Journalist Martin Plaut posted on 28 September 2026 a summary titled "A Brief Update on Ethiopia's 2026 War."
Fighting is escalating in Ethiopia. On the Afar front, Tigray Defense Forces and allied Afar militants have gained the upper hand. The military situation remains fluid along the Amhara-Tigray front. Eritrean forces have established an alliance with the ruling party in Tigray. Regional alliances are in flux.
Thierry Pairault posted on 7 September 2026 an analysis titled "African Copper and China."
China has become a major player in the copper industry. China accounts for 48 percent of the world's copper refining capacity, while its mine production is estimated at only 8 percent of world production and it holds only 4 percent of world reserves.
Africa's two major copper exporters, the DRC and Zambia, already had duty free access to China for copper in all its forms. China's recent removal of all tariffs on all African exports, except from Eswatini will not impact their export of copper to China. The main obstacle facing the DRC and Zambia is their ability to meet demand, whether through extracting more copper or withstanding competition from other suppliers such as Chile and Peru.
Pan African Visions published on 29 August 2026 an article titled "Beyond Promises: Russia-Africa Summit 2026 Faces a Crucial Investment Test" by Kester Kenn Klomegah.
Russia remains a marginal player in African infrastructure, industry, and agriculture compared with China, the European Union, and the United States. Many announced projects have stalled, financing instruments are weak, and younger Africans see little contemporary economic impact of Russia beyond anti-Western messaging.
At the Russia-Africa Summit in October, Moscow needs to deliver on existing pledges with real capital and project execution and engage Africa's large youth and middle-class markets if it wishes to develop a sustained, mutually beneficial economic partnership with the continent.
AEIs Critical Threats Africa File posted on 27 August 2026 an article titled "Ethiopia" by Michael DeAngelo.
The Ethiopian National Defense Force (ENDF) has conducted numerous drone strikes targeting Mekele, the capital, and other parts of Tigray Region. There was large-scale fighting in Western Tigray on 1 August between the ENDF and the Tigray People's Liberation Front.
Hellenic Shipping Lines posted on 11 July 2026 an article titled "Tanker Market: West African Crude Oil Exports Nosediving in 2026."
China's crude oil imports from the west coast of Africa during the first half of 2026 dropped to 19.5 million tons from 27.9 million tons during the same period in 2025 and 25.3 million tons in the first half of 2024. In 2026, China was the second largest importer of west coast crude after the European Union.
Chatham House published on 24 July 2026 an analysis titled "The Houthi Red Sea Blockade: Will Collective Maritime Security Be Defended or Break Down?" by Nitya Labh and Farea Al-Muslimi.
The rebel Houthis are part of Iran's "Axis of Resistance" but retain significant autonomy. The Houthi blockade of Saudi ships in the Red Sea acts as a deterrent against regional adversaries and reinforces their legitimacy in Yemen.
The Houthi objective is not to sink large numbers of ships, but to create enough uncertainty for commercial shipping that insurers raise premiums, companies reroute vessels, and governments absorb mounting economic costs.
African Arguments posted on 13 August 2026 a commentary titled "The Beijing of It All: Africa's Development Terms Are No Longer Written in Washington or Brussels" by Wanjiku Wanjohi.
Political conditionality associated with Western aid is giving way to a new framework established by China. China describes its interaction as a partnership based on non-interference and rapid delivery of development projects. As a result, Africa now has meaningful alternatives and greater negotiating power.
Comment: While Chinese loans and assistance do not come with the baggage of political conditionality, they do have economic conditionality. For example, Chinese loans and projects must be implemented by Chinese companies, usually state-owned ones.
The Somali Media Network posted on 8 August 2026 a 42-minute podcast with me hosted by Ismail Gorse on the Horn of Africa.
This is a wide-ranging discussion of current issues in the Horn of Africa and US policy with a special focus on Somalia and Somaliland.
AEIs Critical Threats Africa File posted on 6 August 2026 an article titled "Red Sea" by Michael DeAngelo and Liam Karr.
Saudi Arabia announced on 30 July the formation of a Multinational Maritime Defense Alliance to protect shipping in the Red Sea and adjacent waterways following the Bab el-Mandeb Strait blockade of Saudi ships by the Houthi rebels in Yemen. So far, 14 nations have joined the task force.
The ChinaMed Project published on 5 August 2026 an analysis titled "Chinese Officials, Experts and Media Discuss the Ceuta Crisis" by Leonardo Bruni.
On 31 July, some 60,000 people crossed from Morocco into Ceuta, a Spanish enclave on the Moroccan coast. This analysis discusses how Chinese officials and media have framed the Ceuta crisis, and if Chinese analysts see it as evidence that internal European Union divisions could weaken the bloc's ability to respond to external threats, such as China's assertive trade policies.
By avoiding discussing responsibility or causes of the migrant surge, Beijing showed its interest in maintaining good relations with both Spain and Morocco. The weakness of European solidarity was, however, a recurring theme.
The Ichikowitz Family Foundation just published its massive African Youth Survey 2026. It held face-to-face interviews with about 5,000 Africans aged 18-24 from 16 countries in Sub-Saharan Africa.
