The 4th tripartite meeting of Ethiopia, Sudan, and Egypt on Ethiopia's Grand Renaissance Dam took place in Khartoum on 25-26 August 2014. Sudan Vision published a good summary of the first three tripartite meetings and the results of the 4th in an article titled "Analysis of the Fourth Tripartite Meeting on the Renaissance Dam" by Salman Mohamed Ahmed Salman.
Concerning the most recent meeting, the author said Egypt has accepted the fact that the dam has become an indisputable reality and did not suggest any halting of construction. Ethiopia accepted the principle of international participation in the studies, which Egypt has called for since the 1st tripartite meeting. Sudan continued its role as a mediator between Ethiopia and Sudan. Everything considered, the author thought all parties were conciliatory during the 4th meeting.
Showing posts with label Nile. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Nile. Show all posts
Wednesday, September 3, 2014
Friday, July 29, 2011
Tuesday, July 5, 2011
"Black Gold for Blue Gold? Sudan’s Oil, Ethiopia’s Water and Regional Integration"
A June 2011 Chatham House paper (PDF) by Harry Verhoeven makes the case for regional integration of Sudan, South Sudan and Ethiopia drawing on their respective oil and water resources.
I am a firm believer in the necessity of economic integration in the Horn of Africa in order to prevent and/or mitigate conflict. This paper contributes to that discussion.
In the case of Nile Basin water sharing or alternations to the 1959 treaty that now governs allocation of Nile water, it will be impossible to make any progress unless Egypt is brought into the dialogue.
| Oil drums in Ethiopia. Flickr/user Carsten ten Brink. |
In the case of Nile Basin water sharing or alternations to the 1959 treaty that now governs allocation of Nile water, it will be impossible to make any progress unless Egypt is brought into the dialogue.
Friday, May 6, 2011
Monograph on security in the Horn of Africa
The Institute for Security Studies published a 400 plus page monograph in April 2011 titled Regional Security in the Post-Cold War Horn of Africa.
Edited by Roba Sharamo and Berouk Mesfin, it contains a wealth of information about the region by mostly African authors.
The chapters include:
The chapters include:
- The Horn of Africa security complex.
- The Ethiopian-Eritrean War of 1998-2000.
- The causes and consequences of the Eritrean-Ethiopian border conflict.
- Regional and extra-regional inputs in promoting (in)security in Somalia.
- Unravelling the Islamist insurgency in Somalia.
- The failure of ‘making unity attractive’ in Sudan.
- Southern Sudan.
- Piracy off the coast of Somalia.
- Water conflict resolution and institution building in the Nile Basin.
- Eritrean-Yemeni relations.
- Not born as a de facto state (Somaliland).
- IGAD’s peace and security strategy.
- Keeping an elusive peace: AMISOM and the quest for peace in Somalia.
- Building a regional peacekeeping capacity: the challenges facing the African Union in Darfur.
Sunday, November 28, 2010
Cooperation between Southern and Northern Sudan essential as independence approaches
The Brenthurst Foundation in South Africa commissioned a study on Southern Sudan titled "Everything is at Zero: Beyond the Referendum – Drivers and Choices for Development in Southern Sudan."
Dated Nov. 2010, it properly focuses on the need for Southern and Northern Sudan to seek ways to collaborate as Southern Sudan moves inexorably towards independence. The paper examines the political and economic challenges facing Southern Sudan.
The paper concludes that Southern Sudan will need to build and reinforce economic linkages with the northern economy in order to develop rapidly and help guard against renewed North-South conflict.
Interdependence with the North could take the form of a common currency, soft borders for trade and people flow, and co-management of the White Nile and oil pipeline. Means to formalize these ties might include a customs union, increased cross-border infrastructure, revenue sharing and new politico-economic structures for joint administration of specific resources and interests.
To make agriculture the primary engine for non-oil growth, the study concluded a robust framework for encouraging commercial-level investment should be devised.
A significant re-balancing of Southern Sudan’s massive expenditure on defense with other budget priorities is essential.
Confidence-building measures between North and South, such as joint exercises and mutual disarmament, will be central to ensuring stability and security in the vital border region.
These are all ambitious goals that will be hard to achieve in the early heady days of Southern Sudan’s independence when the natural reaction will be to turn away from the North.
You can read the entire report at this link (936.72kb PDF).
Dated Nov. 2010, it properly focuses on the need for Southern and Northern Sudan to seek ways to collaborate as Southern Sudan moves inexorably towards independence. The paper examines the political and economic challenges facing Southern Sudan.
