Securing the Red Sea

 The Hollings Center for International Dialogue published in July 2026 a brief titled "Securing Strategic Waters Across the MENA Region: The Red Sea."

The current threat in the Red Sea is not confined to the closure of the geographical Bab el-Mandeb choke point.  It is shaped by persistent uncertainty caused by the security crises in the wider region.

The threat cannot be addressed through conventional naval tools alone, nor reduced to a piracy or law enforcement problem.  The brief recommends incremental cooperation, capacity building, and risk mitigation measures.

Geopolitical Implications of Rapprochement Between Ethiopia and Somaliland

 The Emirates Policy Center published on 1 July 2026 a paper titled "Between Maritime Access and Recognition: Geopolitical Implications of Rapprochement Between Ethiopia and Somaliland."

The prospect of landlocked Ethiopia securing maritime access through Somaliland highlights the intersection of Addis Ababa's structural need for a maritime outlet and Hargeisa's ambition to strengthen its legitimacy and bargaining power--without pressing for immediate formal recognition.

The most likely scenario in the foreseeable future is the gradual expansion of economic and logistical cooperation between Ethiopia and Somaliland, without sovereign arrangements or formal recognition.  While the option of recognition or sovereign maritime privileges remains possible, it is less likely and would require deeper regional and international transformations.  

Iran War Complicates Situation in Horn of Africa

 Foreign Policy posted on 18 May 2026 an article titled "The Gulf's African Aftershocks" by Liam Karr.

The war against Iran is deepening preexisting regional proxy conflicts in the Horn of Africa and making mediation in Sudan of ongoing conflict more difficult.  It has also resulted in a reduction of Gulf State investment in the region and beyond.

Turkey Bets on High-Risk Horn of Africa

 World Politics Review published on 9 April 2026 a commentary titled "Turkey's High-Risk, High-Reward Wager in the Horn of Africa" by Elfadil Ibrahim.  

Turkey is investing billions of dollars in oil and gas development, advanced weaponry, and expanding security cooperation in the Horn of Africa, especially Somalia.  The Horn of Africa is a risky neighborhood facing a number of actual and potential conflicts.

Geopolitical Change in the Horn of Africa and the Gulf States

 African Arguments published on 21 January 2026 a commentary titled "The Horn and the Gulf: How a New Geopolitical Confluence Is Emerging" by Ngala Chome, former research fellow at Ghent University.

Israel's recognition of Somaliland is reverberating across the Red Sea.  Networks of influence in the Horn of Africa and Gulf States are resulting in new power configurations.  This is impacting traditional outside powers and changing the relations of newer ones with major consequences for the future of the region.  

China Offers Security Alternative to US in Africa and Arab World

 Modern Diplomacy published on 21 January 2026 a commentary titled "China Recalibrates Military Outreach, Strengthening Officer Training for Africa and the Arab States" by Nadia Helmy, Beni Suef University in Egypt.

The People's Liberation Army is working to shape the loyalties of future military elites in Africa and the Middle East by emphasizing military training to counter the role of the United States.  Its military base in Djibouti is an important part of this effort.

Israel's Recognition of Somaliland Changes Dynamic in Horn of Africa

 Abren, a group of Ethiopian Americans, posted on 27 December 2025 an analysis titled "Israel's Recognition of Somaliland: A Game-Changer in Horn of Africa Geopolitics."

Israel's diplomatic recognition of Somaliland is a monumental shift in the geopolitical landscape of the Horn of Africa.  The analysis looks at the positions of Turkey, Russia, China, US, and Ethiopia with the latter playing a pivotal role in this evolving situation.

Ethiopia's Gedo Region Is New Flashpoint

 Ethiopia Insight published on 19 August 2025 a commentary titled "The Gedo Stratagem: Ethiopia's High-Stakes Proxy Politics" by Muktar Ismail, regional analyst.

Straddling the tri-border area of Kenya, Ethiopia, and Somalia, the Gedo region has become the epicenter of proxy wars, clan rivalries, and al-Shabaab resurgence, threatening to destabilize the entire Horn of Africa. 

