Turning the US Refugee Program on Its Head

The Washington Post published on 21 September 2026 an exclusive analysis titled "How Trump Turned a Refugee Bureau into a $410 Million Deportation Operation" by David Nakamura and Adam Taylor. 

The State Department's new Office of Remigration reverses a long-standing policy of resettling refugees in the United States to a focus on expelling them.  The State Department implements the policy by bribing governments in Africa and Latin America to accept the deportees.  

The United States has suspended accepting almost all refugees except for White South Africans.  So far, the Trump administration has deported under this program more than 25,000 people, most of them to Mexico and the others to Africa and Latin America.  This is a tiny percentage of the 985,000 deportations conducted by the Department of Homeland Security during Trump's second term.  

China and US Compete for South Africa's Platinum

 Semafor published on 21 September 2026 an article titled "South Africa Woos US and China with Platinum" by Alexis Akwagyiram, Tiisetso Motsoeneng, and Sam Mkokeli.

South Africa is the world's leading supplier of platinum and seeking to gain influence with both China and the United States.  The US needs it for catalytic converters and defense equipment while China needs it to develop green hydrogen as a form of sustainable energy.

At the political level, the Trump administration continues to alienate South Africa, while China is cultivating the South African government.  Washington's criticism of South Africa shows no signs of abating, which risks losing more ground to Beijing in the race to secure access to Pretoria's critical minerals.

China-Africa Trade Developments

 The Rhodium Group published on 14 September 2026 an analysis titled "Monitoring China-Africa Trade Spillovers" by Jeremy Smith.

The analysis focuses on the impact of changes in China's economy on trade with South Africa, Angola, and the DRC.  China's slowing growth and worsening trade imbalances are rapidly reshaping its economic relationship with Africa.  China's export surge to Africa lowers the cost of goods for consumers but makes domestic industrialization harder.  Africa should no longer expect the rising tide of Chinese demand to lift all boats for commodity exporters.

Why Is China Less Active in Africa's 2026 Ebola Epidemic?

 The Diplomat published on 10 September 2026 a commentary titled "Why Is China Less Active in the 2026 Ebola Epidemic?" by Zhida Shang and Joanne Liu.

The 2026 Ebola outbreak in the DRC may result in more cases and deaths than the 2014-2016 West African outbreak, which China responded to quickly and in a major way.  Although China is better positioned to respond today, its assistance so far has been modest.

One explanation is that China faces less pressure to prove itself.  Second, scientific incentives for China's research have decreased.  Third, the Chinese public may want to see resources devoted to China and not foreign countries.  

Russia Expands Cultural Outreach in Africa

 Radar Africa published on 10 September 2026 an article titled "Russia to Open Eight New Cultural Centres across Africa."

Russia plans to open new cultural centers in the DRC, Kenya, Madagascar, Mali, Sao Tome and Principe, Senegal, Sierra Leone, and Togo.  This will add to the 16 it already has in Africa.

Chinese Traders Among Those Under Fire in Kenya

 The Kenya Times published on 8 September 2026 an article titled "Businesses in Kenya Where Foreigners Dominate" by Morgan Wanyonyi.

Foreign nationals are engaged throughout Kenya as roadside vendors, owners of small and large retail shops, and in the import and construction business.  Chinese nationals are prominent among them, especially regarding the sale of goods manufactured in China.  These foreign entrepreneurs are experiencing growing criticism from Kenyan competitors.  

African Copper and China

 Thierry Pairault posted on 7 September 2026 an analysis titled "African Copper and China."

China has become a major player in the copper industry.  China accounts for 48 percent of the world's copper refining capacity, while its mine production is estimated at only 8 percent of world production and it holds only 4 percent of world reserves.

Africa's two major copper exporters, the DRC and Zambia, already had duty free access to China for copper in all its forms.  China's recent removal of all tariffs on all African exports, except from Eswatini will not impact their export of copper to China.  The main obstacle facing the DRC and Zambia is their ability to meet demand, whether through extracting more copper or withstanding competition from other suppliers such as Chile and Peru.     

