China-Africa Ties and US Policy

 The Congressional Research Service published on 6 August 2026 a paper titled "China-Sub-Saharan Africa Ties and U.S. Policy" by Nicolas Cook, Lauren Ploch Blanchard, and Michael D. Sutherland.

China presents its engagement in Africa as promoting mutually beneficial economic development without imposing political conditions.  In practice, China seeks to use integrated multidimensional engagement to advance its broader global strategic goals of expanding its international influence, strengthening its access to natural resources, and challenging US global leadership.

Economic activity is a central pillar of China's activity in Africa.  Beijing's policy banks and state-backed lenders have extended numerous loans to African governments and other actors, making China a key bilateral creditor on the continent.  China engages in education and media cooperation, and provides development aid via grants and concessional loans, technical assistance, and humanitarian programs. Security cooperation between China and African countries has grown, especially over the last decade. 

Interview on the Horn of Africa

 Saxafi Media posted on 23 August 2026 an interview with me titled "Inside Washington's Somaliland Dilemma: David Shinn Reveals What U.S. Policy Really Means."

Although much of the interview deals with Somaliland, it covers issues throughout the Horn of Africa and beyond, including US support for Somalia sovereignty, Israel's recognition of Somaliland, importance of Ethiopia, the conflict in Sudan. Egypt's role in the region, security in the Red Sea, competition with China, the role of African diasporas, and the contribution of UN agencies and IGAD.

Saving USAID's Information After Musk Feeds It into Woodchipper

 The Political Librarian published in its July 2026 issue a study titled "Where Is 60 Years of Data, Information and Knowledge One Year After USAID Was Fed "Into the Wood Chipper?" by Tanya Torres and Zachary Baquet.

When Elon Musk and the Trump administration fed the United States Agency for International Development (USAID) into the woodchipper in early 2025, groups and individuals mobilized to rescue information resources created by staff and partners.  

The USAID Knowledge Rescue effort, along with partner organizations and other volunteers, formed a decentralized network to preserve and provide public access to over sixty years' worth of the agency's data, information, and knowledge.  This study provides a snapshot of the progress and challenges faced by those involved in rescuing USAID's information.  

The shuttering of USAID, the Corporation for Public Broadcasting, and others by the Trump administration makes it clear that organizations are not permanent, and the knowledge they generate is fragile.  When an organization ends, time moves quickly.  The careful, delicate work of identifying and preserving decades-old institutional knowledge can get crowded out by the immediate pressures of winding down in weeks or months.

A Retrospective on Sudan-South Sudan Separation and the Future

 The International Crisis Group posted on 18 August 2026 an hour-long podcast titled "Sudan's Separation Fifteen Years Ago and Today's Disaster" with Alan Boswell, Alex de Waal, and Abdul Mohammed.  

Alex de Waal and Abdul Mohammed review the background of South Sudan's independence from Sudan and the African Union High-Level Implementation Panel led by former South African President Thabo Mbeki.  They explained why negotiations ultimately failed to produce two viable states, and whether such coordinated high-level diplomacy is still possible in today's fragmented regional geopolitics.

Efforts to resolve the crises in Sudan and South Sudan today are experiencing greater involvement from the Gulf States and involve a larger number of competing actors.  Mediation today is extremely difficult.  The global environment is highly transactional.  The situation also has the possibility of becoming a regional war.  It is time for the African Union to step forward and play a stronger role in ending the conflicts.  

US-China Differences on Global Warming Pose Dilemma for Africa

 The Institute for Security Studies published on 14 August 2026 a paper titled "US-China Rivalry Puts Africa's Climate Diplomacy to the Test" by Dhesigen Naidoo.

China has been a consistent signatory of the Paris Agreement while the Trump administration withdrew from it during both its first and second iterations.  

The author argues that Africa must maintain a positive climate-action approach while navigating the American anti-climate stance.  US support for fossil fuel-based development has gained momentum, slowing Africa's pathway to low carbon development.

China and US Following Zambian Election: Critical Minerals Are the Prize

 The Associated Press published on 14 August 2026 an article titled "Zambia Awaits Presidential Election Results. Here's Why China and the US May Be Interested" by Jacob Zimba.

Zambia awaits the results of an election that will decide whether President Hakainde Hichilema wins a second five-year term.  Both China and the US are interested in Zambian copper and cobalt and hence the outcome of the election and its impact on each country.

