Are Chinese and Turkish Drones Fueling Conflicts in Africa?

 The China Global South Project published on 31 July 2026 an analysis titled "Are Chinese and Turkish Drones Fueling Conflicts in Africa?" by Christian Geraud Neema Byamungu.  

China and Türkiye are Africa's primary supplier of drones, which increasingly are used in conflict situations.  Türkiye sells them directly to African militaries engaged in conflict, including in Libya, Sudan, DRC, and Rwanda.  China sells them directly to both conflicting parties in the DRC and Rwanda but those used by Marshall Haftar's army in Libya and the paramilitary Rapid Support Forces in Sudan were transferred by the UAE.

The author concluded that while these drone sales do not start wars, both China and Türkiye insert themselves into pre-existing conflicts fueled by political rivalries, regional tensions, and economic interests.

The Complexities of the China-Libya Relationship

 The ChinaMed Project published on 30 January 2026 an analysis titled "China and the Libyan Crisis: Maintaining a Foot in the Door in a Changing Region" by Bianca Pasquier and Leonardo Bruni.  

This paper revisits the past decade of Chinese engagement in Libya, tracing Beijing's evolving relations with the country's factions and situating them within a regional context.  It concludes that China is unlikely to engage deeply in Libya's power struggles.  Beijing will likely keep its options open, be present but uncommitted.  

China Benefits from Pakistani JF-17 Thunder Aircraft Sales to Libyan National Army

 Military Africa published on 5 January 2026 an article titled "Pakistan to Supply 16 JF-17s and 12 Super Mushshak Aircraft to Libyan Faction."

Pakistan signed a $4 billion deal with Khalifa Haftar's Libyan National Army (LNA) to supply advanced military hardware, including 16 JF-17 Thunder aircraft produced jointly by the Pakistan Aeronautical Complex and China's Chengdu Aircraft Industry Group.  The LNA controls the east and south of Libya, including critical oilfields.  The LNA is a rival force to the United Nations-recognized Government of National Unity in Tripoli. The introduction of 16 JF-17s could radically alter the security landscape of North Africa.

The deal represents a sophisticated maneuver by Beijing to expand its influence in North Africa while avoiding direct violation of an arms embargo.  By routing these sales through Pakistan, China can sidestep regulatory and political scrutiny that accompanies sales into sanctioned territory.  Although the JF-17 incorporates Chinese radars, engines, and missiles, it is technically a Pakistani product.  The LNA also has received Chinese drones and WRJ-Q02 anti-drone guns.

Libyan Fuel Smuggling Benefits Russian Military and Sudan's RSF

 The Sentry published in November 2025 a report titled "Inside Job: Libya's Fuel Smuggling Escalation."

Fuel smuggling in Libya has escalated into a national crisis costing the country about $6.7 billion annually.  The smuggling enables Moscow's military activities in sub-Saharan Africa and the Rapid Support Forces genocidal war in Sudan's Darfur region.  

Russia's Growing Influence in Africa

 The International Crisis Group posted on 2 October 2025 a 7-minute video titled "Russia's Growing Influence in Africa."

This is a brief survey of African countries where the Wagner Group was engaged, and its activities increasingly are being taken over by the Africa Corps. The video ties Russia's interests to the extraction of natural resources such as gold and strategic access in eastern Libya. 

Libya's Drone War

 Military Africa published on 21 September 2025 an article titled "Libyan National Army Acquires Additional Chinese Surveillance Drones" by Darek Liam and Kazim Abdul.  

Khalifa Haftar's Benghazi-based Libyan National Army held a parade earlier this year that featured the VF-200 and Altair-370 drones, both manufactured by Chinese companies.  They join a variety of other drones in the LNA inventory from China, Russia, and Iran.  

China Steps Up Engagement in Libya

 The Libya Tribune published on 27 August 2025 an article titled "China's New Expansion to North Africa" by Sema Kalayaloglu.

