Strategic Horizons, a publication of the Air University, just published an edition that contains my article titled "China's Expanding Airpower in the Western Indian Ocean."
This is an in-depth analysis of China's evolving airpower posture across the Western Indian Ocean from Pakistan to the coast of Africa from Egypt to South Africa, including the island countries. It reflects research as of mid-2025
Modern Diplomacy published on 7 February 2026 a commentary titled "Egypt Seeks Chinese Defense Tech, Manufacturing Base in Cairo" by Nadia Helmy, Beni Suef University Egypt.
The author suggests that Egypt is seeking Chinese technology and assistance to manufacture locally advanced radar and missile systems and unmanned aerial vehicles. Egypt sees itself as becoming a regional manufacturing hub for advanced military weapons.
Australia's Lowy Institute published on 2 February 2026 a commentary titled "China's Security Offerings Gain Traction in Africa" by Piers Pigou.
The author argues that China adapts to Africa's emerging security priorities: countering violent extremism and organized crime and supporting maritime security and infrastructure. It tailors its training programs, equipment transfers, and technical assistance. The critical question is whether China's inputs align with African defined needs and priorities.
The African Center for Strategic Studies published on 30 January 2026 a paper titled "China's Military Footprint in Africa Deepens with People's Liberation Army-led BRICS Naval Drills" by Paul Nantulya.
The January 2026 BRICS Plus naval exercise in South African waters led by China's People's Liberation Army underscored Beijing's use of military power in Africa to advance Chinese geostrategic objectives. China views BRICS Plus as part of an alternative global security and geopolitical architecture intended to counterbalance Western and US-led initiatives.
Beijing has invested heavily in securing African participation in Chinese-led global initiatives to enhance its legitimacy, build regional voting blocs, and strengthen China's leverage amid global rivalries. It accomplishes this through military exercises, naval port calls, creating security architecture, arms sales, and military training.
Modern Diplomacy published on 21 January 2026 a commentary titled "China Recalibrates Military Outreach, Strengthening Officer Training for Africa and the Arab States" by Nadia Helmy, Beni Suef University in Egypt.
The People's Liberation Army is working to shape the loyalties of future military elites in Africa and the Middle East by emphasizing military training to counter the role of the United States. Its military base in Djibouti is an important part of this effort.
The Center for Strategic and International Studies published on 15 January 2026 a report titled "In China's Orbit: Beijing's Space Diplomacy in the Global South" by Matthew P. Funaiole, Brian Hart, and Aidan Powers-Riggs.
China is engaging in space cooperation across the Global South and Africa has emerged as a focal point of its efforts, especially Egypt, Ethiopia, and Namibia. This study provides satellite photography to document China's facilities in all three countries.
China-Africa Security Radar published on 19 October 2025 an analysis titled "Can Inexperience Train Inexperience: The Paradox of the PLA's Military Training in Africa" by Paa Kwesi Wolseley Prah.
The author asks if an army without recent combat experience can effectively train others for war. He points out that China's People's Liberation Army (PLA) has not conducted sustained combat operations since the 1979 Sino-Vietnamese War, adding that combat experience provides irreplaceable insights.
He adds, however, that Chinese military training programs emphasize areas where battlefield experience matters less: peacekeeping operations, infrastructure security, basic military skills, and institutional capacity building. While improvement in these skills may not meet all of Africa's training needs, they make valuable contributions.
Defence Web posted on 19 September 2025 an article titled "New Bilateral Agreement Strengthens China/Uganda Defence Co-operation."
Uganda and China signed a military agreement aimed at expanding defense cooperation through increased exchanges in professional military education, joint training exercises, and technology transfer.
The South China Morning Post published on 30 August 2025 an article titled "A New Model for Peace? China Takes Its Global Security Initiative to Africa" by Jevans Nyabiage.
Africa is a key testing area for China's Global Security Initiative (GSI), which is evolving from an ambiguous concept to concrete training and military and police assistance programs. The GSI also encourages China's security model, which has the potential to entrench a politicized military.
The CTC Sentinel published in its August 2025 issue an article titled "Understanding China's New Counterterrorism Ambitions in Africa" by Jason Warner.
The author argues that despite ostensible rationales related to self-defense of economic interests and solidarity with African states, at its core, Beijing's primary motivations for entering the African counterterrorism space are to diversify its means of influence in Africa beyond its historical economics first approach.
Beijing likely believes it has a new genre of counterterrorism assistance--less kinetic, more economic, and rooted in equitable partnerships--that represents a fundamentally new and productive means of gaining influence in Africa.
The Africa Center for Strategic Studies published on 4 August 2025 a paper titled "Africa as a Testing Ground for China's Global Security Initiative" by Paul Nantulya.
