-controlled parts of Sudan would not resolve the conflict's root causes. Another partition of Sudan would also destabilize its neighbors.
The International Crisis Group posted on 7 April 2026 a 42-minute podcast titled "After Three Years of War in Sudan, What Hope for a Ceasefire" hosted by Richard Atwood with Shewit Woldemichael and Alan Boswell.
The Iran war has not yet had a significant impact on the situation in Sudan beyond driving up prices of everything and causing fuel shortages. If the Iran war continues, it could have a huge negative impact on the food situation in Sudan.
The paramilitary Rapid Support Forces (RSF) control most of Darfur and West Kordofan while the Sudan Armed Forces (SAF) control most of the northeastern and eastern parts of the country. Sudan is effectively partitioned between the RSF and the SAF. The major battle fronts today are along the Chad border, South Sudan border, and Ethiopian border.
The RSF political program has been a failure. Noone has recognized the RSF government. The SAF has improved its position and is the dominant actor in the country today. While SAF fortunes have improved most Sudanese probably do not want the military to remain in power indefinitely.
The RSF continues to receive strong support from the UAE while the SAF has a degree of support from Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Turkey, and Eritrea. The most worrying new dynamic is the deterioration of relations between the SAF and Ethiopia. Differences over Nile water usage and Egyptian and Eritrean support for the SAF contribute to Ethiopia's concerns.
Massad Boulos, President Trump's special envoy for Africa, continues to seek a ceasefire as part of the Quad (US, Egypt, UAE, and Saudi Arabia). The effort is currently lacking high level pressure. RSF and SAF positions on a ceasefire remain far apart. Both sides believe they hold a strong military position. Only major outside pressure on them will likely change the situation.
There is considerable concern among the outside actors about the role of Islamist forces in the SAF, which complicates a resolution. In the meantime, the Sudan conflict continues to destabilize the Red Sea region.
Foreign Policy published on 6 April 2024 an analysis titled "Horrors in Sudan Highlight Deterioration of Western Diplomatic Corps."
There is little willingness by the West to end Sudan's conflict, but there is also little ability to do anything. Western states have minimal leverage with the two major combatants: The Sudan Armed Forces and the paramilitary Rapid Support Forces.
The Sentry published in February 2026 a report titled "Dubai Properties Linked to Hemedti."
Mohamed "Hemedti" Hamdan Dagalo, the leader of Sudan's paramilitary Rapid Support Forces (RSF) is closely linked to a $1.7 million property portfolio in the United Arab Emirates.
Foreign Affairs published on 11 February 2026 an article titled "How the War in Sudan Could End" by Volker Perthes, German Institute for International and Security Affairs.
The author argues that both the Sudan Armed Forces and the paramilitary Rapid Support Forces may have reached the point where they believe it will be difficult to make more territorial gains at an acceptable cost. Consequently, coordinated international pressure on both belligerents could result in a ceasefire, a first step towards peace.
The BBC posted on 11 January 2026 an article titled "Sudan's Government Returns to Capital after Nearly 3 Years of War" by Wedaeli Chibelushi.
The Sudan Armed Forces government officially returned to Khartoum following nearly 3 years of war with the paramilitary Rapid Support Forces (RSF) and having relocated operations to Port Sudan. Basic services are barely functioning after years of fighting in the city. The conflict with the RSF continues in other parts of Sudan.
Foreign Affairs published on 8 January 2026 an article titled "The War that Outgrew Sudan: Middle East Countries Are Turning a Local War into a Regional Crisis" by Alex de Waal.
Last summer, it looked like the Trump administration might make a serious effort to end the conflict in Sudan. That effort has stalled and the civil war in Sudan is becoming a wider regional conflict that increasingly includes Middle Eastern countries.
Aljazeera published on 25 December 2025 an article titled "'No Negotiations, No Truce' with RSF, Says Senior Sudan Official" by Maziar Motamedi.
A senior official in Sudan's Transitional Sovereignty Council has ruled out any negotiations with the paramilitary Rapid Support Forces. All current efforts to negotiate an end to the conflict appear to be stalled.
Aljajeera published on 30 November 2025 an article titled "War in Sudan: Humanitarian, Fighting, Control Developments, November 2025" by Maziar Motamedi.
The paramilitary Rapid Support Forces (RSF) consolidate control in Darfur in western Sudan while the Sudan Armed Forces (SAF) does the same in the Khartoum area. Kordofan region continues to be contested. The RSF says it has accepted a ceasefire requested by the Quad (US, Saudi Arabia, Egypt, and UAE) but continues to engage SAF forces. The SAF has rejected the terms of the Quad's ceasefire. The humanitarian situation is worsening in Darfur but may be improving slightly in the Khartoum area.
The Associated Press published on 24 November 2025 an article titled "Top General Rejects US-led Ceasefire Proposal, Calling It 'the Worst Yet'" by Samy Magdy.
Sudan's top general, Abdel Fattah al-Burhan, called the ceasefire proposed by the US-led Quad (US, Saudi Arabia, Egypt, and UAE) unacceptable and "the worst yet" because it eliminates the Sudanese Armed Forces, dissolves security agencies, and allows the paramilitary Rapid Support Forces (RSF) to stay where they are. The RSF says it has agreed to the truce proposal.
