The Hudson Institute published on 4 July 2026 an analysis titled "The Kremlin's Long Game in Africa" by Joshua Meservey.
The analysis concludes that the Kremlin seeks to extract outsized benefits from Africa with the limited means it can deploy. The nature of this engagement will change only when there is meaningful political transformation in Russia.
The National Interest published on 9 July 2026 an article titled "The Lessons of Mali" by Brendon Sanders.
Both Western and, more recently, Russian counter terrorism efforts in Mali have failed. But the West should take no comfort from Russia's inability to deliver stability in the Sahel region.
France 24 posted on 9 July 2026 an article titled "Mali Rebels Attack Convoy of Russian Reinforcements Headed to Besieged Military Camp."
Tuareg separatists and their jihadi allies attacked on 9 July a convoy of Russian paramilitaries from the Africa Corps and Malian soldiers as they were moving to Anefis in northern Mali. The report provides no details on casualties.
The Associated Press posted on 10 July 2026 an article titled "Mali's Military Says It's Broken a Rebel Blockade Around a Strategic Northern Base."
After heavy fighting, the convoy reached Anefis between the rebel-controlled town of Kidal and Gao to the south, which is under the control of the military government.
Reuters published on 9 July 2026 an article titled "Russia and Sahel States Deepen Military Ties as Insurgent Attacks Persist."
Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov met with his counterparts from Mali, Burkina Faso, and Niger to discuss growing military cooperation with the three Sahel countries. Russia confirmed its intention to strengthen the armed forces of the three countries.
Warfronts posted on 6 July 2026 a 14-minute video titled "This Country Trusted Russia--Then It All Fell Apart" with Simon Whistler.
This is a highly critical account of Russia's Wagner Group and Africa Corps engagement with the Mali military in an effort to prop up the military government.
Euro News posted on 18 June 2026 an article titled "Moscow Uses 'Russian Houses' in Africa to Lure Recruits into War in Ukraine, Investigation Shows" by Sasha Vakulina and Aleksandar Brezar.
Moscow is operating or opening "Russian Houses" in at least 22 African countries as part of its strategy to consolidate its influence on the continent. The centers screen Soviet and Russian films, often on patriotic themes, and distribute ideologically vetted literature. They also teach the Russian language and coach young people on how to move to Russia as students or workers.
Ukraine's military intelligence has done an investigation that identifies Russian Houses as key hubs for recruiting Africans to go to Russia where they eventually end up on the front lines of the war against Ukraine. Ukraine's Ministry of Foreign Affairs reports that at least 2,965 citizens from 36 African countries have taken part in combat on Russia's side.
Foreign Affairs published on 26 June 2026 an article titled "Who Is Winning Africa's Drone Wars?" by Nate Allen and Rida Lyammouri.
Conflicts in Mali, Somalia, Libya, Ethiopia, Sudan, Burkina Faso and Niger have experienced or continue to experience the use of armed drones. Increasingly, insurgent groups are making as effective use of drones as national armies. China, Turkey, and Iran provide most of the drones, but at least 11 African countries now produce them.
Military Africa published on 19 June 2026 an article titled "Orion Drone Sighted over Bamako as Russia's Air War in Mali Deepens" by Ekene Lionel.
Russia's advanced Orion drone has been sighted flying over Bamako, Mali's capital. Its most capable, unmanned strike platform, it suggests Russia is stepping up its battle against jihadi groups in Mali.
The American Security Project posted on 22 May 2026 a commentary titled "What the Mali Offensive Reveals about Russia's Partnerships in Africa" by Thomas Ullman.
Questions about Russia's role in Mali increased when its Africa Corps retreated last month from a key city to the north of the capital. A French journalist suggested that Russian forces considered defending the capital of Bamako to be their sole obligation, regardless of what happened elsewhere.
Military Africa published on 4 June 2026 an article titled "Russian Africa Corps Deploys FPV Kamikaze Drones in Mali--But the Sky Is Already Contested."
Russia's Africa Corps is deploying First-Person View (FPV) kamikaze drones in Mali. They are compact, low-cost suicide drones that have become the defining weapon of modern asymmetric warfare. The battlefield in Mali has changed as insurgent groups first began using FPV drones and the Africa Corps is scrambling to keep up.
Eurasia Review published on 10 June 2026 an article titled "The Head of US Africa Command Testifies before Congress on American Counter-Terrorism Operations in Africa--Analysis" by Daniel Volman, director of the Africa Security Research Project in Washington.
