Egypt Forms Anti-Ethiopia Coalition

 AEIs Critical Threats Africa File published on 8 October 2026 an analysis titled "Egypt Forms Anti-Ethiopian Coalition" by Liam Karr.

Egypt hosted on 3 October a regional summit with the leaders of Eritrea, Somalia, and the head of Sudan's armed forces.  The four countries agreed to the el Alamein joint declaration which did not mention Ethiopia but stated positions in direct response to Ethiopia's perceived policies in the region.

The joint declaration emphasized respect for sovereignty and territorial integrity of countries in the region.  It stated that governance of the Red Sea is the exclusive responsibility of the littoral states and denounced any action on dam construction that negatively impacts downstream countries.

Sudan Armed Forces Stockpiles Chemical Weapons

 The Washington Post posted on 5 September 2026 an article titled "Trove of Documents Reveals Alleged Chemical Weapons Stockpile in Sudan" by Greg Miller and Elizabeth Dwoskin.

The Sudan Armed Forces has built a secret stockpile of chemical weapons that senior military officials sought to conceal after chlorine bombs were used against the Rapid Support Forces.  Sudan developed the weapons by diverting shipments of chlorine meant to provide safe drinking water, hiding warhead production sites on military bases, testing bombs in remote desert locations, and drawing up lists of targets where toxic gas could penetrate enemy defenses.  

China and Russia Oppose US Effort to Expand Sudan Arms Embargo

 Business Insider Africa published on 26 August 2026 an article titled "Russia and China Push Back as Trump Administration Seeks Arms Embargo Across Sudan" by Ayodeji Adegboyega.

The Trump administration is seeking to expand a two-decade-old UN arms embargo on Darfur to all of Sudan and to explicitly cover drones.  China, Russia, and the Sudan Armed Forces faction all oppose the initiative.

Can General al-Burhan Bring Stability to Sudan?

 African Arguments published on 18 August 2026 a commentary titled "Sudan: Burhan's Dialogue Is Not a Path to Stability" by Ezzat Khairi, Sudanese political analyst.

While not making an argument for the rival paramilitary Rapid Support Forces, the author argues that any credible transition in Sudan must start with the departure from sovereign political authority of General Abdel Fattah al-Burhan.  He has broken too many promises.  Sudan's stability begins where al-Burhan's rule ends.

Sudan: A Tour of the Devastation in Khartoum and Omdurman

 The Economist published on 6 August 2026 an article titled "The Ruin of Sudan."

Based on a visit to Khartoum and Omdurman, the article shows the devastation caused by more than three years of war between the Sudan Armed Forces (SAF) and the paramilitary Rapid Support Forces.  The SAF is now in control of the capital region.  

Egypt Provides Drone Base against Sudan's Rapid Support Forces

 Modern Diplomacy published on 5 August 2026 a commentary titled "Cairo's Shadow War in Sudan: Drones, Borders and a Fading Army Ally" by Carla Davies.

The paramilitary Rapid Support Forces (RSF) has been engaged in conflict with the Sudan Armed Forces for more than three years.  Drones launched from inside Egypt have targeted the RSF inside Sudan for at least six months.  Egypt's strong support for the Sudan Armed Forces is linked in part to a coordinated Egypt-Sudan effort to counter Ethiopia's position on Nile water issues.

Sudan's Peace Process Is Trying to End the Wrong War

 African Arguments posted on 21 July 2026 a commentary titled "Sudan's Peace Process Is Negotiating a War That No Longer Exists" by Ezzat Khairi, a Sudan political analyst.

Diplomatic assumptions for ending the war in Sudan remain where they were in April 2023.  Peace initiatives approach Sudan as a two-sided conflict between a national army and a paramilitary rebellion.  That model no longer fits the war.  The Sudan Armed Forces (SAF) and paramilitary Rapid Support Forces (RSF) now contain armed movements, tribal formations, ideological brigades, local defense groups, and commanders with their own constituencies and expectations of the postwar order.  The leaders of the SAF and RSF do not fully control the coalitions supporting them.

