The National Interest published on 9 July 2026 an article titled "The Lessons of Mali" by Brendon Sanders.
Both Western and, more recently, Russian counter terrorism efforts in Mali have failed. But the West should take no comfort from Russia's inability to deliver stability in the Sahel region.
Reuters published on 9 July 2026 an article titled "Russia and Sahel States Deepen Military Ties as Insurgent Attacks Persist."
Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov met with his counterparts from Mali, Burkina Faso, and Niger to discuss growing military cooperation with the three Sahel countries. Russia confirmed its intention to strengthen the armed forces of the three countries.
The South China Morning Post published on 26 June 2026 an article titled "Can China's Strict Policing Model 'Silence the Guns' in Africa?" by Jevans Nyabiage.
China is training African trainees on ways to get better control of small arms and light weapons (SALW). The problem is that China's strict domestic policies do not transfer well to Africa where some African governments supply SALW to non-state actors in neighboring countries. Until this practice ends, China's training will accomplish little.
Eurasia Review published on 10 June 2026 an article titled "The Head of US Africa Command Testifies before Congress on American Counter-Terrorism Operations in Africa--Analysis" by Daniel Volman, director of the Africa Security Research Project in Washington.
This is a wide-ranging discussion of US efforts to counter terrorism in Africa. It includes testimony in May before Congress by Dagvin Anderson, Commander of the U.S. Africa Command, and additional comments by other Trump administration officials. The focus is on terrorist threats in Nigeria, the Sahel, and Somalia.
The Sentry published in April 2026 a study titled "Doubling Down: Russia's Military Network in West Africa."
Russia's Wagner Group withdrew from Mali in June 2025, largely handing over operations to the Kremlin-controlled Africa Corps, which has about the same number of troops as Wagner and many of them are former Wagner fighters. Some core leadership also remains the same.
The Africa Corps has been moving a large quantity of weapons into Mali, which suggests that Russia is doubling down on Mali, despite the concurrent withdrawal and multiple failures of the Wagner Group.
The Carnegie Endowment for International Peace published in April 2026 a study titled "Russia in Africa: Examining Moscow's Influence and Its Limits" edited by Nate Reynolds, Frances Z. Brown, Frederic Wehrey, and Andres S. Weiss.
The collection of essays explores Russia's role, its appeal, and its limitations across very different parts of the continent--from West Africa and the Sahel to Southern Africa. It dives into Russia's interests and tools and explains how they vary over time and between places. It explores the agency and interests of African governments and citizens.
The collection contains the following essays:
--Introduction by Frances Z. Brown and Nate Reynolds
--Moscow's Dual-Track Africa Playbook: Transactional Security Deals in the Sahel, Enduring Political Capital in Southern Africa by Priyal Singh
--The Drivers and Limits of Russia's Appeal in West Africa and the Sahel by Jean-Herve Jezequel
--Russia's Geopolitical Hedging in the Sahel and West Africa by Anouar Boukhars
--Russia Risks Falling into the Sahel Security Trap by Hanna Rae Armstrong
--Battle for the Narrative: Africa in the Crosshairs of Russian Influence by Bah Traore
--Russia Eyes Expanded Role in Coastal West African States by Beverly Ochieng
--The Bear Down South: Russia's Relations with Southern Africa by Steven Gruzd and Friedrich von Treskow
--South Africa's Relationship with Russia: Navigating Historical Legacies, Domestic Change, and Geopolitical Complexities by Ray Hartley
--Beyond Material: Russia's Appeal to Southern African States by Philani Mthembu
The Institute for Economics and Peace posted on 30 March 2026 its "Global Terrorism Index 2026."
Of the ten countries most impacted by terrorism globally in 2025, six were in Africa: Burkina Faso (2), Niger (3), Nigeria (4), Mali (5), Somalia (7) and Democratic Republic of Congo (8). Nevertheless, deaths in sub-Saharan Africa fell in ten countries while rising in just four. Deaths in the Sahel region, however, accounted for more than half of all terrorism-related deaths globally.
Terrorism remains highly concentrated. Just under 70 percent of deaths from terrorism occurred in only five countries: Pakistan, Burkina Faso, Nigeria, Niger, and the DRC. Nigeria recorded the largest increase in 2025, with fatalities rising by 46 percent to 750. Islamic State West Africa Province and Boko Haram were responsible for 80 percent of all terrorism deaths in Nigeria.
The DRC also reported a significant increase in terrorism, reaching its worst ever position on the index. Deaths in the DRC rose by nearly 28 percent to 467, driven by attacks carried out by the IS-affiliated Allied Democratic Forces, which targeted civilians, churches, hospitals, and funerals.
Somalia's al-Shabaab, while experiencing a decline in terrorist deaths for the third consecutive year, launched its Shabelle Offensive in early 2025.
Foreign Affairs published on 25 March 2026 an article titled "Why Russia Is Losing the Sahel" by Frederic Wehrey and Andrew S. Weiss, both at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace.
As Russia confronts shortcomings in its own capacity and the complexities of an environment it never fully understood, its expansion into the Sahel is on the verge of stalling, if not unraveling entirely. Moscow's initiatives should serve as a cautionary tale for other African states contemplating whether to accept Russian security assistance. This is also an opportunity for the United States to return.
World Politics Review published on 10 March 2026 an analysis titled "War and Disorder Are Mobilizing the Middle East's Middle Powers" by Dalia Ghanem and Ahmed Morsy, both with the Middle East Council on Global Affairs in Doha.
A new loosely aligned "statist Quad" of traditional middle powers--Algeria, Egypt, Saudi Arabia, and Turkey--is trying to reassert itself and actively coordinate on the region's most volatile crises. The four countries are fundamentally statist powers that view governing systems in which centralized authority, often with the military as its backbone, as the sole guarantor of social order.