The paper concludes that Southern Sudan will need to build and reinforce economic linkages with the northern economy in order to develop rapidly and help guard against renewed North-South conflict.
Interdependence with the North could take the form of a common currency, soft borders for trade and people flow, and co-management of the White Nile and oil pipeline. Means to formalize these ties might include a customs union, increased cross-border infrastructure, revenue sharing and new politico-economic structures for joint administration of specific resources and interests.
To make agriculture the primary engine for non-oil growth, the study concluded a robust framework for encouraging commercial-level investment should be devised.
A significant re-balancing of Southern Sudan’s massive expenditure on defense with other budget priorities is essential.
Confidence-building measures between North and South, such as joint exercises and mutual disarmament, will be central to ensuring stability and security in the vital border region.
These are all ambitious goals that will be hard to achieve in the early heady days of Southern Sudan’s independence when the natural reaction will be to turn away from the North.
You can read the entire report at this link (936.72kb PDF).
Labels:
agriculture,
economics,
Nile,
oil,
Sudan
Monday, June 28, 2010
Nile water controversy
The Institute for Security Studies and the Ethiopian International Institute for Peace and Development organized a seminar in Addis Ababa on June 3, 2010, on the controversial Nile water question.
The two organizations released a summary of the remarks made at the seminar titled "The Historical Dispute over the Sharing of the Nile: Breaking the Deadlock and Charting a Way Forward."
Most of the speakers were Ethiopian. Not surprisingly, the report (PDF) has an Ethiopian slant to it.
The two organizations released a summary of the remarks made at the seminar titled "The Historical Dispute over the Sharing of the Nile: Breaking the Deadlock and Charting a Way Forward."
Most of the speakers were Ethiopian. Not surprisingly, the report (PDF) has an Ethiopian slant to it.
Thursday, May 27, 2010
Nile water: Down stream versus upstream countries
The Arabic-language Al Hurra TV program based in the United States asked me to join a one-hour panel discussion May 26 concerning recent tension between upstream and downstream countries that constitute the Nile Basin.
Two of the other panelists represented the interests of Egypt and Sudan and a third was an Arabic-speaking journalist from Tanzania based in Cairo. As the only non-Arabic speaking person on the panel and not from the region, I tried to take an academic approach to this controversial issue.

Blue Nile Falls, near Bahar Dar, Ethiopia. Flickr, creative commons licensed, by user mK_B.
Five of the Nile Basin riparian states (Ethiopia, Rwanda, Uganda, Tanzania and Kenya) recently signed a new Nile Basin framework agreement aimed at gaining more legal access to Nile water. Several other upstream countries are expected to sign. Downstream Egypt and Sudan strongly oppose this agreement.
Those two states signed an agreement in 1959 that effectively divided the flow of Nile water 75 percent for Egypt and 25 percent for Sudan, even though 86 percent of the water originates in Ethiopia. None of the other Nile Basin countries signed the 1959 agreement; only Ethiopia was independent at the time. Egypt and Sudan do not want to see any change in the water allocation designated in the 1959 agreement. The upstream states, particularly due to growing population pressures throughout the region, have increasing needs for hydropower and some want to increase irrigated agriculture. Egypt and Sudan see this as a potential threat to their water allocations.
My argument is that upstream hydro dams pose no threat to Egypt and Sudan. The water stops once as it backs up behind the dam and then flows again as before. This is no reason for Egypt and Sudan to get upset.
Large irrigation projects are another matter. They need to be looked at carefully so as not to jeopardize Egypt’s lifeline, the Nile. The same argument applies to a large irrigation project underway in Egypt. There are also ways to improve water usage by better conservation methods in the water sheds and more efficient irrigation techniques than are currently in use. The Nile Basin Initiative has done some excellent work in this area.
Before the current dispute gets out of control, it is useful to remember that the upstream countries have been using water from tributaries feeding into the Nile for many decades. This is not a new issue.
The upstream countries have some legitimate concerns. Ethiopian cities, for example, periodically have no electricity because there is insufficient generating capacity in the country. The downstream countries must take these concerns into account. I have argued for years that the Nile water question is a potential flashpoint in this part of Africa. (See "Avoiding a Water War in the Nile Basin" and "Nile Basin Relations: Egypt, Sudan and Ethiopia.")