It covers many issues, but the focus here is perceptions of China and the United States. African youth see China (79 percent) and the United States (81 percent) as the most influential foreign actors, although China's influence is seen as somewhat more positive.
The survey looked at the influence of the US, China, Brazil, EU, UK, Germany, France, India, and Russia. The only country whose influence was seen as less positive than the United States (85 percent) was Russia (83 percent).
About 3 in 5 youth are optimistic about Africa's future during the Trump administration, especially on military support and security. Just under half believe the closure of USAID will negatively impact their country, with healthcare and disease prevention seen as the areas most affected.
China and India are increasingly viewed as more favorable partners than the United States, a sentiment shaped in part by the return of the Trump administration.
The Royal United Services Institute for Defence and Security Studies published on 23 July 2026 an analysis titled "Losing Control of the West's Longstanding Interests in Seychelles" by Wojciech Pawlus.
The author suggests that the West is losing out in the democratic Indian Ocean archipelago of Seychelles to India, China, Russia, and the Gulf States. He believes the current government is becoming more autocratic and urges Washington, Brussels, London, and Paris to reach out before it is too late.
The International Crisis Group published on 17 July 2026 a commentary titled "As the Horn of Africa Nears Boiling Point, Time for Urgent Diplomacy" by Alan Boswell.
Given the uncertainty about Washington's level of commitment to bring peace to the Horn of Africa, additional Gulf States, the European Union, the United Nations, Norway, and the United Kingdom should step up their engagement.
AEI's Critical Threats Africa File posted on 16 July 2026 an article titled "Puntland Standoff with the Federal Government of Somalia" by Michael DeAngelo and Aaryaman Shah.
Ties between the Somali government in Mogadishu and Puntland state continue to deteriorate as Mogadishu implements its constitutional and electoral agenda. The national Somali Future Council (SFC) opposition coalition, which includes Puntland and Jubaland states and leading Somali opposition figures, has threatened to hold parallel elections and establish new government structures if Mogadishu continues to implement its agenda.
Foreign Policy posted on 15 July 2026 an article titled "Sudan Faces New Sanctions as Evidence of Atrocities Mounts" by Nosmot Gbadamosi.
The EU and the US have expanded sanctions on individuals and companies that have aided the paramilitary Rapid Support Forces (RSF) and/or the Sudan Armed Forces (SAF). In the meantime, global efforts to end the war have largely stalled.
Comment: Numerous sanctions in recent years on the RSF and the SAF have had no impact on bringing this civil war to an end.
The International Crisis Group posted on 29 June 2026 a 41-minute podcast titled "The Scramble for the Red Sea Is Not Cooling Down" by Alan Boswell with Federico Donelli, University of Trieste and author of a new book on the topic.
The scramble for control in the Red Sea region began during the Cold War and increased in intensity in the 21st century. There are now many new actors in the Red Sea. Middle powers have become as significant as major powers.
Russia has been seeking, so far without success, a military base in the region for years. China established a military base in Djibouti to protect its interests in the region and to extend global power. The Gulf states, especially Saudi Arabia, have become much more engaged in the Red Sea.
The US/Israeli war against Iran has underscored the importance of the Red Sea for international shipping. The European Union is the one grouping that should be more engaged in the region than it is.
The ChinaMed Project published on 12 June 2026 an analysis titled "China's Industrial Footprint in Morocco: The Case of Tanger Tech" by Imane Ezzehouany and Amanda Chen.
As Chinese manufacturers expand their presence in Morocco, concern is mounting in Europe and the United States that the Kingdom may become an "industrial platform" for China to circumvent US and EU trade restrictions.
Tanger Tech City is an emerging Chinese platform for green manufacturing driven by a convergence of interests between China and Morocco.
AEIs Critical Threats Africa File posted on 11 June 2026 an article titled "Sudanese Political Dialogue" by Michael DeAngelo.
Political organizations aligned with the Sudan Armed Forces (SAF) and paramilitary Rapid Support Forces (RSF) met in Addis Ababa in early June when they produced a roadmap for ending the civil war. Several key groups did not participate or did not accept the outcome, raising doubts whether any progress has been made in ending the war.
Modern Diplomacy published on 21 May 2026 an article titled "Geology Meets Geopolitics: The Global Race for Critical Minerals in the Climate Transition" by Marta Rehnman, Trinity College Dublin.
China dominates the processing of critical minerals in Africa and Latin America. Beijing has mining partnerships with 44 African countries. But the United States and European Union are stepping up competition for unexploited mineral reserves in both Africa and Latin America.
Africa-Press published on 3 June 2026 an article titled "Tanzania: Historic Russia Visit Amid Tensions."
Tanzanian President Samia Suluhu Hassan made an official visit to Russia 3-5 June, the first visit by a Tanzanian leader in over five decades. The visit takes place following disputed elections in Tanzania in October 2025, deteriorating relations with the West, and during Russia's war with Ukraine.
A June 2 article in Tanzania's Taufa Daily titled "10 Reasons President Samia's Russia Visit Is a Major Win for Tanzania" goes to considerable lengths to justify the timing of the visit.