Egypt Linked to Horn of Africa Challenges

 World Politics Review published on 31 October 2024 a commentary titled "Egypt's Future Increasingly Passes Through the Horn of Africa" by Francisco Serrano.  

With both its water resources from upstream Nile River countries such as Ethiopia and Suez Canal revenue now dependent on events in the Horn of Africa and Red Sea, this region has become a strategic focus for Egypt.  

Encircling Ethiopia

 The Hill published on 28 October 2024 a commentary titled "Shifting Alliances in the Horn of Africa: An Egypt-Eritrea-Somalia Axis" by Imran Khalid.  

The author argues that the recent summit in Asmara of Egypt, Eritrea, and Somalia was an effort "to encircle Ethiopia."  Egypt, frustrated with Ethiopia over the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam, may be positioning itself for a proxy war, using Eritrea to destabilize its neighbor.  

Another Analysis of the Ethiopia-Somaliland Deal

 Ethiopia Insight published on 8 March 2024 an analysis titled "Ethiopia's Somaliland Gambit Rattles a Shaky Horn" by Jussi Grut, a researcher focusing on the history and politics of East Africa.

The author concludes that while conflict between Ethiopia and Somalia is unlikely, this diplomatic row is further destabilizing a fragile region.  It may also revive the possibility of closer ties between the Ogaden National Liberation Front in Ethiopia and an increasingly upset Somalia.  Without significant investments in infrastructure, the Memorandum of Understanding is not likely to affect Ethiopia's import or export of goods. 

Impact on Somalia and Somaliland of Ethiopia-Somaliland Deal

 War on the Rocks published on 24 January 2024 an analysis titled "A Port Deal Puts the Horn of Africa on the Brink" by Caleb Weiss, Bridgeway Foundation, and James Barnett, Hudson Institute.

This analysis focuses on the implications of the Ethiopia-Somaliland Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) on the internal situation in Somalia and Somaliland.  It acknowledges that neither Somalia nor Somaliland has the ability to wage a conventional war against any potential opponent.  The al-Qaeda-linked al-Shabaab terrorist movement in Somalia and the Somali government oppose the MOU.  Al-Shabaab sees the MOU as a way to mobilize additional support for its goals from the wider Somali population.  The MOU has also upended politics in Somaliland.  

UAE Is Major Player in Horn of Africa

 World Politics Review published on 23 January 2024 an analysis titled "The UAE Has Become a Major Player in East Africa.  That's a Problem" by Jonathan Fenton-Harvey.  

The UAE is promoting "authoritarian stability" in the Horn of Africa by investing widely and supporting    movements such as the paramilitary Rapid Support Forces in Sudan.  It also provided drones to the Ethiopian government in its battle against Tigray Region.  

Explanation of Recent Severe Flooding in Southern Ethiopia, Eastern Kenya, and Somalia

 World Weather Attribution posted on 7 December 2023 an academic study by various specialists titled "Compounding Natural Hazards and High Vulnerability Led to Severe Impacts from Horn of Africa Flooding Exacerbated by Climate Change and Indian Ocean Dipole."

After years of drought, the short rainy season (October to December) in the Horn of Africa brought exceptionally heavy rains, particularly in November, leading to severe flooding in the south of Ethiopia, eastern Kenya, and many regions in southern and central Somalia.  In Somalia alone, more than 100 Somalis lost their lives and more than one million have been displaced.  

Climate change and a positive Indian Ocean Dipole (IOD) contributed approximately equally to the flooding event.  The IOD is a natural phenomenon that oscillates between neutral, positive, and negative phases while human-induced climate change will continue to increase until the burning of fossil fuels is stopped.  

Charting China's Relations with Countries in North Africa and the Horn of Africa

 The China-Med Index for North Africa and the Horn of Africa consists of a series of interactive charts for most of the 21st century on China's general imports from countries in the region, general exports to countries in the region, mutual energy dependence, contracts awarded to Chinese companies, Chinese workers in countries in the region, China's foreign direct investment in each country, and China's contribution of troops to UN peacekeeping operations.  In the most recent years, all of the charts demonstrate lower numbers than their peak years.  