US Critical Minerals Policy in Africa

 The Global South Policy Hub, a Washington-based nonpartisan think tank, published on 17 August 2026 a paper titled "Aligning U.S. Critical Minerals Policy with Africa's Development Agenda" by Alaka Lugonzo.  

Africa holds about 30 percent of the world's critical minerals that power renewable energy technology.  Africa's critical mineral wealth is rapidly reshaping its relationship with the United States.  The author argues that current US mineral partnerships remain heavily tilted toward securing supply chains rather than delivering shared economic benefits.  

The United States has an opportunity to rethink its approach by moving away from extractive relationships toward transparent industrial partnerships along the lines of the African Union's African Green Mineral Strategy (AGMS).  A more sustainable approach would align US strategic interests with Africa's development agenda.

Comment:  While this is sound advice, China is a much larger importer of Africa's critical minerals than the United States.  It would be useful if some organization, particularly one in Africa, could offer similar advice for Beijing.

Bauxite and Iron Ore Dominate China-Guinea Trade

 The China Global South Project published on 28 August 2026 an article titled "China-Guinea Trade Is a Story of Bauxite and Iron" by Christian Geraud Neema Byamungu.

Chinese demand for Guinean bauxite ore and, increasingly, iron ore dominates trade between the two countries.  Guinea exports almost all of its bauxite and iron as raw ore and does not earn any added value.  It wants to reach domestic aluminum refining capacity of about 6 million tons by 2030 rather than continue exporting raw ore.  

How China and the US Pursue African Critical Minerals

 China-Africa Security Radar published on 3 August 2026 an article titled "Fragmented Leverage: Why African States Call for Collective Bargaining but Prefer Bilateralism in Critical Minerals Negotiations" by Paa Kwesi Wolseley Prah.

The author explains how China and the United States seek advantage with African countries in bilateral negotiations in their quest for critical minerals.  China exploits bilateral negotiations through processing dominance and bundled infrastructure-mineral deals.  The United States pursues selective frameworks and corridor diplomacy.  

Is China Importing Illicit Uranium from the DRC?

 Netherlands-based Lighthouse Reports published on 30 July 2026 a report titled "Congo's Hidden Uranium Exports."

China imports 95 percent of the cobalt exported by the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC).  Uranium is present in significant quantities in DRC cobalt.  Chinese companies mine the ore, which is then refined in China.  

China has added significantly to its nuclear weapons stockpile in recent years.  Lighthouse Reports argues that China's increase in weapons far exceeds the uranium it mines domestically or that which it receives on the basis of reported imports.  It concludes that much of the uranium for nuclear weapons is imported surreptitiously from the DRC.

Are Chinese and Turkish Drones Fueling Conflicts in Africa?

 The China Global South Project published on 31 July 2026 an analysis titled "Are Chinese and Turkish Drones Fueling Conflicts in Africa?" by Christian Geraud Neema Byamungu.  

China and Türkiye are Africa's primary supplier of drones, which increasingly are used in conflict situations.  Türkiye sells them directly to African militaries engaged in conflict, including in Libya, Sudan, DRC, and Rwanda.  China sells them directly to both conflicting parties in the DRC and Rwanda but those used by Marshall Haftar's army in Libya and the paramilitary Rapid Support Forces in Sudan were transferred by the UAE.

The author concluded that while these drone sales do not start wars, both China and Türkiye insert themselves into pre-existing conflicts fueled by political rivalries, regional tensions, and economic interests.

China-Africa Trade First Half 2026

 Thierry Pairault just posted a paper titled "The Tariff Exemption Saga and the Results for the First Half of 2026."

China's zero tariff policy for all countries in Africa except Eswatini took effect on 1 May.  During the first half of 2026 Africa's trade deficit with China widened from $44.7 billion to $57.9 billion as of the end of the first half of 2026 compared with the first half of 2025.  Chinese exports to Africa rose by 21.8 percent and imports from Africa by 16.3 percent compared with the same period in 2025.

