The Trump Administration Reverses Course and Reinstates Food Aid Programs in Six Countries

 Reuters published on 8 April 2025 an article titled "Trump Administration Moves to Restore Some Terminated Foreign Aid Programs, Sources Say" by Jonathan Landay, Daphne Psaledakis, and Humeyra Pamuk.  

The Trump administration reinstated at least 6 recently cancelled US foreign aid programs for emergency food assistance following pressure from inside the administration and from Congress.  The reversal allows food aid programs to continue in Somalia, Lebanon, Syria, Iraq, Jordan, and Ecuador.

USAID's Door Closing Quickly

 The Washington Post published on 7 April 2025 an article titled "Marco Rubio Said He'd Protect Lifesaving Aid Overseas.  DOGE Disagreed" by Annie Gowen.

USAID's new 28-year-old deputy administrator from the DOGE team has ordered the termination of key medical and emergency assistance work across Africa and the Middle East.  His order seems to contradict Secretary of State Marco Rubio's promise to continue lifesaving USAID programs.  

American Foreign Aid: Where It Goes and Why

 The Wall Street Journal published on 10 February 2025 an article titled "How Much the U.S. Spent on Foreign Aid--and Where It Went" by Gabriele Steinhauser and Ming Li.

This is a useful analysis of the money spent by the United States Agency for International Development that the Trump administration is in the process of dismantling. It explains where the money goes, how it compares to foreign aid from other countries, how it is distributed, and which countries receive most of it.  

Russia's Growing Ambitions in the Red Sea Region

 The Royal United Services Institute published in September 2021 a policy brief titled "Russia's Growing Ambitions in the Red Sea Region" by Samuel Ramani, University of Oxford.

The paper addresses why Russia is paying greater attention to the Red Sea region.  It concludes that Russia's policy towards the Red Sea appears opportunistic.

Although Russia's commitment to the Red Sea region has grown since 2017, the foundations of its influence are shallow and remain vulnerable to competition and disruption from external stakeholders.  Except for arms sales and nuclear energy, Russia's commercial presence in the Red Sea region is small in scale, its cooperation with the West and China on maritime security issues is limited, and it has struggled to convert assertive rhetoric in the UNSC into influence over regional arbitration processes.  

Gulf State Financial Flows to Horn of Africa and Elsewhere

 The American Enterprise Institute published in August 2020 a study titled "Gulf Financial Aid and Direct Investment: Tracking the Implications of State Capitalism, Aid, and Investment Flows" by Karen E. Young.  

The report describes the breadth and scope of Gulf State aid and financial flows into Djibouti, Egypt, Ethiopia, Jordan, Oman, Pakistan, Sudan, and Yemen.  China is capturing most of the press attention; the Gulf States collectively are much bigger players in these countries.  

Both Sides of Red Sea Form Red Sea Pact

The National Interest published on 29 March 2020 an analysis titled "Here Comes Saudi Arabia's African Offensive" by Ilan Berman and Jacob McCarty, both with the American Foreign Policy Council.

Five African nations--Sudan, Djibouti, Somalia, Eritrea, and Egypt--and three Middle Eastern countries--Saudi Arabia, Yemen, and Jordan--signed in January the Red Sea Pact to enhance trade and diplomacy along the Red Sea corridor. The Pact lays the groundwork for what Saudi officials hope will become a new cooperative regime for the area. The objective is to increase trade and security along and within this important waterway that has choke points at each end--the Suez Canal in the north and Bab el-Mandeb in the south.

Architecture for a New Regional Order in the Red Sea

Brookings published in November 2019 a study titled "Toward a Red Sea Forum: The Gulf, the Horn of Africa, and Architecture for a New Regional Order" by Zach Vertin.

Freedom of navigation is at stake in the Red Sea as is the protection of maritime trade and control of a major strategic chokepoint, Bab el-Mandeb, at the south end. The Red Sea and Gulf of Aden represent the western flank of an emering theater of competition among global powers in the Indian Ocean. This paper surveys the changing Red Sea context and offers the rationale for a trans-regional governance framework.

From the Suez Canal to the Gulf of Aden

I contributed a chapter titled "From the Suez Canal to the Gulf of Aden" in a new book titled Maritime Security in the Indian Ocean and Western Pacific: Heritage and Contemporary Challenges edited by Howard M. Hensel and Amit Gupta (Routledge, 2018).

While the book explores maritime security issues throughout the Indian Ocean and Western Pacific, my chapter focuses only on the maritime and coastal space from the Mediterranean end of the Suez Canal, through the Red Sea, Gulf of Aqaba, Bab el-Mandeb, and into the Gulf of Aden.

Naval power in the Red Sea

U.S. Navy photo by Mass Communication Specialist 1st Class Nathanael Miller/Released/Flickr. Red Sea - Feb. 18, 2011: Electronics Technician 2nd Class Jose Lopez-Davila rides an 11-meter rigid-hull inflatable boat from the amphibious transport dock ship USS Ponce (LPD 15), in background, during a visit, board, search and seizure (VBSS) training exercise.

On Feb. 28, Frederick Van Lokeren published a good summary titled “The Naval Balance of Power: The Red Sea” in The Geopolitical and Conflict Report.

His primary focus is on the countries that border the Red Sea and Gulf of Aqaba, although he omits any mention of the role of Jordan.

The analysis would have been more complete if he addressed the presence of naval vessels in the Red Sea from European countries, the United States, Russia and especially Turkey, a rising naval power in the region.

You can access the analysis here.