Ethiopia Insight published on 24 August 2026 a commentary titled "Minority Protection Is Ethiopia's Federal Test" by Abdi Edriss, a human rights advocate in Toronto.
As Ethiopia engages in its national dialogue process, the author emphasizes that smaller ethnic and religious communities need institutions they can rely on when their interests diverge from those of the majority. A state becomes stronger when its minorities do not have to fear the majority.
The Emirates Policy Center published on 13 August 2026 an analysis titled "Trends and Shifts in the Somali Landscape: From Constitutional Dispute to a Crisis of Legitimacy."
Somalia is experiencing one of its most complex political crises since the adoption of the federal system in 2012. These tensions coincide with growing friction between the federal government and federal member states, particularly Puntland.
The analysis concludes that the current governance crisis extends far beyond electoral arrangements or constitutional amendments. Its roots reach into the very foundation of the fragile consensus upon which the federal state has been built in the last decade and a half.
African Arguments published on 11 August 2026 a commentary titled "Somalia: A Government with One Foot Out the Door" by Ismail Abukar, a human rights advocate based in Mogadishu.
A significant percentage of Somali officials are effectively ghost workers who do not come to their offices. Many have foreign passports and dual citizenship. At the same time, remittances from the diaspora have kept Somalia solvent.
The Somali Public Agenda and Somali Dialogue Platform published in July 2026 a study titled "Navigating Political Transition: Citizens' Views on Elections, Legitimacy, and Governance in Somalia."
This study addresses how citizens understand democratic principles, electoral legitimacy, political mediation, and government accountability by means of a May-June 2026 public opinion poll conducted across Mogadishu and five Federal Member State capitals, reaching 928 respondents.
The analysis examines which democratic principles citizens prioritize, which actors they trust to mediate political disputes, which institutions they trust to manage or oversee elections, and which issues they want political leaders to communicate about more openly.
The findings show that citizens express strong support for democratic reform in principle, but their preferences become more complex when democratic goals are weighed against peace, stability, term limits, press freedom, and public participation.
The Ichikowitz Family Foundation just published its massive African Youth Survey 2026. It held face-to-face interviews with about 5,000 Africans aged 18-24 from 16 countries in Sub-Saharan Africa.
It covers many issues, but the focus here is perceptions of China and the United States. African youth see China (79 percent) and the United States (81 percent) as the most influential foreign actors, although China's influence is seen as somewhat more positive.
The survey looked at the influence of the US, China, Brazil, EU, UK, Germany, France, India, and Russia. The only country whose influence was seen as less positive than the United States (85 percent) was Russia (83 percent).
About 3 in 5 youth are optimistic about Africa's future during the Trump administration, especially on military support and security. Just under half believe the closure of USAID will negatively impact their country, with healthcare and disease prevention seen as the areas most affected.
China and India are increasingly viewed as more favorable partners than the United States, a sentiment shaped in part by the return of the Trump administration.
The Royal United Services Institute for Defence and Security Studies published on 23 July 2026 an analysis titled "Losing Control of the West's Longstanding Interests in Seychelles" by Wojciech Pawlus.
The author suggests that the West is losing out in the democratic Indian Ocean archipelago of Seychelles to India, China, Russia, and the Gulf States. He believes the current government is becoming more autocratic and urges Washington, Brussels, London, and Paris to reach out before it is too late.
Ethiopia Insight published on 18 July 2026 a commentary titled "Ethiopia's National Dialogue Could Unravel the Federal Bargain" by Muktar Ismail.
On 15 July, Ethiopia's long awaited National Dialogue Conference opened in Addis Ababa with over 4,000 participants from around the nation.
The author argues that many Somalis in Ethiopia view the Conference not as an attempt to achieve national reconciliation but an attempt to revise Ethiopia's federalist form of government, which remains central to Somali preferences.
AEI's Critical Threats Africa File posted on 16 July 2026 an article titled "Puntland Standoff with the Federal Government of Somalia" by Michael DeAngelo and Aaryaman Shah.
Ties between the Somali government in Mogadishu and Puntland state continue to deteriorate as Mogadishu implements its constitutional and electoral agenda. The national Somali Future Council (SFC) opposition coalition, which includes Puntland and Jubaland states and leading Somali opposition figures, has threatened to hold parallel elections and establish new government structures if Mogadishu continues to implement its agenda.
The International Crisis Group published on 30 June 2026 an analysis titled "New Chapter, Same Stalemate: Somalia's War with Al-Shabaab."
This analysis describes the ebb and flow of al-Shabaab's war with the Somali government since 2022. It concludes that while Mogadishu faces several big challenges, it retains the military capability, in terms of personnel and resources, to hold the line, provided that external support does not abruptly disappear.
Meanwhile, despite al-Shabaab's pragmatic shifts in its approach to ruling areas under its control, its unpopularity among those it governs remains a roadblock for its attempts to supplant the Somali government.
With neither side able to defeat the other, the war in Somalia is fundamentally at a stalemate with no end in sight.
African Business published on 23 June 2026 an article titled "Where Next for Ethiopia after Abiy Ahmed's Landslide?" by Harry Clynch.
Following the landslide victory by Abiy Ahmed's Prosperity Party in national elections, the article suggests Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed will push for deeper centralization of government power, an acceleration of economic reform, and a continuing effort to obtain access to the sea for landlocked Ethiopia.