Even hysterical rhetoric is not new. Former Egyptian President Anwar el-Sadat stated in 1980 that "If Ethiopia takes any action to block our right to the Nile waters, there will be no alternative for us but to use force. Tampering with the rights of a nation to water is tampering with its life, and a decision to go to war on this score is indisputable in the international community." That statement was made 30 years ago.
There is no need for the Nile water question to result in conflict. I believe that renewed diplomacy and cooler heads will eventually prevail. This current disagreement does underscore, however, the importance of this issue and it will only get worse as the population of the Nile basin area continues to grow at its current rapid rate.
Two of the other panelists represented the interests of Egypt and Sudan and a third was an Arabic-speaking journalist from Tanzania based in Cairo. As the only non-Arabic speaking person on the panel and not from the region, I tried to take an academic approach to this controversial issue.
Blue Nile Falls, near Bahar Dar, Ethiopia. Flickr, creative commons licensed, by user mK_B.
Five of the Nile Basin riparian states (Ethiopia, Rwanda, Uganda, Tanzania and Kenya) recently signed a new Nile Basin framework agreement aimed at gaining more legal access to Nile water. Several other upstream countries are expected to sign. Downstream Egypt and Sudan strongly oppose this agreement.
Those two states signed an agreement in 1959 that effectively divided the flow of Nile water 75 percent for Egypt and 25 percent for Sudan, even though 86 percent of the water originates in Ethiopia. None of the other Nile Basin countries signed the 1959 agreement; only Ethiopia was independent at the time. Egypt and Sudan do not want to see any change in the water allocation designated in the 1959 agreement. The upstream states, particularly due to growing population pressures throughout the region, have increasing needs for hydropower and some want to increase irrigated agriculture. Egypt and Sudan see this as a potential threat to their water allocations.
My argument is that upstream hydro dams pose no threat to Egypt and Sudan. The water stops once as it backs up behind the dam and then flows again as before. This is no reason for Egypt and Sudan to get upset.
Large irrigation projects are another matter. They need to be looked at carefully so as not to jeopardize Egypt’s lifeline, the Nile. The same argument applies to a large irrigation project underway in Egypt. There are also ways to improve water usage by better conservation methods in the water sheds and more efficient irrigation techniques than are currently in use. The Nile Basin Initiative has done some excellent work in this area.
Before the current dispute gets out of control, it is useful to remember that the upstream countries have been using water from tributaries feeding into the Nile for many decades. This is not a new issue.
The upstream countries have some legitimate concerns. Ethiopian cities, for example, periodically have no electricity because there is insufficient generating capacity in the country. The downstream countries must take these concerns into account. I have argued for years that the Nile water question is a potential flashpoint in this part of Africa. (See "Avoiding a Water War in the Nile Basin" and "Nile Basin Relations: Egypt, Sudan and Ethiopia.")
Even hysterical rhetoric is not new. Former Egyptian President Anwar el-Sadat stated in 1980 that "If Ethiopia takes any action to block our right to the Nile waters, there will be no alternative for us but to use force. Tampering with the rights of a nation to water is tampering with its life, and a decision to go to war on this score is indisputable in the international community." That statement was made 30 years ago.
There is no need for the Nile water question to result in conflict. I believe that renewed diplomacy and cooler heads will eventually prevail. This current disagreement does underscore, however, the importance of this issue and it will only get worse as the population of the Nile basin area continues to grow at its current rapid rate.
Monday, November 2, 2009
Climate change in Africa
The Grantham Institute for Climate Change has just released an excellent scientific study on the impact of climate change in Africa. It concludes that northern and southern Africa will become much hotter. Eastern Africa, the Horn of Africa and parts of central Africa are likely to see an increase in rainfall.
It is not clear, however, that this will result in an increase in the flow of water in the Nile. Vector borne diseases such as malaria and dengue may spread and become more severe. There continues to be a poor understanding of the drivers of Africa's climate and their complex interactions. The best assumption is that many regions of Africa will suffer from droughts and floods with greater frequency and intensity.
Prepared by Gordon Conway, professor of international development at Imperial College London, the twenty-four page report is titled "The Science of Climate Change in Africa: Impacts and Adaptation" and dated October 2009. You can access it here (in PDF).
Image: "Climate change canvas" by oxfam international via creative commons on flickr. "My illustration shows how time is running out for Africa – and it's in our hands," says the artist who is from Melbourne, Australia. "I feel that Africa will suffer most. As we all experience global warming, Africa’s resources are stretched to help overcome starvation and loss of livelihood."
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