Acting sometimes in concert, sometimes on their own, they are seeking to intervene in a regional order whose current chaos poses an existential threat to their national interests. They have focused so far on the crises in Iran, Yemen, Sudan, Somaliland, Libya, and the Sahel region of Africa.
AEI's Critical Threats Africa File posted on 26 February 2026 an article titled "Sahel" by Liam Karr and Zoe Sommer.
Russia plans to send 1,000 more Africa Corps soldiers to Mali in the coming months, increasing Russian forces there to 3,500. The Africa Corps may also send more troops to Niger. Current Russian forces in the Sahel have failed to degrade the growing jihadi insurgencies in the region.
Politics Today published on 23 January 2026 an article titled "Africa's Quiet Power Shift: From Russian Gold Deals to China's Training Push" by Goktug Caliskan, International University of Rabat.
The author concluded the question among African governments is no longer whether Russia's Africa Corps, China's training offensive, Trump's transactional policy or Europe's climate money is most attractive. The question is how African governments use these choices to maneuver and quietly rewrite the rules. Africa is learning to say yes, no, or not yet--and to make everyone wait.
Foreign Affairs published on 16 January 2026 an article titled "Less Foreign Aid, More Climate Risk: The Massive Costs of Gutting USAID" by Alice Hill and Lindsey Doyle.
Modest investment in USAID-financed climate-resilience projects has been gutted by the Trump administration. Slashing funding and decimating the institutions that deliver it is neither fiscal prudence nor putting America first.
The Africa Center for Strategic Studies published in December 2025 an infographic titled "Ten African Security Trends from 2025 in Graphics."
The paper covers the following issues:
--Sudan Fragmentation Strains Region
--Militant Islamist Group Momentum
--Impunity and Abuses of Power
--China and Russia Expand Foothold
--Growing Gulf Actor Competition
--Escalated Fighting in the DRC
--Regional Instability Impacts Nigeria
--Evolving Warfare Technology
--Urbanization and Youth Protests
--Progress toward Agenda 2063
China-Africa Security Radar posted on 14 December 2025 a commentary titled "China's Weapons for Burkina Faso" by Paa Kwesi Wolseley Prah.
The author argued that China's large military equipment transfer to Burkina Faso last August raises the question as to what kind of order is Beijing constructing in the Sahel and at what cost to the region's long-term stability. China is exploiting the withdrawal of Western security partners from the Sahel and becoming the security provider of first resort. This is a transactional relationship: you need weapons, we sell weapons, and what you do with them is your business.
But the transaction creates a dependency on China, including providing ammunition and spare parts. In this transactional relationship, China gains influence, market access, diplomatic alignment, and a testing ground for its military equipment. Beijing offers states in the Sahel not liberation from Western paternalism but membership in a different form of asymmetric relationship.
NDTV posted on 24 November 2025 an article titled "China's Africa Gamble Turns Dangerous as Insurgencies Target Its Citizens."
Chinese nationals increasingly experience security issues in Africa, especially the Sahel region, as they expand their numbers and presence on the continent.
Business Insider Africa published on 10 November 2025 an article titled "France Angered by Niger's Plan to Sell 1,000 Metric Tons of Uranium to Russia" by Olamilekan Okebiorun.
Niger's military junta is preparing to sell 1,000 metric tons of uranium to Russia, which France sees as a direct challenge to Western influence in the Sahel. The military regime in Niger seized power in 2023 and ended decades of French involvement in the uranium sector.
The Sentry published in August 2025 a report titled "Mercenary Meltdown: The Wagner Group's Failure in Mali."
Wagner Group forces were unable to take control of areas in the north and center of Mali where armed terrorist and separatist groups continue to challenge Malian security forces. There has been a significant increase in attacks on civilians and in civilian casualties since Wagner's arrival in Mali, and this, in turn, has severely undermined relations between the Malian military and the Malian public.
The Wagner Group became more reactive and violent, allowing the terrorist groups they were hired to neutralize to gain more control and increase recruitment in Mali. Wagner failed in its task of eliminating terrorist groups in Mali. Its deployment in Mali has not been a worthwhile investment for any party involved. Russia's Africa Corps is replacing the Wagner Group.
Pressreader reprinted a South China Morning Post article dated 16 August 2025 titled "China Arms Burkina Faso in Sahel Drive" by Jevans Nyabiage.
Burkina Faso has received at least 4 major consignments of arms from China since early 2024. The latest delivery included VN22B fire support vehicles, PLL-05 120mm self-propelled gun mortar systems, and SR5 rocket launch systems.
The International Crisis Group posted on 25 April 2025 a 25-minute podcast titled "Any Hope Left for Diplomacy in Sudan?" with Alan Boswell and Abdul Mohammed, long time follower of Sudanese issues.
The war in Sudan is effectively eliminating the concept of a Sudanese state. Sudan has been at war with itself since independence. Western Sudan is becoming integrated into the Sahel region and eastern Sudan is part of the Horn of Africa. One cannot rule out partition of the country.
What is needed now is a full-time mediation effort led by the African Union with complete bilateral and multilateral support. Sudan can be pieced together again because most Sudanese people want unity.
The South China Morning Post published on 19 April 2025 an article titled "How China Is Filling a Weapons Supply Gap in Africa's Sahel Left by France and Russia" by Jevans Nyabiage.
As France and Russia lose arms supply market share in the Sahel region of Africa, China is stepping in to fill the gap. China offers a large variety of weapons of reasonable quality, fast delivery, and low prices.