UN Report on Hallmarks of Genocide in Sudan

 The UN Human Rights Council published on 8 July 2026 a 26-page report titled "Information Supplementing the Report 'Sudan: Hallmarks of Genocide in El Fasher'."

This report provides detailed references not included in the initial 19 February 2026 report and additional information that the UN Human Rights Council gathered following continued investigations since the publication of the original report.  

It also helps develop the legal basis for the conclusions that were drawn in the original report, that the mass killings and related atrocities committed by the paramilitary Rapid Support Forces in and around El Fasher were indicators of a genocidal path.

Additional Sanctions on Sudanese Companies and Individuals

 Foreign Policy posted on 15 July 2026 an article titled "Sudan Faces New Sanctions as Evidence of Atrocities Mounts" by Nosmot Gbadamosi.

The EU and the US have expanded sanctions on individuals and companies that have aided the paramilitary Rapid Support Forces (RSF) and/or the Sudan Armed Forces (SAF).  In the meantime, global efforts to end the war have largely stalled.

Comment:  Numerous sanctions in recent years on the RSF and the SAF have had no impact on bringing this civil war to an end.  

New York Times Editorial on Sudan

 The New York Times published on 13 July 2026 an editorial titled "The World Must Wake Up to the Horror in Sudan."

Repeating the concerns of so many others, the editorial argues that the world needs to do more to halt the killing and mass displacement in Sudan.  

Amnesty International's Massive Report on Atrocities in Sudan's North Darfur

 Amnesty International published on 1 July 2026 a report titled "City Under Seige, Children Under Fire: Rapid Support Forces' Crimes Against Humanity in North Darfur."

This is a 202-page report on the paramilitary Rapid Support Forces (RSF) atrocities in North Darfur based on 247 interviews, including 208 with survivors of the RSF seizure of El Fasher, capital of North Darfur.

Generals Fight to Finish in Sudan

 Aljazeera published on 28 June 2026 an article titled "'Digging with a Needle': Generals Stall Peace as Sudan's El-Obeid Burns."

The leaders of the Sudan Armed Forces (SAF) and the paramilitary Rapid Support Forces (RSF) are demonstrating no serious interest in bringing the deadly Sudan conflict to an end. Mediation and a ceasefire seem to be the last thing on their minds as the drone war heats up.   

Drone Attacks in Sudan Heighten Tension with Ethiopia

 AEI's Critical Threats Africa File posted on 7 May 2026 an article titled "Ethiopia-Sudan Tensions Rise over RSF Khartoum Strikes" by Michael DeAngelo.

In early May, the paramilitary Rapid Support Forces (RSF) launched a series of drone attacks across Sudan, including on the international airport of Khartoum.  The Sudan Armed Forces accused the UAE and Ethiopia of facilitating the drone strikes, including their launching from Bahir Dar airport and a RSF military base inside Ethiopia along the Sudan border.  

Sudan's Civil War in the Nuba Mountains

 Prospect published on 1 April 2026 an article titled "Sudan's War in the Mountains" by Sophie Neiman.

The paramilitary Rapid Support Forces (RSF) is using the Nuba Mountains as a thoroughfare to take territory controlled by the Sudan Armed Forces (SAF) in the eastern part of Sudan.  The Nuba Mountains have become a new frontline in the civil war.  The RSF is aligned with the SPLM-N against the SAF.

Partition Is Not the Answer to the Sudan Conflict

 Foreign Affairs published on 8 April 2026 an article titled "Don't Partition Sudan Again: Splitting It Didn't Work in the Past and Won't Work Now" by Francis M. Deng and Ahmed Kodouda.

Both the Sudan Armed Forces (SAF) and paramilitary Rapid Support Forces (RSF) insist they are fighting to preserve a unified Sudan, but the longer the current geographical division persists, the harder it will be to put the country together again.  

