Cote d'Ivoire Expands Military Cooperation with China

 Defence Web published on 18 August 2026 an article titled "Cote d'Ivoire Boosts Military Capabilities with New Chinese Patrol Vessels and Drones" by Armand Liebenberg.

Cote d'Ivoire recently took possession of two Chinese donated Predator-class coastal patrol vessels and purchased at least two advanced Chinese-made Wing Loong II drones.  China earlier supplied Cote d'Ivoire with 9 assault vehicles and 27 armored personnel carriers.  

Business Insider Africa published on 11 August 2026 an article titled "China Delivers Its Famous Wing Loong II Combat Drones to Another African Country in Growing Challenge to America's MQ-9 Reaper" by Olamilekan Okebiorun.

Nigeria, Morocco, and Algeria previously received China's Wing Loong II combat drones.  It is a lower cost alternative to the US-produced MQ-1 Predator and the MQ-9 Reaper drones.  

Chinese Fishing Fleet Charged with Illegal Activity in West African Waters

Modern Ghana published on 14 August 2026 an article titled "Illegal Chinese Fishing: Africa Must Stop Taking the Bait" by Mustapha Bature Sallama. 

China's refusal to sign the Mombasa Declaration is an admission that its deep-sea fishing fleet is engaged in illegal practices.  China is gradually expanding its footprint in African waters, at the risk of permanently endangering the economic sovereignty of coastal states.  

African Solar Manufacturing May Not Compete with Chinese Imports

 The Associated Press published on 8 August 2026 an article titled "Africa Wants More Homegrown Solar to Boost Self-Reliance, but China's Shadow Remains" by Allan Olingo and Chan Ho-Him.

Several African countries are building more domestic solar manufacturing capacity, but they face competition from China's dominant global role in making solar cells and other components.  Africa is a perfect market for China's overcapacity in this sector.

China and South Africa to Share Nuclear Waste Experiences

 SABC News posted on 4 August 2026 an article titled "SA Moves to Complete R2 Billion Radioactive Waste Management Facility."

South Africa's National Radioactive Waste Disposal Institute signed a memorandum of understanding with the China National Nuclear Corporation to work together and share experiences.  

Russia-South Africa Relations: It's Complicated

 The South African Institute of International Affairs recently posted a 16-minute podcast titled "South Africa and Russia: It's Complicated."

The Russia-China relationship generates uncomfortable headlines today.  It is based on the strong anti-apartheid position of the Soviet Union.  In addition, Vladimir Putin and former South African President Jacob Zuma solidified the ties.

Russia's invasion of Georgia, Crimea, and Ukraine complicated the relationship.  South Africa fell back on a policy of non-alignment.  By 2022, there was confusion in Pretoria concerning policy towards Russia.

Today, South Africa-Russia trade is negligible and Russian investment in the country is modest.  South Africa and Russia, both members of BRICS, agree on the need to revise the world order but not much else.  

Sub-Saharan Africa Little Affected by Trump's New Tariffs

 The New York Times published on 24 July 2026 an article titled "New Tariffs as Old Ones Expire: The Latest on Trump's Trade War" by Tony Romm, Edison Wu, and Lazaro Gamio.

On 24 July, the Trump administration imposed new duties on imports from more than 80 countries as previous 10 percent global duties expired.  The new tariffs range between 10 and 12.5 percent.  

All five countries in North Africa now face the 12.5 percent tariff but sub-Saharan Africa seems to benefit from the new situation as only Nigeria, Angola, and South Africa are impacted--all at the 12.5 percent rate.    

South Africa and China Deepen Artificial Intelligence Partnership

 The South African Government News Agency posted on 20 July 2026 a press release titled "South Africa, China Deepen AI and Science Partnership at Global Summit."

South Africa and China recently agreed to expand cooperation in the fields of artificial intelligence, joint research centers and laboratories, space science and astronomy, quantum computing, cybersecurity, and the Young Scientists Exchange Program.  

China-Africa Trade First Half 2026

 Thierry Pairault just posted a paper titled "The Tariff Exemption Saga and the Results for the First Half of 2026."

