Horn Review published on 12 August 2026 a commentary titled "South Sudan and China's Evolving Overseas Security Strategy" by Abraham Abebe.
In July, China committed to deepening military cooperation with South Sudan by continuing its support for the UN peacekeeping mission as the backbone of its contribution. Beyond this, China's support seems to be limited to expanding its military dialogue with South Sudan and increasing military exchanges.
The International Crisis Group posted on 18 August 2026 an hour-long podcast titled "Sudan's Separation Fifteen Years Ago and Today's Disaster" with Alan Boswell, Alex de Waal, and Abdul Mohammed.
Alex de Waal and Abdul Mohammed review the background of South Sudan's independence from Sudan and the African Union High-Level Implementation Panel led by former South African President Thabo Mbeki. They explained why negotiations ultimately failed to produce two viable states, and whether such coordinated high-level diplomacy is still possible in today's fragmented regional geopolitics.
Efforts to resolve the crises in Sudan and South Sudan today are experiencing greater involvement from the Gulf States and involve a larger number of competing actors. Mediation today is extremely difficult. The global environment is highly transactional. The situation also has the possibility of becoming a regional war. It is time for the African Union to step forward and play a stronger role in ending the conflicts.
Deutsche Welle published on 4 August 2026 an article titled "South Sudan: How Climate Change Can Turn Toxic" by Buster Emil Kirchner and Marco Simoncelli.
Devastating flooding in South Sudan's Unity State in 2021 continues to have negative impacts on the environment and the wellbeing of people living in the affected area. More than 50 of South Sudan's 400 oil wells remain submerged, which has contaminated water and farmland. This has led to a variety of health problems.
Reuters published on 14 August 2026 an article titled "650,000 Refugees in South Sudan Could Lose Food Aid Within Weeks Due to Funding Squeeze, Say UN Agencies" by Olivia Le Poidevin.
Staff with the World Food Program and UN High Commission for Refugees report that 650,000 refugees in South Sudan, most of them from conflict in neighboring Sudan, may no longer receive food assistance due to a shortage of international funding.
The Conversation published on 16 July 2026 a discussion summary titled "Africa's Greater Horn Region Is Facing a Looming Polycrisis Fueled by Conflict, Prices, Climate and Disease" by Daniel Maxwell, Alex de Waal, Luka Kuol, Merry Fitzpatrick, and Peter Hailey.
The impacts of a strengthening El Nino and effects of the war in Iran combined with existing prolonged crisis and conflict in the Horn of Africa are leading potentially to a major, multicountry polycrisis.
Thierry Pairault just posted a paper titled "The Tariff Exemption Saga and the Results for the First Half of 2026."
China's zero tariff policy for all countries in Africa except Eswatini took effect on 1 May. During the first half of 2026 Africa's trade deficit with China widened from $44.7 billion to $57.9 billion as of the end of the first half of 2026 compared with the first half of 2025. Chinese exports to Africa rose by 21.8 percent and imports from Africa by 16.3 percent compared with the same period in 2025.
Eight African countries (South Africa, DRC, Zambia, South Sudan, Nigeria, Chad, Algeria, and Zimbabwe) accounted for about 94 percent of the increase in Chinese imports from Africa during this period. Almost the entire increase in the value of African exports to China was due to the shock in world commodity prices, largely independent of the zero-tariff policy.
The International Crisis Group published on 17 July 2026 a commentary titled "As the Horn of Africa Nears Boiling Point, Time for Urgent Diplomacy" by Alan Boswell.
Given the uncertainty about Washington's level of commitment to bring peace to the Horn of Africa, additional Gulf States, the European Union, the United Nations, Norway, and the United Kingdom should step up their engagement.
The Rift Valley Institute recently published a report titled "The New Geopolitics of Eastern Africa."
The British Institute of Eastern Africa, Chatham House, and the Rift Valley Institute convened a group of experts to discuss the ongoing transformation of geopolitics in the Horn of Africa. This paper summarizes their conclusions, noting that the region is experiencing profound multi-decade shifts in its relationship with the wider world.
The New York Times published on 1 July 2026 a commentary titled "U.S.A.I.D. Cuts Killed People. That's the Truth" by Nicholas Kristof.
Elon Musk, who at the beginning of the Trump administration ran DOGE, the organization that dismantled the US Agency for International Development, insists "there is not even a single dead child" as a result of the actions by DOGE.
Nicholas Kristof, who has met with family members in Africa of dead children, begs to differ. In addition, studies by university researchers and by Lancet, a British medical journal, estimate that deaths due to USAID financial cuts are in the hundreds of thousands.
The Stimson Center published on 24 June 2026 a report titled "The UN Mission in South Sudan in the Context of Changing Security and Regional Dynamics."
The report concludes that the combined effects of a fragile peace process, heightened political tensions, economic deterioration, the spillover of conflict from Sudan, the emerging Ebola crisis in the neighboring DRC, and growing humanitarian pressures have created a volatile environment in South Sudan.
South Sudan continues to grapple with unresolved questions surrounding the political transition and the lack of implementation of the Revitalized Agreement on the Resolution of the Conflict in the Republic of South Sudan (R-ARCSS), which remains the primary political framework for addressing the conflict and advancing sustainable peace.
The Council on Foreign Relations Global Conflict Tracker posted on 12 June 2026 an updated background piece titled "Instability in South Sudan."
Ten million South Sudanese--nearly 84 percent of the population--need humanitarian assistance, as reports of airstrikes on civilian areas, sexual violence, and forced recruitment have escalated since March 2025.
