Horn Review published on 12 August 2026 a commentary titled "South Sudan and China's Evolving Overseas Security Strategy" by Abraham Abebe.
In July, China committed to deepening military cooperation with South Sudan by continuing its support for the UN peacekeeping mission as the backbone of its contribution. Beyond this, China's support seems to be limited to expanding its military dialogue with South Sudan and increasing military exchanges.
The International Crisis Group posted on 18 August 2026 an hour-long podcast titled "Sudan's Separation Fifteen Years Ago and Today's Disaster" with Alan Boswell, Alex de Waal, and Abdul Mohammed.
Alex de Waal and Abdul Mohammed review the background of South Sudan's independence from Sudan and the African Union High-Level Implementation Panel led by former South African President Thabo Mbeki. They explained why negotiations ultimately failed to produce two viable states, and whether such coordinated high-level diplomacy is still possible in today's fragmented regional geopolitics.
Efforts to resolve the crises in Sudan and South Sudan today are experiencing greater involvement from the Gulf States and involve a larger number of competing actors. Mediation today is extremely difficult. The global environment is highly transactional. The situation also has the possibility of becoming a regional war. It is time for the African Union to step forward and play a stronger role in ending the conflicts.
AEIs Critical Threats Africa File posted on 6 August 2026 an article titled "Red Sea" by Michael DeAngelo and Liam Karr.
Saudi Arabia announced on 30 July the formation of a Multinational Maritime Defense Alliance to protect shipping in the Red Sea and adjacent waterways following the Bab el-Mandeb Strait blockade of Saudi ships by the Houthi rebels in Yemen. So far, 14 nations have joined the task force.
Marine Radar posted on 24 July 2026 an article titled "Two Chinese Supertankers Exit Red Sea Despite Houthi Blockade."
Two Chinese-operated supertankers chartered by COSCO transported Saudi oil safely through the south end of the Red Sea in spite of the Houthi blockade. They carried about 4 million gallons of Saudi crude for destinations in China. The Houthis have not targeted Chinese-operated tankers.
Discovery Alert posted on 11 July 2026 an article titled "Namibia's Oil, Uranium & Lithium Strategic Partnership with China 2026" by Muflih Hidayat.
The China-Namibia strategic partnership entered a new chapter in July 2026 when Namibian President Netumbo Nandi-Ndaitwah made a state visit to China. She signed 8 cooperation agreements that focus on green minerals, uranium, lithium, oil and gas, ports, technology transfer, and clean energy.
The Diplomat published on 8 July 2026 an article titled "Three Decades in, China Is Cashing in on Sudan's Collapse" by Paul Mwirigi.
In the midst of a three-year-long civil war, most Western countries have abandoned Sudan. China, on the other hand, is investing in projects such as copper mining.
The Carnegie Endowment for International Peace published on 1 July 2026 an analysis titled "In the Middle East and North Africa, America and China Converge More Than They Diverge" by Amr Hamzawy and Kathryn Selfe.
Competition between the United States and China in the Middle East and North Africa is less a threat and more an opportunity. The region has important geostrategic significance for both countries. As great power competition develops globally, Washington and Beijing's positions in the region are increasingly converging.
The United States and China are united by their primary interest in maintaining free trade in the region. For both countries, a stable, peace-driven order is key. Washington is also driven by interest in Israel's security; Beijing is similarly driven by China's need for oil and liquid natural gas. These two interests are compatible and underscore the need for peace and stability in the region.
The Stimson Center published on 24 June 2026 a report titled "The UN Mission in South Sudan in the Context of Changing Security and Regional Dynamics."
The report concludes that the combined effects of a fragile peace process, heightened political tensions, economic deterioration, the spillover of conflict from Sudan, the emerging Ebola crisis in the neighboring DRC, and growing humanitarian pressures have created a volatile environment in South Sudan.
South Sudan continues to grapple with unresolved questions surrounding the political transition and the lack of implementation of the Revitalized Agreement on the Resolution of the Conflict in the Republic of South Sudan (R-ARCSS), which remains the primary political framework for addressing the conflict and advancing sustainable peace.
The Royal United Services Institute for Defence and Security Studies published on 7 May 2026 an analysis titled "The New Scramble: Turkey, Somalia and the Battle for the Red Sea" by Matthew Chandler de Waal.
Turkey has become Somalia's foremost ally. Camp TURKSOM, Ankara's largest overseas military base, has trained thousands of Somali special forces since 2017. More recently, Turkey became engaged in a major project to develop Somalia's deepwater oil reserves.
Turkey is now looking to build a base in the Gulf of Aden at Laas Qoray, a port city that is contested by Somalia and the breakaway government of Somaliland. A base in Laas Qoray would put Turkey in position to join a host of other nations with military bases at the south end of the Red Sea.
The International Crisis Group posted on 30 April 2026 a 35-minute podcast titled "Somalia's Election Standoff and New Inflection Point" with Alan Boswell and Omar Mahmood.
Issues discussed include Somalia's latest electoral crisis, tensions with federal member states, the future of the African Union mission in Somalia, the fight against al-Shabaab, and the growing role of external powers, especially Türkiye in Somali politics, and Israel in Somaliland.