Decline of the US State Department

 Small Wars Journal published on 11 August 2026 a commentary titled "The War of the Pen: What America's State Department Is Ignoring" by Julian McBride.

The author laments the absence of ambassadors at numerous US embassies, the State Department's waning soft power, the rise of middle and regional powers at the expense of the United States, and the increasing influence of China in the Global South.

He believes US diplomatic setbacks are self-inflicted but can be reversed through concerted action and the US position restored in the Global South.  

US Policy Challenges in the Horn of Africa

 Responsible Statecraft posted on 12 August 2026 an article titled "How the Egypt-Ethiopia Feud Could Upend Trump's Plans in Africa" by Jonathan Fenton Harvey.

The United States is sending mixed and confusing signals to Egypt, Ethiopia, Eritrea, Sudan, Somalia, and Somaliland on complex relations in the region dealing with allocation of Nile waters and Ethiopia's quest for access to the sea.

China-Sub-Saharan Africa Ties and U.S. Policy

 The Congressional Research Service published on 6 August 2026 a report titled "China-Sub-Saharan Africa Ties and U.S. Policy" by Nicolas Cook, Lauren Ploch Blanchard, and Michael D. Sutherland.

This is a comprehensive overview of China's relations with Sub-Saharan Africa and guidance for US policymakers.  

How Many Deaths Is Demise of USAID Causing?

 The Economist published on 30 July 2026 an article titled "How Many People Are Dying as a Result of USAID's Demise?"

Elon Musk, who is responsible for dismantling the US Agency for International Development (USAID), insists it has not cost any human lives.  The influential publication, Lancet, estimates that by 2030, 14 million people will die as a result of USAID's demise.

The Economist explains that the drop in US health funding has been less cataclysmic than originally predicted and that early estimates of deaths drew on trends that may no longer be valid.  While the early estimates of deaths are too high, Musk's notion of zero deaths is plainly wrong. Lives have been lost.

Red Sea Security and US Policy

 The Congressional Research Service published on 21 July 2026 a brief titled "Yemen: Conflict, Red Sea Security, and U.S. Policy" by Christopher M. Blanchard.

In March 2025, the Trump administration designated the Iranian-backed Houthis a Foreign Terrorist Organization.  On March 15, 2025, U.S. forces began a military campaign against the Houthis which the administration said was intended to compel them to end attacks on international shipping in the Red Sea.  The United States and the Houthis agreed to a truce in May 2025, which continues to hold.  

Why Is the State Department Slashing Visa Processing Across Africa?

 The State Department published on 15 July 2026 an announcement titled "Realignment of U.S. Visa Services in Africa to Regional Hubs."

Effective August 1, the Department of State ended routine visa services at the following 25 US embassies and consulates in Sub-Saharan Africa: Antananarivo (Madagascar), Abuja (Nigeria), Asmara (Eritrea), Bamako (Mali), Banjul (The Gambia), Brazzaville (Republic of Congo), Bujumbura (Burundi), Conakry (Guinea), Cotonou (Benin), Durban (South Africa), Freetown (Sierra Leone), Gaborone (Botswana), Harare (Zimbabwe), Juba (South Sudan), Libreville (Gabon), Lilongwe (Malawi), Lusaka (Zambia), Maputo (Mozambique), Maseru (Lesotho), Mbabane (Eswatini), N'Djamena (Chad), Niamey (Niger), Nouakchott (Mauritania), Ouagadougou (Burkina Faso), and Windhoek (Namibia). 

Instead, persons seeking visas to visit the United States in the countries cited above will have to travel to a regional visa hub in one of the following 20 cities: Abidjan (Cote d'Ivoire), Accra (Ghana), Addis Ababa (Ethiopia), Cape Town (South Africa), Dakar (Senegal), Dar-es-Salaam (Tanzania), Djibouti (Djibouti), Johannesburg (South Africa), Kampala (Uganda), Kigali (Rwanda), Kinshasa (DRC), Lagos (Nigeria), Lome (Togo), Luanda (Angola), Malabo (Equatorial Guinea), Monrovia (Liberia), Nairobi (Kenya), Port Louis (Mauritius), Praia (Cape Verde), and Yaoundé (Cameroon).

The Department of State said it is realigning visa operations in Sub-Saharan Africa as "part of a long-standing Department practice that strengthens national security by promoting more uniform screening, vetting, and adjudication standards, as well as improves efficiency."  

