UN News posted on 12 October 2026 an article titled "Sudan: Drought and War Push Darfur and Kordofan towards Famine."
A severe El Nino drought has added to Sudan's humanitarian catastrophe in Darfur and Kordofan regions. Drought now covers more than half of Sudan and adds to the humanitarian problems caused by the ongoing civil war.
World Politics Review published on 13 July 2026 an article titled "Sudan Could Be Headed for De Facto Partition" by Mohamed Wad Al-Sak.
If the paramilitary Rapid Support Forces take control of El Obeid in central Sudan from the Sudan Armed Forces (SAF), it could result in a de facto partition of the country. El Obed is the SAF's last command center in central Sudan and the linchpin of its western supply corridor.
The BBC posted on 7 July 2026 an article titled "Fears of a Massacre in This City on the Frontline of Sudan's War" by Akisa Wandera.
El Obeid, capital of North Kordofan has been under siege by the paramilitary Rapid Support Forces (RSF) for 18 months. Most recently, the RSF has stepped up the use of drones.
The United Nations believes another human rights catastrophe like the one in El Fasher is unfolding in El Obeid. The Sudan Armed Forces continues to control the city, but its hold is weakening as it faces increasing RSF drone attacks.
Aljazeera published on 28 June 2026 an article titled "'Digging with a Needle': Generals Stall Peace as Sudan's El-Obeid Burns."
The leaders of the Sudan Armed Forces (SAF) and the paramilitary Rapid Support Forces (RSF) are demonstrating no serious interest in bringing the deadly Sudan conflict to an end. Mediation and a ceasefire seem to be the last thing on their minds as the drone war heats up.
UN News posted on 26 June 2026 an article titled "Sudan: Window Is Closing to Prevent Wider Escalation in El Obeid."
This is a useful update on the situation in Sudan that summarizes the fighting, use of drones, external interference, regional tensions, and status of efforts to mediate an end to the conflict.
AEI's Critical Threats Africa File posted on 18 June 2026 an article titled "RSF Mobilizes Around SAF's Sudan Stronghold" by Michael DeAngelo.
The paramilitary Rapid Support Forces appear to be preparing for an offensive on El Obeid, the Sudan Armed Force's headquarters in central Sudan.
UN News published on 9 June 2026 an article titled "Sudan War: Drone Attacks Damage Key Aid Routes."
Escalating drone attacks on key roads and bridges in Darfur and Kordofan are disrupting humanitarian access in Sudan and putting civilians at further risk.
UN News posted on 11 May 2026 an article titled "Armed Drones Are Leading Cause of Civilian Deaths in Sudan War: UN Rights Chief."
Drones launched by the paramilitary Rapid Support Forces and the Sudan Armed Forces accounted for more than 80 percent of civilian deaths during the first four months of 2026, killing at least 880 people.
AEIs Critical Threats Africa File posted on 21 May 2026 an article titled "Sudan" by Michael DeAngelo.
Infighting between the paramilitary Rapid Support Forces (RSF) leadership and three RSF field commanders resulted in their defection together with their troops to the Sudan Armed Forces (SAF).
The SAF is using defections to fracture the RSF and rapidly integrate their troops into SAF combat operations. The SAF is pursuing a military victory and showing no interest in peace talks. Bringing defectors into its senior ranks may, however, complicate its command-and-control challenges.
The Royal United Services Institute for Defence and Security Studies posted on 17 April 2026 an eight-minute video analysis titled "The Sudanese Civil War, Three Years On" by Michael Jones.
After three years of conflict the Sudan civil war has reached a political and military dynamic stalemate. Diplomatic efforts to reach a ceasefire have achieved little progress. The war is sustained by foreign powers, especially the Arab Gulf states. The conflict threatens to become a regional war.
The New York Times published on 15 April 2026 an article titled "Sudan Enters Fourth Year of War Amid World's Most Severe Humanitarian Crisis" by Ephrat Livni ad Declan Walsh.
The article describes the humanitarian crisis as Sudan enters its fourth year of civil war. The international community recently pledged $1.3 billion in funding for Sudan, but only peace can bring this humanitarian disaster to a close.
Foreign Affairs published on 8 April 2026 an article titled "Don't Partition Sudan Again: Splitting It Didn't Work in the Past and Won't Work Now" by Francis M. Deng and Ahmed Kodouda.
Both the Sudan Armed Forces (SAF) and paramilitary Rapid Support Forces (RSF) insist they are fighting to preserve a unified Sudan, but the longer the current geographical division persists, the harder it will be to put the country together again.
The 2011 independence of South Sudan offers a cautionary tale. Any effort to formalize the split between the SAF and RSF-controlled parts of Sudan would not resolve the conflict's root causes. Another partition of Sudan would also destabilize its neighbors.
