The Conversation published on 24 September 2026 a commentary titled "Maps Can Be Misleading--On Purpose--and Their Story Becomes History. The Case of Ethiopia" by Daniel Waktola.
The author explains how maps on Ethiopian social media and in school textbooks inflated boundaries and engaged in outright disinformation, a practice known as maptivism. These inaccurate maps then become evidence about who belongs where, who governs where, and who owns what.
The Africa Center for Strategic Studies published on 29 September 2026 an analysis titled "The Raging Information Battle in Nigeria" by Mark Duerksen.
Russia and China are targeting Nigeria with manipulative information operations to erode trust, deepen polarization, and shape security narratives to gain greater leverage over Nigeria's political and economic trajectory. The barrage of inauthentic content targeting Nigeria frequently portrays the country as chaotic, overrun by violence, and beyond repair through democratic means.
Russia is the most active foreign actor distorting Nigeria's information space. Ghost reporters launder Russian narratives through Nigerian media. Generative AI creates local content and fake experts. Nigerian social media mobilizes influence-for-hire networks to advance Russia's geostrategic agenda. Russia's campaign aims to establish an anti-Western bloc across West Africa.
China has become more aggressive in utilizing inauthentic networks. Chinese-linked systems operate as part of a larger information ecosystem through state media, paid content, and elite relationships, including China's United Front. China uses these networks to insert geopolitical objectives into Nigerian domestic protests and election-related conversations.
The Foreign Service Journal published in its July/August 2026 edition an article titled "When America Went Silent: The Strategic Costs of Dismantling VOA" by Elez Biberaji, 43-year veteran of VOA.
The effort by the Trump administration to shut down the U.S. Agency for Global Media (USAGM), which operates the Voice of America and sister media outlets, has eroded America's capacity to shape global understanding and ceded influence to competitors who weaponize information.
The Washingtonian published on 2 July 2026 an article titled "Reviving Voice of America Will be Difficult, Insiders Say" by Ike Allen.
As a result of a court decision and some funding by Congress, VOA is trying to return to service. But only about 200 of its former 2,000 employees are at work and its effort is limited to a few languages.
The Trump administration is appealing the court order to restart VOA operations, and the matter is in limbo. The situation at the VOA headquarters in downtown Washington has deteriorated so much that some fired staff believe it will not be possible to revive the organization, at least not during the Trump administration.
South Africa's Institute for Global Dialogue published on 16 March 2026 a commentary titled "Beyond Material: Russia's Appeal to Southern African States" by Philani Mthembu.
Although Russia is not a major economic partner in Africa, Moscow's increased focus on the continent has given southern Africa states greater autonomy and options on the global stage as they pursue their own national interests.
Foreign Policy published on 5 May 2026 an article titled "Russia's Africa Recruitment Web Is Expanding" by Maurice Oniang'o, a Kenyan journalist.
This article looks across Africa at Russia's successful program to recruit, usually based on disinformation, men to come to Russia for work but are then given minimal military training and sent to the front lines in the war against Ukraine.
The New York Times published on 4 May 2026 an article titled "'The Death Zone': How Russia Is Luring Africans to Ukraine" by Matthew Mpoke Bigg, John Eligon, and Zimasa Matiwane.
An estimated 1,000 Kenyans went to Russia and ended up in the war against Ukraine. Only 30 have returned to Kenya alive. In addition, South Africa, Tanzania, Zambia, Nigeria, Ghana, Togo, Botswana, Mali, and Cameroon have reported men being falsely recruited into the Russian army.
Global Issues posted on 20 April 2026 an article titled "Russia's African Cannon Fodder" by Andrew Firmin.
The article reviews Russia's program to recruit Africans, often based on disinformation, to fight for Moscow in its war with Ukraine. The top African countries for providing mercenaries to fight in Ukraine are Egypt, Cameroon, and Ghana.
