Africa's Geopolitical Realignment

 Global Views World published on 10 August 2026 a commentary titled "Africa's 2026 Geopolitics: China's $282B Pull" by Alonso Reyes.  

The author argues Africa's geopolitical alignment is undergoing significant transformation by moving away from traditional Western allies and towards emerging powers such as China, India, Russia, and the Gulf States.

But this is not a zero-sum game.  African leaders are not choosing sides.  They are diversifying their partnerships to maximize their own national interests.

Africa Youth Survey: Perceptions of China and US

 The Ichikowitz Family Foundation just published its massive African Youth Survey 2026.  It held face-to-face interviews with about 5,000 Africans aged 18-24 from 16 countries in Sub-Saharan Africa.  

It covers many issues, but the focus here is perceptions of China and the United States.  African youth see China (79 percent) and the United States (81 percent) as the most influential foreign actors, although China's influence is seen as somewhat more positive.

The survey looked at the influence of the US, China, Brazil, EU, UK, Germany, France, India, and Russia.  The only country whose influence was seen as less positive than the United States (85 percent) was Russia (83 percent).  

About 3 in 5 youth are optimistic about Africa's future during the Trump administration, especially on military support and security.  Just under half believe the closure of USAID will negatively impact their country, with healthcare and disease prevention seen as the areas most affected.  

China and India are increasingly viewed as more favorable partners than the United States, a sentiment shaped in part by the return of the Trump administration.  

Russia-South Africa Relations: It's Complicated

 The South African Institute of International Affairs recently posted a 16-minute podcast titled "South Africa and Russia: It's Complicated."

The Russia-China relationship generates uncomfortable headlines today.  It is based on the strong anti-apartheid position of the Soviet Union.  In addition, Vladimir Putin and former South African President Jacob Zuma solidified the ties.

Russia's invasion of Georgia, Crimea, and Ukraine complicated the relationship.  South Africa fell back on a policy of non-alignment.  By 2022, there was confusion in Pretoria concerning policy towards Russia.

Today, South Africa-Russia trade is negligible and Russian investment in the country is modest.  South Africa and Russia, both members of BRICS, agree on the need to revise the world order but not much else.  

Is the West Losing Out in the Seychelles?

 The Royal United Services Institute for Defence and Security Studies published on 23 July 2026 an analysis titled "Losing Control of the West's Longstanding Interests in Seychelles" by Wojciech Pawlus.

The author suggests that the West is losing out in the democratic Indian Ocean archipelago of Seychelles to India, China, Russia, and the Gulf States.  He believes the current government is becoming more autocratic and urges Washington, Brussels, London, and Paris to reach out before it is too late.

Drones Are Becoming Weapon of Choice in African Conflicts

 Foreign Affairs published on 26 June 2026 an article titled "Who Is Winning Africa's Drone Wars?" by Nate Allen and Rida Lyammouri.

Inexpensive drones are fast becoming the weapon of choice in African conflicts.  They are being deployed by both governments and insurgent groups.  China is now Africa's largest supplier of drones, accounting for a quarter of those procured.

Foreign drones have turned African conflicts such as the civil war in Sudan into destabilizing proxy wars.  At least eleven African countries now produce drones including Kenya, Nigeria, South Africa, and Morocco.

The Kremlin's Long Game in Africa

 The Hudson Institute published on 4 July 2026 an analysis titled "The Kremlin's Long Game in Africa" by Joshua Meservey.

The analysis concludes that the Kremlin seeks to extract outsized benefits from Africa with the limited means it can deploy.  The nature of this engagement will change only when there is meaningful political transformation in Russia.

The West Should Take No Comfort from Russia's Failure in Mali

 The National Interest published on 9 July 2026 an article titled "The Lessons of Mali" by Brendon Sanders.

Both Western and, more recently, Russian counter terrorism efforts in Mali have failed.  But the West should take no comfort from Russia's inability to deliver stability in the Sahel region.  

Russian Convoy Attacked in Northern Mali

 France 24 posted on 9 July 2026 an article titled "Mali Rebels Attack Convoy of Russian Reinforcements Headed to Besieged Military Camp."

