The Washington Examiner published on 31 August 2026 an article titled "America Saw No More Oil. China Saw an Atlantic Military Fortress" by Yagiz Sullu.
After oil production in Equatorial Guinea peaked and began to decline, American oil companies began their departure. China remained and began helping Malabo diversify its economy. Beijing may have in mind longer term security interests and possibly even a military base in the Atlantic.
Hellenic Shipping Lines posted on 11 July 2026 an article titled "Tanker Market: West African Crude Oil Exports Nosediving in 2026."
China's crude oil imports from the west coast of Africa during the first half of 2026 dropped to 19.5 million tons from 27.9 million tons during the same period in 2025 and 25.3 million tons in the first half of 2024. In 2026, China was the second largest importer of west coast crude after the European Union.
The Conversation published on 10 March 2026 a commentary titled "China in Africa: Investment and Trade Work Well When There's Strong Oversight, and Badly When There Isn't" by Vincent Tawiah, Dublin City University.
The author concludes that Chinese investment, loans, and trade in Africa offer substantial economic opportunity, but they can also lead to the rapid depletion of vital energy and forestry resources, undermining long-term development goals if institutional guardrails are weak.
China-Africa Security Radar published on 10 March 2026 an article titled "Will China Pursue a Military Base in Africa's Atlantic Ocean?" by Paa Kwesi Wolseley Prah.
The author argues that contrary to conventional wisdom in US military circles, China is not particularly interested in having a military base on Africa's Atlantic coast. It would represent a massive logistical overextension at a time when China needs to concentrate naval power close to home. Such a base would be highly exposed and vulnerable to attack, making it a strategic liability rather than an asset. In any event, by investing extensively in West African commercial ports, China has access, at least in peace time, for PLA Navy port calls.
Comment: While the author makes some good points, it was generally thought that China, which professed publicly that it did not believe in military bases outside China, would not establish a military base in Djibouti--until it did.
El Pais published on 24 January 2026 an article titled "Russian Africa Corps Mercenaries Incorporate Madagascar into Their Expansion Across the Continent" by Jose Naranjo.
A 40-member Russian delegation led by the head of the Africa Corps militia met in late December with Madagascar's interim president and offered personal protection to the Malagasy leader as the Africa Corps has done in the Central African Republic, Mali, Burkina Faso, Niger, Libya, and Equatorial Guinea.
The Middlebury Institute of International Studies at Monterey published in September 2025 a study titled "Putin's New Frontier: The Prospects and Limitations of Africa Corps" by Hanna Notte.
The study chronicles the emergence of the Africa Corps and assesses its activities since the summer of 2023 in relevant African states. It shows how the Africa Corps consolidated its position in Libya and Mali, where the Wagner Group had a legacy presence on the ground; how it embraced new opportunities in Burkina Faso, Niger, and Equatorial Guinea; in which countries there are indications that the Africa Corps might attempt to make inroads in the future; and where the Wagner Group continues to operate as Wagner--in the Central African Republic.
The Robert Lansing Institute, an American nonprofit public policy research group, published on 30 September 2025 a detailed report titled "Russia's Africa Corps: Wagner's Successor in Africa (2022-2025)."
This in-depth account concludes that the Africa Corps has effectively taken over the Wagner Group's Africa program since late 2023. The Africa Corps maintains a presence in the CAR, Mali, Libya, Sudan, Niger, and Burkina Faso. It has a small engagement in Equatorial Guinea and prospective deals in Togo, Benin, and Cameroon.
The shift from the Wagner Group to the Africa Corps marked an effort to align African operations with Russia's state strategy. The goals of securing allies, resources, and strategic positioning remain, but the execution is now more systematic and overtly tied to the Kremlin. The Africa Corps is the beginning of a more ambitious Russian expeditionary posture.
War on the Rocks published on 17 September 2025 a commentary titled "Russia Is Shrewdly Playing the Long Game in Africa" by Hanna Notte.
Russia's Africa Corps is methodically replacing the Wagner Group in Africa's Sahel region and is looking to expand elsewhere in West and Central Africa. Russia seeks to avoid high risk missions and focus on training of local military and law enforcement. Because of its preoccupation with the war in Ukraine, Russia is playing the long game in Africa.
The Middlebury Institute of International Studies at Monterey published in August 2025 a study titled "Putin's New Frontier: The Prospects and Limitations of Africa Corps" by Hanna Notte.
This timely and well researched study concludes that Russia's Africa Corps is a bureaucratic restructuring and rebranding of the Wagner Goup, which only continues to function in the Central African Republic. It employs many former Wagner mercenary fighters and has taken control of its recruitment infrastructure.
The Africa Corps is tethered closer to the Russian military's chain of command. It prioritizes training and routine security assistance rather than the high-risk missions of the Wagner Group. It apparently relies on funding from Russia's state budget. The Africa Corps might face future competition from countries such as Turkey, Iran, and China.
The Atlantic Council published in August 2025 a paper titled "Addressing China's Military Expansion in West Africa and Beyond" by Tressa Guenov.
The United States needs to develop a strategic approach to Africa that addresses all Chinese security-related initiatives on the continent. This is not the time for Washington to be pushing back from a region as important as Africa.
The New York Times published on 6 June 2025 an article titled "'A Big Slap in the Face': Africans Jolted by Trump's New Travel Ban" by Ruth Maclean and Saikou Jammeh.
