How China and the US Pursue African Critical Minerals

 China-Africa Security Radar published on 3 August 2026 an article titled "Fragmented Leverage: Why African States Call for Collective Bargaining but Prefer Bilateralism in Critical Minerals Negotiations" by Paa Kwesi Wolseley Prah.

The author explains how China and the United States seek advantage with African countries in bilateral negotiations in their quest for critical minerals.  China exploits bilateral negotiations through processing dominance and bundled infrastructure-mineral deals.  The United States pursues selective frameworks and corridor diplomacy.  

Is China Importing Illicit Uranium from the DRC?

 Netherlands-based Lighthouse Reports published on 30 July 2026 a report titled "Congo's Hidden Uranium Exports."

China imports 95 percent of the cobalt exported by the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC).  Uranium is present in significant quantities in DRC cobalt.  Chinese companies mine the ore, which is then refined in China.  

China has added significantly to its nuclear weapons stockpile in recent years.  Lighthouse Reports argues that China's increase in weapons far exceeds the uranium it mines domestically or that which it receives on the basis of reported imports.  It concludes that much of the uranium for nuclear weapons is imported surreptitiously from the DRC.

Are Chinese and Turkish Drones Fueling Conflicts in Africa?

 The China Global South Project published on 31 July 2026 an analysis titled "Are Chinese and Turkish Drones Fueling Conflicts in Africa?" by Christian Geraud Neema Byamungu.  

China and Türkiye are Africa's primary supplier of drones, which increasingly are used in conflict situations.  Türkiye sells them directly to African militaries engaged in conflict, including in Libya, Sudan, DRC, and Rwanda.  China sells them directly to both conflicting parties in the DRC and Rwanda but those used by Marshall Haftar's army in Libya and the paramilitary Rapid Support Forces in Sudan were transferred by the UAE.

The author concluded that while these drone sales do not start wars, both China and Türkiye insert themselves into pre-existing conflicts fueled by political rivalries, regional tensions, and economic interests.

China-Africa Trade First Half 2026

 Thierry Pairault just posted a paper titled "The Tariff Exemption Saga and the Results for the First Half of 2026."

China's zero tariff policy for all countries in Africa except Eswatini took effect on 1 May.  During the first half of 2026 Africa's trade deficit with China widened from $44.7 billion to $57.9 billion as of the end of the first half of 2026 compared with the first half of 2025.  Chinese exports to Africa rose by 21.8 percent and imports from Africa by 16.3 percent compared with the same period in 2025.

Eight African countries (South Africa, DRC, Zambia, South Sudan, Nigeria, Chad, Algeria, and Zimbabwe) accounted for about 94 percent of the increase in Chinese imports from Africa during this period.  Almost the entire increase in the value of African exports to China was due to the shock in world commodity prices, largely independent of the zero-tariff policy.  

China Facing African Mineral Export Controls

 Semafor published on 17 July 2026 an article titled "Africa's Mineral Export Bans Are Only the Opening Bid" by Yinka Adegoke.

China controls about 72 percent of global critical minerals processing capacity, giving it more leverage than the countries that produce the ore.

This has propelled a wave of resource nationalism in Africa as governments try to move up the value chain.  The DRC, Zimbabwe, Mozambique, and Gabon are tightening controls on the export of raw minerals in order to force more value addition at home.  

China-South Africa Supply Chain Issues

 The Foreign Policy Research Institute published on 16 July 2026 an article titled "Beyond the Supply Chain: South Africa's China Dilemma" by Raghvendra Kumar.

The question facing South Africa is whether China's evolving supply chain diplomacy is designed to support Pretoria's fair and equitable participation or to reinforce Beijing's own geoeconomic priorities.  South Africa is China's largest trading partner in Africa, but it runs a large trade deficit with Beijing.  

The author concludes that South Africa's relationship with China will be successful only if Pretoria retains control over its critical infrastructure, strategic industries, and foreign policy choices.  

