Houthis Falsely Claim to Sink US Aircraft Carrier

 USNI News published on 7 August 2024 an article titled "Disinformation Effort Key to Houthi Red Sea Campaign, Says 5th Fleet Commander" by Heather Mongilio.

As the US aircraft carrier, Dwight D. Eisenhower, returned safely home, Houthi rebels in Yemen falsely claimed they had sunk it.  The Houthis maintain an active disinformation campaign, although they have sunk 3 commercial ships and continue to threaten shipping in the Red Sea and Gulf of Aden.  

Houthis Attack Liberian-flagged, Greek-owned, and Philippine-crewed Ship in Red Sea

 Military Times published on 16 June 2024 an article titled "Navy Rescues Crew from Merchant Vessel Struck by Houthis in Red Sea" by Jon Gambrell, The Associated Press, and Beth Sullivan.

A Houthi uncrewed surface vessel on 12 June struck a Liberian-flagged and Greek-owned bulk cargo ship, the M/V Tutor, in the Red Sea, causing severe flooding and damage to the engine room.  Most of the crew is from the Philippines and the Tutor most recently docked in Russia.  The British military reported the vessel is on fire and sinking.  

A helicopter from the USS Philippine Sea, which is attached to the Dwight D. Eisenhower carrier strike group, airlifted 24 mariners from the Tutor to the Philippine Sea and then the Eisenhower before being taken to shore.   

Video on Protecting Shipping in the Red Sea

 The What is Going on With Shipping? channel posted on YouTube on 14 June 2024 a 21-minute video titled "Whose Prosperity Are We Guarding?"

Houthi missile and drone attacks from Yemen aimed at international shipping in the Red Sea and Gulf of Aden have driven up the cost of war risk insurance even if they have had minimal success in actually hitting ships.  They have also caused a significant reduction in the passage of ships through the Suez Canal and Red Sea.  At the same time, the number of American and European navy vessels protecting shipping through the Red Sea is down.  

Most of the ships still navigating these waters are associated with China, Russia, Iran, and Global South countries. This raises the question as to who should be providing the protection and the most effective way to do it. The author of the video suggests it is time to institute convoy operations for those ships passing through the Red Sea whose owners are willing to pay a fee for the service.  At the moment, Western navies are providing protection for very few ships that have any connection with Western countries.    

Asymmetric Warfare in the Red Sea

 The Wall Street Journal published on 12 June 2024 an article titled "How an Iranian-Backed Militia Ties Down U.S. Naval Forces in the Red Sea" by Gordon Lubold.

The US has spent about $1 billion on munitions used in defending the Red Sea, conducting more than 450 strikes and intercepting more than 200 Houthi drones and missiles since the beginning of attacks on international shipping last November.  Iranian provided drones and missiles are relatively cheap by comparison.

There is concern that this level of US and UK response cannot be maintained in view of the demand for weapons from Ukraine and Israel.  

Senator Kirk’s report on Somali piracy

Senator Kirk during his recent trip to Africa. Source: Senator Kirk's Flickr page.

U.S. Senator Mark Kirk (R-Ill.) recently visited East Africa, including Bosasso in Puntland, to investigate the rise of piracy.

He went on board Chinese and U.S. warships patrolling pirate zones and talked with officials in Bahrain, Djibouti and Kenya. He made a series of recommendations to combat piracy. Although I am not convinced all of his recommendations are realistic, I particularly liked the following proposals:

• Expand rules of engagement giving local naval commanders authority to attack and disable pirate “motherships,” and tactical authority to arrest pirates and rescue crews.
• Blockade the three primary pirate ports and shorelines, including El Danaan anchorage, where 12 western tankers/merchant ships with 290 hostages are held.
• Reward front line Somali communities with economic assistance if they confront or convert al-Shabaab or pirate-controlled areas.

