Defense News published on 30 April 2026 an article titled "Investigation: Russia Shadow Airlines Use Algeria as Base for Secretive Missions" by Linus Holler.
A fleet of Russian military-affiliated cargo aircraft is using Algeria as a hub to project Russia's power deeper into Africa and as far as Latin America. In return, Algeria is receiving Russia's latest fighter aircraft.
The ChinaMed Project published on 7 May 2026 an analysis titled "From Neutrality to Strategic Ambiguity: China and the Western Sahara Conflict" by Imane Ezzehouany, Bianca Pasquier, and Amanda Chen.
This analysis examines the evolution of China's position on the Western Sahara and the growing tension between diplomatic neutrality, geoeconomics, and geopolitical competition in the Maghreb. The rapid expansion of Sino-Moroccan relations in recent years raise questions whether Beijing may be adopting a calibrated ambiguity compatible with Morocco's autonomy plan, allowing China to safeguard its strategic interests without incurring meaningful political costs.
The Guardian published on 9 March 2026 an investigative report titled "How the 'Galapagos of West Africa' Is Plundered by Floating Fish Factories" by Davide Mancini.
Floating Chinese-owned factory ships longer than a football field illegally process sardinella for fishmeal in the waters off Guinea-Bissau. The Chinese fishmeal factories are supported by Turkish purse seiners that illegally supply them with fish.
The offshore fish processing operation has both negative food security implications for the people of Guinea-Bissau and for artisanal fisherman in the country. Fish are the source of a third of animal protein consumed and the informal fishing industry employs 225,000 people from a population of 2.2 million.
The White House posted on 16 December 2025 a fact sheet titled "President Donald J. Trump Further Restricts and Limits the Entry of Foreign Nationals to Protect the Security of the United States."
The United States added 15 countries to the list impacted by partial or full travel restrictions. There are now 34 countries subject to some kind of restriction; 26 are in Africa. The stated purpose of this policy is "to protect the Nation from national security and public safety threats."
The proclamation continues full restrictions and entry limitations of nationals from 12 "high-risk" countries. This includes the following African countries: Chad, Republic of Congo, Equatorial Guinea, Eritrea, Libya, Somalia, and Sudan.
It adds full restrictions and entry limitations on 5 additional countries, including Burkina Faso, Mali, Niger, and South Sudan.
It imposes full restrictions on 2 countries that were previously subject to partial restrictions, including Sierra Leone.
It continues partial restrictions on nationals of 4 original "high risk" countries, including Burundi and Togo.
It adds partial restrictions and entry limitations on 15 new countries. They include Angola, Benin, Cote d'Ivoire, Gabon, The Gambia, Malawi, Mauritania, Nigeria, Senegal, Tanzania, Zambia, and Zimbabwe.
The Associated Press published on 16 December 2025 an article titled "Trump Expands Travel Ban and Restrictions to Include an Additional 20 Countries" by Rebecca Santana.
This article includes a map that clearly demonstrates the impact of this policy on African countries.
The New York Times published on 16 December 2025 an article titled "Trump Expands Travel Ban and Restrictions to 20 More Countries" by Tyler Pager and Hamed Aleaziz.
The article reports that homeland security secretary Kristi Noem recommended to President Trump that he institute "a full travel ban on every damn country that's been flooding our nation with killers, leeches, and entitlement junkies."
Comment: Most of the African countries on the list are there because of "high visa-overstay rates and refusal to repatriate removable nationals" from the United States. Visa overstay means that an individual received a visa at a US embassy overseas to be in the United States for a limited period of time, for example 3 months to visit relatives or one year to study. They stayed longer than the allotted period, which is a violation of US law. But it has little or nothing to do with US national security.
The fact sheet contains some African countries that do have unusually high visa overstay rates. But others are not especially high. Mauritania's B-1/B-2 visa overstay rate is 9 percent. Nigeria has a B-1/B-2 overstay rate of 6 percent and F, M, and J visa overstay rate of 12 percent. Senegal's B-1/B-2 overstay rate is 4 percent and F, M, and J overstay rate of 13 percent.
The US policy seems more focused on cracking down on immigration and keeping certain foreigners out of the country than US national security. As for Kristi Noem's comment on countries in the travel ban, has America fallen to this low level?
The Washington Post published on 11 March 2025 an article titled "Russia's Wagner Mercenaries Are Leading a Campaign of Terror in Mali" by Rachel Chason and Sarah Cahlan.
