The Institute for Security Studies (ISS) published on 11 June 2019 a commentary titled "Time To Consider Negotiating with Al-Shabaab in Somalia?" by Akinola Olojo, ISS Pretoria.
The author makes the case for negotiating with al-Shabaab since the military option appears not to be working. The problem is that al-Shabaab has never demonstrated any inclination to compromise and seems to insist on the the total capitulation of the government of Somalia. This leaves no room for negotiation.
Showing posts with label Muktar Robow. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Muktar Robow. Show all posts
Thursday, June 13, 2019
Wednesday, January 30, 2019
Somalia's Fractious Federal Politics
War on the Rocks posted on 30 January 2019 a commentary titled "The Saga of Mukhtar Robow and Somalia's Fractious Politics" by Christopher Anzalone, Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs at Harvard University, and Stig Jarle Hansen, Norwegian University of Life Sciences.
The authors argue that former al-Shabaab leader Muktar Robow's arrest by the Somali government should be understood in the context of the power struggle between Somali President Mohamed Abdullahi Mohamed "Farmajo" and Prime Minister Hassan Ali Khayre, on the one hand, and the Somali semi-autonomous regional states. Farmajo's and Khayre's opposition to Robow was tied to their own desire to weaken the power of South West State, where Robow was running for president.
The authors argue that former al-Shabaab leader Muktar Robow's arrest by the Somali government should be understood in the context of the power struggle between Somali President Mohamed Abdullahi Mohamed "Farmajo" and Prime Minister Hassan Ali Khayre, on the one hand, and the Somali semi-autonomous regional states. Farmajo's and Khayre's opposition to Robow was tied to their own desire to weaken the power of South West State, where Robow was running for president.
Saturday, January 26, 2019
Security Program in Somalia Is Not Working
The Elephant posted on 24 January 2019 a commentary titled "Rebranding Al Shabaab: Geopolitics, Greed, Ineptitude and the Losing Battle against Terror" by Abukar Arman.
Somalia has outsourced to foreign actors almost every aspect of its security and none of them is accountable to the Somali government. The author argues that sustainable security will not exist so long as the international community continues its AMISOM-focused initiative at the expense of rebuilding robust Somali military and security forces that are capable of dealing with extremists and securing Somalia's borders.
Somalia has outsourced to foreign actors almost every aspect of its security and none of them is accountable to the Somali government. The author argues that sustainable security will not exist so long as the international community continues its AMISOM-focused initiative at the expense of rebuilding robust Somali military and security forces that are capable of dealing with extremists and securing Somalia's borders.
Tuesday, January 22, 2019
Why Al-Shabaab Attacks Kenya
The Conversation posted on 16 January 2019 an interview titled "Why Al-Shabaab Targets Kenya, and What Can Be Done To Stop Attacks" by Brendon J. Cannon, Khalifa University, and Martin Plaut, Institute of Commonwealth Studies.
One of the reasons al-Shabaab carries out attacks in Kenya is the international publicity it attracts, which aids recruitment and fundraising that are byproducts of the international press coverage. The attacks are also an effort by al-Shabaab to remain relevant.
One of the reasons al-Shabaab carries out attacks in Kenya is the international publicity it attracts, which aids recruitment and fundraising that are byproducts of the international press coverage. The attacks are also an effort by al-Shabaab to remain relevant.
Thursday, January 17, 2019
Somalia Shoots Itself in the Foot
The Institute for Security Studies (ISS) posted on 11 January 2019 a commentary titled "Somalia Shoots Itself in the Foot" by Peter Fabricius, ISS consultant.
The Somali government declared Nicholas Haysom, a South African lawyer and seasoned diplomat, persona non grata on 1 January, thereby forcing UN Secretary-General Antonio Guterres to replace him as the UN Special Envoy to Somalia. Haysom criticized the Somali government's decision to arrest Muktar Robow, a candidate in the presidential elections last December in Somalia's South West State. Robow had earler defected from al-Shabaab where he once was the deputy leader.
Fabricius argues that this is not how to deal with al-Shabaab or to manage Somali federalism. What has been lost is a prime opportunity to demonstrate that former al-Shabaab members can be accepted into mainstream Somali society.
The Somali government declared Nicholas Haysom, a South African lawyer and seasoned diplomat, persona non grata on 1 January, thereby forcing UN Secretary-General Antonio Guterres to replace him as the UN Special Envoy to Somalia. Haysom criticized the Somali government's decision to arrest Muktar Robow, a candidate in the presidential elections last December in Somalia's South West State. Robow had earler defected from al-Shabaab where he once was the deputy leader.
Fabricius argues that this is not how to deal with al-Shabaab or to manage Somali federalism. What has been lost is a prime opportunity to demonstrate that former al-Shabaab members can be accepted into mainstream Somali society.
Monday, December 24, 2018
Somalia: Crisis in South West State
The International Crisis Group published on 24 December 2018 a commentary titled "Somalia's South West State: A New President Installed, a Crisis Inflamed."