Tuareg separatists and their jihadi allies attacked on 9 July a convoy of Russian paramilitaries from the Africa Corps and Malian soldiers as they were moving to Anefis in northern Mali.  The report provides no details on casualties.  

The Associated Press posted on 10 July 2026 an article titled "Mali's Military Says It's Broken a Rebel Blockade Around a Strategic Northern Base."

After heavy fighting, the convoy reached Anefis between the rebel-controlled town of Kidal and Gao to the south, which is under the control of the military government.

Russia Confirms Military Support for Three Sahel Countries

 Reuters published on 9 July 2026 an article titled "Russia and Sahel States Deepen Military Ties as Insurgent Attacks Persist."

Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov met with his counterparts from Mali, Burkina Faso, and Niger to discuss growing military cooperation with the three Sahel countries.  Russia confirmed its intention to strengthen the armed forces of the three countries.

Russian Foreign Minister Meets African Union Chairman

Fana Fact Check published on 7 July 2026 an article titled "AU, Russia Commitment to Deeper Partnership, Advance Africa-Led Solutions to Global Challenges." 

Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov met with African Union Commission Chairperson Mahmoud Ali Youssouf in Addis Ababa on 7 July.  They expressed agreement on numerous mutual issues of concern and on many AU policies and goals.

Comment:  There were no commitments of tangible Russian assistance to the African Union or the challenges it faces in Africa today.  

Video Critical of Russia's Engagement in Mali

 Warfronts posted on 6 July 2026 a 14-minute video titled "This Country Trusted Russia--Then It All Fell Apart" with Simon Whistler.

This is a highly critical account of Russia's Wagner Group and Africa Corps engagement with the Mali military in an effort to prop up the military government.  

The Strategic Costs of Dismantling VOA; Revival Will Be Hard

 The Foreign Service Journal published in its July/August 2026 edition an article titled "When America Went Silent: The Strategic Costs of Dismantling VOA" by Elez Biberaji, 43-year veteran of VOA.

The effort by the Trump administration to shut down the U.S. Agency for Global Media (USAGM), which operates the Voice of America and sister media outlets, has eroded America's capacity to shape global understanding and ceded influence to competitors who weaponize information.

The Washingtonian published on 2 July 2026 an article titled "Reviving Voice of America Will be Difficult, Insiders Say" by Ike Allen.

As a result of a court decision and some funding by Congress, VOA is trying to return to service.  But only about 200 of its former 2,000 employees are at work and its effort is limited to a few languages.

The Trump administration is appealing the court order to restart VOA operations, and the matter is in limbo.  The situation at the VOA headquarters in downtown Washington has deteriorated so much that some fired staff believe it will not be possible to revive the organization, at least not during the Trump administration.    

The Scramble for the Red Sea

 The International Crisis Group posted on 29 June 2026 a 41-minute podcast titled "The Scramble for the Red Sea Is Not Cooling Down" by Alan Boswell with Federico Donelli, University of Trieste and author of a new book on the topic.

The scramble for control in the Red Sea region began during the Cold War and increased in intensity in the 21st century.  There are now many new actors in the Red Sea.  Middle powers have become as significant as major powers.  

Russia has been seeking, so far without success, a military base in the region for years.  China established a military base in Djibouti to protect its interests in the region and to extend global power.  The Gulf states, especially Saudi Arabia, have become much more engaged in the Red Sea.

The US/Israeli war against Iran has underscored the importance of the Red Sea for international shipping.  The European Union is the one grouping that should be more engaged in the region than it is.  

"Russian Houses" in Africa Lure Recruits for Ukraine War

 Euro News posted on 18 June 2026 an article titled "Moscow Uses 'Russian Houses' in Africa to Lure Recruits into War in Ukraine, Investigation Shows" by Sasha Vakulina and Aleksandar Brezar.

Moscow is operating or opening "Russian Houses" in at least 22 African countries as part of its strategy to consolidate its influence on the continent.  The centers screen Soviet and Russian films, often on patriotic themes, and distribute ideologically vetted literature.  They also teach the Russian language and coach young people on how to move to Russia as students or workers.  

