The Economist published on 20 August 2026 an article titled "Somaliland Wants to Help Secure the Red Sea."
Somaliland's president says his country can help secure the Red Sea by offering military bases to global powers along its coastline. Somaliland is prepared to offer both the United States and Israel bases at the port of Berbera.
Saxafi Media posted on 23 August 2026 an interview with me titled "Inside Washington's Somaliland Dilemma: David Shinn Reveals What U.S. Policy Really Means."
Although much of the interview deals with Somaliland, it covers issues throughout the Horn of Africa and beyond, including US support for Somalia sovereignty, Israel's recognition of Somaliland, importance of Ethiopia, the conflict in Sudan. Egypt's role in the region, security in the Red Sea, competition with China, the role of African diasporas, and the contribution of UN agencies and IGAD.
CNBC published on 20 August 2026 an article titled "Somali Pirate Menace Returns as U.S.-Iran War Stokes Regional Chaos and Saps Enforcement Resources" by Aparajita Saxena.
On August 17, pirates seized the cargo vessel Lutuf about four nautical miles off the Somali coast. A month ago, they seized the MT Asana, a Tanzanian-flagged oil and chemical tanker, in the Gulf of Aden. The upsurge in piracy may be driven by drought and food insecurity in Somalia and increased regional instability caused by the war with Iran.
Twin Cities, Minnesota radio station Voices of Ethiopia posted on 21 August 2026 a commentary titled "After Isaias: Could Eritrea's Succession Crisis Destabilize the Red Sea?"
Since independence in 1995, Isaias Afwerki has been the center of power in Eritrea. This commentary raises the question whether Eritrea can undergo a transfer of power without triggering a struggle among the military, security establishment, political elite, and competing regional interests--and whether a potential struggle could spill beyond Eritrea's borders. Internal fragmentation, a proxy struggle along the Red Sea, and even normalization of relations with Ethiopia are all possible.
CNBC published on 12 August 2026 an article titled "Saudi Arabia Ramps Up Oil Exports Through Mediterranean Pipeline to Avoid Attacks in Red Sea" by Spencer Kimball and Deena Zaidi.
Following the Iranian-supported Houthi blockade of Saudi ships passing through the south end of the Red Sea, Riyadh is rerouting oil supertankers north through the Suez Canal even for oil destined for Asia.
The problem is that fully loaded supertankers sit too deep in the water to transit the Suez Canal. Consequently, they pump half the Saudi oil cargo into a pipeline on Egypt's Red Sea coast that conveys it across Egypt to an outlet in the Mediterranean Sea. The supertankers then transit the Suez Canal half loaded and reload the oil at the other end of the pipeline in the Mediterranean. Saudi oil exports departing the south end of the Red Sea are down 90 percent.
Because of the Houthi blockade, a higher percentage of Saudi oil is now going north to Europe rather than south to Asia. This may result in a boon for West African oil by making transport to Asia more competitive than oil originating in Saudi Arabia.
Firstpost posted on 15 August 2026 an article titled "What Is Saudi Arabia's New Red Sea Maritime Alliance?"
Saudi Arabia hosted 43 nations in Riyadh in late July and launched the Multinational Maritime Defense Coalition that, so far, unites 14 regional countries to protect the Red Sea, Bab el-Mandeb Strait, and Gulf of Aden. It aims to counter Houthi threats coming from Yemen, secure global trade routes, and reduce reliance on Western maritime security operations.
Countries that have signed on are Saudi Arabia, Bahrain, Qatar, Kuwait, Jordan, Egypt, Djibouti, Somalia, Sudan, Comoros, Pakistan, Bangladesh, Turkey, and the internationally recognized government in Yemen. Notable omissions are Eritrea, India, UAE, and Oman.
Chatham House published on 24 July 2026 an analysis titled "The Houthi Red Sea Blockade: Will Collective Maritime Security Be Defended or Break Down?" by Nitya Labh and Farea Al-Muslimi.
The rebel Houthis are part of Iran's "Axis of Resistance" but retain significant autonomy. The Houthi blockade of Saudi ships in the Red Sea acts as a deterrent against regional adversaries and reinforces their legitimacy in Yemen.
The Houthi objective is not to sink large numbers of ships, but to create enough uncertainty for commercial shipping that insurers raise premiums, companies reroute vessels, and governments absorb mounting economic costs.
Responsible Statecraft posted on 12 August 2026 an article titled "How the Egypt-Ethiopia Feud Could Upend Trump's Plans in Africa" by Jonathan Fenton Harvey.
The United States is sending mixed and confusing signals to Egypt, Ethiopia, Eritrea, Sudan, Somalia, and Somaliland on complex relations in the region dealing with allocation of Nile waters and Ethiopia's quest for access to the sea.
The New York Times published on 11 August 2026 an article titled "Six Killed in Houth Strikes on Red Sea Ship, Yemeni Government Says" by Ismaeel Naar.
