The Associated Press published on 30 July 2026 an article titled "Child Soldiers Recount Horrors of Sudan's War and Presence of Colombian Mercenaries" by Sam Mednick, Isabel Debre, and Astrid Suarez.
Sudan's paramilitary Rapid Support Forces (RSF) have conscripted child soldiers, some of whom have been trained by Colombian mercenaries. The UAE allegedly recruited the Colombians to fight alongside the RSF.
The National Interest published on 9 July 2026 an article titled "The Lessons of Mali" by Brendon Sanders.
Both Western and, more recently, Russian counter terrorism efforts in Mali have failed. But the West should take no comfort from Russia's inability to deliver stability in the Sahel region.
France 24 posted on 9 July 2026 an article titled "Mali Rebels Attack Convoy of Russian Reinforcements Headed to Besieged Military Camp."
Tuareg separatists and their jihadi allies attacked on 9 July a convoy of Russian paramilitaries from the Africa Corps and Malian soldiers as they were moving to Anefis in northern Mali. The report provides no details on casualties.
The Associated Press posted on 10 July 2026 an article titled "Mali's Military Says It's Broken a Rebel Blockade Around a Strategic Northern Base."
After heavy fighting, the convoy reached Anefis between the rebel-controlled town of Kidal and Gao to the south, which is under the control of the military government.
Warfronts posted on 6 July 2026 a 14-minute video titled "This Country Trusted Russia--Then It All Fell Apart" with Simon Whistler.
This is a highly critical account of Russia's Wagner Group and Africa Corps engagement with the Mali military in an effort to prop up the military government.
The American Security Project posted on 22 May 2026 a commentary titled "What the Mali Offensive Reveals about Russia's Partnerships in Africa" by Thomas Ullman.
Questions about Russia's role in Mali increased when its Africa Corps retreated last month from a key city to the north of the capital. A French journalist suggested that Russian forces considered defending the capital of Bamako to be their sole obligation, regardless of what happened elsewhere.
Aljazeera published on 14 May 2026 an article titled "Zimbabweans Lured into Russia's War as Families Plead for Their Return" by Enos Denhere.
This is a detailed account of the process Russia uses to recruit Zimbabweans, especially those who went to South Africa and failed to find employment, to fight on Moscow's side in the war against Ukraine. In many cases, recruiters used deception and false promises to lure the Zimbabweans.
The Soufan Center, a New York-based nonprofit organization, published on 12 May 2026 a commentary titled "The Limits of Russia's Africa Corps: Mali and the JNIM-FLA Offensive."
Coordinated attacks by al-Qaeda's Sahelian affiliate, Jama'at Nusrat al-Islam wal-Musliman (JNIM), and the Tuareg-dominated separatists, the Azawad Liberation Front (FLA), have highlighted the limited capabilities of the Malian junta and its Russian mercenaries, the Africa Corps, to fend off the insurgency.
Russia's engagement in Mali also raises the question whether it has the resources to counter a genuine insurgency or if it is only in the country to ensure the survival of the military junta.
Foreign Policy published on 5 May 2026 an article titled "Russia's Africa Recruitment Web Is Expanding" by Maurice Oniang'o, a Kenyan journalist.
This article looks across Africa at Russia's successful program to recruit, usually based on disinformation, men to come to Russia for work but are then given minimal military training and sent to the front lines in the war against Ukraine.
The New York Times published on 4 May 2026 an article titled "'The Death Zone': How Russia Is Luring Africans to Ukraine" by Matthew Mpoke Bigg, John Eligon, and Zimasa Matiwane.
An estimated 1,000 Kenyans went to Russia and ended up in the war against Ukraine. Only 30 have returned to Kenya alive. In addition, South Africa, Tanzania, Zambia, Nigeria, Ghana, Togo, Botswana, Mali, and Cameroon have reported men being falsely recruited into the Russian army.
Africa News published on 1 May 2026 an article titled "Rebel Alliance Seizes Key Tessalit Military Camp in Northern Mali."
Tuareg separatists and jihadists have forced the evacuation of Tessalit military base near Mali's northern border with Algeria. Troops from Russia's Africa Corps and Malian soldiers fled south.
The Washington Post published on 30 April 2026 an article titled "Mali's Junta Asked Russians to Bring Order. Militants Just Stormed In" by Rachel Chason.