Comment:  The national security explanation is not convincing.  For example, a consular officer located in Lusaka can adjudicate a visa application just as uniformly and accurately as one at a visa hub in Johannesburg.  In fact, a consular officer located in the country of application has a better understanding of the applicant's background than a consular officer in another country.  Nor is the realignment likely to save much money.  US embassies and consulates are still expected to provide routine passport and protection services for American citizens.  The consular sections in most embassies and consulates in Africa are small with one individual often handling both visa services and assistance to American citizens.  

What the realignment will do is make it more difficult for many Africans to visit relatives in the United States, study at American universities, and travel for tourism and business.  The geography of the realignment means, for example, that the entire Sahel region and all of southern Africa except South Africa and Angola will no longer have local non-immigrant and immigrant visa services provided by US embassies and consulates.  This raises the question.  Is the real reason for this realignment to make it more difficult for Sub-Saharan Africans to come to the United States?  Whatever the rationale, the State Department has just handed another victory to China and Russia.  

 

Africa Youth Survey: Perceptions of China and US

 The Ichikowitz Family Foundation just published its massive African Youth Survey 2026.  It held face-to-face interviews with about 5,000 Africans aged 18-24 from 16 countries in Sub-Saharan Africa.  

It covers many issues, but the focus here is perceptions of China and the United States.  African youth see China (79 percent) and the United States (81 percent) as the most influential foreign actors, although China's influence is seen as somewhat more positive.

The survey looked at the influence of the US, China, Brazil, EU, UK, Germany, France, India, and Russia.  The only country whose influence was seen as less positive than the United States (85 percent) was Russia (83 percent).  

About 3 in 5 youth are optimistic about Africa's future during the Trump administration, especially on military support and security.  Just under half believe the closure of USAID will negatively impact their country, with healthcare and disease prevention seen as the areas most affected.  

China and India are increasingly viewed as more favorable partners than the United States, a sentiment shaped in part by the return of the Trump administration.  

Iran War Drives Africa Toward Renewable Energy and China Model

 Foreign Affairs published on 27 July 2026 an article titled "Can Renewables Industrialize Africa? The Iran War Is Driving the Continent Toward Chinese-Backed Green Energy" by Mohamed Adow, director of Power Shift Africa, a climate think tank in Kenya.

The war on Iran is accelerating a determination among African countries to reduce their dependence on imported fossil fuels and to turn toward renewable power.  As a result, African countries are now leaning toward the model advanced by China, in which abundant, low-cost electricity from renewables underpins industrialization and economic growth.

In the meantime, the United States is ceding a role in Africa's clean energy transition to China and risks losing diplomatic influence on the continent.  Washington has not grasped Africa's new energy reality. 

The State Department and the Trump Administration

 The American Conservative published on 22 July 2026 a commentary titled "The Fight Inside Trump's State Department Is About Power--Not Expertise" by Phillip Linderman.

The author argues that the Trump administration is trying to salvage the US Foreign Service from the "globalist and woke values" that dominate professional diplomatic services.  But the "old guard" in the State Department is stymieing this effort in the belief that the situation in the Department will return to normal after Trump leaves office.

For decades, the State Department's machinery has reflexively favored the globalist or internationalist Foreign Service officer over the American First officer.  Now an administration is trying to rebalance the institution.   

The old guard understands that accepting Trump's approach would mean surrendering much of its power to shape foreign policy.  That is why its members defended "the corrupt and dysfunctional USAID."  He concludes: "This is a fight about Washington power, not diplomatic expertise."

Comment:  There is a grain of truth to the author's core argument.  Foreign Service officers tend to be globalist and internationalist in their approach to foreign affairs.  That has also been the approach of all post-World War II administrations with the exception of the first Trump administration.  Foreign Service officers, especially at the senior level, also want to have an impact on the foreign policy decision making process and not meekly parrot every decision that comes from on high.  

This is where his analysis falls apart.  There is a role for offering a slightly different approach or even a contrary point of view backed up by sound knowledge and analysis.  If it is not accepted, then obviously the decision from "on high" must be accepted.  In the vast majority of cases in my experience, this has been the response from the Foreign Service.  If significant differences remained, the Foreign Service officer was moved to a different position or resigned.  

A Foreign Service officer has every right to disagree, for example, with the author's definition of USAID as "corrupt and dysfunctional" because he is flat-out wrong and the administration erred in dismantling the organization.  But the Trump administration made the decision to shut USAID down, and it is up to the Foreign Service to implement the new policy on foreign assistance.  I suspect the overwhelming majority of Foreign Service officers today are doing just that.