The South African Institute of International Affairs published in February 2026 a study titled "Back to the Shadows: Russia's African Security Engagements Since Prigozhin" by Ivan U. Klyszcz, Centre for Defence and Security in Tallinn, Estonia.
Russia continues to deploy military personnel and conduct information operations to shape regional politics in Africa. Since 2023, Moscow has taken tighter control, with Kremlin-linked figures, state agencies, and federal funding driving these efforts. Russian activities reflect the Kremlin's top foreign policy priorities but are constrained by competing demands, especially the war in Ukraine.
Foreign Affairs published on 25 March 2026 an article titled "Why Russia Is Losing the Sahel" by Frederic Wehrey and Andrew S. Weiss, both at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace.
As Russia confronts shortcomings in its own capacity and the complexities of an environment it never fully understood, its expansion into the Sahel is on the verge of stalling, if not unraveling entirely. Moscow's initiatives should serve as a cautionary tale for other African states contemplating whether to accept Russian security assistance. This is also an opportunity for the United States to return.
The Carnegie Endowment for International Peace published on 26 February 2026 a study titled "Russia in Africa: Examining Moscow's Influence and Its Limits" edited by Nate Reynolds, Frances Z. Brown, Frederic Wehrey, and Andrew S. Weiss.
The study explores Russia's role, its appeal, and its limitations across Africa since the 2010s, drawing on contributions from a range of scholars. It also looks at the agency and interests of African governments and citizens.
Opportunism continues to define Russia's approach to Africa, as Moscow hones a set of tools designed to take advantage of instability and state fragility. African actors can--and do--instrumentalize Russian engagement on the continent and advance their own agency in the relationship. Geopolitical competition in Africa is widening and intensifying as middle powers emerge as important external partners, in addition to traditional powers. The West must evolve its approach accordingly.
These essays point to a complicated and mixed record for Russia in Africa that defies simple characterizations. Russia's influence in Africa has undoubtedly grown, but there are outstanding questions about whether it can translate its gains into stable, lasting relationships; whether its tools and symbolic gestures will gain further traction; and whether it can outcompete a crowded field of external powers that can deliver more than Russia, should they choose to.
Nigeria's The Authority published on 20 February 2026 an article titled "As Russia Takes Over the Wagner Group: Implications for Africa" by Ipole Amajama.
The government of the Russian Federation has taken over the Wagner Group under the guidance of the Foreign Intelligence Service. As a result, it has become part of the state-led strategy of influence and power projection. Much of its effort in Africa is focused on a media campaign of disinformation.
The Forum for Research on Eastern Europe and Emerging Economies (Free Network) published in December 2025 a paper titled "Russia's New Strategy in Africa: Big Ambitions, Limited Gains" by Maria Perrotta Berlin, Stockholm Institute for Transition Economics, and Lev Lvovskiy, Belarusian Economic Research and Outreach Center.
While Russia has intensified relations with a handful of African states, the overall involvement remains limited in scope and depth. There has been a modest expansion of trade since 2022 and Russia's military cooperation agreements with African states have increased markedly in recent years.
Voting patterns in the United Nations General Assembly suggest declining rather than increasing support for Russian positions. Russia's new strategy may yield short-term geopolitical leverage but shows little sign of delivering durable economic or political gains.
The BBC published on 6 November 2025 an article titled "Are Christians Being Persecuted in Nigeria as Trump Claims?" by Olaronke Alo, Chiamaka Enendu, and Ijeoma Ndukwe.
President Trump's claim that Nigeria, which is about equally divided between Muslims and Christians, is persecuting Christians apparently stems from attacks in northern Nigeria by the jihadi organization Boko Haram that began in 2009. The BBC looks at the numbers killed over the years and concludes Boko Haram probably has killed more Muslims than Christians. In any event, the government of Nigeria strongly opposes Boko Haram.
The New York Times published on 24 June 2025 an article titled "As U.S. Dismantles Voice of America, Rival Powers Hope to Fill the Void" by Tiffany Hsu.