Both the government of Yemen and Iran-backed Houthi rebels stated that Houthi missiles hit a ship in the Bab el-Mandeb Strait on 11 August. They disagree on what the ship was carrying. The Yemeni government says food supplies and the Houthis say Saudi military equipment. There are conflicting accounts of the ship's ownership.
The Somali Media Network posted on 8 August 2026 a 42-minute podcast with me hosted by Ismail Gorse on the Horn of Africa.
This is a wide-ranging discussion of current issues in the Horn of Africa and US policy with a special focus on Somalia and Somaliland.
AEIs Critical Threats Africa File posted on 6 August 2026 an article titled "Red Sea" by Michael DeAngelo and Liam Karr.
Saudi Arabia announced on 30 July the formation of a Multinational Maritime Defense Alliance to protect shipping in the Red Sea and adjacent waterways following the Bab el-Mandeb Strait blockade of Saudi ships by the Houthi rebels in Yemen. So far, 14 nations have joined the task force.
The Doha, Qatar-based Middle East Council on Global Affairs published in February 2026 an open access E-book titled "The Red Sea: Divided by Water, United by Opportunities" edited by Dalia Ghanem, Mehari Taddele Maru, Luigi Narbone, and Carlo Palleschi.
This book provides a comprehensive analysis that breaks down the silos between Middle Eastern countries (MECs) and the Horn of Africa (HOA). It argues that it is impossible to understand the region's trajectory by looking at one side of the Red Sea in isolation and examines interactions between the MECs and the HOA. It seeks to align visions and identify concrete steps toward realizing the vision of a region that, though divided by waters, is united by opportunities.
Somalia Today published an article dated 1 August 2026 titled "AFRICOM Chief Rules Out US Military Base in Somaliland" by Mohamed Bashir.
General Dagvin Anderson, head of the US Africa Command, said in an interview published by the US embassy in Mogadishu on 31 July that "there are no plans to build a base in Somaliland." He added that "US policy is and remains the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the Federal Republic of Somalia. That has not changed."
The United States has maintained contact with Somaliland officials and supported development and security programs in the region without recognizing it as a separate state.
The Congressional Research Service published on 21 July 2026 a brief titled "Yemen: Conflict, Red Sea Security, and U.S. Policy" by Christopher M. Blanchard.
In March 2025, the Trump administration designated the Iranian-backed Houthis a Foreign Terrorist Organization. On March 15, 2025, U.S. forces began a military campaign against the Houthis which the administration said was intended to compel them to end attacks on international shipping in the Red Sea. The United States and the Houthis agreed to a truce in May 2025, which continues to hold.
Pakistan's South Asian Chronicle published on 1 August 2026 an article titled "Houthi Red Sea Crisis."
This is a nice summary of the background of the Houthi blockade of the Red Sea and relations with Saudi Arabia.
Insurance Journal posted on 30 July 2026 an article titled "Houthis' Red Sea Attacks Prompt London Insurers to Widen High-Risk Zone" by Jonathan Saul.
As a result of Iran-backed Houthi attacks on international shipping in the Red Sea, London insurers have expanded the area in the Red Sea subject to higher rates. Even small changes to war insurance add hundreds of thousands of dollars in extra costs for a seven-day voyage.
Al-Monitor published on 29 July 2026 an article titled "China in Touch with Yemen's Houthis to Allow Ships to Sail Through Red Sea, Sources Say" by Jonathan Saul, Parisa Hafezi, Timour Azhari, and Chen Aizhu.
Beijing has asked the Iranian-backed Houthi rebels in Yemen to promise safe passage for its oil tankers transporting crude from Saudi Arabia's Yanbu terminal in the Red Sea south through the Bab el-Mandeb choke point. China clears each shipment with the Houthis, who have developed good relations with Beijing.
The New York Times published on 28 July 2026 an article titled "Houthis Claim Strike on Another Saudi Oil Tanker" by Pranav Baskar and Shipin Hakim.
Iranian-backed Houthi rebels in Yemen said they targeted on 28 July a Saudi oil tanker, the NCC Ghazal, in the Red Sea with missiles. Saudi authorities did not confirm the attack.
The Hollings Center for International Dialogue published in July 2026 a brief titled "Securing Strategic Waters Across the MENA Region: The Red Sea."
The current threat in the Red Sea is not confined to the closure of the geographical Bab el-Mandeb choke point. It is shaped by persistent uncertainty caused by the security crises in the wider region.
The threat cannot be addressed through conventional naval tools alone, nor reduced to a piracy or law enforcement problem. The brief recommends incremental cooperation, capacity building, and risk mitigation measures.
Marine Radar posted on 24 July 2026 an article titled "Two Chinese Supertankers Exit Red Sea Despite Houthi Blockade."
Two Chinese-operated supertankers chartered by COSCO transported Saudi oil safely through the south end of the Red Sea in spite of the Houthi blockade. They carried about 4 million gallons of Saudi crude for destinations in China. The Houthis have not targeted Chinese-operated tankers.
