The Insurance Business Magazine published on 1 August 2025 an article titled "Escalating Houthi Attacks in Red Sea Trigger New Global Supply Chain and Insurance Challenges" by Gia Snape.
The renewed Houthi attacks on international shipping in the Red Sea by Iran-backed Houthis in Yemen have the potential to raise energy costs and disrupt supply chains. Many shipping companies are once again diverting cargo around the Cape of Good Hope. Insurers have increased their marine risk premiums.
Dialogue Earth published on 31 March 2025 a study titled "Power Plays: China's Changing Energy Financing in Africa" by Wu Tianyi.
The nature of Chinese bank loans to Africa is changing. Major Chinese policy banks such as the China Development Bank and Export-Import Bank of China are decreasing financing while commercial banks such as the Industrial and Commercial Bank of China and the state-owned Sinohydro are increasing financing. This change represents a diminished appetite for risk and prioritizing of sustainable investment.
Reuters published on 25 March 2025 an article titled "What Are the US and Europe Doing to Counter Houthi Strikes in the Red Sea?"
The article looks at the steps taken by Europe and the Biden administration to counter Houthi attacks in the Red Sea since they began more than a year ago. It updates the situation following the most recent strikes against the Houthis by the Trump administration.
Shipuniverse.com published on 26 March 2025 an article titled "Red Sea Tensions Disrupt Global Shipping as Houthi Attacks Intensify."
The article explains the impact of Houthi attacks on international shipping and the way forward following the US air strikes against the Houthis in Yemen.
The International Crisis Group published on 21 March 2025 an analysis titled "Calming the Red Sea's Turbulent Waters."
The lengthy study concluded: "Now that the ceasefire has collapsed, renewed salvos between the U.S. and the Houthis, as well as the Houthis and Israel, amid rising tensions between Western states and Iran, and the potential for a fresh upsurge in fighting in Yemen have cast a darkening pall over the region. Lasting stability in the Red Sea will depend on steering these conflicts toward a peaceful conclusion."
The Maritime Executive published on 5 March 2025 an article titled "Risks of Houthi Attacks on Shipping Increase."
On January 19, the Houthi leadership in Yemen suspended attacks on international shipping in the Red Sea and Gulf of Aden so long as the ceasefire between Hamas and Israel held. A resumption of hostilities would likely result in new Houthi attacks on shipping.
The Palestine Chronicle posted on 8 March 2025 an article titled "Ansarallah Gives Israel 4 Days to Allow Gaza Aid or Face Red Sea Operations."
The Houthis announced on 7 March that they will resume attacks on "Israeli targets" within 4 days if Israel does not allow humanitarian aid into Gaza.
The Italian Institute for International Political Studies published on 24 November 2024 a paper titled "Blue Economy and the Mediterranean: How the Red Sea Crisis is Shaping the Region's Maritime Future (and What Is Next)" by Mario Mattioli.
Houthi attacks on Red Sea shipping reduced transit through the Suez Canal by about 50 percent in 2023 and 70 percent in the first half of 2024. Transit around Africa's Cape of Good Hope adds 3,000 to 3,500 nautical miles to voyages connecting Europe and Asia, increasing travel time by about 10 days. This results in higher costs for fuel, wages, insurance, and freight borne by shipping companies.
The UK-based Overseas Development Institute (ODI) published in October 2024 a study titled "China's Creditor Diversification in Africa" by Tianyi Wu, Oxford University, and Yunnan Chen, ODI.
China's overseas lending is evolving and diversifying. Financing is becoming less concessional and more targeted to commercial sectors in energy and mining. Going forward, commercial creditors are expected to increasingly focus on infrastructure sectors with clear and immediate revenue potential.
Reuters published on 28 August 2024 an article titled "Red Sea Insurance Nearly Doubles after Attacked Oil Tanker Appears to Leak Oil" by Johathan Saul and Mohammed Ghobari.
Yemen's Houthi rebels attacked and set on fire recently a Greek-flagged oil tanker in the Red Sea carrying a cargo of one million barrels of crude oil. It appears to be leaking oil and could have grave environmental consequences along the shores of the Red Sea. Insurance companies have almost doubled the rates for shipping through the Red Sea.
Comment: If this becomes a major oil spill, one of the most affected countries would be Yemen. What are the Houthis thinking?
Politico published on 28 March 2024 an article titled "How China Ended Up Financing the Houthis' Red Sea Attacks" by Matthew Karnitschnig.
China's illicit purchases of Iranian oil are indirectly financing Houthi attacks on Red Sea shipping. China buys about 90 percent of Iran's oil. Tehran's Quds Force provides the Houthis with the missiles, drones, and training that permit them to launch the attacks. Ironically, China is one of the biggest losers due to the disruption of the large quantity of Chinese imports and exports that transit the Red Sea and higher shipping insurance costs.
The Atlantic Council published on 13 February 2024 an analysis titled "China Is Testing Its Freeriding Strategy in the Red Sea" by Leonie Allard.