China is expanding its outreach to both the Tobruk and Tripoli administrations in Libya as the Trump administration shows little interest in the region.  China's support for rail development, solar power, and water treatment plants is evidence of this engagement.

Egypt's Regional Strategy Damaged by Sudan-Libya Differences

 World Politics Review published on 28 July 2025 an analysis titled "Egypt's Regional Strategy Is Coming Undone in Libya and Sudan" by Elfadil Ibrahim.

In late June, Egyptian President Abdel Fattah el-Sisi hosted General Khalifa Haftar, the commander of the Libyan National Army, and General Abdel Fattah al-Burhan, head of the Sudan Armed Forces, in an attempt to mediate the growing tension between the two leaders.

The meeting reportedly was a disaster.  Burhan accused Haftar of arming his enemy in Sudan's civil war, the paramilitary Rapid Support Forces.  Haftar denied the allegations and Burhan then presented proof of his complicity.  Egypt's attempt at brokering peace between two of Cairo's major clients only laid bare the growing precariousness of Sisi's regional policy.

Sudan's Rapid Support Forces Control Strategic Border Area

 The International Crisis Group posted on 20 June 2025 an article titled "Capture of Tri-border Area Marks Another Twist in Sudan's Civil War" by Shewit Woldemichael.

Sudan's paramilitary Rapid Support Forces (RSF) have seized control of the strategic Sudan-Libya-Egypt border triangle, which marks a significant victory for the RSF following setbacks elsewhere in Sudan.  This could mark the start of an offensive by the RSF into regions that have so far seen limited fighting, forcing the Sudan Armed Forces to redirect resources.  

Russia Looks at Ports in Libya, Algeria, and Sudan as Potential Alternatives to Syria

 The Royal United Services Institute for Defence and Security Studies published on 14 January 2025 an analysis titled "Russia's Options for Naval Basing in the Mediterranean After Syria's Tartus" by Edward Black and Sidharth Kaushal.

In the event that Russia must close its naval base at Tartus in Syria, Mediterranean replacement options are Libya and Algeria and Sudan on the Red Sea.  Tobruk in Libya is the most likely alternative, but it comes with significant downsides.  

Russia Moves from Syria to Libya; Beware the Implications

 The Atlantic Council posted on 2 January 2025 an analysis titled "Russia Is Making a Fragile Pivot from Syria to Libya.  The West Should Beware Falling into a New Trap" by Emadeddin Badi.  

As Russian forces are being pushed out of Syria, Moscow is relocating troops and hardware in eastern Libya, controlled by Khalifa Haftar's Libyan National Army.  Libya should not be seen as a fallback but as part of a long-standing strategy to expand Moscow's strategic hold in the region and to project power beyond it, especially in Africa.  The West should avoid chasing a fleeting alliance with Haftar and focus on addressing the structural weaknesses that make Libya susceptible to external exploitation.

Growing Concerns about Russia's Ability to Provide Security in Africa

 Foreign Policy published on 31 December 2024 an analysis titled "The Illusion of Russian Security in Africa Has Been Shattered" by Samuel Ramani, CEO of Pangea Geopolitical Risk.  

Due to Russia's setback in Syria, African autocracies are second-guessing Moscow's ability to serve as their last line of defense in a moment of crisis.  In any event, Russia's track record for providing security in Africa has been underwhelming.  

Libya and Sudan are highly problematic as replacement locations for Russian air and naval bases in Syria should they be asked to leave.

China's Role in Libya

 The Emirates Policy Center published on 13 December 2024 an analysis titled "Calculations and Future of China's Role in Libya" by Bilal Abdullah.  

The author concluded that China's return to Libya is primarily driven by development and reconstruction efforts, with a noticeable effort to balance ties between authorities in the east and west of the country.  China also has political and military interests, though these are not currently central to its policy.

The UAE Casts Curious Shadow in Africa

 The Geneva-based The Responsible Security Association published on 4 December 2024 a commentary titled "Casting a Shadow: The UAE in Africa" by Raphael Parens, Foreign Policy Research Institute.  