The Federal Government of Somalia had Ethiopian forces arrest popular Muktar Robow and former al-Shabaab official and installed its own candidate as leader of South West State. This creates a new crisis for stability in the region.
The Federal Government of Somalia had Ethiopian forces arrest popular Muktar Robow and former al-Shabaab official and installed its own candidate as leader of South West State. This creates a new crisis for stability in the region.
Wednesday, October 31, 2018
Former Al-Shabaab Leader Runs for Regional Presidency in Somalia
The Washington Post published on 30 October 2018 an article titled "Al-Shabab's Former No. 2 Leader Runs for Office in Somalia" by Abdi Guled and Cara Anna.
Muktar Robo, former press spokesman for al-Shabaab who defected to the government side last year, is running for the presidency of Somalia's Southwest regional state. This presents a dilemma for the Somali government, which argues that Robo is still under international sanctions and has not atoned for his support of terrorist acts by al-Shabaab.
Muktar Robo, former press spokesman for al-Shabaab who defected to the government side last year, is running for the presidency of Somalia's Southwest regional state. This presents a dilemma for the Somali government, which argues that Robo is still under international sanctions and has not atoned for his support of terrorist acts by al-Shabaab.
Thursday, August 31, 2017
Amnesty or Prosecution for Al-Shabaab Leaders?
World Politics Review published on 31 August 2017 a commentary titled "Should Somalia Prosecute or Offer Amnesty to Al-Shabaab Leaders Who Surrender?" by Yasin Ahmed Ismail, head of a research and consultancy in Nairobi.
The author argues that Somalia should not give immunity from prosecution to high-level al-Shabaab terrorists who ordered the killing, maiming and torture of Somali nationals. Al-Shabaab's top leaders should be prosecuted under a new anti-terrorism law.
The author argues that Somalia should not give immunity from prosecution to high-level al-Shabaab terrorists who ordered the killing, maiming and torture of Somali nationals. Al-Shabaab's top leaders should be prosecuted under a new anti-terrorism law.
Wednesday, March 11, 2015
Analysis of Al-Shabaab and Boko Haram
The Columbus, Ohio-based think tank, Center for Policy Analysis and Research, published in March 2015 a policy review titled "Al-Shabaab and Boko Haram" by Abukar Sanei. It provides a background of al-Shabaab and Boko Haram and policy recommendations for Nigeria and Somalia.
Monday, February 24, 2014
Two Articles about Al-Shabaab
The Combating Terrorism Center at West Point published in February 2014 a special issue of CTC Sentinel that includes two articles on al-Shabaab.
The first article is titled "Al-Shabaab's Capabilities Post-Westgate" by Ken Menkhaus, professor of political science at Davidson College. He concludes that al-Shabaab today is both weaker and more dangerous and unconstrained than in the past. In the short term, this is bad news for Kenya, Ethiopia, the Somali government and people, and international actors operating in Somalia. In the longer term, however, al-Shabaab's downward trajectory since 2009 shows few signs of reversal, at least inside Somalia. Additional losses of top leaders could lead to a quick unraveling of the group, at which point the chief security threat will be the residual Amniyat network, which will retain the capacity for extortion and political violence.
The second article is titled "An In-Depth Look at Al-Shabaab's Internal Divisions" by Stig Jarle Hansen, associate professor at the Norwegian University of Life Sciences. He concludes that al-Shabaab will likely continue to attack countries that have deployed forces in Somalia. Al-Shabaab's biggest danger to the West is most likely through potential logistics support for other al-Qaeda units, its indoctrination of Somalis into al-Qaeda's ideology, and its growing reach in African countries.
The first article is titled "Al-Shabaab's Capabilities Post-Westgate" by Ken Menkhaus, professor of political science at Davidson College. He concludes that al-Shabaab today is both weaker and more dangerous and unconstrained than in the past. In the short term, this is bad news for Kenya, Ethiopia, the Somali government and people, and international actors operating in Somalia. In the longer term, however, al-Shabaab's downward trajectory since 2009 shows few signs of reversal, at least inside Somalia. Additional losses of top leaders could lead to a quick unraveling of the group, at which point the chief security threat will be the residual Amniyat network, which will retain the capacity for extortion and political violence.
The second article is titled "An In-Depth Look at Al-Shabaab's Internal Divisions" by Stig Jarle Hansen, associate professor at the Norwegian University of Life Sciences. He concludes that al-Shabaab will likely continue to attack countries that have deployed forces in Somalia. Al-Shabaab's biggest danger to the West is most likely through potential logistics support for other al-Qaeda units, its indoctrination of Somalis into al-Qaeda's ideology, and its growing reach in African countries.
Friday, February 21, 2014
The Reinvention of Al-Shabaab
The Center for Strategic and International Studies in Washington published in February 2014 an analysis titled "The Reinvention of Al-Shabaab: A Strategy of Choice or Necessity?" by Matt Bryden, director of Sahan Research, a think tank located in Nairobi, Kenya.
