Military Africa published on 8 June 2025 an article titled "CATIC Visits Ghana Navy to Explore Cooperation, Enhance Maritime Capabilities" by Ekene Lionel.
Executives from the China National Aero-Technology Import & Export Corporation (CATIC) met recently with the chief of naval staff of the Ghana Navy. This initial meeting could potentially evolve into a more formal cooperation agreement between CATIC and the Ghana Navy.
Defense Express published on 18 January 2025 an article titled "Algeria Chooses Chinese Type 056 Copy-Paste Warships Over Russian Corvettes."
About 85 percent of all equipment and weapons in the Algerian army are Russian made. In 2023, China delivered one Type 056 Corvette to Algeria to the consternation of Moscow. Algiers has now signed a deal with China for delivery of up to six corvettes, including one produced in an Algerian shipyard.
The American Enterprise Institute's Critical Threats published on 8 August 2024 an analysis titled "Turkey Prepares to Ship Out to Somalia" by Liam Karr and Lilya Yatim.
Turkey has agreed to deploy an unspecified number of naval forces to Somalia to build the Somali navy's capacity. This will improve Somalia's ability to compete with Ethiopia's goal to develop a naval base in Somaliland. The Somali-Turkish naval agreement could also complicate Ankara's relations with Addis Ababa and give added incentive for the UAE to strengthen relations with Ethiopia.
The Associated Press published on 21 February 2024 an article titled "Somalia Announces Deal with Turkey to Deter Ethiopia's Access to Sea Through a Breakaway Region" by Omar Faruk.
Somalia announced a defense arrangement with Türkiye that appears aimed at deterring Ethiopia's efforts to secure access to the sea through Somaliland. Türkiye will provide training and equipment to the Somali navy so that it can protect its territorial waters from piracy and "foreign interference."
Ken Opalo posted on 3 November 2023 a commentary titled "Ethiopia Needs a Reliable Seaport and a Navy."
The author makes the case why landlocked Ethiopia should have reliable access to a seaport and a navy as a guarantor of its economic interests in the Red Sea and Indian Ocean.
Except for routine maintenance calls at its military base and dedicated port in Djibouti in connection with continuing task force operations in the Gulf of Aden, the People's Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) suspended during the COVID-19 pandemic all port calls in African waters. The first PLAN port call in Africa after COVID-19 took place as a training exercise in February 2023 with South African and Russian navy ships off South Africa.
PLAN visits to other African ports resumed in June 2023. Three ships--the destroyer Nanning, frigate Sanya, and supply ship Weishanhu--that had completed a tour in the Gulf of Aden continued to West Africa where they called at ports in Cote d'Ivoire, Ghana, Nigeria, and Gabon in June and July.
China Military Online in an article dated 25 June 2023 and titled "43rd Chinese Naval Escort Taskforce Visits Cote d'Ivoire" by Tang Siyu and Wu Kangci reported the goodwill visit to Abidjan. Ghana Business News in an article dated 3 July 2023 and titled "Ghana-China Relations Deepen with Visit of 43rd Chinese Naval Escort Task Group" reported the visit to Tema Port. This Day in an article dated 2 July 2023 and titled "Three Chinese Navy Warships Visit Nigeria, Pledge Enhanced Maritime Security" by Chiemelie Ezeobi reported the visit to Lagos. China Military Online in an article dated 11 July 2023 and titled "43rd Chinese Naval Escort Taskforce Visits Gabon" by Tang Siyu and Wu Kangci reported the visit to Libreville.
Nigeria's Vanguard newspaper in an editorial dated 7 July 2023 titled "Chinese Navy's Curious Africa Tour" offered a commentary on the visits to West Africa.
After the above was posted, the ships continued to Pointe-Noire, Republic of the Congo, where they made a four day visit according to Xinhua on 17 July 2023 in an article titled "Chinese Navy's Visit Showcases Congo-China Friendship: Minister."
Al-Monitor published on 5 July 2022 an article titled "Iran Navy Expanding Its Presence in Red Sea, Israel Says."
Israel's defense chief recently reported that Iran has increased its presence in the Red Sea with 4 naval vessels: a landing ship, a frigate, and 2 support vessels.
The Center for Strategic and International Studies published in August 2021 a study titled "Personal Ties: Measuring Chinese and U.S. Engagement with African Security Chiefs" by Judd Devermont, Marielle Harris and Alison Albelda.
The conclusions are based on an open source database measuring Chinese and U.S. engagement with 454 current and former African security chiefs. China engages with top African security chiefs at less than half the rate of the United States, with engagements peaking in 2019 followed by a sharp decline in 2020.
Aljazeera published on 5 August 2021 a story titled "Why Is India Building a Military Base on Agalega Island?" by Samuel Bashfield, Australia National University's National Security College.
Aljazeera recently reported that India is building what is expected to be a significant naval military facility on North Agalega island owned by Mauritius. It includes an airfield, port, and communications hub. It will support India's fleet of P-81 maritime surveillance aircraft. The author argues that the true motivation for the facility is China's expanding naval presence in the Indian Ocean.
Al-Monitor published on 9 June 2021 an article titled "Ethiopia's Plan to Build Red Sea Military Bases Fuels Tension with Egypt" by Ahmed Gomaa.
Ethiopian spokesperson for the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Dina Mufti, said on 2 June 2021 that landlocked Ethiopia is determined to build military bases in the Red Sea.
If this is the intention of Ethiopia, it is not clear where the bases would be built. Possibly Ethiopia's current alliance with Eritrea would provide an opportunity. Djibouti is another possibility. The bigger question is what is the point.
The Royal United Services Institute posted on 7 December 2020 an analysis titled "Russia's Port Sudan Naval Base: A Power Play on the Red Sea" by Samuel Ramani, St. Antony's College, Oxford.
The author identifies three potential benefits for Russia by establishing a naval facility at Port Sudan on the Red Sea. He also discusses the implications of this development for other countries vying for power in the Red Sea region: US, France, China, and Turkey.
The Jamestown Foundation's Eurasia Daily Monitor published on 19 November 2020 an article titled "Russia to Build Naval Base in Sudan" by Pavel Felgenhauer.
Sudan has signed an agreement with Russia that will result in the establishment of a Russian "naval supply station" at Port Sudan on the Red Sea. The 25-year basing agreement permits Russia to berth up to four warships, including nuclear-powered vessels. Russia will not pay any rent, but will build the base and provide Sudan free of charge with an undetermined amount of military equipment agreed upon in a separate agreement.
Modern Diplomacy posted on 8 August 2020 an analysis titled "Countering Chinese String of Pearls, India's 'Double Fish Hook' Strategy" by Pankaj Jha, Jindal Global University.
India is increasingly concerned over China's naval presence in the Indian Ocean, especially following the establishment of Beijing's first military base in Djibouti. Indian strategists have long argued China is pursuing an encirclement strategy that includes a "string of pearls" in the Indian Ocean, i.e. a number of military facilities across the northern part of the Indian Ocean.
India's has been working to counter this strategy by increasing its own naval support facilities in the Andaman and Nicobar islands in the eastern Indian Ocean and improving security relations with Africa's western Indian Ocean island countries. It is also increasing cooperation with the United States, which has the strongest navy in the Indian Ocean, and with France, which has overseas departments on Reunion and Mayotte. The author's new name for this approach is the "double fish hook" strategy.