As the Voice of American and its affiliated networks such as Radio Free Asia shut down at the request of the Trump administration, Russian networks such as RT and Sputnik and Chinese such as Global Times, Xinhua News Agency, and China Global Television Network are filling the void.
The South African Institute of International Affairs (SAIIA) posted on 14 May 2025 a one hour televised interview titled "Why Is Russia Deepening Its Engagement with Africa?" with Steven Gruzd, SAIIA.
Following intense engagement by the Soviet Union in Africa during the Cold War, Russian interest dropped dramatically in the 1990s and and only began to return in the 21st century under the rule of Vladimir Putin. The Wagner Group is an example of the new interest. Russia still has a small trade and economic footprint in Africa and provides very little foreign aid. Egypt is its most important partner. It has developed partnerships in the nuclear power field and and remains an important source of arms for Africa. The African countries have very little contact with the former Soviet republics.
Rolling Stone published on 8 May 2025 an article titled "Voice of America Will Be Fed OAN's Far-right Coverage, Says Trump Admin" by Charisma Madarang.
Kari Lake, the defeated Republican candidate for governor of Arizona who serves as the senior advisor of the U.S. Agency for Global Media (USAGM), was put in charge of dismantling the Voice of America (VOA).
She announced that the right-wing One America News (OAN) will provide newsfeed services free-of-charge to USAGM networks including VOA, Office of Cuba Broadcasting, and Radio Marti. Fewer than 20 of more than 1,300 VOA personnel were permitted to enter their place of work earlier this week.
The Washington Post published on 9 May 2025 a commentary titled "It Has Come to This: The U.S. Will Broadcast One America News" by Marc Fisher.
The author concludes that the Trump administration is "going to replace the journalism of Voice of America with the slanted sycophancy of One America News," which "seems like a step into a disinformation abyss."
Comment: VOA has effectively been silenced, and the administration seems to want to shut it down entirely. It is not clear who will put the OAN feed on the air and even less clear who will bother to listen to it.
The New York Times published on 16 April 2025 an article titled "Trump Aides Close State Dept. Office on Foreign Disinformation" by Edward Wong.
Secretary of State Marco Rubio has shut down the office that tracks and counters disinformation from foreign actors. He put all 40 employees in the office on paid leave after firing about 80 contractors last month. The office focused on disinformation from Russia, China, Iran, and terrorist groups. He reportedly took this action after complaints that the office allegedly censored conservative ideas.
The International Crisis Group posted on 7 November 2024 a 32-minute podcast titled "Inside Sudan's Catastrophic Civil War" with Elissa Jobson and Mohanad Hashim, Sudanese journalist with the BBC.
Mohanad Hashim travelled by road from Port Sudan on the Red Sea to Omdurman, across the White Nile from Khartoum, escorted by troops from the Sudan Armed Forces. He provides insightful analysis of the situation in Sudan.
The devastation in this part of Sudan is near total. He said the younger generation of Sudanese believes a new Sudan needs to be formed; the previous generation of leaders is not up to the task. He concludes that neither side can win a military victory; it is a war of attrition.
The European Council on Foreign Relations published on 9 October 2024 a commentary titled "The Sweating Bear: Why Russia's Influence in Africa Is Under Threat" by Will Brown.
Russia's military operations in Africa are not succeeding, and Moscow is not setting itself up as a long-term partner for African governments. Moscow is losing credibility as a reliable partner for African governments. Everywhere Russia has sent troops, the security situation is dramatically worse than when international forces were present.
The New York Times published on 14 October 2024 an article titled "Russia's Latest Target in Africa: U.S.-funded Anti-Malaria Programs" by Elian Peltier.
A Russian disinformation program is attacking US-funded health care programs in Africa to weaken Western interests there. The disinformation can usually be traced back to someone close to the Russian government or Russian institutions.