Zimbabwe Shuts Down Chinese Lithium Company for Fraud

 Discovery Alert published on 16 July 2026 an article titled "San Ding Lithium Shutdown: Zimbabwe's $3.65M Mining Fraud Exposed" by Muflih Hidayat.  

Zimbabwe holds Africa's largest lithium reserves and Chinese companies have invested more than $2 billion in the lithium sector.  China's San Ding Lithium operated through the fabrication of receipts and invoices to disguise fund diversions.  Zimbabwe charged two San Ding Lithium officials with two charges of fraud and shut down the company.

US Gets Win Over China in Race for DRC Critical Minerals

 Fox News published on 23 June 2026 an article titled "Trump Gets Major Win against China in African Rare Earth Minerals Race" by Paul Tilsley.

The United States has supported an American company, Virtus Minerals, in developing two major mines producing cobalt and copper in the Democratic Republic of Congo.  This is the Trump administration's first critical minerals (not rare earths as the article asserts) win in the DRC.  

China Trains Africans on How to Control Small Arms

 The South China Morning Post published on 26 June 2026 an article titled "Can China's Strict Policing Model 'Silence the Guns' in Africa?" by Jevans Nyabiage.

China is training African trainees on ways to get better control of small arms and light weapons (SALW).  The problem is that China's strict domestic policies do not transfer well to Africa where some African governments supply SALW to non-state actors in neighboring countries.  Until this practice ends, China's training will accomplish little.  

Ebola and the Dismantlement of USAID

 The American Security Project published on 24 June 2026 a commentary titled "From Aid Cuts to Ebola: A Predictable Crisis Unfolds" by Mohamed Siddiqui.  

The dismantlement of USAID, removal of its on the ground personnel in the DRC and Uganda, and cutting of foreign aid funding for health programs has left international humanitarian groups to provide the bulk of the support for affected communities.  The result has been predictable: a faster spread of Ebola and greater cost to bring it under control.  

China's Health Diplomacy in Africa

 The China-Africa Security Radar posted on 19 June 2026 an article titled "China's Health Diplomacy in Africa: Health Security, Infrastructure, and Strategic Competition" by Lungani Hlongwa.  

A small team of Chinese health experts has arrived in the Democratic Republic of Congo to help the country combat the Ebola outbreak.  This is part of China's long standing health diplomacy in Africa, which follows familiar patterns as the United States cuts back its health care assistance and alters its approach.

Kenya-US Critical Minerals Deal Counters China

 Reuters published on 17 June 2026 an article titled "Kenya, US Close in on Critical Minerals Deal, Ruto Says" by John Irish.

Kenya and the United States are about to close a deal on critical minerals that would allow Kenya to process the minerals domestically, a demand that African countries are increasingly making in their negotiations with buyers.  This is also an effort by the Trump administration to compete with China for African critical minerals.  

Chinese Finance and Critical Mineral Access in Africa

 Boston University's Global Development Policy Center published in June 2026 a paper titled "Development Quid Pro Quo: Chinese Finance and Critical Mineral Access in Africa" by Congyi Dai.

The paper explores whether China's development finance agenda is motivated by its global quest for natural resources, facilitating mine acquisitions in Africa.  It uses four data sources to examine whether Chinese development finance is tied to the pursuit of critical minerals.

The paper concludes that minerals needed for clean energy technologies such as copper, cobalt, nickel, and platinum group metals are associated with Chinese loan commitments to recipient countries.  Specifically, uranium is the mineral most strongly linked to Chinese development projects, particularly those including a substantial grant component and highly concessional repayment terms.

Chinese Companies Are Major Processors of Conflict Coltan from DRC

 Global Witness published on 10 June 2026 a major report titled "Who Buys Rwanda's Smuggled Coltan? The Global Journey of Conflict Coltan from DRC to the World's Electronics."