China's zero tariff policy for all countries in Africa except Eswatini took effect on 1 May.  During the first half of 2026 Africa's trade deficit with China widened from $44.7 billion to $57.9 billion as of the end of the first half of 2026 compared with the first half of 2025.  Chinese exports to Africa rose by 21.8 percent and imports from Africa by 16.3 percent compared with the same period in 2025.

Eight African countries (South Africa, DRC, Zambia, South Sudan, Nigeria, Chad, Algeria, and Zimbabwe) accounted for about 94 percent of the increase in Chinese imports from Africa during this period.  Almost the entire increase in the value of African exports to China was due to the shock in world commodity prices, largely independent of the zero-tariff policy.  

China Aims to Take Lead on Artificial Intelligence in Global South

 CNBC published on 17 July 2026 an article titled "Xi Pitches China as AI Partner to Developing World, Warns Against Risks and Security Overreach" by Lim Hui Jie.

China is reaching out to various blocs of nations in the Global South to build partnerships concerning AI.  The blocs include ASEAN, African Union, League of Arab States, and the BRICS.

Aljazeera published on 17 July 2026 an article titled "China's Xi Jinping Launches New AI Alliance: What Is It?"

Beijing is casting itself as a leader of the global AI order, challenging the position of the United States.  China announced last week a coalition of 29 nations called the World Artificial Intelligence Cooperation Organization (WAICO) with a headquarters in Shanghai.  Founding members include South Africa and Senegal.

In the meantime, Washington is retreating from global cyber and AI norms-setting processes and withdrawing its financial backing for cyber diplomacy more broadly.

China-South Africa Supply Chain Issues

 The Foreign Policy Research Institute published on 16 July 2026 an article titled "Beyond the Supply Chain: South Africa's China Dilemma" by Raghvendra Kumar.

The question facing South Africa is whether China's evolving supply chain diplomacy is designed to support Pretoria's fair and equitable participation or to reinforce Beijing's own geoeconomic priorities.  South Africa is China's largest trading partner in Africa, but it runs a large trade deficit with Beijing.  

The author concludes that South Africa's relationship with China will be successful only if Pretoria retains control over its critical infrastructure, strategic industries, and foreign policy choices.  

African Views of the US vis-a-vis China Fall Since Beginning of Trump Administration

 The Pew Research Center published on 15 July 2026 research results titled "People in Many Countries Now View China More Positively than the U.S." by Jonathan Schulman, Laura Silver, Laura Clancy, and William Miner.

Pew surveyed public opinion of the United States and China in 36 countries, including 4--South Africa, Kenya, Nigeria, and Ghana--in Africa.  Since the beginning of the Trump administration, positive perceptions of the United States in the 4 African countries vis-a-vis China have fallen, although the US still maintains a slight lead in Ghana. 

Positive views of the United States and China today are: 

South Africa: 35 percent for the US and 52 percent for China

Nigeria: 63 percent for the US and 78 percent for China

Kenya: 63 percent for the US and 76 percent for China

Ghana: 68 percent for the US and 64 percent for China

When asked if they are confident Donald Trump or Xi Jinping will do the right thing, the results were:

South Africa: 26 percent for Trump and 46 percent for Xi

Kenya: 63 percent for Trump and 73 percent for Xi

Ghana: 54 percent for Trump and 56 percent for Xi

Nigeria: 65 percent for Trump and 62 percent for Xi

  

The Kremlin's Long Game in Africa

 The Hudson Institute published on 4 July 2026 an analysis titled "The Kremlin's Long Game in Africa" by Joshua Meservey.

The analysis concludes that the Kremlin seeks to extract outsized benefits from Africa with the limited means it can deploy.  The nature of this engagement will change only when there is meaningful political transformation in Russia.

Chinese Surveillance Patent for South African Policing Raises Questions

 China-Africa Security Radar published on 13 July 2026 an article titled "Why This Chinese Surveillance Patent Matters for Africa's Future Policing Models."

South Africa granted a Chinese public security technology company with close ties to state security institutions a patent for algorithmic policing that could potentially shape the future of policing in Africa.  The patent is for mapping relationships between people using digital traces, including text and social media.  The rise of digital authoritarianism across parts of Africa raises the possibility for abuse of this technology.  

South Africa and China Sign Agreement to Expand Trade

 Further Africa published on 30 June 2026 an article titled "South Africa and China Sign Rules Pact to Unlock Zero-Tariff Trade Opportunities."

