The New Arab published on 18 September 2025 an article titled "China Bets on Morocco to Lead Africa's Electric Energy Future" by Basma El Atti.
Morocco has been able to attract increasing amounts of Chinese investment, most recently a giant battery factory, while remaining a non-NATO ally of the United States.
The Middle East Institute posted on 21 June 2024 an analysis titled "Libya Remains the Key for NATO to Counter Russian Malign Activities in Africa" by Jonathan M. Winer, former US special envoy for Libya.
The author argues that Russia's military engagement in Libya remains crucial to its future success in Africa. Russia has double downed on its military build-up in Libya. He is critical of NATO's careful approach to Russian engagement in Libya and, without providing specific policy changes, urges NATO pursue a more robust response.
The US-based Institute for the Study of War published on 16 May 2024 an analysis titled "Russian Outreach Across Africa" by Liam Karr.
Much of the analysis focuses on the recent increase in Libya of Russian soldiers and equipment. Explanations for this activity include the Kremlin's desire to acquire a naval base at Tobruk in eastern Libya where it would pose a threat to NATO countries, using Libya as a platform to supply Russian military operations in African countries to the south, positioning itself to resolve the stalemate between the Government of National Accord in western Libya and Khalifa Haftar's Libyan National Army in eastern Libya, and weaponizing migrant flows from Africa to Europe.
The Hindustan Times published on 4 January 2024 an article titled "Houthi Attacks in Red Sea 'Spook' Putin's Ally China. Israel, NATO Nations Fume at Iran."
China and Russia joined other members of the UN Security Council in calling for an end to attacks on vessels transiting the Red Sea but refused to join the US, UK, and France in singling out the role of the Houthis and their enablers in Iran for these attacks. The article also contains a five-minute video of responses by UN Security Council members to the Houthi attacks.
The private Security Council Report published on 3 January 2024 a more detailed analysis titled "Houthi Red Sea Attacks: Briefing and Consultations."
It states that UN Security Council members could not agree on language concerning the Red Sea crisis amid concerns raised by China and Russia which, while reiterating their concerns over the threat posed to freedom of navigation, apparently contended that the UNSC presidential statement was unnecessary given the 1 December press statement that strongly condemned the Houthi attacks and contained other similar messaging.
Russia's Sputnik published a series of short articles on the 4-day state visit to Moscow by Eritrean President Isaias Afwerki.
According to Sputnik, Isaias stated that we are entering "a new global order," which Eritrea welcomes; "the world order is on the verge of a radical transformation, in which Russia could play its part." Isaias added that "we need to get out of this cycle of containment, containment now, containment of Russia, the containment of China, the containment of Eritrea. . . . NATO will not survive, NATO will not be there."
Modern Diplomacy published on 2 June 2023 a commentary titled "The Strategic Partnership between Eritrea and Russia" by Kester Kenn Klomegah.
It discusses the background of the Eritrea-Russia relationship and prospects for moving forward.
Comment: There is minimal trade between Russia and Eritrea and Russia has little investment in the country and provides almost no foreign aid. The prospects for increasing trade, aid, and investment are poor. Eritrea does have a long and strategically located Red Sea coast, which Russia might find attractive for military purposes. Otherwise, it is difficult to imagine a significantly more important bilateral relationship. Both Russia and Eritrea seem to agree on the need to replace the current international order. The question is with what.
The Foreign Policy Research Institute published in April 2023 a study titled "The Wagner Group's Expanding Global Footprint" by Colin P. Clarke, Christopher Faulkner, Raphael Parens, and Kendal Wolf.
As Wagner Group mercenaries appear to be stalled in Ukraine, the leadership of the organization may be looking to expand its activities in Africa in countries such as Burkina Faso, Chad, and the DRC.
The Foreign Policy Research Institute published on 13 April 2023 a commentary titled "South Africa's Naval Exercise with China and Russia: Cause for Concern?" by Charles A. Ray.
The US expressed "concern" over the February 2023 trilateral naval exercise involving South Africa, China, and Russia. The author concluded that once the exercise is replaced in the news by the next crisis, the US will resume business as usual with South Africa.
The European Union Institute for Security Studies published in March 2023 a paper titled "China's Global Security Initiative: When the Process Matters More Than the Content" by Alice Ekman.
China's Global Security Initiative (GSI) is a label under which Beijing will promote an array of diplomatic initiatives. Through them, China hopes to enlarge a coalition of friendly countries and ultimately shape a post-Western security governance order, in which Russia could play a central role. More than the content of the GSI, it is the process that matters for Beijing. The paper argues that it would be a mistake to underestimate the GSI, even though it may initially look like an empty shell.
War on the Rocks published on 17 February 2023 a commentary titled "Mercenary Shocks: What the War in Ukraine Will Eventually Mean for Africa" by Raphael Parens, independent researcher living in Republic of Congo.
Africa, particularly the Sahel region, is acutely vulnerable to mercenary interventions because of a lack of trust in government. The length and severity of the war in Ukraine will determine the volume of the mercenary influx of Russia's Wagner Group and others into Africa. There may be as many as 50,000 Wagner Group mercenaries looking for new contracts when the war ends in Ukraine. Russia will likely want to deploy more of them to Africa.
Reuters published on 16 February 2023 an article titled "South Africa's Naval Exercise with Russia, China Raises Western Alarm" by Carien du Plessis.
As the South African naval exercise approaches with ships from Russia and China on the eve of the one year anniversary of Russia's invasion of Ukraine, there are growing expressions of concern from Western countries and speculation this could damage Pretoria's trade relations with them.