China's Global Security Initiative (GSI) is slowly taking on concrete structure. GSI principles are designed to appeal to the Global South and are being integrated into the Forum on China-Africa Cooperation. African governments also see GSI as another source of security assistance.
Swarajya, an Indian right-wing monthly magazine, published on 23 July 2025 an article titled "Xi Jinping's Starlink Challenge Stalls as China's Satellite Constellation Projects Face Launch Bottlenecks; India's Private Sector Advances."
Elon Musk's Starlink, the pioneering satellite internet service, faces competition from China's state-led Guowang and the Shanghai-backed Qianfan. Musk's Starlink has launched more than 7,000 satellites providing connectivity to over five million customers in more than 100 countries.
Both of the Chinese projects face delays caused by rocket shortages, sluggish deployment rates, and internal competition. As of July 2025, Guowang had launched only about 40 satellites in a program that envisages a network of over 13,000 that will provide high-speed internet for civilian and military use.
Qianfan, also known as SpaceSail and G60 Starlink, is backed by the Shanghai municipal government and plans to have 15,000 satellites by 2030. To date, it has launched about 90 satellites and at least 17 of them have failed to reach their intended orbits. State-backed Guowang receives launch priority, repeatedly pushing Qianfan to the sidelines.
These problems in China's satellite programs may be alleviated, however, as Xi Jinping has reportedly instructed the People's Liberation Army to accelerate space-based communication systems in order to build a Chinese alternative to Starlink.
Comment: All of this has important implications for the Global South, and especially Africa, where Starlink has been slow to take hold and Chinese competition could challenge it.
The China Global South Project posted on 23 July 2025 a Q & A titled "China's 'Feeling the Stones' Approach to African Security Takes Shape" with Lungani Hlongwa, China-Africa Security Radar, and Paul Nantulya, Africa Center for Security Studies in Washington.
China sees Africa as central to the future of the international order. Because of increasing threats to Chinese nationals and interests in Africa, the security element of China's engagement has become more important. But China is not following a single strategy for dealing with the security challenges that it faces. Chinese policy is usually aligned at the strategic level but often encounters fragmentation at the level of execution.
China-Africa Security Radar posted on 21 July 2025 an article titled "'Africanizing' Security: Charting the Future of China-Africa Peace Cooperation."
The People's Liberation Army Command College in Nanjing hosted in July the Young Leaders Conference of the China-Africa Peace and Security Forum for mid and senior-level military officers from more than 40 countries. It is part of Beijing's pledge to implement the Global Security Initiative (GSI). The article concludes that the long-term impact of the GSI will depend on how effectively African stakeholders can adapt and sustain the initiative for their own purposes.
China Military Online published on 7 July 2025 an article titled "PLA Support Base in Djibouti Participates in 50th Anniversary of Comoros' Independence" by Wang Zongyang and Dong Mingli.
Following its participation in Madagascar's Independence Day celebration (see 4 July below), a unit of PLA troops from China's military base in Djibouti repeated the performance on 7 July at the 50th anniversary of the independence of the Comoro Islands. On this occasion, they joined marching units from Tanzania and Morocco.
Comment: This is another example of PLA military diplomacy in the Indian Ocean region.
The South China Morning Post published on 6 July 2025 an article titled "Inside China and Tanzania's 'Very Special Relationship'--Found Nowhere Else in Africa" by Jevans Nyabiage.
Of all the countries in Africa, Tanzania has perhaps the longest, continuous military cooperation relationship with China. It dates back to the early 1970s and involves all elements of Tanzania's military.
China-Africa Security Radar published on 6 July 2025 an article titled "Rwanda Celebrated for Copying China's Homework in Military Development."
An article published in China praises Rwanda for modeling its military development on the example of the People's Liberation Army (PLA). The article claims that about 73 percent of Rwanda's active-duty officers have undergone Chinese military training. Much of Rwanda's military equipment is Chinese and its military doctrine and culture look much like the PLA's.
China Military Online published on 27 June 2025 an article titled "PLA Support Base in Djibouti Participates in Military Parade Marking 65th Anniversary of Madagascar's Independence."
A detachment of more than 50 People's Liberation Army troops from China's military base in Djibouti marched on 26 June in an Antananarivo military parade to mark the 65th anniversary of Madagascar's independence.
The Congressional Research Service posted on 6 June 2025 an article titled "China's Engagement in Djibouti" by Lauren Ploch Blanchard.
This is a nice, updated summary of China's economic, security, and political relations with Djibouti and a discussion of US concerns.
The Africa Center for Strategic Studies published on 10 June 2025 an analysis titled "China Widening Its Influence in Africa through Expanded Security Engagements" by Paul Nantulya.
China is expanding across Africa its security relationships through training, military exercises, arms sales, party-to-party cooperation, and weapons production. About 70 percent of African countries now operate Chinese armored vehicles. Some 40 African countries have a relationship with Chinese public security agencies.
