Modern Diplomacy published on 20 September 2026 a commentary titled "China-Africa Defense Ties Deepen after Beijing Security Forum" by Nadia Helmy.
The 4th China-Africa Peace and Security Forum took place in Beijing in mid-September. Military representatives and defense officials from the African Union and 41 African nations participated. The event reflects growing interest in security cooperation with China and diversification away from Western countries.
Modern Diplomacy published on 14 September 2026 a commentary titled "Is China Turning Economic Influence in Africa into Strategic Power?" by Nadia Helmy.
The author argues that China is leveraging its membership in BRICS and its direct investment in Africa as tools to build economic influence that gradually translate into sustainable political, security, and strategic influence.
Forbes published on 14 September 2026 a commentary titled "Why Egypt Has Taken an Eastward Turn" by Ilan Berman.
President Xi Jinping's recent state visit to Egypt signals the extent to which Egypt has drifted decisively into the Chinese orbit in recent years. Cairo's geopolitical orientation toward Washington is no longer a given.
The Carnegie Endowment for International Peace published on 3 September 2026 a commentary titled "The Two Key Takeaways from Xi's Egypt Visit" by Amr Hamzawy.
The author concluded that "China's influence in the Middle East is on the rise, and Egypt's international partnerships amid regional turmoil in the Middle East are growing. Those are the two key takeaways of Xi's visit to Egypt."
Armstrong Economics posted on 24 August 2026 a commentary titled "China and Egypt Unite" by Martin Armstrong.
The author argues that Washington never seems to understand that trade and geopolitical influence go hand in hand, citing the case of China's influence in Egypt. The United States sees Egypt in a military context while China looks at Egypt as a commercial gateway connecting three continents.
Al-Monitor published on 26 August 2026 an article titled "China's Xi to Visit Egypt for First Time in Decade as Military, Huawei Ties Grow" by Jack Dutton.
President Xi Jinping will make his first visit to Egypt in a decade next week. The visit comes after the beginning of a joint military air exercise and as Huawei seeks to supply more than 2,000 advanced AI chips for Egyptian government data centers. Huawei's move prompted Washington to consider backing a rival offer from US technology companies.
Small Wars Journal published on 11 August 2026 a commentary titled "The War of the Pen: What America's State Department Is Ignoring" by Julian McBride.
The author laments the absence of ambassadors at numerous US embassies, the State Department's waning soft power, the rise of middle and regional powers at the expense of the United States, and the increasing influence of China in the Global South.
He believes US diplomatic setbacks are self-inflicted but can be reversed through concerted action and the US position restored in the Global South.
Business Insider Africa published on 30 July 2026 an article titled "Ethiopia's $12.5 Billion Airport Has Become the Latest Investment Battleground between the U.S. and China in Africa" by Solomon Ekanem.
The United States is seeking a role for its private sector companies in the development of Ethiopia's new $12.5 billion Bishoftu Airport as it challenges China's commanding position of building infrastructure projects in Africa by its state-owned companies.
The United States sees this as an opening for its construction and engineering companies and an opportunity to sell more Boeing aircraft to Ethiopian Airlines. In addition, the Bishoftu Airport is a gateway to influence Africa's fast-growing aviation, logistics, and technology sectors.
The South China Morning Post published on 4 July 2026 an article titled "China's Influence on African Ports Extends to Software, Automation and AI: Study" by Jevans Nyabiage.
The article discusses those aspects of African port construction and operations where China has gained influence in the past twenty years or more. They include related infrastructure projects and all kinds of software and information technology.
The Carnegie Endowment for International Peace published on 1 July 2026 an analysis titled "In the Middle East and North Africa, America and China Converge More Than They Diverge" by Amr Hamzawy and Kathryn Selfe.
Competition between the United States and China in the Middle East and North Africa is less a threat and more an opportunity. The region has important geostrategic significance for both countries. As great power competition develops globally, Washington and Beijing's positions in the region are increasingly converging.
The United States and China are united by their primary interest in maintaining free trade in the region. For both countries, a stable, peace-driven order is key. Washington is also driven by interest in Israel's security; Beijing is similarly driven by China's need for oil and liquid natural gas. These two interests are compatible and underscore the need for peace and stability in the region.
The Africa Center for Strategic Studies published on 10 June 2026 a paper titled "Beyond Ports: China Embeds Itself in Africa's Maritime Networks" by Paul Nantulya.
China is Africa's largest trade partner, major financer and builder of African ports, and has embedded itself in other aspects of the continent's maritime networks.
China's growing role in training, governance, and data systems could entrench long-term influence over Africa's institutions, potentially normalizing Chinese standards and creating structural dependencies on Chinese-built physical and digital infrastructure. This can limit Africa's domestic competition, divert scarce revenue, introduce data and security concerns, and reduce policy flexibility and bargaining power.
The Torino World Affairs Institute published in 2026 a study titled "The Sino-Moroccan Rapprochement: An Analysis of Geoeconomic Convergence, Diplomatic Calibration and Media Narratives in a Changing Maghreb" by Bianca Pasquier and Imane Ezzehouany, edited by Amanda Chen and Leonardo Bruni.