Mali's military junta turned to Russia to help in quelling an Islamist insurgency. But in the five years since the arrival of Russian mercenaries with the Wagner Group and subsequently with the Africa Corps, the militants have gained strength, and Mali is now teetering on the edge of collapse.
The Sentry published in April 2026 a study titled "Doubling Down: Russia's Military Network in West Africa."
Russia's Wagner Group withdrew from Mali in June 2025, largely handing over operations to the Kremlin-controlled Africa Corps, which has about the same number of troops as Wagner and many of them are former Wagner fighters. Some core leadership also remains the same.
The Africa Corps has been moving a large quantity of weapons into Mali, which suggests that Russia is doubling down on Mali, despite the concurrent withdrawal and multiple failures of the Wagner Group.
Global Issues posted on 20 April 2026 an article titled "Russia's African Cannon Fodder" by Andrew Firmin.
The article reviews Russia's program to recruit Africans, often based on disinformation, to fight for Moscow in its war with Ukraine. The top African countries for providing mercenaries to fight in Ukraine are Egypt, Cameroon, and Ghana.
Africa News published on 7 April 2026 an article titled "War in Ukraine: Cameroon Confirms Death of 16 Nationals Enlisted in Russian Army" by Sarah Miansoni.
Cameroon's Minister of External Affairs confirmed the death of 16 of its nationals fighting for Russia in its war against Ukraine.
APA News published on 26 March 2026 an article titled "Over 80 Zimbabweans Lured into Russia-Ukraine War, 15 Killed."
Zimbabwe accused Russia of fraudulently recruiting its nationals to fight in the war with Ukraine. Fifteen Zimbabwe nationals have died in the war and the government in Harare is working to repatriate 66 others.
The National Interest published on 11 March 2026 an article titled "Why African Leaders Are Beginning to Speak Out Against Russia" by Thomas Kent.
African leaders are increasingly speaking up about a pattern in which paid recruiters in Russia and Africa coax young men to come to Russia with promises of civilian jobs or training. Once they arrive, they are urged or forced to join the Russian Arny and are then sent to the frontlines in Ukraine.
The Associated Press published on 5 March 2026 an article titled "Families of Kenya Recruits Duped into Fighting in Russia's War on Ukraine Demand Their Sons Return" by Evelyne Musambi and Vivianne Wandera.
Russia has recruited mare than 1,000 Kenyans to fight in its war against Ukraine, many of them lured under false pretenses. Their family members and the government of Kenya want the Kenyans returned and the practice to stop.
Ghana Web posted on 1 March 2026 an article titled "Two Ugandans Reported Killed in Ukraine-Russia War."
The article indicates that Russia has recruited Africans to fight in Ukraine from Uganda, Kenya, Burundi, DRC, Rwanda, Somalia, South Sudan, Egypt, Cameroon, Ghana, and South Africa.
Comment: This is not a complete list of African countries where Russia has recruited mercenaries.
The Associated Press published on 27 February 2026 an article titled "At Least 55 Ghanaians Killed Fighting for Russia in Ukraine War, Minister Says."
Ghana's foreign minister commented on 27 February that at least 44 Ghanaians have died fighting for Russia in Ukraine. He added that Russia has lured 272 Ghanaians into the battle since 2022. The foreign minister said Ghana would dismantle all the dark web illegal recruitment schemes.
The Carnegie Endowment for International Peace published on 26 February 2026 a study titled "Russia in Africa: Examining Moscow's Influence and Its Limits" edited by Nate Reynolds, Frances Z. Brown, Frederic Wehrey, and Andrew S. Weiss.
The study explores Russia's role, its appeal, and its limitations across Africa since the 2010s, drawing on contributions from a range of scholars. It also looks at the agency and interests of African governments and citizens.
Opportunism continues to define Russia's approach to Africa, as Moscow hones a set of tools designed to take advantage of instability and state fragility. African actors can--and do--instrumentalize Russian engagement on the continent and advance their own agency in the relationship. Geopolitical competition in Africa is widening and intensifying as middle powers emerge as important external partners, in addition to traditional powers. The West must evolve its approach accordingly.
These essays point to a complicated and mixed record for Russia in Africa that defies simple characterizations. Russia's influence in Africa has undoubtedly grown, but there are outstanding questions about whether it can translate its gains into stable, lasting relationships; whether its tools and symbolic gestures will gain further traction; and whether it can outcompete a crowded field of external powers that can deliver more than Russia, should they choose to.