The index includes the following countries: Algeria, Djibouti, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Libya, Mali, Mauritania, Morocco, Somalia, South Sudan, Sudan, and Tunisia.  The Italian Ministry of Foreign Affairs and International Cooperation supported publication of the data.  

Sudan-Iran Rapprochement Complicates Horn of Africa Geostrategy

 Modern Diplomacy published on 19 September 2023 a commentary titled "Iran and Sudan's Rapprochement in 2023: New Changes in the Regional Geopolitics of the Middle East" by Aishwarya Sanjukta Roy Proma, research associate at the Bangladesh-based BRAC Institute of Governance and Development.  

Written before Sudan and Iran recently reestablished diplomatic relations after a seven year break, this commentary takes on added importance and adds a new dimension to the regional geopolitics of the region.  Sudan, although currently embroiled in war between the Sudan Armed Forces (SAF) and the paramilitary Rapid Support Forces, can provide Iran with access to the Red Sea at Port Sudan.  The Suez Canal and Red Sea are vital to Iran's oil exports and maritime trade.  

Depending on how Iran's relationship develops with the SAF, which is also supported by Egypt, Tehran could complicate an already complicated geopolitical situation in the Horn of Africa.  Saudi Arabia and the UAE are deeply involved in Sudan.  A rapprochement between Iran and Sudan might also undermine an already fraught US relationship with Sudan.   

Unlearned Lessons of Famine in the Horn of Africa

 Refugees International published in December 2022 a report titled "We were Warned: Unlearned Lessons of Famine in the Horn of Africa" by Abdullahi Halakhe.

Some 40 million people in Somalia, Ethiopia, and Kenya face an unprecedented food and nutrition emergency driven by 5 poor rainy seasons and a 6th looming in 2023.  Domestic conflict has exacerbated the situation in Somalia and Ethiopia.  COVID-19 and Russia's invasion of Ukraine have also contributed to the problem by increasing the price of imported food.  

China Pursues Low Profile in Horn of Africa Disputes

 The South China Morning Post published on 27 November 2022 an article titled "Is China Ready to Take a Front Seat to Help Resolve Conflicts in the Horn of Africa?" by Jevans Nyabiage.

China has taken a back seat in efforts to end conflicts in the Horn of Africa, including the one in Ethiopia's Tigray Region, South Sudan, and the Greand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam.

China's Global Security Initiative and Africa

 The Council on Geostrategy published in September 2022 a paper titled "What Is China's Global Security Initiative?" by Chris Cash, UK parliamentary China Research Group.  

Xi Jinping, General Secretary of the CPC, announced in April 2022 the Global Security Initiative (GSI) at the Boao Forum for Asia Annual Conference.  Cash explains that it remains a vague concept that is an effort to provide an alternative to the existing geopolitical order.  It is not yet clear how the GSI, which is long on principles and short on practical details, will be operationalized.  A case can be made that the GSI simply represents a CPC repackaging of existing security objectives with a new propaganda wrapping.  Nevertheless, it is now a core component of Xi Jinping's "comprehensive security" and needs to be taken seriously.  

China has prioritized the GSI in the Horn of Africa, where Beijing has its only military base outside China in Djibouti.  China has also attached the GSI label to China-Africa Cooperation Vision 2035 and the Outlook on Peace and Development in the Horn of Africa.  Beijing's special envoy for the Horn of Africa, Xue Bing, organized the first ever China-Horn of Africa Peace Conference in Addis Ababa in June 2022, reportedly to mediate conflicts in the region.  China cited this conference as an early achievement of the GSI.  (Never mind that it produced nothing more than flowery press releases.)

Comment:  Those of us interested in China's approach to security have been struggling with the significance and future of GSI.  Chris Cash's analysis is the best I have seen so far, but GSI remains an elusive initiative.  

China Seeks Peace in Horn of Africa without Engagement

 The South China Morning Post published on 25 September 2022 an article titled "Chinese Envoy Opposes Foreign Intervention in Horn of Africa on Return to Ethiopia" by Jevans Nyabiage.

China rejects foreign intervention in the Horn of Africa and believes conflict can be resolved through dialogue and economic development.  Nor does China have any interest in trying to mediate complicated conflicts in the Horn of Africa.