In this excellent study, Bryden notes that al-Shabaab's leadership was once relatively heterogeneous, including nationalist and politically pragmatic figures such as Hassan Dahir Aweys and Muktar Robow. There were differences within al-Shabaab over the value of a relationship with al-Qaeda, the wisdom of attacks on civilians, and the role of foreign fighters in the organization. Following a purge of the nationalists, what now remains of al-Shabaab is the more extremist fringe: an al-Qaeda franchise in Somalia, imbued with the "takfiri" ethos that legitimizes the killing of other Muslims, and recommitment to the cause of international jihad and the restoration of an Islamic caliphate.
In this excellent study, Bryden notes that al-Shabaab's leadership was once relatively heterogeneous, including nationalist and politically pragmatic figures such as Hassan Dahir Aweys and Muktar Robow. There were differences within al-Shabaab over the value of a relationship with al-Qaeda, the wisdom of attacks on civilians, and the role of foreign fighters in the organization. Following a purge of the nationalists, what now remains of al-Shabaab is the more extremist fringe: an al-Qaeda franchise in Somalia, imbued with the "takfiri" ethos that legitimizes the killing of other Muslims, and recommitment to the cause of international jihad and the restoration of an Islamic caliphate.
Wednesday, August 28, 2013
Al-Shabaab: Down But Not Out
The George Washington University Homeland Security Policy Institute published on 27 August 2013 a study titled "Somalia's Al-Shabaab: Down But Not Out" by the Navanti Group.
The study concluded: Al-Shabaab once appeared to be one of the most formidable terrorist groups in the world proving capable of governing vast amounts of territory and executing well-orchestrated attacks both inside and outside Somalia. However, events over the past two years have left the group in a weakened state. Al-Shabaab's loss of territory and public support, in combination with internal conflict, has greatly reduced the groups capacity since its peak. This has created hope for the Somali Federal Government and opportunity for interventions by the international community to engage the Somali people and help rebuild the country. However, despite its setbacks, al-Shabaab still commands territory and fighters, and remains a serious threat capable of destabilizing Somalia and the Horn of Africa, and potentially inspiring attacks globally.
The study concluded: Al-Shabaab once appeared to be one of the most formidable terrorist groups in the world proving capable of governing vast amounts of territory and executing well-orchestrated attacks both inside and outside Somalia. However, events over the past two years have left the group in a weakened state. Al-Shabaab's loss of territory and public support, in combination with internal conflict, has greatly reduced the groups capacity since its peak. This has created hope for the Somali Federal Government and opportunity for interventions by the international community to engage the Somali people and help rebuild the country. However, despite its setbacks, al-Shabaab still commands territory and fighters, and remains a serious threat capable of destabilizing Somalia and the Horn of Africa, and potentially inspiring attacks globally.
Wednesday, April 25, 2012
Split in Somalia's Al-Shabaab Organization
Abdi Aynte, a Somali journalist with Al Jazeera English, has published a superb analysis of the growing split in Somalia's al-Shabaab organization. He argues that Sheikh Hassan Dahir Aweys and Muktar Robow have effectively broken with the more radical leadership of al-Shabaab, especially Ahmed Abdi Godane. Sheikh Hassan wants desperately to become president of Somalia and is moving to create an alternative to both al-Shabaab and the Transitional Federal Government (TFG). Abdi Aynte emphasizes that Somali alliances are constantly shifting and the "self-immolation of al-Shabaab is a step closer to ending one of Somalia's most brutal episodes." Click here to read his analysis.
A number of non-Somali analysts in the Washington area have been arguing for the past two years that the United States should engage the likes of Sheikh Hassan and Robow in dialogue with the goal of bringing them into a Somali coalition government. I have argued against this idea for several reasons. The United States has no business engaging committed anti-Western jihadis such as Hassan and Robow even if they disagree with more radical al-Shabaab leaders. Somalis both in and out of the TFG have been in contact with al-Shabaab dissidents, almost certainly including Sheikh Hassan and Robow. That is their business. If the Somalis can work something out on their own, power to them. There is no place, however, for Americans (or other outsiders) in this discussion. They don't understand how the Somali system works and have no business speaking on behalf of Somalis. Nor is there any evidence that Somalis like Sheikh Hassan and Robow will accept anything less than complete control of the Somali government on their terms, which will certainly not be in the U.S. interest.
A number of non-Somali analysts in the Washington area have been arguing for the past two years that the United States should engage the likes of Sheikh Hassan and Robow in dialogue with the goal of bringing them into a Somali coalition government. I have argued against this idea for several reasons. The United States has no business engaging committed anti-Western jihadis such as Hassan and Robow even if they disagree with more radical al-Shabaab leaders. Somalis both in and out of the TFG have been in contact with al-Shabaab dissidents, almost certainly including Sheikh Hassan and Robow. That is their business. If the Somalis can work something out on their own, power to them. There is no place, however, for Americans (or other outsiders) in this discussion. They don't understand how the Somali system works and have no business speaking on behalf of Somalis. Nor is there any evidence that Somalis like Sheikh Hassan and Robow will accept anything less than complete control of the Somali government on their terms, which will certainly not be in the U.S. interest.
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