An estimated 1,500 Wagner Group mercenaries are fighting alongside Malian forces to defeat an al-Qaeda-affiliated organization. In the process, the Wagner Group mercenaries are engaging in draconian practices that are driving ordinary Malians to neighboring Mauritania. Malian refugees who have arrived in Mauritania since 2023 said it was attacks by Mali's military and its Russian allies--not Islamist militants--that made them flee.
The Malian government pays about $10 million a month for Wagner's services. Russia has also been awarded concessions at several gold mines, giving it a material stake in Mali's security.
The Diplomat published on 11 February 2025 a commentary titled "China's Navy Steps Up Its Peace Ark Diplomacy" by Lea Thome.
The PLA Navy's hospital ship, Peace Ark, completed in December 2024 its six-month circumnavigation of Africa where it made stops of seven days each in the following ports: Victoria, Seychelles; Dar es Salaam, Tanzania; Antsiranana, Madagascar; Maputo, Mozambique; Cape Town, South Africa; Luanda, Angola; Brazzaville, Republic of Congo; Owendo, Gabon; Douala, Cameroon; Cotonou, Benin; Nouakchott, Mauritania; and Djibouti.
The Washington Post published on 4 February 2025 an article titled "Fear, Pain and Hunger: The Dire Impact of U.S. Funding Cuts in Africa" by Katharine Houreld and Rachel Chason.
The Trump administration's decision to cancel or suspend billions of dollars in foreign aid is deepening a humanitarian crisis and putting lives at risk across Africa. Countries like Sudan, already facing the world's largest humanitarian crisis, are experiencing the worst of the pain.
The National Bureau of Asian Research published on 1 August 2024 an essay titled "Geography Matters, Time Collides: Mapping China's Maritime Strategic Space Under Xi" by Andrew Erickson.
The author uses maps as visual references for understanding China's evolving maritime geography and the constraints on its power in the maritime domain. Concerning Africa, he identifies potential PLAN ports in Mozambique, Equatorial Guinea, Cameroon, and Mauritania. Constraints on the projection of Chinese sea power in African waters are long distances from China and choke points such as Bab el Mandeb in the Red Sea.
Defence Web posted on 21 August 2024 an article titled "Chinese Hospital Ship on Goodwill Visit to Cape Town."
The Chinese PLA Navy hospital ship, Peace Ark, has completed visits to Seychelles, Tanzania, Madagascar, and Mauritania. It is currently visiting South Africa and will continue to Angola, the Republic of Congo, Gabon, Cameroon, Benin, Mauritania, and Djibouti.
Gallup published on 26 April 2024 an article titled "U.S. Loses Soft Power Edge in Africa" by Benedict Vigers.
Gallup just published the results for 2023 of approval ratings in 36 of Africa's 54 countries on leadership in the United States, China, Russia, and Germany. In 2023, China nudged ahead of the United States by two points compared with 2022. Both the United States and China remained well ahead of Russia, which did restore its position following a drop in the aftermath of its attack on Ukraine.
The view of U.S. leadership improved significantly in Ghana, Mauritania, Cote d'Ivoire, and Tunisia but declined sharply in Kenya, Gambia, and Uganda. China's position was much stronger in Ghana, Cote d'Ivoire, Senegal, and Guinea, but fell sharply in Gambia and Uganda. The approval rating for the United States, China, and Russia is down significantly from where it was in 2011.
China Mediterranean Observer recently posted "Examining New Data on Chinese Foreign Direct Investment across the Wider Mediterranean Region." It includes data from 2003 through 2022 for countries in the Middle East, Southern Europe, North Africa, and the Horn of Africa. The African countries are Algeria, Djibouti, Egypt, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Libya, Mali, Morocco, Mauritania, South Sudan, Sudan, and Tunisia.
From 2021 to 2022, Chinese investment in North Africa and the Horn of Africa declined by almost 7 percent. The decline in value probably occurred because of conflict in the region, especially in Sudan, Libya, and Ethiopia. Mali was one of the few countries in the region to experience an increase, apparently due to Chinese investment in lithium mines.
AidData, a research lab at William & Mary, published in July 2023 a study titled "Harboring Global Ambitions: China's Ports Footprint and Implications for Future Overseas Naval Bases" by Alexander Wooley, Sheng Zhang, Rory Fedorochko, and Sarina Patterson.