The International Crisis Group posted on 7 April 2026 a 42-minute podcast titled "After Three Years of War in Sudan, What Hope for a Ceasefire" hosted by Richard Atwood with Shewit Woldemichael and Alan Boswell.
The Iran war has not yet had a significant impact on the situation in Sudan beyond driving up prices of everything and causing fuel shortages. If the Iran war continues, it could have a huge negative impact on the food situation in Sudan.
The paramilitary Rapid Support Forces (RSF) control most of Darfur and West Kordofan while the Sudan Armed Forces (SAF) control most of the northeastern and eastern parts of the country. Sudan is effectively partitioned between the RSF and the SAF. The major battle fronts today are along the Chad border, South Sudan border, and Ethiopian border.
The RSF political program has been a failure. Noone has recognized the RSF government. The SAF has improved its position and is the dominant actor in the country today. While SAF fortunes have improved most Sudanese probably do not want the military to remain in power indefinitely.
The RSF continues to receive strong support from the UAE while the SAF has a degree of support from Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Turkey, and Eritrea. The most worrying new dynamic is the deterioration of relations between the SAF and Ethiopia. Differences over Nile water usage and Egyptian and Eritrean support for the SAF contribute to Ethiopia's concerns.
Massad Boulos, President Trump's special envoy for Africa, continues to seek a ceasefire as part of the Quad (US, Egypt, UAE, and Saudi Arabia). The effort is currently lacking high level pressure. RSF and SAF positions on a ceasefire remain far apart. Both sides believe they hold a strong military position. Only major outside pressure on them will likely change the situation.
There is considerable concern among the outside actors about the role of Islamist forces in the SAF, which complicates a resolution. In the meantime, the Sudan conflict continues to destabilize the Red Sea region.
AEI's Critical Threats Africa File posted on 19 March 2026 an article titled "Sudan" by Michael DeAngelo and Elliot Nazar.
The paramilitary Rapid Support Forces has consolidated control in western Sudan while the Sudan Armed Forces made gains in southeastern Sudan. External actors continue to fuel the conflict.
Deutsche Welle published on 15 March 2026 an article titled "Civil War in Sudan Is a Never-ending Humanitarian Crisis" by Jennifer Holleis,
This update on the civil war in Sudan is a continuing humanitarian crisis increasingly fueled by drone warfare and disappearing from international attention.
The Rift Vally Institute published in October 2025 a study titled "Political Economy of Cash and Markets in Sudan" by Omer Egemi and Calum McLean.
Sudan is the world's largest displacement and humanitarian crisis. The study covers Khartoum, the political and economic hub of the country, and the two regions of Kordofan and Darfur in western Sudan during the period from February to April 2025.
Sudan's economy is largely controlled by warring parties, especially the Sudan Armed Forces and the paramilitary Rapid Support Forces. The study analyses the political economy dynamics shaping Sudan's crisis with particular focus on aspects affecting cash and markets.
AEI's Critical Threats Africa File posted on 5 March 2026 an article titled "Sudan" by Michael DeAngelo, Liam Karr, and Elliot Nazar.
Sudan's Ministry of Foreign Affairs and International Cooperation claimed that Ethiopia is allowing the paramilitary Rapid Support Forces to launch attack drones from Asosa airport in western Ethiopia against Sudan Armed Forces (SAF)-controlled territory in Sudan. Ethiopia has denied the charge.
If true, this situation could quickly get out of control and result in SAF retaliatory attacks against Ethiopia and encourage closer SAF relations with the Tigray People's Liberation Front.
The AEI's Critical Threats Africa File posted on 8 January 2026 an article titled "Sudan" by Michael DeAngelo.
The article documents military advances by the paramilitary Rapid Support Forces (RSF) and the SPLM-N in Kordofan region of Sudan. Both the RSF and the Sudan Armed Forces (SAF) routinely use drones in the conflict. The RSF appears focused on an effort to take the key city of El Obeid from the SAF.
Aljazeera published on 31 December 2025 an article titled "War in Sudan: Humanitarian Collapse, Fighting, Deadlock, December 2025" by Mohammad Mansour.
The humanitarian situation in Sudan deteriorated to a new low following a collapse of international funding, although the European Union launched an air bridge to deliver supplies to Darfur. Kordofan province became the new epicenter for fighting as both the Sudan Armed Forces and the paramilitary Rapid Support Forces relied increasingly on the use of drones. All attempts to end the conflict through negotiation appeared to be stalled.
The UN Political and Peacebuilding Office posted on 22 December 2025 remarks titled "ASG Khiari Warns Indiscriminate Drone Strikes and Arms Flows Are Driving Sudan's War."
UN Assistant Secretary General for the Middle East, Asia and the Pacific, Khaled Khiari, condemned the use of drones and foreign supply of increasingly sophisticated and deadly weapons to the belligerents in Sudan's civil war. Calls to end these flows have gone unheeded and there has been no accountability.