The International Crisis Group posted on 1 June 2026 a five and one-half minute video titled "Divided Sudan, Elusive Peace."
The video provides a good, summary update of the current situation in the Sudan conflict.
The Guardian published on 21 May 2026 an article titled "US Is 'Simply Choosing Not to Stop' Ebola Outbreak after Massive Public Health Cuts, Experts Say" by Melody Schreiber.
Following the dismantlement of the US Agency for International Development and massive cuts in global and domestic public health efforts, the United States appears to be doing little to stem the outbreak of Ebola in central Africa.
The Middle East Monitor published on 12 May 2026 an article titled "Nearly 50,000 Displaced in Sudan's Blue Nile State Since Start of 2026."
The International Organization for Migration reported that almost 50,000 people have been displaced since the beginning of 2026 in Sudan's Blue Nile State as a result of fighting between the Sudan Armed Forces and the paramilitary Rapid Support Forces. Blue Nile State borders both Ethiopia and South Sudan.
UN News published on 10 April 2026 an update titled "Sudan: 14 Million Displaced; Hunger and Attacks on Health Continue as War Enters Fourth Year."
Some 14 million people, or a quarter of the population, have been forced to flee, with 9 million remaining displaced inside Sudan and 4.4 million as refugees mostly in Chad, South Sudan, and Egypt. In addition, 21 million Sudanese now face acute food insecurity, including 6.3 million in the direst state of food emergency. Over 40 percent of Sudan's population require urgent health assistance and disease outbreaks are widespread.
Most of the UN agencies have their main logistics hub in the United Arab Emirates. The closure of the Strait of Hormuz is impacting their ability to respond as humanitarian supply routes have been cut and shipping aid has become slower and more costly.
Prospect published on 1 April 2026 an article titled "Sudan's War in the Mountains" by Sophie Neiman.
The paramilitary Rapid Support Forces (RSF) is using the Nuba Mountains as a thoroughfare to take territory controlled by the Sudan Armed Forces (SAF) in the eastern part of Sudan. The Nuba Mountains have become a new frontline in the civil war. The RSF is aligned with the SPLM-N against the SAF.
Foreign Affairs published on 8 April 2026 an article titled "Don't Partition Sudan Again: Splitting It Didn't Work in the Past and Won't Work Now" by Francis M. Deng and Ahmed Kodouda.
Both the Sudan Armed Forces (SAF) and paramilitary Rapid Support Forces (RSF) insist they are fighting to preserve a unified Sudan, but the longer the current geographical division persists, the harder it will be to put the country together again.
The 2011 independence of South Sudan offers a cautionary tale. Any effort to formalize the split between the SAF and RSF-controlled parts of Sudan would not resolve the conflict's root causes. Another partition of Sudan would also destabilize its neighbors.
The International Crisis Group posted on 7 April 2026 a 42-minute podcast titled "After Three Years of War in Sudan, What Hope for a Ceasefire" hosted by Richard Atwood with Shewit Woldemichael and Alan Boswell.
The Iran war has not yet had a significant impact on the situation in Sudan beyond driving up prices of everything and causing fuel shortages. If the Iran war continues, it could have a huge negative impact on the food situation in Sudan.
The paramilitary Rapid Support Forces (RSF) control most of Darfur and West Kordofan while the Sudan Armed Forces (SAF) control most of the northeastern and eastern parts of the country. Sudan is effectively partitioned between the RSF and the SAF. The major battle fronts today are along the Chad border, South Sudan border, and Ethiopian border.
The RSF political program has been a failure. Noone has recognized the RSF government. The SAF has improved its position and is the dominant actor in the country today. While SAF fortunes have improved most Sudanese probably do not want the military to remain in power indefinitely.
The RSF continues to receive strong support from the UAE while the SAF has a degree of support from Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Turkey, and Eritrea. The most worrying new dynamic is the deterioration of relations between the SAF and Ethiopia. Differences over Nile water usage and Egyptian and Eritrean support for the SAF contribute to Ethiopia's concerns.
Massad Boulos, President Trump's special envoy for Africa, continues to seek a ceasefire as part of the Quad (US, Egypt, UAE, and Saudi Arabia). The effort is currently lacking high level pressure. RSF and SAF positions on a ceasefire remain far apart. Both sides believe they hold a strong military position. Only major outside pressure on them will likely change the situation.
There is considerable concern among the outside actors about the role of Islamist forces in the SAF, which complicates a resolution. In the meantime, the Sudan conflict continues to destabilize the Red Sea region.
Ethiopia Insight published on 24 March 2026 a commentary titled "The Looming War to Eclipse the Horn's Past Conflicts" by Nebiyu Daniel Meshesha, former Ethiopian diplomat.
The author argues that earlier dynamics in the Horn of Africa that once fractured states and redrew borders now risk drawing Ethiopia into a similar spiral, with potentially profound consequences for the region. The Horn of Africa may once again find itself trapped in a cycle of conflict.
The International Crisis Group posted on 19 March 2026 a 36-minute podcast titled "What Is Really Going on in the Horn?" with Alan Boswell and Moses Chrispus Okello, Institute of Security Studies.
The drivers of conflict and instability in the Horn of Africa are no longer confined to the Horn, which is being absorbed into the geopolitical arena of the Red Sea and Gulf States. External actors are contributing to fragmentation in the Horn that is rooted in domestic politics.
Landlocked Ethiopia is key to stability in the region because it borders all other countries in the Horn, is the most populous, and is now trying to obtain access to the Red Sea.