Ethiopia Insight published on 23 June 2026 a commentary titled "TPLF's New Proclamation Codifies a Police State" by Getachew Gebrekiros Temare.
The author dissects a new Tigray People's Liberation Front 42-page proclamation that imposes compulsory mobilization and establishes wartime institutions under presidential command. He concludes the proclamation should be withdrawn before it becomes "a machinery of fear" over the Tigrayan people.
The Heritage Institute for Policy Studies published in April 2026 a study titled "Somalia's Mandate in the UN Security Council 2025-2026."
The study provides a comprehensive assessment of Somalia's performance during its non-permanent term in 2025-2026 on the UN Security Council. It evaluates Somalia's institutional capacity, diplomatic engagement, and strategic positioning within the Council. The study also identifies key gaps and offers practical recommendations to strengthen Somalia's diplomatic effectiveness.
Ethiopia Insight published on 15 April 2026 a commentary titled "American Federalism Model Can Inspire Ethiopia Reforms" by Nagessa Dube, lawyer in Seattle, Washington.
The author makes the argument that the basic principles of American federalism offer lessons for Ethiopian governance. American federalism has a clearer conception of dual sovereignty than is the case with Ethiopian federalism. In addition, the role of the judicial system is particularly important in the American model.
Foreign Affairs published on 8 April 2026 an article titled "Don't Partition Sudan Again: Splitting It Didn't Work in the Past and Won't Work Now" by Francis M. Deng and Ahmed Kodouda.
Both the Sudan Armed Forces (SAF) and paramilitary Rapid Support Forces (RSF) insist they are fighting to preserve a unified Sudan, but the longer the current geographical division persists, the harder it will be to put the country together again.
The 2011 independence of South Sudan offers a cautionary tale. Any effort to formalize the split between the SAF and RSF-controlled parts of Sudan would not resolve the conflict's root causes. Another partition of Sudan would also destabilize its neighbors.
The International Crisis Group posted on 19 March 2026 a 36-minute podcast titled "What Is Really Going on in the Horn?" with Alan Boswell and Moses Chrispus Okello, Institute of Security Studies.
The drivers of conflict and instability in the Horn of Africa are no longer confined to the Horn, which is being absorbed into the geopolitical arena of the Red Sea and Gulf States. External actors are contributing to fragmentation in the Horn that is rooted in domestic politics.
Landlocked Ethiopia is key to stability in the region because it borders all other countries in the Horn, is the most populous, and is now trying to obtain access to the Red Sea.
The Habesha published on 10 March 2026 a commentary titled "Legitimacy and the Limits of Political Experimentation in Welkait" by Sisay Mulu.
The author disagrees at both the analytical and policy level with the conclusions of Zola Moges's "The Welkait Quagmire Neither Ballots nor Bullets Can Resolve" reposted below on 2 March.
Sisay Mulu argues that Zola Moges downplayed the importance of historical administrative continuity, discussed legal and constitutional issues in abstract terms, and failed to fairly consider the practical challenges of governing a contested post-conflict area.
Ethiopia Insight published on 9 March 2026 a commentary titled "When Genocide Becomes a Shield Against Accountability" by Getachew Gebrekiros Temare, a lawyer focused on human rights.
This is a counterpoint to the commentary titled "Judging the Tigray Genocide Backwards" by Girmay Weldedawit and Ella Atsbeha reposted below on 16 February. The author concludes that genocide intensifies the obligation to examine how power was exercised across time. Leadership that fails at every stage of a crisis loses its mandate.
Ethiopia Insight published on 2 March 2026 a commentary titled "The Welkait Quagmire Neither Bullets nor Ballets Can Resolve" by Zola Moges, PhD in international law.
Welkait is a district that has been part of Western Tigray since the Tigray People's Liberation Front annexed it following the demise in 1991 of the Derg regime. Prior to that, Welkait was part of Amhara Region.
Welkait's strategic location at the intersection of Ethiopia's borders with Sudan and Eritrea complicates the ability to find a solution that manages to overcome long-standing ethnic, language, and cultural differences.
The author suggests as a solution creation of a self-administered territory that might take the form of a special autonomous zone or even an additional regional state with bilingual Amharic and Tigrinya administration.
The African Union Peace and Security Council adopted on 12 February 2026 a Communique on the Situation in Sudan.
The Communique called on member states to respect the territorial integrity and unity of Sudan and the total rejection of a parallel government led by the paramilitary Rapid Support Forces. It welcomed the return to Khartoum of the Transitional Government of Sudan. It condemned unnamed external actors for fueling the conflict in Sudan.
Kenyans.co.ke posted on 31 January 2026 an article titled "Ruto to Launch Political School for UDA Using Communist Party of China Framework" by Maxwell Amunga.
A senior delegation from Kenya's ruling United Democratic Alliance (UDA) is in China studying the Communist Party of China's (CPC) organization, cadre training, and grassroots mobilization. The delegation aims to incorporate best practices in political discipline, governance structures, and leadership development.
The Star published on 31 January 2026 an article titled "Top UDA Officials in China Ahead of Launch of UDA Party School" by Felix Kipkemoi.
This article adds that the current visit to the Zhejiang Provincial Party School follows talks in 2024 between UDA and CPC officials on party-to-party cooperation. The article also notes that the UDA is seeking up to $7.75 million from the CPC to serve as its headquarters, which will incorporate the new party leadership school. The UDA is banking on the solid relations Kenya has with China to secure the funding.
