Business Insider Africa published on 26 August 2026 an article titled "Russia and China Push Back as Trump Administration Seeks Arms Embargo Across Sudan" by Ayodeji Adegboyega.
The Trump administration is seeking to expand a two-decade-old UN arms embargo on Darfur to all of Sudan and to explicitly cover drones. China, Russia, and the Sudan Armed Forces faction all oppose the initiative.
Thierry Pairault just posted a paper titled "The Tariff Exemption Saga and the Results for the First Half of 2026."
China's zero tariff policy for all countries in Africa except Eswatini took effect on 1 May. During the first half of 2026 Africa's trade deficit with China widened from $44.7 billion to $57.9 billion as of the end of the first half of 2026 compared with the first half of 2025. Chinese exports to Africa rose by 21.8 percent and imports from Africa by 16.3 percent compared with the same period in 2025.
Eight African countries (South Africa, DRC, Zambia, South Sudan, Nigeria, Chad, Algeria, and Zimbabwe) accounted for about 94 percent of the increase in Chinese imports from Africa during this period. Almost the entire increase in the value of African exports to China was due to the shock in world commodity prices, largely independent of the zero-tariff policy.
The International Crisis Group published on 17 July 2026 a commentary titled "As the Horn of Africa Nears Boiling Point, Time for Urgent Diplomacy" by Alan Boswell.
Given the uncertainty about Washington's level of commitment to bring peace to the Horn of Africa, additional Gulf States, the European Union, the United Nations, Norway, and the United Kingdom should step up their engagement.
Reuters published on 15 July 2026 an in-depth article titled "The US Army Veteran and the Mystery Boeings Flying Sudan's War Routes" by Alexander Dziadosz, Reade Levinson, and David Lewis.
Companies registered in Singapore and the UAE owned by a US government, and military contractor and US Army Special Forces veteran have been operating several Boeing aircraft linking regional supply routes of the paramilitary Rapid Support Forces (RSF) in Sudan. The United Nations has accused the RSF of genocide. The United States has not sanctioned the companies.
AEI's Critical Threats Africa File posted on 9 July 2026 an article titled "Sudan" by Michael DeAngelo and Angus Muldoon.
The Sudan Armed Forces (SAF) has recaptured from the paramilitary Rapid Support Forces several towns in Sudan's Blue Nile State that borders Ethiopia. This relieves some of the pressure on SAF forces elsewhere in the country. The SAF has also had some military gains near Sudan's border with Chad.
Euro News posted on 18 June 2026 an article titled "Moscow Uses 'Russian Houses' in Africa to Lure Recruits into War in Ukraine, Investigation Shows" by Sasha Vakulina and Aleksandar Brezar.
Moscow is operating or opening "Russian Houses" in at least 22 African countries as part of its strategy to consolidate its influence on the continent. The centers screen Soviet and Russian films, often on patriotic themes, and distribute ideologically vetted literature. They also teach the Russian language and coach young people on how to move to Russia as students or workers.
Ukraine's military intelligence has done an investigation that identifies Russian Houses as key hubs for recruiting Africans to go to Russia where they eventually end up on the front lines of the war against Ukraine. Ukraine's Ministry of Foreign Affairs reports that at least 2,965 citizens from 36 African countries have taken part in combat on Russia's side.
UN News published on 9 June 2026 an article titled "Sudan War: Drone Attacks Damage Key Aid Routes."
Escalating drone attacks on key roads and bridges in Darfur and Kordofan are disrupting humanitarian access in Sudan and putting civilians at further risk.
The International Crisis Group posted on 1 June 2026 a five and one-half minute video titled "Divided Sudan, Elusive Peace."
The video provides a good, summary update of the current situation in the Sudan conflict.
The Royal United Services Institute for Defence and Security Studies posted on 17 April 2026 an eight-minute video analysis titled "The Sudanese Civil War, Three Years On" by Michael Jones.
After three years of conflict the Sudan civil war has reached a political and military dynamic stalemate. Diplomatic efforts to reach a ceasefire have achieved little progress. The war is sustained by foreign powers, especially the Arab Gulf states. The conflict threatens to become a regional war.
UN News published on 10 April 2026 an update titled "Sudan: 14 Million Displaced; Hunger and Attacks on Health Continue as War Enters Fourth Year."
Some 14 million people, or a quarter of the population, have been forced to flee, with 9 million remaining displaced inside Sudan and 4.4 million as refugees mostly in Chad, South Sudan, and Egypt. In addition, 21 million Sudanese now face acute food insecurity, including 6.3 million in the direst state of food emergency. Over 40 percent of Sudan's population require urgent health assistance and disease outbreaks are widespread.
Most of the UN agencies have their main logistics hub in the United Arab Emirates. The closure of the Strait of Hormuz is impacting their ability to respond as humanitarian supply routes have been cut and shipping aid has become slower and more costly.
Foreign Affairs published on 8 April 2026 an article titled "Don't Partition Sudan Again: Splitting It Didn't Work in the Past and Won't Work Now" by Francis M. Deng and Ahmed Kodouda.