The 2011 independence of South Sudan offers a cautionary tale.  Any effort to formalize the split between the SAF and RSF-controlled parts of Sudan would not resolve the conflict's root causes.  Another partition of Sudan would also destabilize its neighbors.    

Podcast on Prospects for a Cease Fire in Sudan

 The International Crisis Group posted on 7 April 2026 a 42-minute podcast titled "After Three Years of War in Sudan, What Hope for a Ceasefire" hosted by Richard Atwood with Shewit Woldemichael and Alan Boswell.  

The Iran war has not yet had a significant impact on the situation in Sudan beyond driving up prices of everything and causing fuel shortages.  If the Iran war continues, it could have a huge negative impact on the food situation in Sudan.  

The paramilitary Rapid Support Forces (RSF) control most of Darfur and West Kordofan while the Sudan Armed Forces (SAF) control most of the northeastern and eastern parts of the country.  Sudan is effectively partitioned between the RSF and the SAF.  The major battle fronts today are along the Chad border, South Sudan border, and Ethiopian border. 

The RSF political program has been a failure.  Noone has recognized the RSF government.  The SAF has improved its position and is the dominant actor in the country today.  While SAF fortunes have improved most Sudanese probably do not want the military to remain in power indefinitely.  

The RSF continues to receive strong support from the UAE while the SAF has a degree of support from Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Turkey, and Eritrea.  The most worrying new dynamic is the deterioration of relations between the SAF and Ethiopia.  Differences over Nile water usage and Egyptian and Eritrean support for the SAF contribute to Ethiopia's concerns.  

Massad Boulos, President Trump's special envoy for Africa, continues to seek a ceasefire as part of the Quad (US, Egypt, UAE, and Saudi Arabia).  The effort is currently lacking high level pressure.  RSF and SAF positions on a ceasefire remain far apart.  Both sides believe they hold a strong military position.  Only major outside pressure on them will likely change the situation.

There is considerable concern among the outside actors about the role of Islamist forces in the SAF, which complicates a resolution.  In the meantime, the Sudan conflict continues to destabilize the Red Sea region.  

Limitations of Western Efforts to End War in Sudan

 Foreign Policy published on 6 April 2024 an analysis titled "Horrors in Sudan Highlight Deterioration of Western Diplomatic Corps."

There is little willingness by the West to end Sudan's conflict, but there is also little ability to do anything.  Western states have minimal leverage with the two major combatants: The Sudan Armed Forces and the paramilitary Rapid Support Forces.  

Growing Tension between Ethiopia and Sudan

 The International Crisis Group posted on 4 March 2026 a commentary titled "As Tensions Mount, Sudan Accuses Ethiopia of New Hostilities" by Alan Boswell.  

Sudan has charged that Ethiopia is permitting the paramilitary Rapid Support Forces to launch drones that strike locations inside Sudan and warned Addis Ababa of unspecified consequences.  Tension in the Horn of Africa was already high; this just raises the temperature.  

Sudan: Quad Peace Plan Flounders

 AEI's Critical Threats Africa File posted on 19 February 2026 an article titled "Sudan" by Michael DeAngelo and Elliot Nazar.  

The Quad (United States, UAE, Egypt, and Saudi Arabia) peace proposal is stalled due in large part to the fact that the UAE supports the paramilitary Rapid Support Forces (RSF) and Egypt and Saudi Arabia support the Sudan Armed Forces (SAF).  Neither the RSF nor the SAF has fully committed to the Quad ceasefire proposal.  Ethiopia's support for a new RSF military campaign in Sudan's neighboring Blue Nile state is further complicating any peace settlement.  

Is the War in Sudan Nearing an End?

 Foreign Affairs published on 11 February 2026 an article titled "How the War in Sudan Could End" by Volker Perthes, German Institute for International and Security Affairs.

The author argues that both the Sudan Armed Forces and the paramilitary Rapid Support Forces may have reached the point where they believe it will be difficult to make more territorial gains at an acceptable cost.  Consequently, coordinated international pressure on both belligerents could result in a ceasefire, a first step towards peace.