The Asia Times published on 9 January 2023 an article titled "S. Africa Lends China-Russia Helping Naval Hand" by Gabriel Honrada.
On February 17-24, naval vessels from South Africa, China, and Russia will perform joint drills off the South African coast involving search and rescue, vessel in distress, officer of the watch maneuvers, gunnery, force protection, and air defense exercises.
Defense News published on 10 October 2022 an article titled "US Army Brigade in Africa Seeks to Ward Off Chinese, Russian Influence" by Bryant Harris.
The article discusses recent U.S. Army training in several African countries which is designed in part to woo them away from Chinese and Russian influence.
Foreign Affairs published on 3 October 2022 an article titled "Xi Jinping's Quest for Order: Security at Home, Influence Abroad" by Sheena Chestnut Greitens, University of Texas at Austin.
In April 2022, President Xi Jinping announced at the Boao Forum for Asia the Global Security Initiative (GSI), which he framed as "promoting the common security of the world." The GSI marks a significant shift in Chinese foreign policy and directly challenges the role of U.S. alliances in global security and seeks to revise global security governance to make it more compatible with the security interests of the Communist Party of China (CPC).
While the focus of the GSI is on internal Chinese security, it has a strong foreign policy component that will guide China's diplomacy based on its comprehensive national security concept. The author points out that Xi has always seen external security threats largely through the prism of how they could undermine CPC rule at home. The GSI is likely to underscore international outreach by Chinese police and domestic security officials. Offers of police and domestic security assistance seem designed to make China the security partner of choice for countries that might not want such assistance to come with the human rights conditions or democratic accountability mechanisms that Western nations often demand.
Brookings published on 2 August 2022 a commentary titled "How Do Global South Politics of Non-alignment and Solidarity Explain South Africa's Position on Ukraine?" by Elizabeth Sidiropoulos, South African Institute of International Affairs.
South Africa's neutral position on Russia's invasion of Ukraine should be understood through two prisms: (1) its key foreign policy principles and positions and (2) the continuing importance of solidarity with old friends. South Africa sees the invasion of Ukraine as a proxy war between Russia and NATO.
The Associated Press published on 24 July 2022 an article titled "Russia's FM Visits Egypt, Part of African Trip Amid Ukraine War" by Samy Magdy.
Russia's Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov is visiting Egypt, Ethiopia, Uganda, and the Democratic Republic of the Congo in an effort to justify Moscow's invasion of Ukraine.
The Guardian (Nigeria) published on 14 July 2022 an article titled "Russia-Ukraine Conflict: What It Means for Africa" by Oluwafemi S. Agbelusi.
The author identifies the following reasons why many African countries have failed to condemn Russia's invasion of Ukraine: skepticism of NATO's motives, growing reliance on Moscow for arms purchases, increasing dependence on Russia for wheat and fertilizer, and a belief that this marks a return to the Cold War.
Foreign Policy published on 8 July 2022 an article titled "Libya Could Be Putin's Trump Card" by Robert Uniacke.
Russia's mercenary Wagner Group is entrenched in Libya as guns for hire for Khalifa Haftar's Libyan National Army. Some 2,000 Wagner Group mercenaries support Haftar's effort to control oil-rich eastern Libya. The country claims to have 39 percent of Africa's total oil reserves. Haftar has imposed a blockade on oil exports, which helps keep prices high to the delight of Moscow.
KT Press published on 6 June 2022 a commentary titled "War on Ukraine: Africa May Care But Who Cares for Its Opinion?" by Vincent Gasana, African journalist.
In a provocative commentary, the author concludes that Africans are not turning a blind eye to Putin's invasion of Ukraine. Rather, they are watching helplessly, knowing their opinion will not count.
The International Crisis Group posted on 19 May 2022 a half hour podcast titled "What Africa Really Thinks about the War in Ukraine" with Hassan Khannenje, director at the HORN International Institute for Strategic Studies based in Nairobi, as interviewed by Alan Boswell.
Khannenje argues that the conflict in Ukraine is not a priority for Africans and is seen as an extension of the Cold War. African countries are ambivalent and not especially interested in taking sides. There is also a desire not to offend China, which is aligned with Russia on its war in Ukraine. There is an African perception that Western countries pursue a double standard when it comes to human rights and the use of sanctions. Africans were also appalled at the treatment of African students as they escaped the war in Ukraine.
Africans want to maintain good relations with both East and West. There is a widespread view that Africans have nothing to lose by staying neutral. This does not mean there is much support for Russia, a marginal player in Africa with whom some African countries have almost no relations.
Comment: This is an important discussion and the best explanation I have heard so far on the ambivalence of so many African countries to Russia's invasion of Ukraine.
The Conversation published on 30 March 2022 a commentary titled "Five Reasons Why Many African Countries Choose to Be 'Neutral'" by Olayinka Ajala, Leeds Beckett University.
The author suggests the following 5 reasons why many African countries have taken a "neutral" position on Russia's invasion of Ukraine: (1) skepticism about the motives of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization; (2) growing reliance by some African countries on Russian arms; (3) growing dependence on Russia for wheat and fertilizer; (4) a sense that this is a return of the Cold War; and (5) the perception of some African countries that traditional Western allies are only focused on self interest.
Comment: Unfortunately, this analysis seems to omit any reference to the aggrieved party, Ukraine, or the depredations brought to it by Russia.