The author argues that the "public record" suggests senior Foreign Service officers' reluctance to implement the president's decisions fully and faithfully is widespread.  The "public record" he cites is a flawed analysis titled "Why Does Trump Hate the State Department" published by The American Conservative on July 20 and reposted below on July 21.  

Sub-Saharan Africa Little Affected by Trump's New Tariffs

 The New York Times published on 24 July 2026 an article titled "New Tariffs as Old Ones Expire: The Latest on Trump's Trade War" by Tony Romm, Edison Wu, and Lazaro Gamio.

On 24 July, the Trump administration imposed new duties on imports from more than 80 countries as previous 10 percent global duties expired.  The new tariffs range between 10 and 12.5 percent.  

All five countries in North Africa now face the 12.5 percent tariff but sub-Saharan Africa seems to benefit from the new situation as only Nigeria, Angola, and South Africa are impacted--all at the 12.5 percent rate.    

Status of Fired USAID Staff

 The Hill published on 22 July 2026 a commentary titled "The Dismantling of USAID and the Firing of Its Staff Was Illegal" by J. Brian Atwood and Kevin E. Burns.

The Trump administration has violated the Civil Service Reform Act of 1883, updated in 1978, by firing most USAID personnel without offering an opportunity for due process.

The Merit Systems Protection Board ruled that the president can remove career officials without due process.  Fired USAID employees are appealing this decision through the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit.

Why Does Trump Hate the State Department?

 The American Conservative published on 20 July 2026 an opinion piece titled "Why Does Trump Hate the State Department?" by Peter Van Buren.

This is a blanket condemnation of the State Department as an institution, at least under both Trump administrations if not all Republican presidencies.  The only positive comment about the Department comes at the end of Van Buren's remarks when he states: "Of course there will always be some role for the State Department overseas at least, primarily in consular staff assisting American citizens and the few traditional diplomats needed to handle the bureaucratic concierge work and VIP logistics that State has always been good at." 

Comment:  Van Buren's cherry-picked half-truths and non sequiturs are still a useful reminder to State Department personnel, who tend to be more liberal than the populists of the Trump administration, that it is important to follow the policy direction of the administration in power.

I spent thirty-seven years as a Foreign Service officer in the State Department under Republican and Democratic administrations (but not a Trump administration) and concluded that Department personnel with rare exception do, in fact, pursue the policies laid down by the White House.  

The Reagan administration, for example, attached considerable importance to support for the development of American trade and investment overseas. Appointed in the late 1980s by Reagan as ambassador to Burkina Faso, I devoted much of my three years in Ouagadougou promoting American trade and investment, albeit with only modest success.  My ambassadorial colleagues throughout Africa were equally supportive of Reagan administration policies.   

Reagan's Republican successor, George H.W. Bush, and his Secretary of State, James A. Baker was highly respected throughout the Department of State.  In return, I believe Bush and Baker respected State Department personnel.  It is simply not accurate to conclude, or at least imply, that State Department personnel do not follow the policies of Republican administrations.    

Van Buren writes that "State's Foreign Service Officers saw themselves as resistance superheroes who would take down Trump I."  This is utter nonsense.  Based on my continuing contact with active-duty officers, they are quietly doing their jobs as directed by political appointee supervisors or just trying to stay out of harm's way until there is an administration, Republican or Democratic, that gives them a little respect.  

The Decline of Diplomacy in the United States

 USA Today published on 19 July 2026 an opinion piece titled "Reduction in US State Department Staff Was Purge in Diplomacy" by Elizabeth "Liz" Colton.

The Trump administration's dismissal of diplomacy and purge of the State Department have resulted in the predictable negative impact on US foreign policy.  

Marco Rubio Dismantles Human Rights at State Department

 Foreign Policy published on 8 July 2026 an article titled "Marco Rubio Burned Down the House to Fix a Sink" by Amanda Klasing, Amnesty International.  

Secretary of State Rubio has led an assault on human rights in American statecraft by slashing humanitarian aid, decimating human rights programs, gutting human rights offices and bureaus, disengaging from global human rights systems at the United Nations and elsewhere, and threatening international justice mechanisms.  

He has also changed the guidelines for the State Department's annual, global human rights reports by prioritizing political agendas over consistent accounting of human rights violations around the world.