This is a wide-ranging discussion of US efforts to counter terrorism in Africa. It includes testimony in May before Congress by Dagvin Anderson, Commander of the U.S. Africa Command, and additional comments by other Trump administration officials. The focus is on terrorist threats in Nigeria, the Sahel, and Somalia.
The Soufan Center, a New York-based nonprofit organization, published on 12 May 2026 a commentary titled "The Limits of Russia's Africa Corps: Mali and the JNIM-FLA Offensive."
Coordinated attacks by al-Qaeda's Sahelian affiliate, Jama'at Nusrat al-Islam wal-Musliman (JNIM), and the Tuareg-dominated separatists, the Azawad Liberation Front (FLA), have highlighted the limited capabilities of the Malian junta and its Russian mercenaries, the Africa Corps, to fend off the insurgency.
Russia's engagement in Mali also raises the question whether it has the resources to counter a genuine insurgency or if it is only in the country to ensure the survival of the military junta.
The Robert Lansing Institute published on 11 May 2026 an analysis titled "Russia's Setback in Mali: Intelligence Failures, Strategic Limits, and the Failure of Moscow's Africa Project."
Russia's Africa Corps retreat from Kidal in Mali exposed Moscow's operational fragility and weakened the mythology of Russia's expeditionary effectiveness. Russia relied too heavily on coercion without sufficient understanding of local ethnic, tribal, and political realities.
Mali demonstrates Russia may struggle to control large territories, defeat insurgencies, or maintain durable legitimacy. It exposed the limits of Russia's expeditionary warfare model.
Africa News published on 1 May 2026 an article titled "Rebel Alliance Seizes Key Tessalit Military Camp in Northern Mali."
Tuareg separatists and jihadists have forced the evacuation of Tessalit military base near Mali's northern border with Algeria. Troops from Russia's Africa Corps and Malian soldiers fled south.
The Washington Post published on 30 April 2026 an article titled "Mali's Junta Asked Russians to Bring Order. Militants Just Stormed In" by Rachel Chason.
Mali's military junta turned to Russia to help in quelling an Islamist insurgency. But in the five years since the arrival of Russian mercenaries with the Wagner Group and subsequently with the Africa Corps, the militants have gained strength, and Mali is now teetering on the edge of collapse.
Reuters published on 29 April 2026 an article titled "Mali Turmoil Threatens Russian Push for Influence and Mineral Wealth in Africa" by Andrew Osborn and Anna Peverieri.
A series of reversals suffered by Mali's Moscow-backed military government has dented Russia's image and threatens its strategic and economic interests in Africa. Mali's military junta's future is now in jeopardy and Russia's military presence in Mali is also on the line.
The Sentry published in April 2026 a study titled "Doubling Down: Russia's Military Network in West Africa."
Russia's Wagner Group withdrew from Mali in June 2025, largely handing over operations to the Kremlin-controlled Africa Corps, which has about the same number of troops as Wagner and many of them are former Wagner fighters. Some core leadership also remains the same.
The Africa Corps has been moving a large quantity of weapons into Mali, which suggests that Russia is doubling down on Mali, despite the concurrent withdrawal and multiple failures of the Wagner Group.
AEIs Critical Threats Africa File published on 21 April 2026 an article titled "US Competes with Russia and Others as It Engages African Autocrats" by Liam Karr, Yale Ford, and Zoe Sommer.
The Trump administration has put the United States in more direct competition with Russia in Africa, especially in states that have come under military control. The US is primarily pursuing security-related interests and exploring opportunities for cooperation on critical minerals.
Modern Diplomacy published on 27 February 2026 a commentary titled "Africa's Rise: The 21st Century Story that Leaves Russia Behind" by Kester Kenn Klomegah, an independent researcher.
Russia has focused on a limited part of Africa. About 80 percent of its trade is with North African countries and South Africa. It has sent the Africa Corps to Niger, Mali, and Burkina Faso. But it has largely ignored the rest of the continent.
The South China Morning Post published on 27 February 2026 an article titled "Why Beijing's US$4.5 Billion Niger-Benin Oil Pipeline Is Being Attacked by Rebels" by Jevans Nyabiage.
A rebel group has been attacking the oil pipeline from Niger's oilfields to an Atlantic port in Benin in an effort to restore a former elected president to power in Niger. China financed, built, and continues to have a management role in the pipeline, which provides a significant amount of revenue for Niger's military junta. Although the attacks are not aimed at China, the situation poses a dilemma for Beijing and its non-interference policy.