Ukraine's military intelligence has done an investigation that identifies Russian Houses as key hubs for recruiting Africans to go to Russia where they eventually end up on the front lines of the war against Ukraine.  Ukraine's Ministry of Foreign Affairs reports that at least 2,965 citizens from 36 African countries have taken part in combat on Russia's side.  

Africa's Drone Wars

 Foreign Affairs published on 26 June 2026 an article titled "Who Is Winning Africa's Drone Wars?" by Nate Allen and Rida Lyammouri.

Conflicts in Mali, Somalia, Libya, Ethiopia, Sudan, Burkina Faso and Niger have experienced or continue to experience the use of armed drones.  Increasingly, insurgent groups are making as effective use of drones as national armies.  China, Turkey, and Iran provide most of the drones, but at least 11 African countries now produce them.  

Algeria Increases Purchases of Chinese Military Equipment

 

Defence Security Asia posted on 25 June 2026 an article titled "Algeria's J-10C and KJ-500 Deal Signals China's Biggest Air Power Breakthrough."

Algeria is apparently prepared to buy Chinese Chengdu J-10C multirole fighters and Shaanxi KJ-500 airborne early warning and control aircraft beginning in 2027.  This acquisition would make Algeria's air force one of the most advanced air powers in the region and challenge Russia as the traditional supplier of its air force.  

Min.com posted on 25 June 2026 an article titled "China Won a Large Order in Algeria, 24 Pterosaur 2, Frigates and Anti-ship Missiles Are on the List."

Recent purchases of Chinese arms by Algeria include frigates, missile systems, and drones.

Major Fishing Powers Fail to Sign Mombasa Declaration

Oceana published on 17 June 2026 a news release titled "Sixteen Countries Adopt Mombasa Declaration to Advance Fisheries Transparency and Combat Illegal Fishing." 

Sixteen countries adopted the Mombasa Declaration at the 11th Our Ocean Conference committing to advance global fisheries transparency and strengthen efforts to combat illegal, unreported, and unregulated fishing.  The countries that signed are Belgium, Cameroon, Chile, the Dominican Republic, France, Gabon, Gambia, Ghana, Guinea, Liberia, Panama, Papua New Guinea, Peru, Republic of Congo, Somalia, and South Korea.  

Maritimes Crimes published on 19 June 2026 an article titled "Kenya: Illegal Fishing Fight Gains Mombasa Backing."

The article notes that the world's most significant fishing powers, who represent a major share of global catches, did not sign the Mombasa Declaration.  They include China, Indonesia, Russia, India, Vietnam, and the United States. 

Russia's Most Capable Drone Spotted in Mali

 Military Africa published on 19 June 2026 an article titled "Orion Drone Sighted over Bamako as Russia's Air War in Mali Deepens" by Ekene Lionel.  

Russia's advanced Orion drone has been sighted flying over Bamako, Mali's capital.  Its most capable, unmanned strike platform, it suggests Russia is stepping up its battle against jihadi groups in Mali.  

What Is Russia's Africa Corps Mandate in Mali?

 The American Security Project posted on 22 May 2026 a commentary titled "What the Mali Offensive Reveals about Russia's Partnerships in Africa" by Thomas Ullman.  

Questions about Russia's role in Mali increased when its Africa Corps retreated last month from a key city to the north of the capital.  A French journalist suggested that Russian forces considered defending the capital of Bamako to be their sole obligation, regardless of what happened elsewhere.

Russia's Drone War in Mali

 Military Africa published on 4 June 2026 an article titled "Russian Africa Corps Deploys FPV Kamikaze Drones in Mali--But the Sky Is Already Contested."

Russia's Africa Corps is deploying First-Person View (FPV) kamikaze drones in Mali.  They are compact, low-cost suicide drones that have become the defining weapon of modern asymmetric warfare.  The battlefield in Mali has changed as insurgent groups first began using FPV drones and the Africa Corps is scrambling to keep up.