Omar Mahmood offers an especially clear explanation of the current electoral situation in Somalia. Technically, 15 May is the end of the current government's term, but the situation is actually more complicated. The current government argues it has one more year in power; the opposition says it ends on 15 May. In any event, there will not be elections on 15 May.
Ecofin Agency published on 20 April 2026 an article titled "China-Africa Trade: Windfall Gains for Resource Giants in Q1 2026, but a Deeper Structural Reality Behind" by Idriss Linge.
A small number of African countries--DRC (cobalt), Angola (oil), Guinea (bauxite), and South Africa (critical minerals) in the first quarter of 2026 captured the bulk of the gains in exports to China. The deeper story points to a structural shift in how Africa is being integrated into China's global economic strategy.
The growing trade between China and Africa is driven by Africa's extractive sectors with limited industrial spillovers and constrained economic transformation. Africa is becoming a critical outlet for Chinese industrial exports. The key question going forward is whether African economies can leverage this situation to move up the value chain.
The New York Times published on 15 April 2026 a guest essay titled "I have Watched the Catastrophe of My Country Be Reduced to Nothing" by Mohammed Ahmed.
The author takes issue with those who call what is happening in Sudan a "civil war." He argues it is "a resource war fought by proxy, playing out against the world's indifference." About the only thing sustaining Sudan today is communal mobilization or self-help by ordinary Sudanese.
Foreign Affairs published on 8 April 2026 an article titled "Don't Partition Sudan Again: Splitting It Didn't Work in the Past and Won't Work Now" by Francis M. Deng and Ahmed Kodouda.
Both the Sudan Armed Forces (SAF) and paramilitary Rapid Support Forces (RSF) insist they are fighting to preserve a unified Sudan, but the longer the current geographical division persists, the harder it will be to put the country together again.
The 2011 independence of South Sudan offers a cautionary tale. Any effort to formalize the split between the SAF and RSF-controlled parts of Sudan would not resolve the conflict's root causes. Another partition of Sudan would also destabilize its neighbors.
Business Insider Africa published on 10 March 2026 an article titled "Africa's Second-largest Oil Producer Says China Dominated $21.88 Investment Proposals Over Five Years" by Solomon Ekanem.
Angola has received 596 investment proposals worth an estimated $21.8 billion over the past five years. with Chinese investors accounting for 80 percent of the total.
Africa Press posted on 20 February 2026 an article titled "China Returns to Libya with New Economic Partnership" by Tamara Pro.
Closed since 2014 for security reasons, China reopened its embassy in Tripoli late last year and recently appointed an ambassador. Subsequently, China signed a number of economic agreements with the Government of National Unity (GNU). China will likely begin to increase its purchase of Libyan oil and may expand the port of Tobruk in eastern Libya.
China will continue to maintain balanced relations between the GNU in western Libya and the Government of National Stability that controls eastern Libya.
The South China Morning Post published on 11 February 2026 an article titled "China Sends Envoy to Libya after Embassy Shuttered for More Than a Decade" by Jevans Nyabiage.
China has appointed a new ambassador to the Libyan Government of National Unity in Tripoli following the reopening of its embassy there last November. The embassy closed in 2014 for security reasons.
The China Global South Project published on 9 February 2026 an article titled "China's Export Surge to Africa in 2025 Complicates Efforts to Rebalance Trade" by Christian Geraud Neema Byamungu.
In 2025, China's exports to Africa rose 25.8 percent while imports from Africa grew only 5.4 percent. The dollar value of Chinese exports to Africa was $225 billion versus $123 billion worth of imports from Africa, leaving Africa with a major trade deficit.
Africa's five largest recipients of Chinese goods were Nigeria, South Africa, Egypt, Liberia, and Algeria. Africa's five largest exporters to China were South Africa, DRC, Angola, Guinea, and Zambia, all oil and/or mineral exporting countries.
Semafor published on 9 February 2026 an article titled "Somaliland Pitches Minterals, Strategic Location to Trump" by Mohammed Sergie.
The President of Somaliland, Abdirahman Mohamed Abdullahi, is encouraging the Trump administration to recognize Somaliland because of its strategic location at the south end of the Red Sea and oil and gas reserves.
The ChinaMed Project published on 30 January 2026 an analysis titled "China and the Libyan Crisis: Maintaining a Foot in the Door in a Changing Region" by Bianca Pasquier and Leonardo Bruni.
This paper revisits the past decade of Chinese engagement in Libya, tracing Beijing's evolving relations with the country's factions and situating them within a regional context. It concludes that China is unlikely to engage deeply in Libya's power struggles. Beijing will likely keep its options open, be present but uncommitted.
Australia's Griffith University and the Green Finance & Development Center in Shanghai published on 18 January 2026 "China Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) Investment Report 2025" by Christoph Nedopil Wang.
Since the beginning of BRI in 2013, the report says Chinese construction projects (profit making opportunities by Chinese construction companies) totaled $837 billion globally while investment projects totaled $561 billion globally. The figures are based on having an active memorandum of understanding with China at the time of the report. Energy, mining, and transportation projects top the list.
In 2025, Africa accounted for a significant increase ($61.2 billion) in BRI engagement (construction projects and investment), but most of it was in construction projects (47 percent of global total) and not investment (22 percent of global total). Nigeria alone accounted for $24.6 billion in construction projects and the Republic of the Congo for another $23.1 billion.