Naval power in the Red Sea

U.S. Navy photo by Mass Communication Specialist 1st Class Nathanael Miller/Released/Flickr. Red Sea - Feb. 18, 2011: Electronics Technician 2nd Class Jose Lopez-Davila rides an 11-meter rigid-hull inflatable boat from the amphibious transport dock ship USS Ponce (LPD 15), in background, during a visit, board, search and seizure (VBSS) training exercise.

On Feb. 28, Frederick Van Lokeren published a good summary titled “The Naval Balance of Power: The Red Sea” in The Geopolitical and Conflict Report.

His primary focus is on the countries that border the Red Sea and Gulf of Aqaba, although he omits any mention of the role of Jordan.

The analysis would have been more complete if he addressed the presence of naval vessels in the Red Sea from European countries, the United States, Russia and especially Turkey, a rising naval power in the region.

You can access the analysis here.

Future of Combined Joint Task Force-Horn of Africa?

The U.S. Government Accountability Office submitted a report in April 2010 to the Subcommittee on National Security and Foreign Affairs, Committee on Oversight and Government Reform, House of Representatives, on the only U.S. military base in Africa known as Combined Joint Task Force-Horn of Africa (CJTF-HOA).

Titled "DOD Needs to Determine the Future of Its Horn of Africa Task Force," the report raises important questions about the role, funding and future of the base. You can read the entire report here (PDF).

CJTF-HOA falls under the Africa Command (AFRICOM) based in Stuttgart. AFRICOM is evaluating CJTF-HOA — including whether it should continue to exist as a joint task force, and if so, whether changes are needed to the task force's mission, structure and resources.

CJTF-HOA has about 1,650 personnel. The Navy continues to fund the majority of the approximately $80 million budget as well as most of Camp Lemonnier's $238 million budget. CJTF-HOA is located at Camp Lemonnier in Djibouti. About 60 percent of its activities are civil affairs projects such as community medical care and bridge construction. Other roles include military-to-military interaction, peace support operations and counter-piracy activities.

Without long-term assessments of its projects and activities, it is difficult for AFRICOM to determine the effectiveness of CJTF-HOA. Its presence in Africa offers benefits such as its ability to respond to contingencies, provide forces for AFRICOM activities and build U.S.-African relationships. On the other hand, the task force's sustainability is uncertain because AFRICOM has not developed options for funding the task force over the long term.

Jan. 05, 2010. U.S. Air Force Pararescuemen conduct a combat insertion & extraction exercise from a Marine CH-53 helicopter attached to Heavy Marine Helicopter Squadron 464. The two units are deployed to Combined Joint Task Force Horn of Africa. (U.S. Air Force photo by MSgt Jeremiah Erickson). Camp Lemonnier. Flickr creative commons licensed content.

New Heritage Foundation study on piracy

I call to your attention another useful report that deals with Somali piracy titled "Maritime Security: Fighting Piracy in the Gulf of Aden and Beyond," published by the Heritage Foundation on June 24, 2009. You can access the report (in PDF format) here. It is unfortunate that this otherwise excellent study released in mid-2009 only has statistical data through 2007. I also found a couple of the recommendations a little strange. For example, the report calls for "expanding the Navy's stated goal of raising its number of ships from 277 to 313 (the majority of the additional 36 should be nuclear powered, including additional nuclear-powered submarines) and focusing Navy operations more on sea control and assured access, less on maritime engagement and security missions." I am not sure I see much of a connection between reducing piracy and adding more nuclear-powered submarines to the U.S. fleet. On the other hand, shifting the U.S. military contribution from the Navy to the Coast Guard and expanding the Coast Guard, as the report recommends, makes a lot of sense. The report correctly urges that the international community focus on helping Somalis to reestablish governance. On the other hand, the recommendation that the United States should support a "grassroots model" of governance in Somalia is a little too facile. The report is on target when it urges the United States to support the UN Security Council in demanding international respect for Somalia's Exclusive Economic Zone and related conventions that bar the dumping of toxic wastes.