Both the Sudan Armed Forces (SAF) and paramilitary Rapid Support Forces (RSF) insist they are fighting to preserve a unified Sudan, but the longer the current geographical division persists, the harder it will be to put the country together again.
The 2011 independence of South Sudan offers a cautionary tale. Any effort to formalize the split between the SAF and RSF-controlled parts of Sudan would not resolve the conflict's root causes. Another partition of Sudan would also destabilize its neighbors.
The International Crisis Group posted on 7 April 2026 a 42-minute podcast titled "After Three Years of War in Sudan, What Hope for a Ceasefire" hosted by Richard Atwood with Shewit Woldemichael and Alan Boswell.
The Iran war has not yet had a significant impact on the situation in Sudan beyond driving up prices of everything and causing fuel shortages. If the Iran war continues, it could have a huge negative impact on the food situation in Sudan.
The paramilitary Rapid Support Forces (RSF) control most of Darfur and West Kordofan while the Sudan Armed Forces (SAF) control most of the northeastern and eastern parts of the country. Sudan is effectively partitioned between the RSF and the SAF. The major battle fronts today are along the Chad border, South Sudan border, and Ethiopian border.
The RSF political program has been a failure. Noone has recognized the RSF government. The SAF has improved its position and is the dominant actor in the country today. While SAF fortunes have improved most Sudanese probably do not want the military to remain in power indefinitely.
The RSF continues to receive strong support from the UAE while the SAF has a degree of support from Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Turkey, and Eritrea. The most worrying new dynamic is the deterioration of relations between the SAF and Ethiopia. Differences over Nile water usage and Egyptian and Eritrean support for the SAF contribute to Ethiopia's concerns.
Massad Boulos, President Trump's special envoy for Africa, continues to seek a ceasefire as part of the Quad (US, Egypt, UAE, and Saudi Arabia). The effort is currently lacking high level pressure. RSF and SAF positions on a ceasefire remain far apart. Both sides believe they hold a strong military position. Only major outside pressure on them will likely change the situation.
There is considerable concern among the outside actors about the role of Islamist forces in the SAF, which complicates a resolution. In the meantime, the Sudan conflict continues to destabilize the Red Sea region.
The Clash Report posted on 23 March 2026 an article titled "UAE Tries to Rewire Supply Routes to Sudan's RSF via Ethiopia & Central African Republic."
The United Arab Emirates is restructuring its logistical network to sustain supply lines to Sudan's paramilitary Rapid Support Forces, shifting routes through Ethiopia and the Central African Republic as existing corridors in Chad and Libya face pressure.
AEI's Critical Threats Africa File posted on 19 March 2026 an article titled "Sudan" by Michael DeAngelo and Elliot Nazar.
The paramilitary Rapid Support Forces has consolidated control in western Sudan while the Sudan Armed Forces made gains in southeastern Sudan. External actors continue to fuel the conflict.
AEI's Critical Threats Africa File posted on 5 March 2026 an article titled "Sudan" by Michael DeAngelo, Liam Karr, and Elliot Nazar.
Sudan's Ministry of Foreign Affairs and International Cooperation claimed that Ethiopia is allowing the paramilitary Rapid Support Forces to launch attack drones from Asosa airport in western Ethiopia against Sudan Armed Forces (SAF)-controlled territory in Sudan. Ethiopia has denied the charge.
If true, this situation could quickly get out of control and result in SAF retaliatory attacks against Ethiopia and encourage closer SAF relations with the Tigray People's Liberation Front.
AEI's Critical Threats Africa File posted on 26 February 2026 an article titled "Sudan" by Michael DeAngelo and Elliot Nazar.
Chad closed its border with Sudan following two attacks by the paramilitary Rapid Support Forces (RSF) on Chadian troops inside Chad. The RSF relies on supply lines through Chad for its weapons and equipment.
Ukraine's Mezha published on 10 February 2026 an article titled "Russia Expands Influence in Africa Ahead of 2026 Summit."
Russia is sending more diplomatic staff to its embassies in Africa. In 2025, some 35,000 African students studied in Russian universities. Russia is ramping up its soft power across the continent.
AEI's Critical Threats Africa File published on 22 January 2026 an analysis titled "Sudan" by Michael DeAngelo and Liam Karr.
Sudan's paramilitary Rapid Support Forces (RSF) conducted an attack on Chadian forces in Chad, raising tensions with a key partner amid disruptions to RSF supply lines. The RSF claimed the attack was a mistake, but it has strained already complicated relations between Chad and the RSF. Supply routes to the RSF through Chad are also under pressure.
The New York Times published on 20 December 2025 a photojournalism piece titled "Escape from the Abyss: Surviving the Atrocities in El Fasher."
An estimated 100,000 people left El Fasher, the capital of North Darfur, after it fell to the paramilitary Rapid Support Forces (RSF). This left an estimated 150,000 remaining in the city and subject to RSF atrocities.
Foreign Policy published on 20 November 2025 an article titled "The Dire Need for International Pressure to End the War in Sudan" by John Haltiwanger.
The secretary-general of the Danish Refugee Council, Charlotte Slente, recently met with Sudanese refugees in eastern Chad. She concluded that the international community must put pressure on the belligerents in Sudan to end the atrocities and genocide.