Most of the conflict coltan mined in the Democratic Republic of Congo and smuggled through Rwanda is processed by companies in China.  A few companies in Kazakhstan and Thailand are also involved.  The refined tantalum often unwittingly ends up in the products of major Western companies. 

China, US, EU Competition for Critical Minerals in Africa and Latin America

Modern Diplomacy published on 21 May 2026 an article titled "Geology Meets Geopolitics: The Global Race for Critical Minerals in the Climate Transition" by Marta Rehnman, Trinity College Dublin.

China dominates the processing of critical minerals in Africa and Latin America.  Beijing has mining partnerships with 44 African countries.  But the United States and European Union are stepping up competition for unexploited mineral reserves in both Africa and Latin America.  

Will China Replace US in Fight against African Ebola?

 The New York Times published on 6 June 2026 an article titled "As Ebola Spreads in East Africa, Will China Step Up?" by Lily Kuo and Stephanie Nolen.

The United States is playing a much smaller role in combatting Ebola in Africa than it has in previous outbreaks.  China has made a modest contribution, but it is unclear how much Beijing is willing to do to help confront what could become the deadliest Ebola outbreak in history.  

China to Help DRC Combat Ebola

 Xinhua published on 1 June 2026 an article titled "China Ready to Actively Assist DRC, Other African Countries Hit by Ebola."

China has announced it will provide humanitarian assistance and send medical teams to the DRC to combat Ebola.  In 2014-2016, China played a significant role in combatting the Ebola outbreak in three West African countries.  It is not clear if this contribution will be as extensive as China's engagement ten years ago.

Dismantlement of USAID Prevents US from Responding to Africa's Ebola Outbreak

 The Guardian published on 21 May 2026 an article titled "US Is 'Simply Choosing Not to Stop' Ebola Outbreak after Massive Public Health Cuts, Experts Say" by Melody Schreiber.  

Following the dismantlement of the US Agency for International Development and massive cuts in global and domestic public health efforts, the United States appears to be doing little to stem the outbreak of Ebola in central Africa.  

Likely Impact of China's Zero Tariff Policy on African Imports (in French)

 GeopoWeb posted on 18 May 2026 an analysis titled "Africa, China, and Zero Tariffs: A Diplomatic Gesture Put to the Test by the Data" by Thierry Pairault.  

Effective on May 1, China began a policy of zero tariffs on imports from all African countries except Eswatini, which recognizes Taiwan.  Six African countries (South Africa, DRC, Angola, Guinea, Zambia, and Congo Brazzaville) now supply three quarters of China's imports from Africa.  Most of these imports consist of minerals, metals, and crude oil, which already enter China duty free.

A modest quantity of African agricultural products will benefit from the zero-tariff policy.  Landlocked African countries, which tend to be among the poorest, will receive little or no benefit from the zero-tariff policy because of transportation constraints.  In addition, non-tariff barriers such as sanitary standards remain in effect.  Thierry identifies several other barriers to increased African exports to China that will limit the impact of the zero-tariff policy.  He also compares the impact of EU and Chinese imports from Africa.

Thierry concludes the zero-tariff policy has less to do with rebalancing trade between China and Africa than it is an effective diplomatic tool at little cost to China but also limited in its economic impact.  

China-Africa Trade Grows but So Does Africa's Deficit

 Ecofin Agency published on 27 April 2026 an article titled "China-Africa Trade in 2026: Cooperation, but Not on Equal Terms" by Idriss Linge.

As exports to the United States fall sharply, China is turning increasingly to Africa to export its consumer and industrial products.  During the first quarter of 2026, China-Africa trade reached $92 billion, up 27 percent year on year.  But while Chinese exports to Africa rose 32 percent, African exports to China increased by only 18 percent.  Africa's trade deficit with China for the quarter reached $29 billion, nearly $10 billion higher than a year earlier.  

The zero-tariff policy announced for Africa by Xi Jinping beginning 1 May 2026 is largely cosmetic and will make little difference in the trade relationship because 95 percent of African exports to China already enter the country duty free.