Chinese Company Acquires Stake in Ethiopian Gold Mine Near Sudan War Zone

The Middle East Eye published on 19 August 2026 an article titled "UAE-backed Chinese Company Acquires Stake in Ethiopian Gold Mine Near Sudan War Zone" by Zecharias Zelalem and Oscar Rickett.

Last week, Canadian mining company Allied Gold sold a 9.2 percent stake to China's Zijin Gold International.  This gives Zijin partial ownership of mines in Mali, Cote d'Ivoire, and near Kurmuk in Ethiopia. The Kurmuk mine is in Ethiopia's Benishangul-Gumuz region, which hosts at least one base used by Sudan's paramilitary Rapid Support Forces (RSF).  The UAE supports the RSF and is the main buyer of gold coming from both Sudan and Ethiopia.  

The UAE's sovereign wealth fund has a major share in the parent company of Zijin Gold International and in Canada's Allied Gold.  The Ethiopian gold mine puts Chinese, Canadian, and UAE interests close to the civil war between the RSF and the Sudan Armed Forces in Sudan's Blue Nile State and raises further questions about the UAE's role in the conflict.   

The Decline of France in Africa's Sahel and Rise of China

 The Foreign Policy Research Institute published on 29 July 2026 an article titled "How France's Fall Signals China's Rise in the Sahel" by Raghvendra Kumar.

China has seized on the decline of French and Western influence in Africa's Sahel to embed itself into the region's political, economic, and security structures.  The article pays particular attention to China's role in Burkina Faso.  

China Increases African Agency vis-a-vis the West

 African Arguments posted on 13 August 2026 a commentary titled "The Beijing of It All: Africa's Development Terms Are No Longer Written in Washington or Brussels" by Wanjiku Wanjohi.

Political conditionality associated with Western aid is giving way to a new framework established by China.  China describes its interaction as a partnership based on non-interference and rapid delivery of development projects.  As a result, Africa now has meaningful alternatives and greater negotiating power.

Comment:  While Chinese loans and assistance do not come with the baggage of political conditionality, they do have economic conditionality.  For example, Chinese loans and projects must be implemented by Chinese companies, usually state-owned ones.  

Drones Are Becoming Weapon of Choice in African Conflicts

 Foreign Affairs published on 26 June 2026 an article titled "Who Is Winning Africa's Drone Wars?" by Nate Allen and Rida Lyammouri.

Inexpensive drones are fast becoming the weapon of choice in African conflicts.  They are being deployed by both governments and insurgent groups.  China is now Africa's largest supplier of drones, accounting for a quarter of those procured.

Foreign drones have turned African conflicts such as the civil war in Sudan into destabilizing proxy wars.  At least eleven African countries now produce drones including Kenya, Nigeria, South Africa, and Morocco.

The West Should Take No Comfort from Russia's Failure in Mali

 The National Interest published on 9 July 2026 an article titled "The Lessons of Mali" by Brendon Sanders.

Both Western and, more recently, Russian counter terrorism efforts in Mali have failed.  But the West should take no comfort from Russia's inability to deliver stability in the Sahel region.  

Russian Convoy Attacked in Northern Mali

 France 24 posted on 9 July 2026 an article titled "Mali Rebels Attack Convoy of Russian Reinforcements Headed to Besieged Military Camp."

Tuareg separatists and their jihadi allies attacked on 9 July a convoy of Russian paramilitaries from the Africa Corps and Malian soldiers as they were moving to Anefis in northern Mali.  The report provides no details on casualties.  

The Associated Press posted on 10 July 2026 an article titled "Mali's Military Says It's Broken a Rebel Blockade Around a Strategic Northern Base."

After heavy fighting, the convoy reached Anefis between the rebel-controlled town of Kidal and Gao to the south, which is under the control of the military government.

Russia Confirms Military Support for Three Sahel Countries

 Reuters published on 9 July 2026 an article titled "Russia and Sahel States Deepen Military Ties as Insurgent Attacks Persist."

Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov met with his counterparts from Mali, Burkina Faso, and Niger to discuss growing military cooperation with the three Sahel countries.  Russia confirmed its intention to strengthen the armed forces of the three countries.

Video Critical of Russia's Engagement in Mali

 Warfronts posted on 6 July 2026 a 14-minute video titled "This Country Trusted Russia--Then It All Fell Apart" with Simon Whistler.

This is a highly critical account of Russia's Wagner Group and Africa Corps engagement with the Mali military in an effort to prop up the military government.  

African Sesame Exports and China's Zero Tariff

 Thierry Pairault published on 30 June 2026 an article titled "The African Sesame Industry and the Chinese Tariff Exemption."

China obtains from Africa more than 80 percent of its imported sesame seeds.  Six countries account for 95 percent of African sesame exports to China: Niger, Sudan, Tanzania, Togo, Mozambique, and Ethiopia.

China's recent zero tariff policy for African countries will primarily benefit Chinese importers-processors rather than African producers.  The tariff advantage is captured at the point of entry into China by companies whose shareholders are Chinese, Singaporean, and Taiwanese.  

"Russian Houses" in Africa Lure Recruits for Ukraine War

 Euro News posted on 18 June 2026 an article titled "Moscow Uses 'Russian Houses' in Africa to Lure Recruits into War in Ukraine, Investigation Shows" by Sasha Vakulina and Aleksandar Brezar.