Eight African countries (South Africa, DRC, Zambia, South Sudan, Nigeria, Chad, Algeria, and Zimbabwe) accounted for about 94 percent of the increase in Chinese imports from Africa during this period.  Almost the entire increase in the value of African exports to China was due to the shock in world commodity prices, largely independent of the zero-tariff policy.  

China Facing African Mineral Export Controls

 Semafor published on 17 July 2026 an article titled "Africa's Mineral Export Bans Are Only the Opening Bid" by Yinka Adegoke.

China controls about 72 percent of global critical minerals processing capacity, giving it more leverage than the countries that produce the ore.

This has propelled a wave of resource nationalism in Africa as governments try to move up the value chain.  The DRC, Zimbabwe, Mozambique, and Gabon are tightening controls on the export of raw minerals in order to force more value addition at home.  

China-South Africa Supply Chain Issues

 The Foreign Policy Research Institute published on 16 July 2026 an article titled "Beyond the Supply Chain: South Africa's China Dilemma" by Raghvendra Kumar.

The question facing South Africa is whether China's evolving supply chain diplomacy is designed to support Pretoria's fair and equitable participation or to reinforce Beijing's own geoeconomic priorities.  South Africa is China's largest trading partner in Africa, but it runs a large trade deficit with Beijing.  

The author concludes that South Africa's relationship with China will be successful only if Pretoria retains control over its critical infrastructure, strategic industries, and foreign policy choices.  

Zimbabwe Shuts Down Chinese Lithium Company for Fraud

 Discovery Alert published on 16 July 2026 an article titled "San Ding Lithium Shutdown: Zimbabwe's $3.65M Mining Fraud Exposed" by Muflih Hidayat.  

Zimbabwe holds Africa's largest lithium reserves and Chinese companies have invested more than $2 billion in the lithium sector.  China's San Ding Lithium operated through the fabrication of receipts and invoices to disguise fund diversions.  Zimbabwe charged two San Ding Lithium officials with two charges of fraud and shut down the company.

US Gets Win Over China in Race for DRC Critical Minerals

 Fox News published on 23 June 2026 an article titled "Trump Gets Major Win against China in African Rare Earth Minerals Race" by Paul Tilsley.

The United States has supported an American company, Virtus Minerals, in developing two major mines producing cobalt and copper in the Democratic Republic of Congo.  This is the Trump administration's first critical minerals (not rare earths as the article asserts) win in the DRC.  

China Trains Africans on How to Control Small Arms

 The South China Morning Post published on 26 June 2026 an article titled "Can China's Strict Policing Model 'Silence the Guns' in Africa?" by Jevans Nyabiage.

China is training African trainees on ways to get better control of small arms and light weapons (SALW).  The problem is that China's strict domestic policies do not transfer well to Africa where some African governments supply SALW to non-state actors in neighboring countries.  Until this practice ends, China's training will accomplish little.  

Ebola and the Dismantlement of USAID

 The American Security Project published on 24 June 2026 a commentary titled "From Aid Cuts to Ebola: A Predictable Crisis Unfolds" by Mohamed Siddiqui.  

The dismantlement of USAID, removal of its on the ground personnel in the DRC and Uganda, and cutting of foreign aid funding for health programs has left international humanitarian groups to provide the bulk of the support for affected communities.  The result has been predictable: a faster spread of Ebola and greater cost to bring it under control.  

China's Health Diplomacy in Africa

 The China-Africa Security Radar posted on 19 June 2026 an article titled "China's Health Diplomacy in Africa: Health Security, Infrastructure, and Strategic Competition" by Lungani Hlongwa.  

A small team of Chinese health experts has arrived in the Democratic Republic of Congo to help the country combat the Ebola outbreak.  This is part of China's long standing health diplomacy in Africa, which follows familiar patterns as the United States cuts back its health care assistance and alters its approach.