South Africa and China signed a memorandum of understanding (MOU) aimed at converting China's zero-tariff treatment for African exports into practical commercial opportunities for South African businesses.  Because tariff preferences alone do not guarantee market access, the MOU deals with technical regulations, standards, product certification, inspection procedures, and conformity assessment systems.  The agreement signals a broader strategic deepening of South Africa-China trade.

US-China Space-based Competition in Africa

 Space News published on 22 June 2026 a commentary titled "America Is About to Cede Africa's Space Industry to China, and Nobody's Talking About It" by Philip Dackiw.  

As China advances its own space program, there is still an opportunity for US companies to forge space-based partnerships in Africa, which is looking at significant space-focused technological expansion.  If the US does not seize this opportunity, China will.  

Chinese Finance and Critical Mineral Access in Africa

 Boston University's Global Development Policy Center published in June 2026 a paper titled "Development Quid Pro Quo: Chinese Finance and Critical Mineral Access in Africa" by Congyi Dai.

The paper explores whether China's development finance agenda is motivated by its global quest for natural resources, facilitating mine acquisitions in Africa.  It uses four data sources to examine whether Chinese development finance is tied to the pursuit of critical minerals.

The paper concludes that minerals needed for clean energy technologies such as copper, cobalt, nickel, and platinum group metals are associated with Chinese loan commitments to recipient countries.  Specifically, uranium is the mineral most strongly linked to Chinese development projects, particularly those including a substantial grant component and highly concessional repayment terms.

China Leads Electric Vehicle Sales in Africa

 IntelliNews posted on 3 June 2026 an article titled "China's BYD Captures 35% of Africa's EV Market, as Latecomer Rival Tesla Bets on Morocco" by Brian Kenety.

Chinese automaker BYD Company Ltd. increased its African market share for electric vehicles (EVs) to 35 percent in 2025, up from 4 percent two years ago.  Tesla is trying to break into the African market by focusing on Morocco.

South Africa Tightens Controls on Certain Chinese Imports

 Africa Business Insight published on 29 May 2026 an article titled "South Africa Tightens Controls on Chinese Imports to Protect Local Industry" by Nana Oye Ankrah.

South Africa is introducing stricter controls on certain Chinese imports to curb the influx of low-cost and non-compliant products that undermine domestic production.  South Africa is also taking these steps to balance trade with China, which consistently maintains a large surplus.

Communist Party of China Deepens Ties with Six Ruling Parties in Southern Africa

 The Respondents posted on 20 May 2026 an article titled "CCM, China's CPC Deepen Ties with Southern African Liberation Parties."

Tanzania's ruling Chama Cha Mapinduzi hosted a meeting with the head of the International Department of the Communist Party of China and senior leaders from the ruling political parties in Mozambique, Angola, Namibia, South Africa, and Zimbabwe.  The parties launched the Research Centre for Xi Jinping Thought on Socialism with Chinese Characteristics for a New Era. 

Likely Impact of China's Zero Tariff Policy on African Imports (in French)

 GeopoWeb posted on 18 May 2026 an analysis titled "Africa, China, and Zero Tariffs: A Diplomatic Gesture Put to the Test by the Data" by Thierry Pairault.  

Effective on May 1, China began a policy of zero tariffs on imports from all African countries except Eswatini, which recognizes Taiwan.  Six African countries (South Africa, DRC, Angola, Guinea, Zambia, and Congo Brazzaville) now supply three quarters of China's imports from Africa.  Most of these imports consist of minerals, metals, and crude oil, which already enter China duty free.

A modest quantity of African agricultural products will benefit from the zero-tariff policy.  Landlocked African countries, which tend to be among the poorest, will receive little or no benefit from the zero-tariff policy because of transportation constraints.  In addition, non-tariff barriers such as sanitary standards remain in effect.  Thierry identifies several other barriers to increased African exports to China that will limit the impact of the zero-tariff policy.  He also compares the impact of EU and Chinese imports from Africa.

Thierry concludes the zero-tariff policy has less to do with rebalancing trade between China and Africa than it is an effective diplomatic tool at little cost to China but also limited in its economic impact.