Moscow is operating or opening "Russian Houses" in at least 22 African countries as part of its strategy to consolidate its influence on the continent.  The centers screen Soviet and Russian films, often on patriotic themes, and distribute ideologically vetted literature.  They also teach the Russian language and coach young people on how to move to Russia as students or workers.  

Ukraine's military intelligence has done an investigation that identifies Russian Houses as key hubs for recruiting Africans to go to Russia where they eventually end up on the front lines of the war against Ukraine.  Ukraine's Ministry of Foreign Affairs reports that at least 2,965 citizens from 36 African countries have taken part in combat on Russia's side.  

Africa's Drone Wars

 Foreign Affairs published on 26 June 2026 an article titled "Who Is Winning Africa's Drone Wars?" by Nate Allen and Rida Lyammouri.

Conflicts in Mali, Somalia, Libya, Ethiopia, Sudan, Burkina Faso and Niger have experienced or continue to experience the use of armed drones.  Increasingly, insurgent groups are making as effective use of drones as national armies.  China, Turkey, and Iran provide most of the drones, but at least 11 African countries now produce them.  

Russia's Most Capable Drone Spotted in Mali

 Military Africa published on 19 June 2026 an article titled "Orion Drone Sighted over Bamako as Russia's Air War in Mali Deepens" by Ekene Lionel.  

Russia's advanced Orion drone has been sighted flying over Bamako, Mali's capital.  Its most capable, unmanned strike platform, it suggests Russia is stepping up its battle against jihadi groups in Mali.  

What Is Russia's Africa Corps Mandate in Mali?

 The American Security Project posted on 22 May 2026 a commentary titled "What the Mali Offensive Reveals about Russia's Partnerships in Africa" by Thomas Ullman.  

Questions about Russia's role in Mali increased when its Africa Corps retreated last month from a key city to the north of the capital.  A French journalist suggested that Russian forces considered defending the capital of Bamako to be their sole obligation, regardless of what happened elsewhere.

Russia's Drone War in Mali

 Military Africa published on 4 June 2026 an article titled "Russian Africa Corps Deploys FPV Kamikaze Drones in Mali--But the Sky Is Already Contested."

Russia's Africa Corps is deploying First-Person View (FPV) kamikaze drones in Mali.  They are compact, low-cost suicide drones that have become the defining weapon of modern asymmetric warfare.  The battlefield in Mali has changed as insurgent groups first began using FPV drones and the Africa Corps is scrambling to keep up.  

The Limits of Russia's Africa Corps

 The Soufan Center, a New York-based nonprofit organization, published on 12 May 2026 a commentary titled "The Limits of Russia's Africa Corps: Mali and the JNIM-FLA Offensive."

Coordinated attacks by al-Qaeda's Sahelian affiliate, Jama'at Nusrat al-Islam wal-Musliman (JNIM), and the Tuareg-dominated separatists, the Azawad Liberation Front (FLA), have highlighted the limited capabilities of the Malian junta and its Russian mercenaries, the Africa Corps, to fend off the insurgency.

Russia's engagement in Mali also raises the question whether it has the resources to counter a genuine insurgency or if it is only in the country to ensure the survival of the military junta.  

Algeria Serves as Hub for Russian Military Flights

 Defense News published on 30 April 2026 an article titled "Investigation: Russia Shadow Airlines Use Algeria as Base for Secretive Missions" by Linus Holler.

A fleet of Russian military-affiliated cargo aircraft is using Algeria as a hub to project Russia's power deeper into Africa and as far as Latin America.  In return, Algeria is receiving Russia's latest fighter aircraft.  

Mali Exposes the Limits of Russia's Expeditionary Warfare Model

 The Robert Lansing Institute published on 11 May 2026 an analysis titled "Russia's Setback in Mali: Intelligence Failures, Strategic Limits, and the Failure of Moscow's Africa Project."

Russia's Africa Corps retreat from Kidal in Mali exposed Moscow's operational fragility and weakened the mythology of Russia's expeditionary effectiveness.  Russia relied too heavily on coercion without sufficient understanding of local ethnic, tribal, and political realities.

Mali demonstrates Russia may struggle to control large territories, defeat insurgencies, or maintain durable legitimacy.  It exposed the limits of Russia's expeditionary warfare model.   

How Russia Lures Africans to Fight in Ukraine

 The New York Times published on 4 May 2026 an article titled "'The Death Zone': How Russia Is Luring Africans to Ukraine" by Matthew Mpoke Bigg, John Eligon, and Zimasa Matiwane.

An estimated 1,000 Kenyans went to Russia and ended up in the war against Ukraine.  Only 30 have returned to Kenya alive.  In addition, South Africa, Tanzania, Zambia, Nigeria, Ghana, Togo, Botswana, Mali, and Cameroon have reported men being falsely recruited into the Russian army.  

Russian Troops Forced to Abandon Base in Northern Mali

 Africa News published on 1 May 2026 an article titled "Rebel Alliance Seizes Key Tessalit Military Camp in Northern Mali."

Tuareg separatists and jihadists have forced the evacuation of Tessalit military base near Mali's northern border with Algeria.  Troops from Russia's Africa Corps and Malian soldiers fled south.

Mali on the Edge; Russian Forces Retreat

 The Washington Post published on 30 April 2026 an article titled "Mali's Junta Asked Russians to Bring Order. Militants Just Stormed In" by Rachel Chason.

Mali's military junta turned to Russia to help in quelling an Islamist insurgency.  But in the five years since the arrival of Russian mercenaries with the Wagner Group and subsequently with the Africa Corps, the militants have gained strength, and Mali is now teetering on the edge of collapse.