At the moment, China's only naval base outside China is located in Djibouti. The study provides a shortlist of the most likely basing options in the order in which they might be prioritized by Beijing. Four of the eight ports on the short list are located in Africa.
The eight prospects in priority order are:
--Hambantota, Sri Lanka
--Bata, Equatorial Guinea
--Gwadar, Pakistan
--Kribi, Cameroon
--Ream, Cambodia
--Luganville, Vanuatu
--Nacala Mozambique
--Nouakchott, Mauritania
The South China Morning Post published on 14 August 2023 an article titled "How China's Communist Party Seeks to Win Friends and Influence Through Mideast Political Groups" by Zhao Ziwen.
The Communist Party of China (CPC) recently reached out to political parties in North Africa and the Middle East. More than 60 party leaders and think tank representatives from 19 countries were invited to the dialogue in China, which has been held every two years since 2016. At this event, the CPC promotes its governance model to Arab countries as a path to development.
AidData, a research lab at William & Mary, published on 25 July 2023 a study titled "Harboring Global Ambitions: China's Ports Footprint and Implications for Future Overseas Naval Bases" by Alexander Wooley, Sheng Zhang, Rory Fedorochko, and Sarina Patterson.
The authors suggest a list of port locations--where China has invested significant resources and maintains relationships with local elites--that may be favorable locations for future Chinese naval bases.
Foreign Policy published on 27 July 2023 a commentary titled "Beijing Is Going Places--and Building Naval Bases" by Alexander Wooley and Sheng Zhang.
Based on new AidData information, the authors offer the following short list for likely future PLA Navy bases outside China: Hambantota, Sri Lanka; Bata, Equatorial Guinea; Gwadar, Pakistan; Kribi, Cameroon; Ream, Cambodia; Luganville, Vanuatu; Nacala, Mozambique; and Nouakchott, Mauritania.
The Council on Foreign Relations published on 19 July 2023 an analysis titled "Russia Killed the Black Sea Grain Deal. These Countries Could Suffer Most" by Kali Robinson.
Ukraine produces about 10 percent of the world's wheat and 15 percent of its corn. Russia's cancellation of the deal to allow Ukraine to export grain from Black Sea ports will negatively impact a number of African countries. The percentage of wheat imported from Ukraine as a share of total wheat imports follows: Libya (49 %), Ethiopia (45 %), Tunisia (31 %), Mauritania (23 %), Madagascar (20 %), Nigeria (18 %), Kenya (14 %), Zambia (13 %), and Uganda (12 %).
The Madrid-based Elcano Royal Institute published on 30 June 2023 an analysis titled "China in the Maghreb: Engagement, Perceptions and Prospects" by Tin Hinane El Kadi, London School of Economics and Political Science.
Since the beginning of this century China has significantly increased its economic and political engagement in the Maghreb, although there are unequal trade patterns and investment remains minimal. Nevertheless, China provides an opportunity for the Maghreb to expand and modernize its domestic infrastructure, while reducing its reliance on the West.
The South China Morning Post published on 30 April 2023 an article titled "China Donates Patrol Boat to Sierra Leone to Tackle Illegal Fishing and Piracy off West Africa" by Jevans Nyabiage.
China donated a patrol boat to Sierra Leone to deal with illegal fishing. This is part of a pattern of donations to countries in West Africa to combat both piracy in the Gulf of Guinea and illegal fishing in offshore waters. Much of the legal and illegal fishing is attributed to China's distant-water fishing fleet.
Foreign Policy posted on 8 February 2023 a commentary titled "Why Russia Markets Itself as an Anti-Colonial Power to Africans" by Jade McGlynn, King's College London.
Moscow is using "memory diplomacy" to remind Africans that Russia had no colonies on the continent, did not participate in the slave trade, and helped them achieve independence from colonial powers. As it invades Ukraine, Russia also brushes aside the fact that it was an imperial power.
Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov during a recent visit to Angola even suggested that Russia's war to "liberate" Ukraine from external Western influence compares to the Angolan war of independence. Sadly, this line of argument resonates in some parts of Africa.
Eurasia Review published on 22 January 2023 a commentary titled "Russia Scrambling for Africa's Resources" by Kester Kenn Klomegah.
Russia is expanding its influence in Africa by selling arms and security, often in exchange for natural resources.