The UAE is heavily involved in civil wars in Libya and Sudan.  Illicit gold flows through Abu Dhabi fund armed groups, mercenaries, and juntas in West Africa.  The UAE may even be considering establishing its own "foreign legions," drawing from the examples of the Russian Wagner Group and the French Foreign Legion to build the country's brand of aggressive foreign involvement.  

Is Libya Russia's Gateway to Africa?

 The Middle East Institute posted on 21 June 2024 an analysis titled "Libya Remains the Key for NATO to Counter Russian Malign Activities in Africa" by Jonathan M. Winer, former US special envoy for Libya.  

The author argues that Russia's military engagement in Libya remains crucial to its future success in Africa.  Russia has double downed on its military build-up in Libya.  He is critical of NATO's careful approach to Russian engagement in Libya and, without providing specific policy changes, urges NATO pursue a more robust response.

Why Is Russia Reinforcing Its Military Presence in Libya?

 The US-based Institute for the Study of War published on 16 May 2024 an analysis titled "Russian Outreach Across Africa" by Liam Karr.

Much of the analysis focuses on the recent increase in Libya of Russian soldiers and equipment.  Explanations for this activity include the Kremlin's desire to acquire a naval base at Tobruk in eastern Libya where it would pose a threat to NATO countries, using Libya as a platform to supply Russian military operations in African countries to the south, positioning itself to resolve the stalemate between the Government of National Accord in western Libya and Khalifa Haftar's Libyan National Army in eastern Libya, and weaponizing migrant flows from Africa to Europe.  

Russia Sends More Troops and Equipment to Eastern Libya

 Meduza, a news organization based in Riga, Latvia, published on 16 May 2024 an English-language summary of a joint investigation by the independent Verstka and the All Eyes on Wagner project titled "A Big Mess Is Brewing."

Russia has been supporting Khalifa Haftar's Libyan National Army in eastern Libya since about 2018.  In the past few months, Russia has been bolstering its military presence in Libya.  There has been a notable increase in shipments of Russian weapons and transport vehicles from Syria to Libya.  Russia reportedly is shipping a large amount of military equipment to Libya by sea.

The article speculates on the reasons for this military buildup.  

Are Africans Losing Confidence in the Mercenary Wagner Group?

 Foreign Policy published on 25 September 2023 an article titled "Wagner's African Hosts Regret Letting Them In" by Jack Detsch.  

Drawing on U.S. Defense Department sources, the author says African countries are reporting they don't want to be dependent on the Wagner Group for security and are encountering problems with their presence.  The Khalifa Haftar government in eastern Libya has apparently been especially critical of the Wagner Group.  

Evolution of Russian Private Military Companies in Africa

 The New York Times published on 25 August 2023 an article titled "Wagner Group May Have Lost 'Mythic Appeal' in Africa" by Elian Peltier.  

Russia is working to assure African client governments of the mercenary Wagner Group that it is taking charge of the organization.  Other Russian military companies more closely affiliated with the Kremlin may also seek to recruit Wagner mercenaries.  

The Washington Post published on 25 August 2023 an article titled "Before Prigozhin Plane Crash, Russia Was Preparing for Life After Wagner" by Mary Ilushina, Francesca Ebel, Rachel Chason, and Claire Parker.  

The article identifies other Russian private military companies (PMCs) that may try to compete with Wagner in the African market.  One is Redut, a PMC controlled by the Russian Defense Ministry.  Another is Konvoi, which has close ties with the Russian Defense Ministry.  

Risk of Regionalizing the Sudan Conflict

 The Rift Valley Institute published in June 2023 a study titled "Sudan Conflict: Assessing the Risk of Regionalization."

The paper looks at the potential for a regionalization of the conflict between the Sudan Armed Forces and the paramilitary Rapid Support Forces, including external involvement by Sugan's neighbors and cross-border spillover.  Until now, most regional states are hedging their bets and pushing for greater regional engagement in mediation efforts and an eventual peace negotiation.