The study concludes that by deepening its engagement with China, Morocco is reengineering its agency and room for maneuver while maintaining its traditional ties with the United States and Europe. China's economic presence in the Kingdom, albeit still limited compared to European and Gulf partners in overall investment terms, has rapidly expanded in industrial sectors critical for the green transition and the restructuring of global value chains.
The ChinaMed Project published on 12 June 2026 an analysis titled "China's Industrial Footprint in Morocco: The Case of Tanger Tech" by Imane Ezzehouany and Amanda Chen.
As Chinese manufacturers expand their presence in Morocco, concern is mounting in Europe and the United States that the Kingdom may become an "industrial platform" for China to circumvent US and EU trade restrictions.
Tanger Tech City is an emerging Chinese platform for green manufacturing driven by a convergence of interests between China and Morocco.
The Africa Center for Strategic Studies published on 10 June 2026 a study titled "Beyond Ports: China Embeds Itself in Africa's Maritime Networks" by Paul Nantulya.
China has established new shipping corridors that connect African port clusters in West, North, and Southern Africa to Chinese port hubs in Qingdao, Tianjin, and Yantai. These routes add to the dozens of direct lines between African and Chinese ports, reflecting growing integration into China-centered maritime networks.
Modern Diplomacy published on 21 May 2026 an article titled "Geology Meets Geopolitics: The Global Race for Critical Minerals in the Climate Transition" by Marta Rehnman, Trinity College Dublin.
China dominates the processing of critical minerals in Africa and Latin America. Beijing has mining partnerships with 44 African countries. But the United States and European Union are stepping up competition for unexploited mineral reserves in both Africa and Latin America.
Semafor published on 3 June 2026 an article titled "Africa's Leverage with China Is Growing" by Yinka Adegoke.
It's simple; China needs Africa's raw materials, especially critical minerals, to maintain its industrial output and export program.
Rare Earth Exchanges published on 17 May 2026 an article titled "Africa Has Become the New Geopolitical Battleground for Critical Minerals."
The article summarizes a study that examines trade flows, foreign direct investment, military relationships, diplomatic agreements, mining policy, and strategic industrial initiatives shaping Africa's critical minerals economy. It evaluates how China, Russia, the United States, and Europe are accessing and responding to Africa's critical mineral wealth.
The entire study "In the Crosshairs: Twenty-first-century Rivalry for Africa's Critical Minerals" by Ron Matthews and Vlado Vivoda was published online on 11 May 2026 by the European Journal of International Security.
Brookings published on 6 May 2026 a study titled "Foreign Investment Is Not Making Friends for China--or the US" by John F. McCauley, University of Maryland, Margaret M. Pearson, John L. Thornton China Center, and Xiaonan Wang, City University of New York - Baruch College.
Drawing on over 750 Chinese and American foreign direct investment (FDI) projects in 23 African countries, the research challenges the assumption that it generates not only economic returns but also goodwill in the local community. While proximity to a major power's investment increases its perceived influence in local communities and undermines that of its adversary, it also decreases affinity for the investing power.
This reputational cost is not unique to China; U.S. investment triggers a strikingly similar backlash. Unmet expectations around jobs and local economic benefits, heightened perceptions of corruption among local officials, and concerns about external influence erode the soft power dividends that both powers anticipate. China and the United States must recognize that investing abroad can sabotage goodwill if projects are not constructed with local economic development in mind.
Comment: While the study offers a useful cautionary note about the impact of FDI, it is based on a narrow definition of the value of investment. FDI can have positive effects on the economy that go well beyond the impact on the community in close proximity to the investment project. FDI can add to a country's GDP, increase tax revenue, and have downstream economic benefits not captured in the nearby community. While the negative results on reverse model preference identified in the study are revelatory, they are modest and probably skewed by a small number of egregiously flawed investment projects.
Modern Diplomacy published on 6 May 2026 a commentary titled "Egyptian Military Bases: A Strategic Linchpin for China's Interests in the Eastern Med and Red Sea" by Nadia Helmy, Beni Suef University.
China seeks to leverage the development of Egyptian military bases as centers for Chinese military technology, especially UAVs and advanced air defense systems. By supporting Egyptian military modernization, China also weakens Cairo's military dependence on the United States.
The Transportation Research Interdisciplinary Perspectives journal published in March 2026 an in-depth assessment titled "The Road Divides: When Funding Shapes Form - Assessing the Connectivity Impacts of China-financed Light Rail in Addis Ababa" by Guibo Sun, The University of Manchester, and Kristen Zhao, Manchester Metropolitan University.
Chinese loans provided $475 million for financing most of the Addis Ababa Light Rail Transit (AALRT), a system that rings the capital city. Completed by Chinese companies almost ten years ago, the system was designed to move up to 60,000 passengers per hour. AALRT was promoted as a showcase project for the Belt and Road Initiative.
The assessment concludes that AALRT fell far short of its promises. Chronic service disruptions and limited maintenance funding mean only about a third of its 41 trains are operational, transporting just 55,000 passengers a day, a fraction of its projected capacity. Instead of alleviating congestion in Addis Ababa, the system has contributed to the creation of new traffic bottlenecks, with daily life in Addis Ababa being impacted by both reduced connectivity and inadequate transfer capacity.