China is freeriding on US and European security efforts in the Red Sea to enhance its own presence and influence in the Gulf of Aden and northwestern Indian Ocean. It is reaping benefits while others secure the shipping lanes in the Red Sea.
Reuters published on 25 January 2024 an article titled "Exclusive: China Presses Iran to Rein in Houthi Attacks in Red Sea, Sources Say" by Parisa Hafezi and Andrew Hayley.
In the best reporting I have seen on this subject, Reuters says that Chinese officials have asked their Iranian counterparts to help rein in attacks on ships in the Red Sea by the Iran-backed Houthis, or risk harming business relations with Beijing. It was unclear whether Iran would take any action following the request from China.
China has important leverage with Iran. It has been Iran's largest trading partner for the past decade and Chinese oil refiners purchased over 90 percent of Iran's crude exports last year. Chinese commerce is also disproportionately impacted negatively by higher costs and disruption associated with the attacks.
The report speculated that China waited so long to take this action because it did not want to publicly ascribe blame to the Houthis and, in any event, Iran does not have complete control over its Houthi allies. In addition, China prefers to "free-ride" on efforts by the US, UK, and others in maintaining freedom of navigation in the Red Sea.
The Center for Strategic and International Studies published on 22 January 2024 a study titled "The Global Economic Consequences of the Attacks on Red Sea Shipping Lanes" by Thibault Denamiel, Matthew Schleich, William Alan Reinsch, and Will Todman.
Ship traffic through the Bab el-Mandeb choke point at the southern end of the Red Sea has dropped 46 percent compared to the same period in 2023. Cape of Good Hope passages around Africa are up 70 percent. Suez Canal revenues are down 40 percent. Global shipping costs are rising, and Egypt is experiencing significant losses.
India's World Is One News (WION) posted on 13 December 2023 a short news clip titled "Will China Join US in Safeguarding Shipping Lane from Houthis?"
The news clip reported that US Secretary of State Antony Blinken invited China's foreign minister to join the multinational naval effort to protect Red Sea shipping from drone and rocket attacks by Houthis in Yemen.
Comment: There was no indication of China's response to the request, but Beijing has a far greater interest in the security of commercial shipping through the Red Sea than does the United States. China also has two frigates and a supply ship permanently stationed in Gulf of Aden/Red Sea waters and a naval base at Djibouti, which is located close to the Red Sea lanes being attacked by Iranian-backed Houthis.
Because of the large volume of Chinese exports and imports that pass through the Red Sea and Suez Canal and the relationship of this geostrategic territory to the success of the Belt and Road Initiative, China probably has more interest from a commercial point of view than any other country in the safety and freedom of navigation through these waters. China is also in a position to contribute to the protection of shipping in the Red Sea. It maintains a three-ship PLA naval task force in the Gulf of Aden/Red Sea region as a hangover from the days of Somali piracy. It has a naval base in Djibouti at the southern entrance to the Red Sea. It has constructed and owns extensive commercial shipping infrastructure in the Suez Canal Zone, Djibouti, and along Saudi Arabia's Red Sea coast. The Gulf International Forum spelled out China's commercial and military interests in the region in a 21 July 2023 article titled "China's Dual Strategy in the Red Sea: Balancing Economic Expansion and Military Presence" by Leonardo Jacopo Maria Mazzucco.
Recent drone and missile attacks on commercial vessels in the Red Sea by Iranian-supported Houthis in Yemen, which borders the southern end of the waterway, do not appear to exempt vessels from any particular country. The United States also has naval ships in the Red Sea/Gulf of Aden and is part of Combined Task Force 153, which is designed to ensure freedom of navigation in the region. Washington is trying to expand the task force so that there are sufficient military assets in place to deter Houthi threats to maritime trade in these waters. The Washington Post reported on this effort in an article dated 10 December 2023 titled "U.S. Seeking Partners to Safeguard Ships after Red Sea Attacks" by Dan Lamothe and Kareem Fahim.
This raises the question what China is prepared to do to protect shipping through the Red Sea. Although it is highly unlikely that China would participate in the American-influenced Combined Task Force 153, it is in Beijing's interest to take some kind of action. China has leverage with Iran, which controls Yemen's Houthis. China is now the largest purchaser of Iranian crude and early this year brokered a diplomatic reconciliation between Iran and Saudi Arabia. If China is not prepared to join the international naval effort, it should, at a minimum, use its leverage with Iran to reign in the Houthis.
Nikkei Asia published on 6 December 2023 an article that appeared originally in Caixin titled "Chinese Auto Exporters Face Costly Detour after Red Sea Attacks" by Li Rongqian and Wang Xintong.
Recent attacks on Red Sea shipping by Houthi rebels in Yemen could force Chinese cargo ships to reroute around the Cape of Good Hope, significantly increasing the cost and time of Chinese exports and imports.