Between the imposition of new tariffs and the dismantlement of the US foreign aid program, many Africans see the full travel ban on 7 countries and partial ban on 3 others as singling out Africa for punishment by the Trump administration. Of the 19 countries globally facing new travel restrictions, just over half are in Africa.
Foreign Affairs published on 2 June 2025 an article titled "The War on Trees: How Illegal Logging Funds Cartels, Terrorists, and Rogue Regimes" by Justyna Gudzowska and Laura Ferris.
China is a major player in the global illegal logging industry. Much of the timber comes from Africa. Without a concerted effort by China to stop the trade, demand will ensure that it continues. The United States is complicit in that American consumers purchase many of the Chinese products manufactured with illegal timber.
The White House published on 4 June 2025 a fact sheet titled "President Donald J. Trump Restricts the Entry of Foreign Nationals to Protect the United States from Foreign Terrorists and Other National Security and Public Safety Threats."
The proclamation fully restricts and limits the entry of nationals from twelve countries found to be deficient with regards to screening and vetting and determined to pose a very high risk to the United States: Afghanistan, Burma, Chad, Republic of Congo, Equatorial Guinea, Eritrea, Haiti, Iran, Libya, Somalia, Sudan, and Yemen.
The proclamation partially restricts and limits the entry of nationals from seven countries who also pose a high level of risk to the United States: Burundi, Cuba, Laos, Sierra Leone, Togo, Turkmenistan, and Venezuela.
Comment: Seven of the twelve fully restricted countries and three of the seven partially restricted countries are in Africa.
Four of the fully restricted countries--Chad, Republic of Congo, Equatorial Guinea, and Eritrea--were included because nationals from those countries have a history of disproportionally overstaying their visas after coming to the United States. Three of them--Libya, Somalia, and Sudan--were included because the governments have no competent or cooperative central authority for issuing passports.
All three of the partially restricted countries--Burundi, Sierra Leone, and Togo--have a history of disproportionally overstaying their visas after arriving in the United States.
Clearly, this proclamation, at least in the case of the African countries, has little to do with combatting terrorism and a lot to do with keeping people out of the United States from certain countries for other reasons.
Foreign Policy published on 31 March 2025 a commentary titled "Are China and Russia on a Collision Course in Africa?" by Jessica Moody.
China and Russia, although committed to countering Western influence, have fundamentally different objectives in Africa. China seeks political stability to protect and advance its economic investments. Russia thrives on instability and insecurity on the continent. The two countries typically do not work together in Africa but keep out of each other's way.
The Hill published on 24 February 2025 an article titled "These 17 Countries Voted with US Against Ukraine UN Resolution" by Elizabeth Crisp.
Seventeen countries joined the US at the UN General Assembly in voting against a resolution condemning Russia as the aggressor in the war against Ukraine. Eight of these countries--almost half the total--are among the most authoritarian in Africa: Burkina Faso, Burundi, Central African Republic (CAR), Equatorial Guinea, Niger, Sudan, Eritrea, and Mali.
Comment: Burkina Faso, CAR, Niger, Mali, and Sudan receive military support from Russia's Wagner Group or its Africa Corps. Is the US trying to build a new group of "friends" in Africa?
The South China Morning Post published on 29 December 2024 an article titled "In Africa's Gulf of Guinea, China Is Proving It Is Master of the Sea" by Jevans Nyabiage.
China is paying increasing attention to security in the Gulf of Guinea where its shipping interests have been subject to attack and littoral African countries have requested assistance in preventing attacks on international shipping. This is also in China's long-term interest to extend its military influence in the region.
The South China Morning Post published on 9 December 2024 an article titled "Maritime Threats High on Agenda as Chinese Navy Hosts Gulf of Guinea Security Forum" by Seong Hyeon Choi.
China hosted a two-day forum on the security situation in the Gulf of Guinea in Shanghai for representative of 18 countries from the region.
The Center for Naval Analyses published in October 2024 a study titled "The Military and Security Dimensions of the PRC's Africa Presence: Changes in a Time of Global Shocks" by Tim Ditter, Kaia Haney, Tsun-Kai Tsai, and Carita Reid.
The study concludes that China could use Africa as the testing ground for its aspirations of security assistance globally through the implementation of the Global Security Initiative, potentially foreshadowing a future more globally active PLA military and security presence.
Africa Business Insider published on 7 September 2024 an article titled "US Proposes Strategic Deal to Block Chinese Military Expansion in Africa" by Adekunle Agbetiloye.
The United States will train Gabon's special forces and offer a $5 million package that includes radars to assist the country in monitoring illegal fishing, pay for collaboration with the West Virginia National Guard, and support conservation efforts in national parks. There is speculation Washington offered the package to preempt China's goal of establishing a military training facility in Gabon.
The Diplomat published on 20 February 2024 a commentary titled "China Continues Its Search for a Maritime Military Presence in West Africa" by Lea Thome.
This earlier commentary reviews China's rumored efforts to establish a military presence on Africa's Atlantic coast.
The Diplomat published on 10 June 2024 an analysis titled "China and Equatorial Guinea: Why Their New 'Comprehensive Strategic Partnership' Matters" by Ovigwe Eguegu, Development Reimagined.
Oil reserves, the backbone of Equatorial Guinea's foreign exchange, are expected to dry up by 2035 and the country is seeking to diversify its economy as a matter of urgency. Malabo sees Beijing as a crucial partner going forward. For its part, Beijing sees military cooperation and a potential naval base in the future relationship.
